Louisiana State University

LSU Digital Commons
LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses

Graduate School

1999

Curriculum and the Holocaust: Competing Sites of Memory and
*Representation.
Marla Beth Morris
Louisiana State University and Agricultural & Mechanical College

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_disstheses

Recommended Citation
Morris, Marla Beth, "Curriculum and the Holocaust: Competing Sites of Memory and *Representation."
(1999). LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses. 7112.
https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_disstheses/7112

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at LSU Digital Commons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses by an authorized administrator of LSU
Digital Commons. For more information, please contact gradetd@lsu.edu.

INFORMATION TO USERS

This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI films
the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and
dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from any type of
computer printer.
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the
copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations
and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, and improper
alignment can adversely affect reproduction.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete manuscript
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized
copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.
Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by
sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand comer and continuing
from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps.
Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced
xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6” x 9" black and white
photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations appearing
in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to order.

Bell & Howell Information and Learning
300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 USA
800-521-0600

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

CURRICULUM AND THE HOLOCAUST:
COMPETING SITES OF MEMORY
AND REPRESENTATION

A Dissertation
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the
Louisiana State University and
Agricultural and Mechanical College
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
in
The Department of Curriculum
and Instruction

by
Marla Morris
B.A., Tulane University, 1991
M.A., Loyola University, 1993
December 1999

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

UMI Number 9960083

__

®

UMI
UMI Microform 9960083
Copyright 2000 by Bell & Howell Information and Learning Company.
All rights reserved. This microform edition is protected against
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.

Bell & Howell Information and Learning Company
300 North Zeeb Road
P.O. Box 1346
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

DEDICATION
I dedicate this work to Mary Aswell Doll. You have been my mentor, my
friend and constant companion throughout many tough writing moments. You
are a great teacher. I remember sitting in your classroom at Tulane University, in
what you term u pedestrian writing 102," many years ago and thought that you
were the Dewey of Tulane. I remember thinking to myself: here is a progressive
educator, a progressive teacher. That was 1988. Now it is 1999 and I think that
because of your influence and great teaching I have been able to write this most
difficult dissertation. You have taught me more about writing than anyone else.
Yet more than that, you have given me the nurturing that young scholars need.
The Goddesses sent you, of that I am sure.

ii

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to acknowledge the many people who have helped me move
my thinking along over the years. The conversations I have had with all of these
wonderful souls have helped me grow intellectually, emotionally and spiritually.
Without the mentoring of all of these people I would not have been able to write
this dissertation. I would like to thank Ronna Berger, Cathy Binstock, Alan Block,
Deborah P. Britzman, Toby Daspit, Brent Davis, Mary Aswell Doll, William Doll
Jr., Vivus Dorwin Jr., Tibby Duboys, Father Steven Duffy, Elizabeth Ellsworth,
Denise Egea-Kuehne, James Gaffney, Rhoda Gilpin, Lillian Glick, Rabbi David
Goldstein, Shannie Goldstein, Denis Janz, Rosan Jordan, Harisimran Khalsa,
Wendy Kohli, Janet Miller, Petra Munro, Marshall Parks, William F. Pinar,
Elaine Riley, Paula Salvio, Mike Siddoway, Roger Simon, Lisa Snider, Patrick
Slattery, Sally Stiller, Dennis Sumara, Susan Talburt, Andrew Reck, Mary B.
Virre, Cathy Wessinger, Delese Wear, John Weaver.
IN MEMORY
This dissertation is in memory of my father, Meyer Morris, who died
August 22,1999, the very day I finished this work. In your absence you are
present. And yet you are gone. You lived just the way you wanted to. You died
the way you wanted to. And I thank God you died peacefully in your sleep. I
respond to the call to remember you. Anti-establishment to the core. You were
radical and funny, charming and good-hearted. You were the most generous
person I knew. You cut through the trivial and only had profound thoughts,
philosophic thoughts about lived experience. King Lear, Willie Loman and
Sancho Panza were never far from your thoughts. Death does not allow us to
say goodbye. But death isn’t exactly goodbye either. You will be with me in
memory, for I am my father’s daughter. They used to say to me “you are a spittin’
iii

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

image of Mike.” And so I am, in many ways, like you. I look like you, think like
you. But I'm not as radical. I only wish you could have lived long enough to see
me complete my doctorate. And so I honor your memory the best way I know
how. I have devoted my life work to the task of memory, and it is ironic that the
very day I finished my dissertation, August 22,1999, you died. God works in
uncanny ways. I wish I could have told you that I loved you more than anybody,
except Mary-- of course. But I felt that we were soul mates in many ways. You
will be missed. Along with my father, I have written this work in memory of the
following people: George Gabris, Ida Gabris, Irwin Glick, Richard Kendrick,
Sally Morris, Milton Morris, Bea Schwartz, Hershey Schwartz, Hyme Schwartz,
Mary Schwartz, Morris Schwartz, Rebecka Sneiderman, Harry Stiller. And the
six million others.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DEDICATION..............................................................................................ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS........................................................................... iii
ABSTRACT.............................................................................................

vii

CHAPTER
1
CURRICULUM THEORY AND THE HOLOCAUST.................1
General Overview of Study............................................ 11
Education and the Holocaust............................................ 17
2

A PSYCHOANALYTIC HERMENEUTIC................................33
The Vicissitudes of Classical Psychoanalytic
Theory............................................................................... 34
Object Relations Theory................................................... 63
The Limits of Psychohistory............................................ 74

3

REPRESENTATION AND ANTI-SEMITISM....................... 80
Understanding the Notion of Representation................87
Historical Overview of Anti-Semitism..............................97
Effects of Anti-Semitic Representations.................... 115

4

MEMORY AND HISTORY................................................ 121
Collective and Personal Memory............................... 124
Memory, the Unconscious and the Holocaust . . . . 132
The Memory Text of History: The Unconscious and
the Holocaust................................................................ 144
The Vicissitudes of Historiography.............................158
The Vicissitudes of Historical Interpretation
163

5

MEMORY TEXT OF HOLOCAUST HISTORIES................ 167
Perpetrator Histories....................................................... 174
Victim Histories...............................................................196
Bystander Histories.......................................................... 216

6

MEMORY TEXT OF HOLOCAUST NOVELS................
228
Jewish Novels.................................................................. 239
German (non-Jewish) Novels......................................
254

7

UNDER THE SIGN OF DYSTOPIA................................ 277
Remembering Utopianism..........................................
283
The Four Horsemen of Utopianism................................291

v

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

REFERENCES........................................................................................310
VITA....................................................................................................... 344

vi

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

ABSTRACT
Curriculum theory is a call to understanding. My call as a curriculum
theorist is to attempt to understand work around the Holocaust. This study
examines the ways in which the Holocaust gets represented in texts written by
historians as well as texts written by novelists. I argue that memory is the larger
category under which history is subsumed; history is the systematization of
memory. Although historians draw on archives and are constrained by their
discipline, nevertheless they operate out of their own memories. Psychological
transference, repression, denial, projection and reversal shape historians’
memories and therefore determine, to a certain extent, what gets represented in
the first place. Novels around historical events are also forms of memory. Like
the craft of doing history, novel writing is a kind of systematization of memory.
Writers organize, select and narrate. Novel writing, however, is not reducible to
memory; since writers, even if drawing on their own memories, are constrained
by the narrative form. For both historians and novelists, personal memories
function out of sites of psychological transference, repression, denial, projection
and reversal and may therefore determine the ways in which writers construct
the past. When educators attempt to grapple with competing memories and
representations of the Holocaust, they might do so under what I call the sign of a
dystopic curriculum. A dystopic curriculum is one that brings into awareness the
ways in which transference relations with texts influence what it is that historians
and novelists write about, as well as influence researchers’ responses to what I
call difficult memory texts such as the Holocaust. Understanding the Holocaust
is therefore ambivalent and must remain open to tentative interpretations.
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CHAPTER 1
CURRRICULUM THEORY AND THE HOLOCAUST
So the curriculum that we study is the presence of
an absence. Present is the curriculum, the course of
study, the current compliance, general education.. . .
Present is the window. Absent is the ground from
which these figures are drawn, negation and
aspiration. Absent is the laugh that rises from the belly,
the whimper, the song. Supressed is the body count,
Auschwitz. (Grumet, 1988, xiii)
Madeleine Grumet tells us that curriculum is the presence of an absence.
The absence of Auschwitz, the silence around this dreadful memory in my own
educative experience, is like a gaping hole in the heart of memory. Silence
around the Holocaust in my own education has not, however, silenced memory.
In fact, silence has allowed this memory to speak to me in haunting ways. It has
called me out of the site of my unconscious. The repressed has returned. As
Emmanuel Levinas (1996) might say, the other, or the memory of my ancestors,
has “summoned" (p. 6) me.
Grumet remarks that “Absent is the ground from which these figures are
drawn” (1988, xiii). The ground she refers to is that of lived experience, and it is
lived experience that is absented from school life. Erasing lived experience,
erasing human subjectivities in school life, endangers students and teachers
alike because we have no sense of who we are. This absenting erases our
histories, memories and our situatedness. Repressed human subjectivities and
continual erasures deaden. William Pinar warns that “Repression of memory
and history is accompanied by distortions of various kinds, including political,
social, racial, and psychological distortions” (1991, p. 177). The Holocaust is a
memory that has been repressed for me. School was not a place in which I
encountered this memory. Home was not a place that I encountered this
1
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memory either. Hauntings of this memory have emerged because of this
silence. The date was November, 1937. This date marks my mother’s birth.
Exactly one year later, November, 1938, marks the date of Kristallnacht. Efraim
Sicher comments that,
The breaking of crystal obscures any clear
understanding of the meaning of what has happened,
so that meaning itself is not easily recoverable. The
breaking of crystal might therefore be a fit metaphor
for a continuous crisis in the post-Holocaust generation.
(1998, p. 3)
Kristallnacht signifies a turning point in Jewish and German history. Isaiah
Trunk (1979) reminds us that it was immediately after this event that Jews
began to realize that their lives were in danger. Kristallnacht marks the event
after which many Jews committed suicide.
The date of my mother's birth, November 1937, is significant for me. It
situates my family historically at the heart of this crisis. But because my parents
and grandparents are American, they were saved from this nightmare. My
maternal great grandparents had the foresight to leave Austria at the turn of the
century. My paternal great grandparents had the wisdom to leave Russia. But
distant relatives stayed in Europe. However, tracing these distant relatives is
impossible. With the exception of my maternal grandmother, all of my
grandparents are dead.
I ask my grandmother to tell me what she remembers about my family. I
ask her to tell me about my great grandparents. Why did they leave Europe, I
ask. What about the others who stayed behind? She says she does not know.
Tell me about my great grandparents, I say to her. She says my great
grandmother spoke in broken English, she spoke mostly Yiddish. My great
grandfather was president of a synagogue in Pittsburgh. Both of my
2
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grandfathers were religious men. For women, religious ritual, except in the
home, was not thought to be important. This is the extent of the oral history my
grandmother passes down to me. This is all I know about my people.
My parents are secular Jews. I grew up knowing little of my own religious
tradition. Talking about the Holocaust is taboo in my family. No one breathes a
word about it. My older sister tells me that she cannot bare it, she cannot read
anything about the Holocaust, it is just too depressing and too awful. And so the
silence continues into the third generation after Auschwitz. Esther Rashkin,
drawing on the work of Nicolas Abraham and Maria Torok, who are Holocaust
survivors and psychoanalysts, comments that family silences and family secrets
become “suspended within the adult [and are]. .. transmitted silently to the child
in "undigested’’ form and lodge within his or her mental topography as an
unmarked tomb" (Rashkin, 1992, p. 28). “What returns to haunt is the ‘unsaid’
and ‘unsayable’ of an other” (Rashkin, 1992, p. 28). The memory of Auschwitz,
that silent absent presence about which Madeleine Grumet speaks, has
become lodged in my psyche. It is the profound silence, both educative and
familial, that has marked me. The silence has called me toward the other,
toward the memory of the other and toward the other of memory. Emmanuel
Levinas says,
This tie to the Other (autrui) which does not reduce
itself to the representation of the Other (autrui) but
rather to his invocation, where invocation is not
preceded by comprehension, we call religion. The
essence of discourse is prayer. (1996, p. 7)
The invocation I hear, the call of the other of memory, the call of my ancestors,
demands a response. And this response will be a prayerful one. Like Levinas,
James Macdonald (1995) suggests that “theory is a prayerful act.” Thus, I offer

3
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up this study as a prayerful act, as a response to the call of my ancestors, as a
responsibility to my own conscience. I am driven by an ethical imperative to
remember. And this ethical imperative is not marked off from my life in the
academy. As John Dewey (1909/1975) says, “There cannot be two sets of
ethical principles, one for life in the school [or the university], and the other for
life outside of the school" (p. 7). The call to remember is an ethical commitment,
a public testimony of an academic struggling to grapple with the Holocaust. This
commitment is also a private testimony of a third generation Jew after
Auschwitz, as a private testimony to my ancestors.
I have, however, suffered much resistance to thinking about my own
Jewishness and what this Jewishness means against the backdrop of the
Holocaust. I wrote my masters thesis on Christology, the study of who and what
Jesus was. I did not understand fully why I chose this as a masters thesis topic.
At bottom, I felt deeply troubled by the anti-Semitism Christology perpetuated,
but still I was not psychologically ready to embrace my own Jewishness.
Doing curriculum theory, William Pinar (1994) stresses, is most
fundamentally an autobiographical act. Academic work, if it is to progress, must
have something to do with one's own lifework. Thus, it is through curriculum
theory that I have been able to return to myself, I have returned to my
Jewishness. My intellectual and spiritual return to Judaism, to the synagogue, to
shul has not been without difficulty, however. The return and the work on the
Holocaust have sent me back and down into the terrifying depths of the
unconscious. Ten years ago, previous to this return, I plunged into
psychoanalytic-oriented therapy primarily because I suffered from a sense of
numbness. I experienced an uncanny speechlessness. I felt haunted by
phantoms. Some analysts might call speechlessness resistance. And I certainly
4
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resisted these phantoms. Ten years later, during my work on the Holocaust,
these phantoms returned and so too did I to psychoanalytically oriented
therapy.
At the start of my research on the Holocaust I fiercely resisted utilizing
psychoanalytic theory. I did not know why I felt this way. But I suppose I intuited,
at some dimly conscious level, that engagement with psychoanalytic theory
opens one to vulnerability because it unleashes the unconscious. Finally, after
overcoming this initial resistance, I decided that it was psychoanalytic theory as
it intersects with curriculum theory that would help me to untangle issues
around the Holocaust. Many argue that curriculum theory and psychoanalytic
theory are not incompatible (Appelbaum & Kaplan, 1998; Atwell-Vasey, 1998;
Benzaquen, 1998; Britzman, 1998; Gilbert, 1998; Grumet, 1988; Kaplan, 1998;
Pinar, 1991; Pitt, 1998; Robertson & Todd, 1998; Salvio, 1998.) William Pinar
(1991) suggests that “curriculum as a form of social psychoanalysis permits the
student to emerge as a figure, capable of critical participation in a historical
present hitherto denied" (p. 165). Drawing on Pinar's notion of social
psychoanalysis, I offer up what I term a social psychoanalytic hermeneutic to
recover Holocaust memory. I offer up a Holocaust curriculum, a memory text that
lets me speak from my own situatedness.
It is curriculum theory which allows me to recover Holocaust memory
across many registers. William Pinar says, “Curriculum becomes intensely
historical, political, racial, gendered, phenomenological, postmodern,
autobiographical, aesthetic, theological, and international” (1999, xvii). A
psychoanalytic hermeneutic allows me to move across these curricular
registers, to weave through the warp and woof of the educative landscape. A
psychoanalytic hermeneutic is a form of interpretation that allows me to cut
5
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across and cut between these multitudinous sites. Madeleine Grumet (1999)
says that curriculum is “hermeneutic activity [it is an] act of interpretation" (p.
233). Grumet tells us that the “prefix [of the word interpretation] “inter” means
between, and the root is traced to its Sanskrit antecedent, prath~to spread
abroad. Interpretation occurs at the junction of opposites” (p. 233). To move
inbetween curricular sites in broad ways is my task. My task as a curriculum
scholar is not unlike Michel Serres' image of the weaver. Serres says, “one
must find the weaver, the proto-maker of space, the prosopopeia of topology
and nodes, the weaver who works locally to join two worlds that are separated”
(1982, p. 52).
Holocaust scholarship tends to be divided into two worlds: the world of
historical representations and the world of literary representations. William
Paulson (1988) reminds us that C.P. Snow warned against what he called “the
two cultures" (p. 4). “Snow denounced the consequences for intellectual
ignorance of those who live by literature and those who live by science"
(Paulson, 1988, p. 4). I believe, like Snow, that curricularists must find a way to
bridge the two cultures of social science and the humanities, especially when
attempting to interpret the complexities around the Holocaust. However, merely
adding one culture (history) to another (literature) is not my aim, either. My task
is to synthesize these two cultures in ways unique to the discipline of curriculum
theory. A psychoanalytic hermeneutic around different and competing
representations of the Holocaust allows me to cut across curricular registers
that are “intensely historical, political, racial, gendered, phenomenological
postmodern, autobiographical, aesthetic, theological and international” (Pinar,
1999, xviii).The ways in which the Holocaust gets represented tells much about
the ways in which this event will be remembered in generations to come.
6
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Many different kinds of representations around Holocaust memory
abound. Audio-visual testimony, diaries, memoirs, dance, poetry, music, art and
film all represent the Holocaust in important ways. However, I choose to focus
on two kinds of representations, the historical and the literary. History was
always a subject I detested in high school; it seemed interminably boring. It
seemed to be little more than memorizing dates. But in college, history began to
fascinate me. Most of my scholarly papers that have been published, since my
entrance into graduate school, have been historical treatments. Whatever
curricular issue I have grappled with has been treated historically. I feel that
historical representations of the Holocaust are indispensible guides toward
understanding complexities around this event. Of course, historical accounts
are not the most authoritative representations; historians are not the only
keepers of memory. But I suggest that if we are to call ourselves educated
people, we have to know something about the history of this event.
Like history, English was a subject I also detested in high school. It
seemed little more than memorizing plots. But literature, outside of school, has
always been my great love. Without realizing it, I had been collecting Holocaust
novels all during my high school years. In essence, I have been doing memory
work around the Holocaust most of my life.
Doing interpretive work around historical and literary representations of
the Holocaust does not mean that one can get a complete picture of this event.
It does not grant a better understanding than, say, study of audio-visual
testimony or poetry. Studying historical and literary accounts of the Holocaust
offers a particular perspective that enables me to raise broad curricular
questions across many kinds of registers of lived experience. Robin Barrow
(1981) claims that “Education implies breadth of understanding rather than
7
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narrow specialism” (p. 39). And it is a broad picture of the Holocaust that I would
like to paint. However, any understanding of this event is necessarily limited. It
would be arrogant to suggest that an academic, who has never actually suffered
Auschwitz, can really understand after all. In many ways, the Holocaust is
beyond understanding and representation. And yet-cautiously and with
humility-1 proceed. Curricularists can approach the black sun of Auschwitz in
spite of the limits of understanding. If we refuse the call of remembering this
event altogether because of the ineffableness of Auschwitz, we lapse back into
silence. And silence is not the place to which I wish to return. Silence kills.
Evocation, speech, writing, dialogue and prayer beckon. I am driven by
phantoms: the phantoms of the dead, the phantoms of my Jewish ancestors.
A Holocaust education pains. There is no doubt about that. There is no
way to avoid the fear and trembling in the face of Auschwitz. Shoshana Felman
and Dori Laub ask “whether there is a relation between crisis and the very
enterprise of education" (1992, p. 1). A Holocaust curriculum cannot avoid crisis
because it evokes one. A Holocaust curriculum approaches what Deborah
Britzman calls “difficult knowledges” (1998, p. 6). But doing interpretive work
around the Holocaust is not just about acquiring knowledge. Rather, it is about
understanding the event, while standing at the limits of understanding. It is an
understanding that is necessarily aporetic; it is to understand that we cannot
understand. It is impossible, especially for outsiders to this event, to understand
in the same way as a Holocaust survivor. David Geoffrey Smith tells us that,
While standing in the middle of things, interpretive
pedagogy looks to the margins of collective life for
the oracular word of signification... it is exactly at
the boundary of experience.. . where we become
available to that which addresses us. (1999, p. 132)

8
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We know that we cannot understand the event of the Holocaust no matter how
much knowledge we may acquire. Studying historical and literary
representations of Auschwitz does not mean we understand them. Reading
history does not mean we understand it. Reading novels about the Holocaust
does not mean that we understand this event. Still, we understand at the limits
of our own situatedness, at the limits of our own horizon.
It is on the psychological register, though, that understanding suffers
most interference. The aporias of understanding are inextricably tied to the
psychological. The psychological register is complexified by unconscious traces
that emerge in the forms of resistances, repressions, projections, introjections,
reversals and denial. At the outset of my study, I believed that the task at hand
was to get rid of these interferences, because I thought that they thwarted and
distorted interpretations of the Holocaust. However, I came to realize that this
position is not realistic. It presupposes that, at the end of the day, we could get a
close reading of this event without too much psychological baggage. But, as I
dwelled over my own intellectual resistances and emotional struggles with this
material, I realized that this position was naive.
My encounter with the writings of Jean Laplanche (1973; 1985; 1999)
altered my thinking. Laplanche suggests that psychological interferences
always leave traces in the psyche, no matter how much one works through
difficult emotional issues. Some amount of repression remains, no matter how
aware or how conscious one becomes of one’s inner psychic workings. “The
message [of the other or of the text] is partly translated and partly repressed"
(Laplanche, 1999, p. 94). The message of the text and its reception by the
reader undergo repression and interference, no matter how much the reader
thinks she understands the text. Some repression always remains. This
9
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complex interaction between reader and text is guided by an unconscious
transferential relation. The reader transfers her own patterns of perception onto
the text which are marked by a certain amount of resistance, repression and
anxiety.The reader dwells in the liminal space between her own unconscious
transference and the unconscious inscriptions introjected into the text by the
writer. Exactly what it is that transpires between reader and text, at the site of the
unconscious, is not clear. Interpretations which are inadequate are symptomatic
of too much repression. An adequate translation lifts repression as much as
possible, but traces of repression remain.
Laplanche (1999) stresses that translations of an analysand by an
analyst should leave intact the otherness of the analysand. I argue, drawing on
Laplanche, that translations of Holocaust texts should also leave intact the
otherness, the alterity, of these texts. The complexity of doing interpretive work
emerges as one’s own otherness, which is marked by unconscious
transference, co-mingles with the otherness of the text, which is marked by the
unconscious inscription “implanted" (Laplanche, 1999, p. 258) in the text by the
writer. Laplanche (1999) says that at the intersection between self and other,
[and I would add between reader and text] lies an "enigmatic message” (p. 258),
or a “third reality” ( p. 80) that is in some ways beyond translation. I argue that
Laplanche’s notion of an enigmatic message can be applied to studying
Holocaust texts. The alterity of the text, the text as other, the text of the
Holocaust, which is other to itself (as an inscription of the author's unconscious),
and its “implantation” (Laplanche, 1999, p. 258) in the reader (which is the
introjected message) must be maintained. A “failed translation” (Fletcher, 1999,
p. 16) is marked by rigidity. Laplanche stresses that rigid interpretations are
guided by the compulsion to repeat old patterns, old habits of perception. And it
10
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is this that analysts call transference. Laplanche (1999) argues that we cannot,
however, get outside of transference; we cannot get outside of our old patterns
of perception and interpretation. All we can do is work to “loosen” (Laplanche,
1999, p. 258) transference. Madeleine Grumet (1988) suggests that we should
avoid getting “trapped in transference” (p. 117). But perhaps this move is
impossible. We are always already trapped. Thus, it is not a matter of getting rid
of transference, rather, it is a matter of becoming aware of our own habits of
interpretation and translation. We can work to lift repression and resistance
somewhat and become more aware of our intellectual and emotional responses
and trappings, and by doing so I think we can become more open to the alterity
of Holocaust texts.
Historical and literary representations of the Holocaust are determined, in
part, by the ways in which we approach epistemological and psychological
interferences. Psychological resistances to the difficult memory of the Holocaust
may determine what it is that gets represented in the first place. That which is
not-said and not-represented may be absented because of the writers’
resistances and repressions. What it is that historians and novelists choose to
exclude becomes key to what it is they might be repressing.
General Overview of Study
Generally speaking, this study will examine what I call curriculum as
memory text. I will argue that memory is the larger category under which history
is subsumed. History, then, is a systematization of memory. History, though, is
not reducible to memory; for historians, although operating out of their own
memories, draw on archives, documents and testimonies and are constrained
by the discipline of history. Personal memories, perhaps, effect historians'
renderings, but personal memories are different from historical renderings
11
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because they are not constrained in the same ways. Psychological
interferences such as repression, resistance, denial, projection, introjection and
transference shape memory and therefore may determine, to a certain extent,
the ways in which historians select, imagine, deconstruct and reconstruct
documents.
Historical novels are also a form of memory; they are expressions of
memory. Writers organize, select and narrate. Novel writing, however, is not
reducible to memory, since writers, even if drawing on their own memories, are
constrained by the narrative form. Memory seems not to be constrained in the
same way. Although memory is a stream, stream of consciousness novels seem
more tightly woven and constructed than memory itself. Personal memories
operate out of sites of repression, resistance, projection, introjection, denial and
transference and may determine, to a certain extent, the ways in which novelists
select, imagine, construct and reconstruct the past.
I will argue that the writings of historians share certain features with the
writings of novelists. But, at bottom, writing history is not the same as the writing
of historical novels. History shares with literature its narrative and imaginative
form. I maintain that historians construct the past by drawing on memory,
perception and imagination. Historians select and omit events and express their
thoughts by narration. But historians are ultimately constrained by the
methodology of the discipline of history. Novelists, however, do not have to
draw on evidence and are not constrained by any methodology, so their task is
different.
History writing and the writing of historical novels around the Holocaust, if
they are to be considered adequate representations of this awful event, if they
are to do justice to the memory of the Holocaust, might follow Edith
12
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Wyshogrod's (1998) lead, that the “promise of truthfulness" (p. 10) be
maintained. Truthfulness, for me, is not the same as Truth with a capital T. Truth
is nowhere absolute. But truthfulness does justice to the memory of the
Holocaust because it approaches an approximation of this event through many
different perspectives and keeps the alterity and otherness of the event intact.
Whatever truths we may learn about the Holocaust are ultimately limited
because of the enormity and horror of this event.
William Pinar says that “The curriculur task becomes to recover memory
and history in ways that psychologically allow individuals to reenter politically
the public sphere” (1991, pp. 173-174). Recovering Holocaust memory means
that the researcher might be able to become more reflexive and reflective,
marking and re-marking her own responses, resistances, interferences and
repressions around doing this kind of work. Recovering Holocaust memory is
guided by what I call a dystopic curriculum. A dystopic curriculum allows
interferences, otherness, alterity and strangeness to emerge out of the
different sites of representations. Under the sign of a dystopic curriculum,
memories emerge not as a promise of hope, but as a testament to despair and
truthfulness. Following Lawrence Langer (1991), Jeffrey Hartman (1996), Ofer
and Weitzman (1998), I argue against hope. Lawrence Langer says "Tainted
memory seems inconsistent with the rhetoric of hope" (1991, p. 128). I argue
against discourse that “eliminates the noise of otherness” (Edgerton, 1996, p.
57). As Jeffrey Hartman says, “What we generally do is seek a redemptive
perspective to save the good name of humanity... .Yet the Final Solution’s
man-made calamity is exceptionally resistant to such a perspective" (1996, p.
39). Similarly, Ofer and Weitzman point out that there is danger when scholars
attempt to shield readers from the horrors of the Holocaust. They suggest that
13
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the need to find meaning in the events of the
Holocaust, the need to shield the audience from
the worst horror of the Holocaust, and the need to
comfort ourselves with some “redeeming” messagelead to both popularization and banalization. (1998, p. 15)
There is nothing meaningful about Auschwitz; there is nothing about Auschwitz
which is redemptive, salvific or hopeful. The title of the Holocaust film “Life is
Beautiful” signals to me an offensive, trivializing banalization of Holocaust
memory. There was nothing beautiful about Auschwitz. To say that there is, is to
turn suffering into pleasure. It was this that repulsed Adorno (1966/1995).
Similarly, Lawrence Langer (1998) criticizes Judy Chicago’s artwork entitled
Holocaust Project because her message seems to be that there is light at the
end of darkness. Langer suggests that Chicago offers to us a redemptive
memory. But Langer points out that redemptive strategies serve as
psychological defense mechanisms against pain. The film “Tea with Mussolini,"
a comedy about Italy’s complicity with Germany during the Holocaust, is yet
another offensive, redemptive representation which turns suffering into
humor. This has to be the biggest insult of all. Langer comments that we have
inherited “A tradition of avoidance.. . . how much of our language about the
Holocaust is designed to console instead of confront’ (1995, p. 5). Avoidance is
also marked, Deborah Britzman (1998) tells us, in readings of Anne Frank’s
diary which offer up messages of hope and courage. Britzman argues that these
kinds of consoling interpretations reflect psychological resistances and defense
mechanisms that serve to protect against pain. The fact is that Anne Frank died
in Bergen-Belson and there is nothing hopeful or couragous about that.
Britzman says that
If the pedagogy of the diary enacts the educator’s
desire for a rescue fantasy, stable truth, and the
14
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splitting of good and evil through the idealization of
the good object, such strategies preclude the
possibilities of the learner and teacher working
through the ambivalences of their own conflict. (1998, p. 134)
Representations of the Holocaust should not be made comfortable. And this
comfort is what these redemptive strategies offer. But there is nothing
comfortable about the Holocaust.The horrors of the Holocaust demand a certain
psychological readiness on the part of the researcher. Psychological readiness
means that Holocaust representations and responses should not be covered
over with gloss, which serve only to make the strange familiar. There is nothing
familiar about planet Auschwitz.
If Jewish experience in the Holocaust can be made to
“stand for" something else, some “larger human experience"
whether a testimony to the integrity of the moral self,
as in Todorov, or, in the case of Judy Chicago, a
positive statement about the human condition in
general, then the intolerable might seem more tolerable... .
Whatever the intention, the result is to dilute or diffuse
the particularity of mass murder. (Langer, 1998, p. 15)
A dystopic curriculum allows the shadow of the object, the shadow of the
Holocaust, to darken perspectives. But darkening perspectives does not mean
sliding into nihilism. A dystopic curriculum is an ethical one, a response to the
"invocation” (Levinas, 1996, p. 7) of the other. This is a response to “the promise
of truthfulness" (Wyschogrod, 1998, p. 10). A promise of remembering in a
dystopic way. A dystopic curriculum is not unlike what Man Gur-Ze’ev calls a
“counter-education.” Gur-Ze’ev comments that
Within counter-education no room exists for a
positive utopia, and it does not promise collective
emancipation.. . . Counter-education suggests
possibilities for identifying, criticizing, and
resisting violent practices of normalization,
control. (1998, p. 463)
15
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There is nothing emancipating or liberating about doing memory work around
the Holocaust. As Richard Rorty (1991) points out, it is coping with reality that
matters, not solving it or fixing it. Redemptive or emancipating strategies serve
to fix this horrible reality by making it seem less horrible. But as Net Noddings
(1989) stresses, American education moves against the grain of anything that
smacks of suffering or grief. She says,
Education has at least in modern times been
guided by optimism and notions of progress
(notions that are, I think, peculiarly masculine).
Perhaps we should now consider an education
guided by a tragic sense of life. (1989, p. 244)
And it is the Jewish tragedy, a particular tragedy to Jews, around which we
need to attend.
In what way should we attend to this disaster? I suggest educators
approach the Holocaust without repressing grief and suffering, even though
traces of repression will always already affect our work. Paula Salvio calls for
an attending to the other through “empathetic identification.” She says that
empathetic identification, defined as the capacity
for attending to how another person feels rather
than merely imagining ourselves in his/her position,
is a powerful index to the social attitudes of a given
period. (Salvio, 1998, p. 44)
But can we wholly empathize with Holocaust survivors? On the one hand, I can
say that I feel for the survivor; I feel for her suffering and am troubled by it. But,
on the other hand, I can never fully empathize, because I really do not know
how it feels to have suffered Auschwitz. Jonathan Boyarin (1992) cautions
against what he terms the “hegemony of empathy” (p. 86). Empathy might have
“repressive effects,” (p. 87) says Boyarin. He explains that we must become
cautious of the way in which we use the notion of empathy. Boyarin argues that
16
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The hegemony of empathy is an ethic of
obliteration of Otherness. We might say that this
occurs where humanism demands acknowledgment
of the Other’s suffering humanity, but where conditions
do not allow the work involved in what Eric Cheyfitz
calls “the difficult poetics of translation"
that is, where
the paradoxical linkage of shared humanity and cultural
Otherness cannot be experienced, (p. 86)
Empathy can be a move toward making the strange familiar by saying “I
understand what it is you are suffering.” But how can an outsider to the event of
the Holocaust ever understand in an emotional way what this nightmare felt
like? Outsiders to this horrific event will never understand what it was like, or
what it felt like to live and die under the black sun of Auschwitz. If empathy
suggests that your suffering is the same as mine, that the Holocaust survivor’s
suffering is like my own, then empathy is false. Still, a cautious empathy, a
limited empathy, must remain or else we cannot do work on this horrific
memory. A limited sense of empathy must keep the alterity of Auschwitz intact. I
can empathize with the other, but I cannot feel what she feels. I will never wholly
be able to translate her suffering as if it were my own. Her suffering always
remains a stranger suffering than mine. We must always remain strangers to
one another in our grief. The memory of the Holocaust lies at the limits of
understanding, representation and empathy.
Education and the Holocaust
In the field of education, there have been notable contributions to
Holocaust scholarship that I would like to comment on at this juncture. I hope to
demonstrate the importance of some of the work that has already been done in
the field. Although I draw on my predecessors, my work departs from that which
has already been done. I offer up a particular perspective of Holocaust
education primarily because curriculum theory allows me to examine both
17
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historical and literary representations through a dystopic lens guided by what I
term a psychoanalytic hermeneutic.
John Weaver’s (1994) doctoral dissertation entitled Academic Politics:
The Case of Former East German Historians and the Restructuring of the East
German University System concerns the ways in which former East and West
German historians shape memory. Weaver writes that historians together with
government officials in East Germany shaped a particular memory of the
Holocaust which suited their ideological and political agendas. Former East
Germany has only recently, since reunification, begun to come to terms with
their complicity during the Nazi era.
Former West German historians have been attempting to come to terms
with their Nazi past since the end of World War II. Weaver explains that West
German historians embraced what was termed “ Vergangenheitsbewaltigung"
(1994, p. 13). This term means to grapple with loss or to grapple with that which
passed. This term, then, signals that West German historians attempted to
examine what had happened, to examine where Germany had gone wrong.
West German historians, much earlier than East German historians, tried to look
back with a critical edge. Whether or not they were successful is another issue
though. But at least there was a start to examine the past after the war had
ended. Later, Weaver recounts, West German historiography “shifted" (p. 13).
Doppelvergangenheitsbewaltigung signifies grappling with two pasts. Here,
West German historians attempted to grapple with “two dictatorial traditions" (p.
13). These two dicatorial traditions were labeled Fascism and Stalinism.
Fascism in the West and Stalinism in the East needed to be unpacked. Weaver
says that West German historians, unlike their counterparts in the East, claimed
that the “former GDR was just as authoritative and destructive as the Nazi
18
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regime” (p. 13). West German historians always felt that their academic work
was far “superior” (pp. 13-14) to that of East Germans’ work, for at least in the
West historians got a head start in coming to terms with the past. West German
historiography followed trends in the United States and Britain. Political and
military histories were being written alongside cultural histories and the
histories of everyday life, which is termed Alltagsgeschichte.
In contrast to West German historiography, East German historiography,
Weaver explains, tended to become “rigid" (p. 98). Academics and state officials
together decided what kind of history would be considered appropriate. As the
keepers of official memory, historians wanted to be certain that East Germans
would not be implicated in the rise of the Nazi regime. But since the opening of
the Stasi archives, it is now well known that Communists in the East were
complicit with the Holocaust, but they also perpetuated crimes against Jews
even after the end of the war. The memory that these historians created was
covered-over rhetoric that served to conceal the truth. Weaver says that
historians conveniently “pass[ed] over working class collaboration with the
Nazis” (p. 98). Calling this framing of collective memory an “issue of power," (p.
41) Weaver explains
East German historians would meet with SED
[Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands or
the United Socialist Party of Germany] officials
at the party congresses to establish research
agendas. At these congresses, historians would
be given the task of creating history for the East
German State with an emphasis on working class
opposition during the Nazi regime, critiques of the
West German historiographical tradition and the
role of capitalism in the rise of fascism, (p. 69)
The East German government has traditionally only honored Communist
“resisters” of Fascism, while denying recognition that Jews were victims. The
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true victims of the East, according to this ideology, were anti-Fascist resisters,
while Jews remained an afterthought. East Germany not only denied any
responsibility for the Holocaust until 1991, they also denied paying restitution to
Holocaust survivors. In a move of psychological reversal, Jews were seen,
especially by the State, as enemies of Communism, typically associated with
capitalism. East German historians and state officials have claimed, in one way
or another, that the root cause of the Holocaust was capitalism. Capitalism led
the way to Fascism. Although reunification has changed the East German party
line, Jeffrey Peck (1996) is not confident that hard liners had changed their
views. Peck says, “The official disappearance of East Germany, however, does
not make its response to the Holocaust a moot issue. The 40 year history of the
GDR was not erased with the declaration of reunification" (1996, p. 449).
Weaver (1994) points out the ways in which collective memory is produced by
politics and ideology. Academics shape collective memory and can become
complicit in erasing unwanted memory. As we will see later, fiction writers living
in the former East Germany were not free to write anything. Like historians, they
had to comply with the SED mentality or fear accusations of espionage and
arrest. Later, I will discuss Christa Wolf’s (1980) novel called Patterns of
Childhood, which evokes critics’ suspicions that she was offering up a portrait of
heroic East Germans. She suggests that East Germans were victims of Nazism.
But this portrayal omits the fact that the victims of history were Jews, not
Germans. This portayai also omits the fact that East Germans were complicit in
many ways with Nazism.
Weaver’s (1994) dissertation is important because we learn that
collective memory is place-bound. Where we live has much to do with how we
remember the Holocaust. Different places produce different kinds of Holocaust
20
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memory. Bystander countries like the United States and Britain frame Holocaust
memory differently than collaborating countries like France and Italy.
Bystanders and collaborators also produce different kinds of repressed
memories to cover up or cover over their indifference, inaction, apathy, or
outright complicity. Place is indeed an important factor in the work of memory.
In addition to Weaver’s work, Gregory Wegner (1995) also emphasizes
the importance of place around collective memory of the Holocaust. In the
Journal of Curriculum and Supervision, in an article entitled “Buchenwald
Concentration Camp and Holocaust Education for Youth in the New Germany,"
Wegner stresses the emotionally evocative power of doing historical
work on site at the Buchenwald Memorial with high school students. Wegner
tells us that, "Students arriving at Buchenwald from theWeibelfeldschule
stepped into an environment heavily reinforced with the geographical
significance of place. [The students studied].. . . in a building once used as
apartments for SS personnel” (p. 181). Wegner stresses that this high school
history seminar was not just an intellectual exercise, but a real encounter, an
emotional encounter with Germany’s past.The intensity of actually being on the
site at Buchenwald heightened students’ sense of confrontation with the past.
"One student could be heard to ask "why” over and over again as we proceeded
to the upstairs rooms, where corpses were sorted.. . . gold teeth removed"
(p. 183). Downstairs meathooks could be seen. Wegner explains that these
were used to hang Jews. Buchenwald was "attached to a crematorium" (p. 183),
which Wegner says was “one of the darkest and most haunting places” (p. 183).
Before reunification, Wegner writes that Buchenwald Memorial reflected
the anti-Fascist rhetoric common among former East Germans. And so when the
Memorial initially opened to the public, Buchenwald became a memorial to the
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heroes and resisters of Fascism. Carefully “omitted” from the “visitors guides" (p.
175) were stories about inmates who were not Communist. Also omitted was
the story of Buchenwald after 1950. Under Stalinist control, approximately
10,000 prisoners died there. Wegner tells us that “mention of the Soviet Camp
remained strictly forbidden in East German schools" (p. 175).
Like Weaver, Wegner points out how collective memories are inextricably
tied to politics and ideology. The ways in which a memorial is remembered has
much to do with power. The powerful shape memory for public consumption.
After reunification, explanations of Buchenwald have since changed as the antiFascist rhetoric has changed. One of the important points Wegner raises is that
collective memory is not static. Collective memory changes primarily because of
politics.
Historians and novelists are not immune from the politics of memory.
Academic politics influence whether or not one considers legitimate certain
kinds of memory. Academic politics influences whether or not one considers
legitimate literary and or historical representations of the Holocaust. Because
some academics feel that historians are the keepers of memory and represent
authoritative voice of the past, historians’ renderings of the Holocaust seem to
be more legitimate than novelists' renderings. Historians are considered, by
some, to be arbiters of truth and gatherers of hard facts, while novelists are
considered mere dreamers. James Young (1988) writes that this attitude, which
he claims is perpetuated by historians themselves, deligitimates and denigrates
literary representations of the Holocaust. Literary representations seem second
rate, trivial and unimportant. This unfortunate attitude on the part of some
historians, and others inside the academy who relegate the humanites to a
second class status, has done much damage to the ways in which we create
22
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memory around the Holocaust. Literary representations are just as important to
the memory of this event as historical accounts. It is not enough to read
historical representations of the Holocaust. I argue that both historical and
literary representations are crucial and should be read alongside each other.
But the politics of the academy has much to do with what it is we remember and
what becomes more valued as memory.
The politics of memory is what Elizabeth Ellsworth (1997) becomes
concerned about in her book entitled Teaching Positions: Difference. Pedagogy
and the Power of Address. Ellsworth draws on Shoshana Felman’s
interpretation of Claude Lanzemann’s film called Shoah. “The political labor of
memory construction,"( p. 178) writes Ellsworth, turns much on the ways in
which we understand this event. Ellsworth argues that notions of communicative
dialogue, representation and understanding cannot help us fathom that which is
discontinuous, that which moves beyond representation, and that which we
really cannot understand after all. Concepts like communication, dialogue,
representation do not do justice to the memory of the Holocaust, Ellsworth
suggests. These concepts attempt to know too much, attempt to promise too
much. These concepts offer up closure where there is none, truth where there is
none. Ellsworth declares that:
This question (about the Holocaust! is not “about"
truth or establishing warrants for action. The question
is about the necessity, the right, the responsibility of
participating in the ongoing, never completed historical,
social, and political labor of memory construction, (pp. 177-178)
Lanzemann’s film Shoah (1985) “teaches through analytic dialogue, through
the discontinuity and the impossibility of full understanding” (p. 115). Ellsworth
stresses the discontinuity of this event. The discontinuity of this event is not only

23

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

due to differing perspectives of victims, bystanders and perpetrators, but the
discontinuity is also a psychological one. This discontinuity, is because of “the
splitness of my own psyche" (p. 124). And she argues that this splitness is
"beyond any conscious control” (p. 124). Exactly what this split psyche is,
Ellsworth does not elaborate. But I think she is suggesting perhaps that
encounters with Holocaust texts create a split in the psyche because the event
is so hideous. A split off part of the self is a repressed self. And this repressed
self attempts to protect the ego from being overwhelmed.
Ellsworth argues that what we should be concerned about are active
engagements with Holocaust texts, with responses to these texts, and the
aporetic nature of these responses. The consequences of responding to these
texts in a certain way are not clear. We do not know what the implications of our
response will be. Further, Ellsworth wants to "foreground the notion of
performativity" (p. 136). “What has reading performed or let loose in the world?"
(p. 128). What are the implications of our umode[s] of address?" (p. 116).
Ellsworth stresses again that these implications are not clear.
I believe that Ellsworth raises some important questions. She is right to
point out the difficulties and uncertainties that abound when approaching
Holocaust texts. Unsettling our notions of clarity or understanding, Ellsworth is
on target. Representing the Holocaust is not an easy task and many questions
remain about the effects of these representations on readers and researchers. I
also agree with Ellsworth that the notion of response is important. Of course we
must respond to these memories. My own work has emerged from an ethical
sensibility around the notion of response.
Unlike Ellsworth, however, I claim that notions of representation and
understanding, although problematic, do not always lead to closure and or
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certainty. Unlike Ellsworth, I believe that notions of “truthfulness" (Wyshogrod,
1998, p. 10) are crucial in this discussion, especially in light of Holocaust
deniers and so-called revisionists who operate to unwrite the Holocaust
altogether. I argue that we work at the limits of understanding, empathy and
representation. Our perspectives are partial and situated. I suggest that
understanding the Holocaust is always already an ambivalent undertaking.
Representing this event in textual form does not necessarily imply mapping it
onto a corresponding reality. But approximations of truthfulness are key, if our
representations are to be adequate to the memory of the victims and survivors.
Further, I argue that understandings and representations are always already
tenuous because of psychological interferences which guide interpretations.
Ellsworth says that this event is haunted by discontinuties. I draw on the work of
Jean Laplanche (1999) to try to untangle some of the psychological reasons
why this event is discontinuous. Laplanche (1999) says that we have a
“primordial split self (p. 220). The self is split because of the otherness of the
unconscious. The unconscious is not our center, rather it is perpetually and
radically “decentered" (p. 52). Human subjectivity is marked by an “ex-centricity"
(p. 52), because there is no center to the self. The self is a stranger to itself. And
this stranger within, the stranger of the unconscious is what creates a split self.
Extending Ellsworth’s notion of the split psyche, I attempt to draw out in more
detail what the implications of a split self might mean when interpreting
Holocaust texts. Drawing on Freudian, Kleinian, Fairbairnian and Laplanchian
psychoanalytic theory, I hope to raise questions not only about the split seif as it
encounters Holocaust texts, I also hope to raise questions around symbiosis,
internal objects, mental representations, alterity and individuation.Thus.my
study is more grounded in psychoanalytic theory than Ellsworth’s and this
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theory helps me to understand why phantasy, good and bad objects, projection
and transference all play roles in the notion of split selves and why these
notions are relevant to studying the Holocaust. A split off self, a repressed self, a
dissociated self, a detached self, could all have many implications when it is
that self who is trying to untangle responses and “modes of address." The
notion of the split self, though, is complex and demands interrogation.
Like Ellsworth, Deborah P. Britzman (1998), in her book entitled Lost
Subjects. Contested Objects, and the Power of Address, discusses how a
“mode of address"(p. 119) is made complex by approaching what she terms
“difficult knowledges” (p. 119). Like Ellsworth, Britzman suggests that the
Holocaust demands,
A patience with the incommensurability of understanding. .. .
the ways meaning becomes... fractured, broken and lost,
exceeding the affirmation of rationality, consciousness and
consolation, (p. 118)
Like Lawrence Langer (1998), Jeffrey Hartman (1996) and Ofer and Weitzman
(1998), Britzman worries that the very discourse we use to interpret Holocaust
texts may become suspect. Britzman warns against consoling or comfortable
language around “difficult knowledges" (p. 119). She suggests that words like
courage and hope only reflect psychological defense mechanisms that serve to
protect against pain. Britzman draws heavily on the problematics of the
utilization of defense mechanisms and the ways in which these can protect
readers from experiencing pain. “These mechanisms of defense... are key
ways the ego attempts to console itself (p. 119). In my own work, I too draw on
the problematics of defense mechanisms. However, I think my work differs from
Britzman’s because I also worry about the complexities around the notion of
transference and tease out different interpretations around this term.
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Both Ellsworth and Britzman use Holocaust texts as examples of the
ways in which educators might grapple with “difficult knowledges” (Britzman,
1998, p. 119). It seems to me that both suggest pedagogical strategies to cope
with horrors beyond our imagination. Ellsworth (1997) suggests that the Shoah
is “pertinent to all teaching situations" (p. 115). Against this position, I argue that
learning about the Holocaust is not pertinent to all teaching situations; it is only
pertinent to teaching and learning about the Holocaust. I do not think
encounters of the Holocaust are generalizable, nor should they be. The
Holocaust and our encounters with it should not be lumped together with
Hiroshima or Stalinist crimes. There are no universal messages to be drawn. I
argue for the radical alterity and radical uniqueness of this event. Any move
toward comparability is a move which levels the horrors specific to the black sun
of Auschwitz. Comparing Auschwitz to something else denigrates this Jewish
tragedy. My approach also differs from Ellsworth and Britzman because I do not
suggest pedagogical strategies. My work turns on the notion of understanding
and what it means to be an educated person in a post-Holocaust era.The
teaching of the Holocaust will spring from our understanding of it.Curriculum
theory is a call to understanding. In fact, “the field today is preoccupied with
understanding" (Pinar, Reynolds, Slattery & Taubman, 1995, p. 6). I am
interested in examining what it is a curriculum theorist can understand about an
event that is beyond understanding.
In77ie International Journal on Audio-visual Testimony, in a piece named
“The Contribution of Holocaust Audio-Visual Testimony to Remembrance,
Learning and Hope,” Roger Simon (1998) suggests that educators encounter
audio-visual testimony alongside the reading of historical accounts.Simon
argues that testimonies enable one to engage with Holocaust texts in a
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personal way “not limited to abstract and objectified forms of historical
interpretation” (p. 148). Here, the viewer must “respond responsibly" (p. 147).
Like Ellsworth, Simon is concerned about the importance of response. Recall,
for Ellsworth, responding is an ambiguous performative activity because one
does not know beforehand the consequences of one's response. There are
always discontinuites between one’s response and the consequences of
responding in a particular way. Like Ellsworth, Simon (1998) says that
responding to testimony demands “an attending to alterity, to a difference not
easily or ethically reduced to the terms of one's own self-understanding” (p.
147). I agree with Simon here. Like Simon, I argue that the alterity of the text,
the otherness of the text of the Holocaust, must be kept intact.Unlike Simon, I
suggest that this otherness is not only due to epistemological problems, but also
to unconscious traces left or deposited in the text by the other and is co
complexified by my unconscious transferential relation to the text. Although
Simon mentions that resistance to viewing testimony will prevail, he does not
unfold the psychological reasons why this might occur. Again, my
interpretations are grounded in psychoanalytic theory to help unpack some of
these notions like resistance.
Simon suggests that there are two kinds of responses to testimony: the
“spectatorial” (p. 147) and the “summoned" (p. 148). Simon does not privilege
one kind of response over against the other, but he maintains rather that these
are different ways in which one may respond to Holocaust survivor testimony.
The “spectatorial” (p. 147) reception of Holocaust testimony, is a “sensibility
[that] embodies and enacts a capacity to group a given testimony within frames
of understanding which render it intelligible and meaningful" (Simon, 1998 p.
148). It seems to me that the spectator’s perception is marked by distance, by a
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detached and intellectualized engagement. At this level of reception, one could
say that the viewer understands what the survivor says. However, at a deeper
more psychological level, the observer who remains a stranger to this event
cannot understand what the survivor says after all. Radical alterity mitigates
against any clear understanding of what it is the survivor says. I think that
Simon’s spectator who can “make sense" of what she hears, and make
“intelligible" what she sees, admits too much. The spectator's reception, to me,
seems naive.
Drawing on the work of Levinas, Simon suggests that another kind of
reception of Holocaust testimony is what he calls “the summoned” (1998, p.
147). When one feels summoned to hear the call of the other, one engages in a
response which opens toward the listener’s “vulnerability” (p. 148) so as to be
summoned, to open oneself to pain. Like Simon, I suggest that one needs to
embrace a psychological readiness if one wishes to engage in this kind of work.
And I suggest also that it is not just a question of the reader’s or listener's
vulnerability. What is at stake is even more than this. Researchers need to be
prepared for the possibility of being traumatized. Of course, not everyone who
does work on the Holocaust becomes traumatized. And certainly researchers
will not experience trauma in the same ways as Holocaust survivors. But there
are traces of trauma deposited in these texts, deposited deeply from the
unconscious of the writer. The reader’s own unconscious will interact with these
complex psychodynamics and it is almost unavoidable that some sort of psychic
upheaval will occur. The intensity of this psychic upheaval the researcher may
experience has much to do with her own psychic make-up, her family history
and her own personal memory in relation to the black sun of Auschwitz. What
complexifies “intrapsychic trauma" (Roth, 1995b, p. 38) is that it might not
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happen at a conscious level. I will argue that Holocaust texts, because they are
so hideous, cannot be assimilated consciously. And as Freud (1915) pointed
out, what transpires between one unconscious and another (the reader’s
unconscious and unconscious traces deposited in texts by the author) does not
have to pass through consciousness at all. Thus the reading impacts the reader
at the site of the unconscious in uncanny ways. And of course it is difficult to say
when “intrapsychic” (Roth, 1995a, p. 38) trauma will emerge and in what form it
might become manifest. Again, not every reader will experience this, but it is
nearly unavoidable if one is truly emotionally and intellectually engaged with
these difficult memories.
Roger Simon (1998) calls the engagement with Holocaust testimony a
“hopeful project” (p. 141). This is not a “utopian” (p. 141) hope, one that is
pointed toward the future, but a “present” (p. 141) hope. This is a “proleptic”
hope, as Patrick Slattery (1999, p. 30) might say, one that is intertwined in past,
present and future. Simon contends that our very “re-thinking” (pp. 146-147) of
the Holocaust and its necessarily “unsettling” (pp. 146-147) nature, and our
openness to “loss" (p. 149), gives us hope in the continued remembrance of the
Holocaust. Against Simon, Britzman (1998), Langer (1998), Hartman (1996),
and Ofer and Weitzman (1998), suggest that the notion of hope is incompatible
with the memory of Auschwitz. I too argue against hope. I argue for a dystopic
curriculum. A curriculum that is not nihilistic but that is guided by an ethically
sensitive “promise of truthfulness" (Wyshogrod, 1998, p. 10). There is nothing
hopeful about the Holocaust. Lawrence Langer says, “What [do]hope and grace
have to do with a historical episode that ended in mass murder?" (1998, xiv).
In sum, John Weaver, Gregory Wegner, Elizabeth Ellsworth, Deborah
Britzman and Rober Simon have all done noteworthy work on the Holocaust.
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Each of these scholars demonstrates an ethical sensibility. I have learned much
from their work. However, my study departs from what these scholars have done
in many ways. I offer to educators a Holocaust curriculum which is interpreted
through dystopic lenses. Under the sign of a dystopic curriculum, competing
memories (those memories inscribed in historical representations and those
inscribed in literary representations) emerge not as a promise of hope, but as a
testament to despair and truthfulness.
In chapter two I offer up a psychoanalytic hermeneutic that might help us
to understand the complexities involved when attempting to “recover memory”
(Pinar, 1991, pp. 173-174). I will argue that unconscious processes may, in
some way, determine what gets represented as Holocaust memory in the first
place. And I also suggest that unconscious psychological processes guide our
responses to these difficult memories as well.
In chapter three I will examine what I term classical and postmodern
notions of representation and discuss possible psychological effects for Jews, of
anti-Semitic representations of Jewish subjects. I contend that although there
were many reasons that the Holocaust occured, one cannot reduce these
causes to anti-Semitism. Still anti-Semitism played a large role in the rise of the
Nazi era and the Final Solution. Therefore, it becomes important for educators
to grapple with anti-Semitic representations. Because the anti-Semite and the
Jew have interconnected and perhaps symbiotic “representational trajectories”
(Nochlin, 1995, p. 1), it is crucial to reflect on the relations of anti-Semitic
projections and Jewish introjections with these representations.
In chapter four I will unravel some complexities around the notions of
memory and history. I will suggest that memory is the larger category under
which history may be subsumed, although history is not reducible to memory. I
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will show how the discipline of history grew out of literature during the
seventeenth century. It is important to understand the connections between
history and literature. Although history shares certain features with literature, it is
not reducible to it. Like history, I contend that literature is a form of memory, an
expression of memory.
What I term the memory text of Holocaust histories will be fleshed out in
chapter five. Here I will analyze perpetrator, victim and bystander histories. I will
draw on psychoanalytic theory to help understand the complex nature of
responses to the Holocaust.
Chapter six will deal with what I term the memory text of Holocaust
novels. Here I will examine current debates around the very act of writing these
novels. Then I turn to both Jewish and German non-Jewish Holocaust novels.
Again, I draw on psychoanalytic theory to interpret these works.
Chapter seven is entitled Competing Memories under the Sign of a
Dystopic Curriculum. My title is named in memory of Bruno Schultz. Schulz's
(1939/1979) novel called Sanatorium under the Sian of the Hourglass, was
written just a few years before he was killed by the Nazis. Schultz was a Jew, a
teacher, a poet and a novelist whom many consider to have been as great a
writer as Kafka. John Updike comments that Schulz’s "panoramas disclose
themselves... through the lens of memory" (1979, xiii). A dystopic curriculum is
a call to remembrance, a testament to suffering and not a promise of hope.
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CHAPTER 2
A PSYCHOANALYTIC HERMENEUTIC
In order to interpret competing memories of the Holocaust as they are
represented in the writings of historians and novelists, I will draw on
psychoanalytic theory. Psychoanalysis is a form of hermeneutics that offers
insights helpful for understanding complexities around the ways in which we
might psychologically frame memories, especially when these memories are
repressed. As William Pinar suggests, “The curricular task becomes to recover
memory and history in ways that psychologically allow individuals to reenter
politically the public sphere in meaningful ways" (1991, pp.173-174). The task
of recovering Holocaust memory, however, becomes difficult because
researchers are subject to their own resistances, reversals, intellectualizations,
projections and denials. Many kinds of unconscious psychological mechanisms
can alter the way in which we construct and reconstruct memory. A step toward
recovering memory is grappling with our own unconscious responses to difficult
texts. Adequate interpretations of the Holocaust take account of the limits of
interpretation due to psychological resistances. Adequate interpretations must
do justice to victims and survivors. Yet attempts to tell and re-tell Holocaust
memory must be made, keeping the limits of interpretation in mind. Justice is
done if the re-telling approximates truthfulness and keeps intact the otherness
of this memory. But interpreters cannot represent the Holocaust adequately if
they are unaware of their own unconscious psychological resistances and
repressions.
Transferential relations with texts complexify these responses. We
transfer old patterns of perception onto new texts. And these old patterns,
perhaps established in early childhood, shape the ways in which we
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interpret and translate texts. Our awareness of these old habits helps to undo
habitually complacent readings, readings that do not allow for the otherness of
the text to emerge, readings that do not allow for interference, discontinuity and
difference to emerge. Reading Holocaust texts interferes with complacency
because psychic upheavals do not allow for assimilation into consciousness.
These psychic upheavals get introjected into the unconscious and take on a life
of their own.
This chapter will examine Freudian, Kleinian and Fairbairnian
psychoanalytic theory. Freud, Klein and Fairbairn help us raise different
questions that pertain to the ways in which we construct Holocaust memory.
This chapter will also introduce some debates around the ways in which
psychohistorians and psychobiographers have traditionally used
psychoanalytic theory in their work around the Holocaust.
The Vicissitudes of Classical Psychoanalytic Theory
A psychoanalytic hermeneutic is necessarily incomplete and ambivalent.
Addressing Holocaust texts always keeps us at the limits of interpretation. It
would be arrogant to suggest that a psychoanalytic hermeneutic could get it
right or tell the absolute truth about the Holocaust. I want to emphasize that the
call that has addressed me to do work around the Holocaust continually
announces itself in interferences and ruptures. I am continually unsettled. Doing
interpretive work around these texts causes unsettling ruptures in
understanding and ruptures in representation, in working toward understanding
these difficult memories, I realize how little an outsider to this event can
understand. I stand outside this event because I am not a Holocaust survivor
and thus I am always looking at this event through the memory text of others.
At the moment I think I grasp Holocaust memory, this grasp is ruptured.
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Psychoanalytic theory can do only so much to help us understand. Saul
Friedlander remarks that “A successful application of Freud’s notions to history
[or anybody else's notions for that matter] would lead to a partial explanation of
a partial series of events" (1978, p. 5). A psychoanalytic hermeneutic is indeed
a partial explanation. Still, I argue that psychoanalytic notions can serve as
powerful tools of interpretation.
Psychoanalytic theory is not monolithic. Edith Kurzweil comments that
“the fragmentation of psychoanalytic theory proves, among other things, that the
Freudians primarily are united by their profession rather than by their ideas”
(1998, ix). Deter Wyss (1961/1973) categorizes splits in the field of
psychoanalysis as follows: The Freudian school, he suggests, includes
Abraham, Ferenczi, Fenichel. The New York Group includes Hartmann, Kris,
Loewenstein, Erikson, Greenacre, Reich, Reick, Federn, Alexander. The neoFreudians include Adler, Horney, Fromm, Rado and Sulliven. The British Group
includes Glover, Jones, Anna Freud, Klein. The British Group split because of
disagreements between Melanie Klein and Anna Freud. Greenberg and
Mitchell (1983) tell us that the British Group split into the A Group (followers of
Anna Freud), the B Group (followers of Melanie Klein) and the Middle Group
(followers of Winnicott and Fairbairn). Sandler and Sandler (1998), however,
suggest that the A Group includes Kleinians and the B Group “contemporary
Freudians” (ix). Sandler and Sandler refer to the Middle Group as the “Group of
Independent Analysts" (ix). The British Group is known for what is called object
relations theory. Sandler and Sandler (1998) suggest that object relations
theorists include “Margaret Mahler, Rene Spitz, Ronald Fairbairn, Erik Erikson,
Michael Balint, Donald Winnicott, Heinz Hartman, Edith Jacobson, Heinz Kohut,
John Bowlby, Harry Guntrip, Arnold Modell, Otto Kernberg, Wilfred Bion” (1998,
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ix). I would add to these lists post-Freudians like Christopher Bollas, Adam
Phillips, Andre Green, Jean Laplanche, Martin Stanton, Julia Kristeva. PostLacanians might include Bice Benvenuto, Dary Nubs, Filip Geer-a-dyn and
Judith Guruvich (Burgoyne & Sullivan, 1997). Kleinians, Fairbairnians, postFreudians and post-Lacanians agree on little. And interestingly enough, many
of these splits in the field have been caused over interpretations of Freud's
texts. Otto Kernberg (1998) points out that
The interpersonal, intersubjective, and self psychoanalytic
theorists feel that Freud and object relations are incompatible
because it is impossible to reconcile drive theory with
object relations. Conversely, Kleinian Independent
[British Independent Group] and ego-psychology
theorists feel that those theories are compatible, (xvi)
The question around whether or not theories like object relations are
continuous or discontinuous with Freud’s initial project has caused rifts in the
field of psychoanalysis. However, this debate seems misguided because every
new interpretation of Freud’s texts alters his initial intentions, no matter how
continuous or orthodox or close the reading. There is no authoritative or
definitive reading of Freud.
In part, difficulties around Freud’s texts are due to James Strachey’s
English translation of Freud, which is referred to as the Standard Edition of the
Complete Psychological Works of Freud, or simply (SE). Many scholars feel that
Strachey’s translation is the most definitive and authoritative one. Thus,
Strachey’s translation has become the ’’standard" reading of Freud. Scholars’
loyalty to Strachey’s "standard" translation presupposes that, again, Strachey
has got Freud right, that his is the closest reading. But some point out that
Strachey’s translation is skewed and re-presents a Freud which is more
scientific and medicalized than Freud. Use Grubrich-Simitis tells us that
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For the past dozen years or so, James Strachey’s
English translation, as presented in the Standard
Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of
Sigmund Freud, has been the butt of vehement
criticism. The criticism was brought to the attention of
a wider public in 1983 by Bruno Bettleheim’s book essay
Freud and Man's Soul.. . . its author accuses Freud’s
English translations, including of course James Strachey,
of corrupting Freud's humanistic project, set down in
the vernacular... by their scientistic, medicalized
rendering. (1996, p. 11)
The scientistic, medicalized rendering does pose problems for the reader.
Strachey's translation gives the impression that Freud was even more prone to
pathologize and medicalize than he was. Medicalized and scientistic language
also give the impression that Freud’s notions function in a way that reify and
reduce. Notions that medicalize function as a diagnosis for an illness. Illnesses
need to be cured.Certainly this is one way to read Freud.
However, a post-Freudian interpretation of Freud might sound different. A
post-Freudian reading of Freud does not reify notions of self but points to
complexities and ambiguities of self. Christopher Bollas, Adam Phillips, Andre
Green, Martin Stanton, Jean Laplanche and Jacques Derrida read Freud in a
post-Freudian way. These scholars point out the ambivalences of Freud’s texts.
These scholars suggest that the project of Freudian analysis is not to reduce
and pathologize, but to show, in fact, how strange and other we are, even to
ourselves. The point here is not to use Freud to normalize and diagnose, but to
use Freud in order to complexify notions around self and other. Instead of
interpreting Freud as fixing problems and curing illness, Freud can also be
interpreted through the lenses of ambivalence and uncertainty around who we
are as human beings. Ambivalences concerning Freudian notions is something
around which Jacques Derrida has remarked. Derrida comments that,
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Freud never managed to form anything that deserves
to be called a concept.. . . [he offers to us] only an impression,
a series of impressions associated with a word. To the vigor
of the concept, I am opposing here the vagueness or the
open impression, the relative indeterminacy of such a
notion... the unstable feeling of a shifting figure. (1996, p. 29)
The Freudian notion “introjection", for example, is one that is slippery. It is
not something that is easily definable by Freud, or by anyone else for that
matter. Introjection is a vague and shifting impression, as Derrida might say,
pointing toward the ways in which we might internalize significant others into
our psyche. Exactly how or why introjection happens is not clear. Freud
suggests that after the resolution of the Oedipus Complex we introject images of
our parents. How these significant others get internalized remains a mystery.
What it is we do with these internal images is not clear either. And Freud does
not tell us, in any precise way, what it is we do with these internal images. Thus,
a post-Freudian reading of Freud leaves open these kinds of questions. I
suggest that we should use Freud’s notions in a way that avoids pathologizing,
diagnosing or fixing, which reduces and reifies notions around identity and self.
Freud continually revised his texts and changed positions around many
different ideas throughout his life. To say the least, Freud’s texts are bewildering
because of the contradictions, repetitions and reversals readers find throughout
his twenty-four volume masterpiece. Jean Laplanche comments that
It is above all certain large contradictions, traversing
Freud’s work from one end to the other, which must be
interpreted dialectically, either as contradictions of
thought-consequently referable to a certain
“unspoken” dimension-or as contradictions of the
object itself: such for instance, is the case for the major
contradictions inherent in the notion of the “ego,” at
once a totality and a specific agency, a cathected
love object that nevertheless arrogates to itself the
position of a subject. (1985, p. 1)
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Laplanche is right to point out Freud’s “unspoken dimension.” This unspoken
dimension highlights Freud’s own ambivalences around his work. Now these
ambivalences, which result in the many contradictory positions one finds
reading the vast landscape of Freudian theory, can become frustrating for the
reader who wants clarity and certainty, but that is not what Freud's project was
about. And certainly, to dismiss Freud because he tended to be contradictory is
naive.
Freud seemed ambivalent about the nature of the psyche. It seems to me
that the large change in Freud’s own thinking turns on the notion of the
unconscious. Early Freud divides the psychic apparatus into three “systems.”
The first “topography" (Freud, 1932-1936b p. 71) includes systems Ucs., Pcs.
and Cs. which are designated as the unconscious, preconscious and conscious
respectively. Early on, Freud seemed to suggest that the unconscious played
less of a role in our lives than consciousness. Freud became convinced later in
his life that most of our lives are acted out unconsciously. Freud revises this first
topography because he realizes th a t,
portions of the ego and superego [are] well
unconscious... we percieve that we have no right
to name the mental region that is foreign to the
ego the system Ucs; since the characteristic
of being unconscious is not restricted to it. (1932-1936b, p. 72)
Later Freud, therefore, designated these three areas of the psyche, or what is
called the second topography, as id, ego and superego. And the id or the
unconscious plays a much greater role in conscious life than initially assumed
by Freud. The id covers over larger portions of both ego and superego than was
once presupposed. Along with revising his mental topography, Freud changed
his position around many other notions too. For example, the notion of anxiety,
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before 1926, suggests an overloading of stimulus. After 1926 the term “signal
anxiety” appears and anxiety is considered to be “ a device activated by the
ego" (Laplanche & Pontalis, 1973, p. 422). Anxiety serves to ward off danger.
Here anxiety plays a defensive role to protect the ego.This function of defense is
the crucial change Freud makes around the notion of anxiety.
Along with revisions around the notions of topography and anxiety, Freud
dropped the hypnotic method, dropped the term “defense hysteria,” dropped the
notion of the “seduction theory." Most notably, though, Freud became more
pessimistic about human nature. In 1930 he began to talk about aggression and
the death instinct; some suggest he was influenced by Melanie Klein. But it is
against the backdrop of the rise of the Nazi era that Freud changed his mind
about what it is that motivates human action. Peter Gay says, “Having long
delayed the recognition of aggression as a fundamental human endowment,
Freud, in his later years, confessed that he could no longer conceive of the mind
without if (Gay, 1989, xxviii). It is important to understand that Freud’s later work
was written against the backdrop of Hitler's ascendency to power. Hitler was
elected in 1933 and Freud, subject to his own denial and resistances, “refused”
(Gay, 1989, xivi) to believe that the Nazis would overshadow all of Europe.
While many Jewish psychoanalysts had already fled Europe by 1933, Freud
refused to leave until his daughter Anna was “summoned to [the] Gestapo"
(Gay, 1989, xivii). Finally, Freud fled to London and died in 1939. He was,
however, not totally oblivious to what was happening. We read in the final lines
of Civilization and Its Discontents that
Men have gained control over the forces of nature to
such an extent that with their help they would have no
difficulty in exterminating one another. And now it is
to be expected that the other of the two 'Heavenly Powers’
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. . . eternal Eros, will make an effort to assert himself___
But who can foresee with what sucess and with what
result? (Freud, 1930/1961, p. 104)
James Strachey notes that the last sentence of Civilization and Its Discontents
was added in 1931 when “the menace of Hitler was already beginning to be
apparent" (1930/1961, p. 104).
No matter what objections one might have to reading Freud and utilizing
his psychoanalytic notions, it must be acknowledged that Freud is a major figure
of our time and has changed our language and the landscape of Western
culture. Jacques Derrida says that
The nearly unforgettable and incontestible,
and undeniable impression (even above all for those
who deny it) that Sigmund Freud will have made on
anyone, after him, who speak of him or speak to
him, and who must, accepting it or not, knowing it or
not, be thus marked.. . . If one is under the impression
that it is possible not to take into account, forgetting
it, effacing it, crossing it out, or objecting to it, one has
already confirmed... even countersigned (thus achieved)
a “repression." ( 1996, pp. 30-31)
Freud suggests in his second topography that there are three places of
mind: the id, ego and superego. The ego and superego are born out of the id,
and to a great extent the id covers over both ego and superego. The id
seeks “satisfaction" (Freud, 1914-1916a, pp. 122-123) of libidinal “aims." “The
object [objeht] of an instinct.. . . may be changed any number of times” (pp. 122123). The object around which the instinct aims is secondary, while the
satisfaction of the libido is primary. The id, Freud tells us, “has no organization..
. contrary impulses exist side by side.. .There is nothing in the id that could be
called negation... [nothing] compares to tim e... no alteration in its mental
processes is produced by the presence of time" (1932-1936b, p.74). What is
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unconscious is not remembered. For Freud, there is no such thing as a dim
unconscious or shadowy unconscious. What is unconscious cannot be
remembered.
Freud says that “the ego is identical with the id, and is merely a specially
differentiated part of i t . . . The same is true of the relation between the ego and
superego. In many situations they are merged" (1959, p. 17). However, Freud
also says that the ego is not identical with the id because unlike the id, the ego
is “an organization” (1959, p. 17), which has the “impulsion to bind together"
(1959, p. 19). Hence, it seems Freud is saying that the ego is both identical and
not identical with the id. Thus, the aporia of the ego. Most of the content of
consciousness, Freud suggests is unconscious; therefore, much of our lives are
acted out unconsciously.
The superego for Freud is a later development than either id or ego. The
superego develops after the resolution of the Oedipus Complex. Laplanche and
Pontalis explain that the Oedipus Complex is
A desire for the death of the rival- the parent of the same
sex- and sexual desire for the parent of the opposite sex
.. . [or] love for the parent of the same sex, and jealous hatred
for the parent of the opposite sex. (1973, p. 283)
If the child does not resolve the Oedipus Complex she will develop
relationships in later life that unconsciously repeat these early struggles.
Whether or not the Oedipus Complex is resolved, however, the child still
introjects mental representations of her parents into her psyche. These
introjections sound the voice of conscience. If a too-harsh superego emerges,
then Freud might suggest that the Oedipus Complex has not been resolved. A
too-harsh superego can cause psychic upheavals in later life and become
unsettling. Many suggest that a too-harsh superego is the root of sadism.
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If the Oedipus Complex is not resolved, repression of unbearable thoughts
about parents occur. Freud says that,
All repressions take place in early childhood;
they are primitive defense mechanisms taken by
an immature, feeble ego. In later years no fresh
repressions are carried out; but the older ones
persist... new conflicts are disposed of by... after
repression. (1937/1991, p. 14)
After repressions, then, are uncanny repetitions of old conflicts in new forms.
Repressed material pushes upward and has "an impulsion to break through”
(Freud, 1932-1936, p. 68) to consciousness. But the ego, which manifests
resistances, pushes against repressed material preventing it from being made
conscious. Juan-David Nasio explains that
The more the ego attacks the representation
[which is intolerable] the more it isolates it. This defensive
spirt of effort on the part of the ego is precisely what
Freud calls repression.. . repression primarily means
isolation. It is because this representation has become
radically separated from the other organized representations
of psychic life that it becomes fundamentally unbearable.
(1998, p. 17)
That which is repressed returns. But it returns in the form of disguises and
displacements. Hysteric, phobic, schizophrenic, depressive, obsessional acting
out are signals that something old is not being remembered and has not been
worked through. These are symptoms that signal the failure of repression.
Repression has failed to keep these interferences pushed down into the
unconscious registers. What is old and not worked through arrives at the
conscious level in bizarre forms which take on their own trajectories and unfold
in their own time.
Repression is considered by Freud as one of the “vicissitudes of the
instincts” (1914-1916a, p. 126). Instincts “undergo the following vicissitudes43
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reversal into its opposite, turning around upon the subject or self, repression,
sublimation" (I9l4-19l6a, p. 126). These “vicissitudes" serve to protect the ego
from the flooding of negative or unpleasurable stimuli. In her book called The
Eao and The Mechanisms of Defense. Anna Freud (1966/1993) fleshes out
these so-called vicissitudes under the name defense mechanisms. Anna Freud
expands her father's list of vicissitudes, terming defense mechanisms
“regression, repression, reaction formation, isolation, undoing, projection,
introjection, turning against the self, reversal. .. displacement” (p. 44). She also
mentions other kinds of defense mechanisms such as intellectualization and
identification with the aggressor. Understanding defense mechanisms becomes
key especially when one attempts to deconstruct responses researchers might
have reading Holocaust texts.
Defense mechanisms are used by the psyche to protect the ego from
pain. We utilize them all throughout life. They can help or hurt depending upon
what they are used to do. When examining Holocaust texts we need to
understand some of the ways defense mechanisms work to shut off intolerable
thoughts from conscious awareness. Thus, it becomes crucial to flesh out some
of the defense mechanisms that are relevant to Holocaust memory work.
Denial is the most obvious form of defense. And there are all kinds of
denials. To deny, for instance, that the Holocaust happened is a form of defense
against pain. Holocaust deniers are easy to dismiss as kooks, but it becomes
frightening to realize that their numbers continually grow. So-called revisionists
practice another form of denial by re-writing the Holocaust in ways that falsify.
Some revisionists say that fewer than six million Jews were murdered; some
argue that gas chambers did not exist. Some argue that only Nazis were
complicit and not ordinary Germans, theWehrmacht (the German army) or
44
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police reserve units. Some argue that the real culprits were the Russians not the
Germans, who merely imitated the Gulag system in order to prevent Russians
from putting Germans in Gulags. The Russians, in other words, should be
blamed for starting up concentration camps, while Germans merely imitated the
Russians in order not to be killed themselves. Some claim that the Holocaust
was a Jewish plot to acquire Israel. These bizzare rationalizations, reversals
and outright lies are all forms of denial. Although they seem crazy to me and
crazy to others doing work on the Holocaust, they seem perfectly reasonable to
revisionists. And this is what is unsettling.
Another form of denial has been prevalent among East Germans. Recall,
East Germans have traditionally considered themselves, not Jews, to be the
victims of history.The anti-Fascist rhetoric serves as a defense mechanism
against pain, against the idea that Germans, East and West, were complicit.
East German Communists persecuted Jews and perpetuated anti-Semitic
crimes against Jews even after the close of World War II. Margaret MitscherlichNielson points to the way in which Germans have generally been in denial
since the end of the war. She says that
After the defeat [of Germany] there was first an
abrupt derealization; the past simply faded away
like a dream. The switch of identity through identification
with the victims, accomplished as it was without
particularly noticeable signs of injured pride, reinforced
the defense against any feelings of being implicated. The
manic effect to undo, the enormous effort to rebuild,
a kind of nationally accepted therapy, made permanent
denial and repression possible for the majority of
Germans. (Mitscheriich-Nielson, 1989, p. 406)
The idea that Germans were victims of history, is a form of defense, a form of
denial that serves to protect the ego from pain. And in Germany there are all
sorts of levels of this denial still intact today.
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One of the bizarre manifestations of denial for Germans concerns the
arrival of philosemitism during the 1970s and 1980s (Rapaport, 1997). Against
the backdrop of the Holocaust and Germany's long history of anti-Semitism, it
seems odd that all things Jewish had become suddenly fashionable. German
Jews seem to be, for the most part, skeptical of this; many say that they live in
Germany but sit on their suitcases. I would suggest that philosemitism, at least
for Germans, could function as a reaction formation. Laplanche and Pontalis
note this is a
Psychological attitude or habitus diametrically
opposed to a repressed wish, and constituted as
reaction against it.. . . reaction-formation is the
counter-cathexis of a conscious element equal
in strength to the unconscious cathexis, it works
in the contrary direction. (1973, p. 376)
Philosemitism masks an anti-Semitism, and I think that I would subsume
reaction formations as forms of defense. Underneath the love for all things
Jewish is a more insideous hatred.
Projection is another defense mechanism that becomes useful to look at
when studying the perpetrators of the Holocaust. Projection is a defense
mechanism that perpetrators utilized to justify scapegoating and ultimately
murdering Jews. When the ego cannot tolerate its own heart of darkness, its
own negativity, it projects negativity onto the other to rid itself of intolerable
thoughts. Andre Green says that “Projection is linked to a primary defense
mechanism fundamentally defined by the action of expelling; of casting out (to
project-to spit, to vomit) something within which is unpleasant” (1986, p. 85).
Green says further that projection is “closely linked to paranoia" (p. 85). The
anti-Semite is paranoid because he feels, in a move of reversal, that the Jew is
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the persecutor. Anti-Semites throughout history, and especially during the
Middle Ages, had bizarre phantasies about Jews. Jews had been thought to be
the devil, Christ killers, bloodsuckers, cannibals. And of course, these
phantasies have absolutely no basis in reality. These phantasies get projected
onto the Jew because the anti-Semite cannot tolerate his own heart of
darkness: He projects it onto the Jew so as to rid himself of badness.
Along with the mechanism of projection, the defense mechanism of
splitting might have allowed perpetrators to carry out murder, while repressing
the emotional effects of killing. Lifton (1986) and Kelman (1976) point out that
Nazi doctors and camp guards might have experienced a process of
derealization and numbing, becoming desensitized to what they were doing.
Sometimes this desensitization led to splitting, or what Lifton (1986) calls
“doubling” (p. 6). Andre Green points out that splitting and repression for Freud
are two different things, but both serve to protect the ego from flooding of
negative feelings. “In splitting the relationship [between id and ego] is
horizontal; the reason of the ego and the reason of the instinctual demands
coexist

It says 'yes' and 'no' at the same time" (Green, 1986, pp.25-26).

Unlike splitting, repression, for Freud, is a “vertical move" (Green, 1986, p. 25)
which pushes against the ego's resistances. Lifton and Kelman, when they talk
of splitting, suggest the simultaneity of experiencing two selves at once. The
man who kills, experiences himself in two places at once. He pulls the trigger,
but while doing this he splits off from the act psychologically. From the site of his
observing ego, he watches himself, distancing himself from the act of murder.
For victims and survivors of the Holocaust, the utilization of the
mechanisms of defense were crucial for survival. But let me make it clear that
the experiences of victims and victimizers were radically different and should
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never be leveled. I am not suggesting here that victims’ experiences were the
same as the victimizers, because both groups utilized defense mechanisms.
People use defense mechanisms for radically different reasons in radically
different circumstances. Without utilizing defense mechanisms, we would lapse
into a state of psychosis. According to Freud, everyone needs defenses to be
ego syntonic. Without defenses, our egos would simply deteriorate. For victims
and survivors of the Holocaust defense mechanisms became crucial. Those
who could not turn to stone emotionally endangered their existence. Splitting,
which serves to cut off emotions and stop the flow of feeling, became prevalent
among Jews. Bruno Bettlelheim (1971) remarked, while being deported to
Dachau,“What happened to m e-for instance, the split within me onto one who
observed and one to whom things happened-was a typical schizoid
phenomena” (p. 114). Splitting might have prevented the ego from
deteriorating. But, at the end of the day, it is hard to say whether these defenses
saved anybody. Bettleheim comments that all of the teachings of
psychoanalysis that he took with him into the concentration camp became
irrelevant. People who seemed to demonstrate a psychological togetherness,
before the war, those who seemed to have intact egos before the advent of
Auschwitz, responded in ways that completely stunned Bettelheim. He points
out that psychoanalytic theory came up short against the horrors of the
Holocaust and what these horrors did to the human psyche. Psychoanalytic
theory did not help Bettelheim understand the complex responses of Jews. And
I think this is a very important point to keep in mind. Psychoanalytic theory can
only explain so much.
Repressed memory around the Holocaust, for Jews, serves as yet
another form of defense against pain. The not-telling, the pact of silence around
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this horrific event is still very much a part of Jewish culture, although more
people talk about the Holocaust today than they did twenty years ago. Even if
Jewish survivors talk about this memory, the re-telling haunts. It becomes
difficult to say whether talking about it or repressing it is more harmful. Many
Jewish fiction writers, after having written about the Holocaust, committed
suicide. But many analysts would suggest that repressing the memory has
bad effects too. Many analysts suggest that lifting repressed memory might help
undo depression and depersonalization. Dori Laub (1992) comments that
repressing Holocaust memory eventually becomes harmful to the psyche, for
the repressed returns. The repressed haunts in all sorts of bizarre ways.
Survivors who do not tell their story become victims
of a distorted memory, that is, of a forcibly imposed
“external evil"... The “riot telling” of the story serves as
a perpetuation of its tyranny. The events become more
and more distorted in their silent retention and
pervasively invade and contaminate the survivor’s
daily life. (p. 74)
Karl Abraham and Maria Torok have suggested that repression is not
total. Unlike Freud, they suggest that memory becomes, rather, “encrypted” (in
Bellamy, 1997, p. 21). An encrypted memory is one that is not wholly forgotten
nor wholly remembered. It manifests itself, Bellamy tells us “in the form of a
“crypt"- a kind of melancholia that must inhabit an obscure threshold between
memory and forgetting” (p. 21). Kestenberg (1989) points out that Shatan and
Rosenfeld suggest that memory of Holocaust survivors is “encapsulated” or
“jailed” (p. 386). Memory gets stuck; it becomes lodged in the heart of the
psyche. Repressed memory is located somewhere between the remembered
and the forgotten; it becomes haunting and torments survivors because it never
goes away. And repressed memory somehow gets intrapsychically passed
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down to the next generation. Intergenerational trauma is a result of not working
through encrypted and repressed memory. But it is difficult to say if these
memories can ever really be worked through. Laplanche (1999) argues that
when the repressed returns, it does not return as a copy of the originary trauma;
rather, it becomes “dislocated" (p. 104) and forms what he calls a “double
inscription” (p. 36). Second and even third generation Jews, who are children or
grandchildren of Holocaust survivors, suffer these dislocations and
displacements. It is not uncommon for children of Holocaust survivors to suffer
nightmares,even if their parents never talk about their experiences in the
camps. A belated and unwelcome suffering haunts intergenerationally, but
analysts really do not understand how repressed memory gets introjected into
the next generation. But the unconscious works in uncanny ways.
Researchers of the Holocaust are subject to their own psychological
resistances, repressions, denials and projections while working on this difficult
memory. Curriculum theorists and educators generally who do work on the
Holocaust might be on the lookout for their own intellectualizations of this
difficult material. Anna Freud (1966/1993) suggests that intellectual activity,
when it is divorced from emotional registers, serves as a defense against pain.
Intellectualization is an “ascetic flight from instinct” (p. 162). It is not enough to
engage in “abstract intellectual discussions and speculations” (p. 162),
although these abstractions are important. Anna Freud is not arguing here for
anti-intellectualism, which is something altogether different from
intellectualization. Rather, intellectualization is one way the ego
compartmentalizes overwhelming emotional affects by detaching and
separating them from emotional life. Laplanche and Pontalis comment that the
trouble with intellectualization is that it cuts one off from emotional life.
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Intellectualization is comparable to other mechanisms
described by psychoanalysis, and particularly to
rationalisation. One of the main aims of intellectualizations
is to keep the affects at arms length, to neutralize them.
(1973, p. 225)
This process of neutralizing emotions in analysis becomes evident, for
example, when the analysand draws on theoretical knowledge, of, say,
psychoanalytic literature, while ignoring emotional conflicts at hand during the
encounter of working with the analyst. Drawing on abstractions may work to
avoid emotional reactions from being analyzed. To intellectualize is a way to
explain away emotions. And this is very dangerous when doing work around
the Holocaust. If researchers do not feel anything while studying these horrific
texts, something is wrong. More than likely, the researcher has shut down her
emotional register. Distance and detachment from memory work damages both
the researcher and her subjects of research. However, it is important to engage
in intellectual activity but not at the expense of emotional life.
Researchers of the Holocaust are subject not only to their own
resistances and repressions around difficult texts, but they are also subject to
unconscious transferential relations with texts. One's awareness of
transferential relations with texts may alter the ways in which interpretative work
is done. At this juncture I would like to flesh out the notion of transference as it
has relevance to self and other and then I would like to draw out some
implications of transference for interpreting texts.
Freud (1911-1913) tells us that the “compulsion to repeat” (p. 151) old
patterns of relations, formed with primary others or significant others, like our
parents, shape the ways in which we handle relations with new people who
come into our lives. “Repetition is a transference of the forgotten pasf (Freud, p.
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151). The forgotten past is most fundamentally an unconscious past. When a
new person arrives on the scene, under the influence of transference, one tends
to attribute qualities and feelings, thoughts and phantasies that are, in essence,
transferred from the past, from some other significant other who has become
internalized in the psyche, onto the new person. The old and the new can get
blurred. Sometimes one may even unconsciously seek out others who, in some
uncanny way, remind one of significant others from childhood,especially and
ironically, if the relations one had with these significant others, were bad. Freud
says that transference relations turn on uprototypesn (1966/1990, p. 29) from
childhood which were primarily “unsatisfied" “libidinal cathexis" ( p. 29). These
prototypes “attach" themselves to “stereotype plates" ( p. 29). Because the
compulsion to repeat bad relations continues for some throughout life, and
because it seems that the unconscious seeks its own destruction, Freud
connects the compulsion to repeat with the death instinct.
The purpose of analysis, says Freud, is to help us undo transferences by
becoming conscious of what is unconscious so that the cycle of abusive
relations can stop. Arnold Cooper comments that Freud “believed that the
transference represents a true reconstruction of the past, a vivid reliving of
earlier desires and fears that distort the patient’s capacity to percieve the “true
nature” of the present reality" (1990, p. 513). in analysis, the analysand
misperceives the analyst who becomes blurred with the internalized phantasies
of significant others. These internal objects, then, get transferred onto the
analyst. Freud’s project, and the project of classical psychoanalysis, is to
untangle these distortions and resolve the transference, so that the analyst can
appear as she actually is to the analysand. The object of anaylsis is to send
internal objects back to their original source, to send these phantoms back
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where they belong, back home. Internal objects, or what Freud calls stereotype
plates, usually represent the image of the mother or father or any other
significant other who shaped one’s childhood. But when these images get
projected onto other people, the identities of the new people become blurred
with the identities of the parents. The internal other, who is a sort of double of
the original other or, say, the mother, must go back home. The analyst is not the
mother, although the analysand may see her that way. The analyst may be a
second mother figure, but she is not the mother. Analysis is supposed to
untangle these confusions. But whether or not it can do this is questionable.
Freud uses the word transference in several senses. Generalized
transference, Freud suggests, happens all the time and is not particular to the
analytic situation. Transference at this level is a psychical process that is not,
strictly speaking, induced only in the analytic situation. But in the analytic
situation, the nature of transference changes. As analysis progresses, as
anxiety is created by the analytic situation itself, the transference heightens and
it changes from a generalized transference to a more specific one. This specific
transference, which gets deposited onto the analyst, Freud called transference
neurosis. Analyst Brian Bird explains, “When I think of transference, I think of
feelings, of reactions, and of a repetition of past events; but when I think of
transference neurosis, I think literally of neurosis. A transference neurosis is
merely a new edition of the patient’s original neurosis, but with me in it” (1990,
p. 343). When the analyst becomes the center of the analysand’s anxieties, this
is a signal that transference neurosis has arrived. Transference neurosis,
according to Freud, can be experienced both as sexual and hostile. Freud
suggests that both of these responses to the analyst serve as resistances to
getting underneath the repressed unconscious. In order to sort out the actual
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from the phantasized images that blur relations due to transference, the activity
of transference neurosis must be enacted. Otherwise analysis will fail.
But transference is not that simple. The analyst, too, undergoes changes
in her unconscious as a result of the patient’s transference relations with her.
Freud mentions only briefly that the analyst’s unconscious is subject to what he
terms countertransference. Freud suggests that countertransference should be
avoided. Countertransference is seen by Freud primarily as sexual in nature
and as an impediment to the anaiysand’s treatment and the analyst's work.
In current psychoanalytic literature around the notion of transference
analysts point out its complexities. Arnold Cooper remarks that Today, the idea
of transference has become so complex that we are no longer sure what in the
analysis is not transference, and if it is not, what it is" (1990, p. 527). If
transference clouds lived experience, can we ever be in relation with others in a
way that does not blur who these others are in our perception of them? Or are
others always already blurred with patterns of perception inherited from
childhood? Is any sorting out of transference possible? Or are we “trapped in
transference” (Grumet, 1988, p. 117)? This blurring between self and other is
thought by many analysts to be “inappropriate" (Greenson, 1990, p. 151) to the
present situation at hand, it is viewed as an “illusion" (Mackenzie Rioch, 1988,
pp. 37-38), or it is seen as an “abnormal phenomena” (Tower, 1988, p. 155),
and it is most fundamentally considered to be irrational. The trouble with
transference is that it is mostly unconscious. And as Margaret Little comments,
“What is unconscious one cannot easily be aware of (if at all), and to try to
observe and interpret something unconscious in oneself is rather like trying to
see the back of one's own head" (1981, pp. 35-36).
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The question becomes whether these unconscious “stereotype plates"
(Freud, 1966/1990, p. 29) are irrational and inappropriate after all. Merton Gill
suggests that this kind of thinking “does violence to the actual nature of the
relationship between patient and analysf (1988, p. 314). Further, Gill claims
that transference is not so much about distorted perceptions of the other as it is
a question of seeing the other in preconceived and “rigid" frameworks (p. 320).
The more we become aware of transferences the more “flexibility" (Gill, 1988, p.
32) we will have in our relations with others. It is not that transference will ever
fully be resolved but if we are aware of it, we can undo rigid relations with
others. Gill comments that transference functions as a way in which we
“organize the field [of perception] to single out, for example, the particular item
that others ignored but to which [one] attributes as idiosyncratic significance”
(1988, p. 320). As against Freud, Martin Stanton (1997) suggests that what is
made conscious during analysis does not clarify anything. Stanton argues,
conversely, that “Transference resists interpretation" (p. 50).
Like transference, countertransference is thought by many analysts to be
inappropriate and irrational. Following Freud, some analysts believe
countertrarrference disrupts treatment. Countertransference is signaled by the
analyst's “anxiety" (Blake Cohen, 1988, p. 69) that emerges while in
relationship with the analysand. According to Edward Tauber,
countertransference “represents] unanalyzed portions of the therapist’s
personality that... interfere with the treatment’ (1988, p. 111). The point, then,
for analysts, is to be analyzed enough before analyzing patients, so that the
analyst s own issues get worked through. However, some argue that traces of
countertransference remain no matter how much working through an analyst
may accomplish. Margaret Little explains the difficulties of countertransference.
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The ever-quoted remedy for countertransference
difficulties-deepen and move through analysis of
the analyst-one can at best only be an incomplete
one, for some tendency to develop unconscious infantile
countertransference is bound to remain. (1981, p. 45)
Some analysts argue, as against Freud, that countertransference may be
viewed not as an impediment, but as a “tool” (Blake Cohen, 1988, p. 67) that
may be used to understand the ways in which an analysand evokes feelings in
others. Paula Heimann was one of the first analysts to understand
countertransference in a positive way. Mabel Blake Cohen comments that
Heimann
states that the analyst's emotional responses to his
patients within the analytic situation represent one of
the most important tools for his work, and that the
analyst's countertransference is an instrument of
research into the patient’s unconscious. (1988, p. 67)
It becomes important to understand that the analyst should not act out her
countertransference anxieties, but that she should become aware of her own
feelings toward the analysand. The feelings evoked tell the analyst much about
the ways in which the patient evokes these kinds of feelings in others.
Lucia Tower (1988) contends that the term countertransference neurosis
has also emerged on the scene. This term is not unlike transference neurosis.
Countertransference neurosis might emerge in late stages of the analysand’s
analysis. Here the analysand becomes the center of anxiety for the analyst. If
the analysand reminds the analyst of someone else, and the analysand
becomes blurred in the analyst’s psyche with someone else from the analyst's
past, something has not been worked through. Tower, however, is
uncomfortable with the term countertransference neurosis, thinking it a
“misnomer” (p. 140). Perhaps she is uncomfortable with the term because it
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suggests a weakness on the part of the analyst. For some, the very notion of
countertransference seems taboo and has traditionally been thought to be
destructive for both analysand and analyst. But analysts are not simply mirrors
to the analysand’s unconscious. Analysts are human beings who are subject to
their own psychic interferences. Freud was well aware of this, but still he
thought countertransference a negative response to the analysand.
Another point of contention among analysts around transference
concerns the notion of transference neurosis. Some collapse transference
neurosis onto generalized transference. Generalized, or “floating transference"
(Greenson, 1990, p. 151), according to some analysts, is all that analysands
experience during analysis. Brian Bird points out that
Most analysts nowadays work only with transference
feelings. They either ignore the transference neurosis
or believe... that there are no significant differences between
transference neurosis and other transference reactions. For
myself, I believe just the opposite: there are differences,
and they are significant. (1990, p. 342).
Analysts who refuse to believe that transference neurosis signals a significant
shift during analysis may fear their own anxiety and countertrarrference
responses. This fear may result in simply ignoring the patient’s transference
neurosis, as Bird points out, explaining it away. According to Freud,
transference neurosis is different from generalized transference and should be
paid attention to. In fact, Freud argues that analysis will end in failure if the
analysand does not move through the stage of experiencing transference
neurosis. If transference neurosis is not enacted in the analytic situation, the
gritty stuff of the unconscious never comes up. But it is up to the analyst to allow
these intense feelings to surface. Transferential relations with others, whether
inside or outside the analytic situation, remain elusive, especially when
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transference reactions may provoke responses in the other and cause the other
to experience countertransference. Identities are built in relation, and relations
are complex.Thus, the translation of transference is anything but transparent.
Whether in therapeutic or nontherapeutic relations, interpretation with others
and of others signifies strangeness. Analysis, if anything, points to this
strangeness of self and other. As Jean Laplanche (1999) stresses, analysis
points to our ‘‘ex-centric" (62) and idiosyncratic subjectivity.
I suggest that transferential relations continue to emerge not just with
people but also with texts. The text of transference, then, is broader than a one
on one relation with an analyst. Freud claimed that generalized transference
happens all the time. Transferential relations with texts have to do with the ways
in which old patterns of perception mark interpretive work. Mertin Gill (1988)
contends that the problem with transference is primarily rigidity. Whenever
preconceived frames of reference continually haunt interpretations, whenever
the interpreter finds herself repeating over and over again the same kinds of
thoughts that keep the interpreter from thinking through the text in broader ways,
transference could be the culprit. When researchers read Holocaust texts and
are not psychologically ready to deal with horrific violence, the tendency is to
gloss over the text or pull from the text ideas that in some way match
preconceived notions or prearranged feelings about violent encounters.
Transferential relations with texts are not unlike those experienced with people.
Researchers need to become aware of their emotional responses to difficult
texts, they need to become aware of the ways in which old patterns of
perception overlay new scholarly projects. It is not that researchers can clearly
translate texts, or clearly interpret texts; but reorganization of perception, and
the undoing of resistances of our own emotional responses, may alter what it is
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that we see in these texts. I am not arguing for clarity or getting a close reading.
I am arguing for a closer examination of inner psychic upheavals, numbness
and rigidity when approaching texts. Interpreters should be aware that readings
of texts do something to the psyche as interpreters do something to the
translation. As Andre Green suggests that “when all is said and done, it is the
interpretation that he must give himself of the effect of the text in his own
unconscious” (1986, p. 338). As the reader translates the text, the text changes
the reader. And this is especially difficult when dealing with texts around the
Holocaust. These texts change interpreters, and many of these changes are
belated. How difficult memory texts change readers and researchers is elusive,
but change is inevitable. It is important that curricularists mark these changes
because these changes effect the present work at hand and the work that is to
come in the future.
Although researchers may transfer a “stereotype plate” (Freud,
1966/1990, p. 29) onto new texts, and although there may a certain amount of
rigidity and resistance while doing work on the Holocaust, because traces of
transference will always remain; still, work to construct, interpret and re-interpret
Holocaust texts can do justice to the memories of victims and survivors.
Transference is inevitable, but I think that it is possible to translate a text in a
certain way that is less rigid, less bounded by one’s previous experiences and
handling of violence. But perhaps researchers are never fully ready to do this
kind of work after all. No matter how much time is spent around the black sun of
Auschwitz, constant ruptures in understanding occur, psychic upheavals
continue. Transferential relations with texts may determine beforehand what a
Holocaust historian and what a Holocaust novelist will choose to write about.
Transference, Freud suggests, is brought on by a “compulsion to repear
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(1920/1989, p. 603) which “overrides the pleasure principle” (p. 605). In fact,
Freud argues that the compulsion to repeat is a manifestation of the death
instinct. An examination of Freud's notion of the death instinct and aggression
raises many questions for the Holocaust researcher. Let us now turn, then, to
Freud’s notion of the death instinct at this juncture.
Aggression is “the main representative of the death instinct” (Freud,
1930/1961, p. 71). Aggression can either be introjected and “sent back toward”
the ego (pp. 78-79), or it can be projected out onto other people. It manifests
itself as self hatred or hatred of the other. And Freud remarks that hatred is older
than love. But the death instinct, Freud insists, is enmeshed with the life instinct
or eros. Eros and thanatos are inextricably bound.
Individuals who are aggressive can become dangerous. Groups can
become especially dangerous when thanatos and eros are unleashed. When a
group is led by a “tryannical leader,” Freud stresses that a “horde" mentality
tends to overtake the group (1920-1922, p. 121). When thanatos and eros are
unleashed, trouble is bound to occur. And this trouble is cause primarily
because of “contagion” and “imitation” (Freud, 1920-1921, p. 89). Tyranny is
unleashed because it undoes repressed impulses and allows “all that is evil” in
humankind to emerge (p. 74). Rob Weatherill comments that for Freud,
the catch-all term, the ‘death instinct’ tends to conflate
sadism, aggressiveness, assertiveness, destructivness,
mastery and the will for power, which are qualitatively
different phenomena. Freud did see the differences
between these qualities... but in his final duality
[eros and thanatos] he was forced to lump them
all together. (1998, p. 23)
Although Freud’s notion of the death instinct has not been
wholeheartedly embraced by the psychoanalytic community (Laplanche and
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Pontalis, 1973), he is not alone in his conviction that the death instinct is real.
Melanie Klein (1937/1975), Christopher Bollas (1996/1997), Paul Russell
(1998) and Rob Weatherill (1998) consider Freud's notion of the death instinct
important since it can explain humankind's potential for aggression. Paul
Russel declares that
We take the notion of the death wish quite seriously.
It is not obviously wrong. One usually hears that
aggression is the basic instinct, but that the idea of
a death wish is mystical, unprovable. But this won't
do. Freud's conception is a deeper one.. . . Hate is
the death wish, and love and hate lie at the very
core of what trauma is about. (1998, p. 42)
I struggle with the notion of the death instinct because it suggests an
essentialized, universal, innate thing which is lodged in the heart of humanity.
On the other hand, I wonder why it is people who are not provoked, do bad
things? From whence does their aggression spring? If people have an innate
disposition toward destruction, can they be held responsible for committing
crimes? Ernst Rappaport points out that
One might object to Freud’s theory of the death instinct
inasmuch as by laying the blame on an inborn destructive
instinct--man is freed-from the responsibility for his
behavior and permitted to escape the fear of
consequences. (1975, p. 295)
Opponents of the death drive (Kohut, 1996a/1996b; Fairbairn, 1943/1954)
believe that aggression is caused by bad relations with parents. Aggression is
not natural, it is provoked by others. Heinz Kohut comments that "no purely
destructive urge arises so long as the environnment is reasonably empathetic
and responsive” (1996a, p. 207). But counter examples abound. Many
scholars argue that Germans were not provoked and were not coerced to act
aggressively. It does not seem to make sense that an entire country was the
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product of bad parenting. Most Germans were not innately sadistic or victims of
child abuse (Lifton, 1986; Kelman, 1976; Langer, 1998; Goldhagen, 1997).
Why, then, did Germans murder Jews? What was the source of their
aggression? Daniel Goldhagen (1997) argues that Germans killed Jews
because they wanted to, they chose to, nobody coerced them. But Goldhagen's
argument seems so simplistic. To say that Germans killed because they wanted
to, still does not explain much. Rob Weatherill (1998) suggests that acts of
aggression are due to both external provocation and internal conflict. He takes
a middle position between Freud (1920-1922) and Fairbairn (1943/1954).
Freud, recall, argued that the death instinct causes violence. Fairbairn suggests
that aggression is caused by provokation and bad parenting. Weatherill (1998)
comments that aggression is a mixture of both internal and external
circumstances. At the end of the day, questions around why it is people kill
remain open. Perhaps researchers can never get behind the complex motives
of mass murderers.
Freud has much to teach about aggression, the unconscious, defense
mechanisms, transference relations, civilization and its discontents. But one of
his shortcomings turns on dealing with the ways in which others get introjected
into our psyches and become lodged. Object relations theorists pick up where
Freud left off and develop notions of what they term internal objects. Object
relations theorists flesh out the ways in which others get introjected into the
psyche. Object relations theorists ask questions around the unconscious
underpinnings of our inter-relations. Internal objects influence social relations.
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Object Relations Theory
Generally speaking, object relations theorists draw on Freud, in one way
or another, to expand the notion of the “object." Freud claims that “the object
[objeht ] of an instinct is the thing in regard to which the instinct is able to
achieve its aim" (1914-1916, xiv). An object can be a person or a thing. Object
relations theorists flesh out how objects get internalized and what it is these
internalizations do to the psyche. When we interact with others we not only have
a sense of the other as “an actual other" (Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983, p. 10) but
as an “internal other" (p. 10) as well. These internal objects or internal
representations of others “go under various names.. .‘illusory objects,’
‘introjections,’ ‘personifications'" (Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983, p. 11). Thomas
Ogden (1994) stresses that object relations is not just about inter-relations with
others, but it is about most “fundamentally a theory of unconscious internal
object relations in dynamic interplay with current interpersonal experience" (p.
88, 1994). Thus, object relations theorists are interested in understanding the
way in which these introjects complexify our inter-relations at an unconscious
level.
At the start of this chapter, I suggested that there are many theorists who
engage in what is termed object relations. Donald Winnicott, Wilfred Bion, Rene
Spitz, Heinz Kohut, Heinz Hartman, Harry Guntrip, Edith Jacobson, Erik Erikson,
Melanie Klein, and Ronald Fairbairn, to name a few, are all considered object
relations theorists. I have chosen, however, to examine the work of Melanie
Klein and Ronald Fairbairn only. Melanie Klein was the first to do object
relations theory and I think she offers much depth and insight especially around
the notions of phantasies, projections and paranoia. These issues become
crucial when examining Holocaust perpetrators. For Holocaust texts, Fairbairn’s
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ideas around the notion of introjection and reactive aggression become key.
When examining Holocaust perpetrators, Fairbairn’s theories become relevant.
Let us first turn to Melanie Klein's work. For Klein, the infant introjects the
image of the mother into her psyche. This internal object is “bound up with the
external one, of whom she is a 'double'" (1940/1975, p. 346). This ‘double’
becomes distorted because the infant’s phantasies of her mother do not match
the actual mother. The actual mother and the double, or introjected
representation of the mother, become blurred. Klein suggests that the more
blurred the mother becomes with the internal representation of the mother, the
more split the ego becomes. Klein remarks that
Phantasies and feelings about the state of the internal
object virtually influence the structure of the ego. The
more sadism prevails in the process of incorporating the
object, the more the object is felt to be in pieces. (1946/1984, p. 6)
Klein goes on to say that the more in pieces is the object the more likely the ego
becomes split. Phantasies, for Klein, are the most primordial psychic reality.
Thus, perceptions of the mother are always already distorted by phantasies. If
phantasies are not worked through, the child cannot see the mother as mother,
rather she sees the mother as a product of phantasy.
Phantasies, for Klein, emanate primarily out of the site of anxiety. Anxiety
is brought on by the death instinct and the ego’s fear of being “annihilated"
(1946/1984, p. 4). “Persecutory anxiety” (1950/1975 p. 43) emerges as a
response to the intrusion of the mother as internal object. The child’s image of
the mother is split into the good and bad breast. “From the beginning the
destructive impulse is turned against the object and is first expressed in
phantasized oral-sadistic attacks on the mother’s breast" (Klein, 1946/1984, p.
2). A key term for Klein is projection then because the child projects onto the
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mother what she phantasizes about the bad breast. The mother is potentially
dangerous and is a possible persecutor. Klein calls this period in the child's life,
which occurs from the beginning of life until about eighteen months, the
paranoid-schizoid position. And it is this persecutory anxiety and fear of
annihilation that characterizes the child's phantasies. Most fundamentally, then,
for Klein, object relations, from the very beginning of life, are primarily
aggressive.
When the child reaches about eighteen months, if she is able to work
through the paranoid-schizoid position, she arrives at what Klein calls the
depressive position. Here, anxieties and guilt consume the child. Guilt arises
due to the child’s feelings towards the mother. “[D]epressive anxiety relates to
dangers felt to threaten the loved object” (1950/1975, p. 43). In other words, the
child feels guilt over projecting such hateful feelings onto the mother. Klein
states that the child experiences “a melancholia in statu nascendi : The object
that is being mourned is the mother’s breast" (1940/1975, pp. 344-345). During
the depressive position a “reparative" phase announces itself if the child has
been able to work through the paranoid-schizoid position. Klein claims that
reparation is possible and is perhaps
a more realistic response to the feeling of grief, guilt
fear of loss resulting from the aggression against the
loved object. Since the drive to repair or protect the
injured object paves the way for more satisfactory
object-relations. (1946/1975, p. 14)
For Klein, then, a psychologically healthy individual works through both the
paranoid-schizoid position and the depressive-position. If one gets stuck in
either position, neurosis and or psychosis is bound to appear in later life. Klein
suggests that the psyche introjects and projects both good and bad objects all
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throughout life and so the psyche is dynamic and fluid. But these two positions,
if not worked through, sound the cry of repetition compulsion later in life. If these
two positions are worked through, the ego is less likely to become split.
Greenberg and Mitchell (1983) point out that Klein “has a tendency to
see bad objects as internally derived... and good objects as absorbed from the
outside” (p. 135). If the mother is good, it is the child who turns her into a bad
object through phantasies. What is important here concerns the origin of
aggression. Like Freud, Klein suggests that aggression and the death instinct
are innate. Therefore, a predisposition toward aggression is natural. Mitchell
comments that “For Klein, the root of evil lies in the heart of man himself” (1994,
p. 84). In other words, Klein argues that there is lodged internally an innate
desire toward aggression. There is something in human nature that leads to
phantasies about aggressive and “terrifying objects" (Klein, 1940/1975, p. 348).
And if we cannot work through these phantasies, the tendency to act out
aggression and paranoia becomes a real and dangerous potential.
For Klein, phantasies about the other, especially paranoid phantasies,
have no basis in reality. So when we study, for example, the anti-Semite, it
becomes clear that his phantasies are born out of this sense of paranoia; most
scholars would agree that these phantasies about the Jew have no basis in
reality. Phantasies tell more about the anti-Semite than the Jew. Klein helps us
to understand that paranoid phantasies have little to do with the other but have
everything to do with the paranoic's own persecutory anxiety. Representations
of Jews as devils on horseback, as cannibals, as child murderers, as
menstruating men (which were all popular during the Middle Ages) arrive on the
scene out of a bizarre panorama of phantasies springing from paranoia.
Paranoia also played a role in German culture during the rise of the Third Reich.
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A paranoid country needs a scapegoat. A paranoid country needs to blame
someone for its problems. And so the Jew became a convenient scapegoat.
However, Sheldon Roth (1995a) argues that Germans did not suffer from a
paranoid-schizoid illness. The Germans’ egos, he claims, were quite intact.
They knew what they were doing. Klein’s paranoid-schizoid position may
suggest that someone who suffers from this is psychotic. But Germans were not
psychotic. Thus, Roth suggests that when applying psychoanalytic notions to
perpetrators, caution becomes necessary.
Some questions around Klein’s work might be raised here. Whether we
can divide up the psyche into two positions is questionable and seems to be
reductionistic. Whether or not children phantasize bad thoughts about their
mothers universally is questionable. And whether or not children phantasize at
the very beginning of life is impossible to determine. Mitchell claims that Klein’s
"critics (e.g. Guntrip [who was a Fairbairnian]) accuse Klein of depicting the
objects of human passion as phantasmagoric, solipsistic creations, with no
necessary connection to the outside world" (1994, p. 69). However, I think
phantasy life for both children and adults plays a much larger role in our lives
than most would like to admit. So I think Klein is right to emphasize phantasy.
Laplanche (1999) suggests that one of the problems with theories like Klein's ,
is that it offers up a "subjectivist" position whereby the other is always reduced
to a perception of the other. But how does one get outside one’s perceptions?
Can we ever really see the other as other? Does perception always blind?
W.R.D. Fairbaim is often overlooked. Many people are not familiar with
Fairbairn's work simply because he only wrote one book and his work has been
overshadowed by Heinz Kohut. Some claim that Kohut has taken many of his
ideas directly from Fairbairn without crediting Fairbaim. Grotstein and Rinsley
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(1994) have accused Kohut of stealing Fairbairn's ideas. “It is ironic, therefore,
that the recent contributions of Heinz Kohut, which bear a striking resemblance
to those of Fairbaim, never refer to Fairbairn's work. The same irony
unfortunately applies to Winnicott, who never acknowleged Fairbairn's
anticipations of his work” (Grotstein & Rinsley, 1994, p. 6). And so Winnicott and
Kohut have become, perhaps the most well known object relations theorists,
while Fairbairn remains somewhat obscure. I think Fairbairn is one of the most
important psychoanalytic thinkers of our time and so I would like to bring him out
of obscurity.Fairbairn (1941 /1954;1943/1954;1944/1954; 1946/1954) tried to
get beyond Klein's solipsistic position. Fairbairn suggested that the child can
see the mother as other, therefore, the mother does not get reduced to the
perception or representation of the mother. The mother is bad only if she
neglects and or abuses the child. She is not bad because of the child’s
perception or projection or phantasy about a bad breast; rather, she is bad
because she may be so in actual reality. Fairbairn's message was,
fundamentally, that children are innocent. They become ill because of abusive
parents. James Grotstein and Donald Rinsley (1994) tell us that, interestingly
enough, Fairbairn’s name itself is significant.
Fairbairn’s name, like Freud (“joy” in German), describes
an important aspect of his contributions-that of
acknowledging “fairness" to the child at a time when such
a view could not be taken for granted. At the same time,
his name represents the acknowledgment of the sense
of a “blessing” offered to the “fair” child ("bairn”), (p. 3)
Unlike Freud, Fairbaim suggests that it is not instinctual “impulses”
(1943/1954, p. 62) which seek satisfaction. But rather that “iibidinal “aims” are
of secondary importance in comparison with object relationships... that a
relationship with the object, and not gratification of the impulse, is the ultimate
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aim of libidinal striving” (p. 60). Here, Fairbairn turns Freud on his head. For
Freud, the object of libidinal satisfaction serves as a means to an end; whereas,
for Fairbairn the object is the end itself. What is primary for Fairbaim, then, are
object relations, not instinctual satisfactions.
Unlike Freud and Klein, Fairbairn dismisses the notion of drives and the
death instinct. In order to account for aggression, Fairbairn turns to actual
relations between mother and child, not phantasized ones. Accordingly, if the
child is in some way neglected and or abused by the mother, a “basic
endopsychic structure" (1944/1954, p. 114) is set in place by forces of
repression. Repression is put in motion by “a certain volume of aggression” ( p.
114). Like Klein, Fairbairn claims that the mother's image is split into the good
and bad mother. Recall, for Klein, both good and bad breast get introjected. But
Fairbairn stresses that there is no need to introject a good object. Only bad
objects get introjected. And the bad object gets introjected not because the child
has phantasized that she has a bad mother, but rather the mother is bad in
actuality and bad objects seep into the psyche. Initially, bad objects “are simply
banished to the unconscious" (1943/1954, p. 65). Along with bad objects, “parts
of the ego” (1944/1954, p. 89) get repressed as well. “What are primarily
repressed are neither intolerably guilty impulses nor intolerably unpleasant
memories, but intolerable bad internalized objects" (1943/1954, p. 62).
Thus bad memories are bad because they are attached to bad objects and it is
because of the bad objects that memories get repressed. When “repression
fails” (1943/1954, pp. 65-66) what comes up from the unconscious, where the
bad object was initially “banished” (p. 65), are distorted and
“psychopathological defences” (pp. 65-66). The abused child, later on,
expresses herself in “phobic,""obsessional,” “hysterical,” or “paranoid” ways (pp.
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65-66). These defenses serve to protect the ego from pain. These modes of
being serve to distance the self from itself. Obsessional thinking is a way to not
think about things that are bothersome. Ruminating obsessively over the
number five for instance, keeps the self from getting underneath this desire to
repeat words over and over again. Underneath these ruminations, lurks some
repressed memory and some kind of bad object that has gotten internalized in
the psyche.
For Fairbairn there are three egos. Fairbairn suggests that there is the
central ego, the libidinal ego and the superego, plus what he termed and
“internal saboteur” which “differs from the superego... [because] it is in no
sense conceived as an internal object. It is wholly an ego structure" (1944/
1954, p. 106). Fairbairn explains that “The subsidiary egos are of course,
ordinarily unconscious; and their unconscious status at once raises the
suspicion that they are subject to repression” (p. 108). Unlike Freud's second
topography (id, ego, superego), whereby the ego and superego are bom out of
the id, Fairbairn claims that the endopsychic structure of the mind develops
because of the ways in which subsidiary egos split off from the central ego,
especially if one has introjected bad objects. “The central ego is conceived as a
primary and dynamic structure, from which... other mental structures are...
derived” (p. 106). The libidinal ego, unlike Freud’s id, is not “a mere reservoir of
instinctual impulse, but as a dynamic structure... [has] greater devotion to
internalized objects" (1944/1954, p. 106). Hence, the central ego, libidinal ego
and superego are all “dynamic ego structures" (p. 132). While the internalized
objects are “objects of the dynamic ego structures... [they are] endopsychic
structures which are not themselves dynamic" (p. 132). Odgen explains that for
Fairbairn, internal objects are not images, they are structures. Internal objects
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are not simply mental representations of objects,
but are active agencies whose activity is perceived
by itself and by other dynamic structures [which become]
organized and registered as stable mental representations.
(1994, p. 95)
Fairbairn's insistence that internal objects become endopsychic structures
suggests that internal objects lodge themselves in the heart of the psyche and
become very difficult, if not impossible, to remove primarily because these
objects are structures, not images. Grotstein and Rinsely explain that
By postulating the obverse of classical and Kleinian
theory, he [Fairbairn] helped us to understand the
well-known conundrum that the worse one’s internal
objects are experienced to be, the less one is able
to leave them! (1994, p. 7)
Bad objects which become internalized as endopsychic structures also are the
root of self destruction and self hatred because the child believes that she must
have somehow provoked her mother’s wrath. Fairbaim declares that “the
reaction provoked in the child conforms to the idea that he is not loved because
of the badness and destructivness of his hate” (1941/1954, pp. 55-56).
Fairbairn argues, most fundamentally, for the goodness of the child. He
believes that no one is a natural born killer. And it is here that Fairbairn departs
from both Klein and Freud. Aggression, for Fairbairn is bom of provocation.
Heinz Kohut, whose work is derivative of Fairbairn, suggests that “no purely
destructive urge arises so long as the environment is reasonably empathetic
and responsive" (1996a, p. 200). Kohut claims that "when the self is shattered..
. you have the fragment of utter destructiveness” (p. 223).
When one examines early psychohistories and psychobiographies of the
Nazi era, many early works suggest that Germans acted out because of bad
parenting. But again, I stress that it cannot be the case that the whole of German
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society was a product of bad parenting. I find this claim counterintuitive.
Children who are abused often continue the cycle of abuse. This is, for the most
part, true. However, many children who are abused, do not act out this cycle.
Universal claims about human behavior always come up short against the
complex landscape of lived experience. Even if many German children were
victims of child abuse, it still does not explain why they turned into killers. Many
victims of child abuse never kill. Rob Weatherill critiques reactive explanations
of aggression because “the claim that all aggression is environmental and
reactive does not seem to answer the obvious: namely, the unbelievable cruelty
and destructiveness that erupts in human behavior” (1998, p. 25). Reactive
positions around aggression, Weatherill suggests, overlook “internal psychic
realities" (p. 26). Here, I think Weatherill is referring to the death instinct or a
death wish. Something springs from within the psyche that has little to do with
the external world and pulls the self toward destruction. Ultimately, I think none
of these explanations complete. But they do offer up partial answers, or at least
raise questions that perhaps have no resolution.
Fairbairn argues that only bad objects get introjected into the psyche.
The question is what does the self do with these bad objects once they get
installed? The psyche cannot seem to get rid of them. This introjective
mechanism may explain why it is that bad relations in later life manifest, if the
compulsion to repeat gets acted out. That is, the compulsion to repeat the
originary bad object’s internalization may shape later relations and the psyche
may continue throughout life to introject bad objects. Transferential relations
with others may turn on this kind of introjective mechanism. One may even
unconsciously seek out others who are bad because they remind one of the
initial bad object. The psyche tends to act in ways that are comfortable and
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familiar, even if these familiar ways are bad. Patterns of acting out become rigid
especially when one seeks bad objects.
Introjecting others' badness can occur even when reading texts. The Jew
who reads anti-Semitic texts, who introjects representations of Jews as
monsters, devils or evil people, harms the psyche. It may become quite
devastating to read texts which represent Jews as devils, as Christ-killers. A
certain amount of distance becomes necessary for Jewish readers, if they
encounter anti-Semitic literature or do research around it. The point here is that
Jewish readers must work to not introject these bad representations; they must
read in ways that puts psychological distance between themselves and the
texts. But it becomes difficult to say just how this mechanism works. It becomes
difficult to say what exactly the effects of introjection are on Jewish readers. At
the end of the day, it is not clear how these bad objects work on Jewish
subjects.
From Freud, Klein and Fairbairn we learn how primal our early
relationships are with significant others. We tend to repeat patterns of reponse
and behavior that were evoked with these originary relations with others later in
life. And it is not just that early object relations shape our perceptions; rather,
they become part of the very structure of our psyche. Phantasies, splitting of the
ego, change the very structure of our psyche. So the ways in which we perceive
others and texts written by others, to some extent, are products of early
experiences in life. The more integrated the ego, Freud, Klein and Fairbairn
would agree, the better able we are to get an approximation of the person or
text or event we are trying to understand and deconstruct. But for Jean
Laplanche (1999), what is at stake is not getting an approximation of the other,
but loosening up the transference so that we are able to see the other as other,
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as radically different from the self. The other is stranger. John Fletcher (1999)
states that Laplanche’s notion of otherness demands attention. He
writes ‘otherness’ as a neologism in Frenchnot just etrangete, strangeness, foreignness,
alienness, but strangerete, strange-ness,
foriegner-ness.. . ‘alien-ness.’ (p. 47)
Thus for Laplanche our perceptions of the other are not reduced to a mental
representation of the other which might get housed in a solipsistic realm. The
other becomes stranger through language, through “the enigmatic message”
(Laplanche, 1999, p. 80), the “third reality” (p. 80) that ensures a distance
between self and other. So for Laplanche relations with others and with texts do
not turn on getting a likeness, but remembering to keep strangeness of the other
and of the self intact.
The Limits of Psychohistory
Applying psychoanalytic notions to history is not new. In fact, a field of
study called psychohistory has been established since the 1930s. Here, I want
to briefly introduce some of the debates that have emerged around doing
psychohistory. A study of these debates teaches about the limits of doing
psychohistory in the first place. And it is to these limits that we should turn.
Frank Manuel (1979) suggests that one can trace the roots of
psychohistory to Vico, Herder, Michelet, Diithey and Febre. Albin argues that
“psychohistory’s birth pains occurred in the wake of Hitler” (1980, xi). Reich
(1933/1945), Fromm (1941/1969), Adorno (1950), Horkheimer (1950), Erikson
(1976) all grapple with the horrors of the Holocaust utilizing psychoanalytic
tools. Some of these writers’ works will be fleshed out in subsequent chapters.
Psychohistories can broadly be divided into two kinds: psychobiographies
(Binion 1976; Rappoport, 1975; Waite, 1977; Erikson, 1976) and social
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psychohistories (Litton, 1986; Reich ,1933/1945; Lowenberg, 1983; Adorno,
1950; Horkheimer, 1950; Fromm, 1941/1969; Friedlander, 1978). Within the
field of psychohistory there are, broadly speaking, two rival groups. Lawton
explains that the
radicals (basically the de Mause Group) tend to
view psychohistory as an independent field.. . .
The conservatives (basically GUPH) are more
cautious about viewing our field as being
separate from history. (1988, p. 10)
Many historians dismiss psychohistory altogether because they feel that
psychoanalysis is not scientific (Stannard, 1980), and when it is applied to
history much of it tends to be reductionistic and simplistic (Stannard, 1980;
Albin, 1980) or “too speculative" (Kren & Rappoport, 1976). Kren and Rappoport
suggest that “most efforts to apply psychology and particularly psychoanalysis
to history have at best been interesting failures” (1976, p. 66). These “failures,"
as traditional historians might call them, are due to “lack of rigor" (Friedlander,
1978, p. 7). Friedlander counters these claims and offers up some important
insights on the ways in which Freud’s notions can be useful for the historian.
Peter Gay says that traditional historians complain that “researchers cannot
psychoanalyze the dead” (1985, p. 3). And the discourse of psychoanalysis, for
the traditional historian might seem obfuscating or beside the point of historical
research. Peter Gay says that the traditional historian
is likely to find the techniques of psychoanalysis
esoteric, its language deplorable, and its propositions,
to put it generally, remote from his researches into the
past. (1985, pp. 43-44)
Even though the discourse of psychoanalysis is, no doubt, difficult, I
would argue, and I think Peter Gay would support my claim, that psychoanalytic
notions could certainly help historians articulate and explain, partially, why it is
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people do what they do. Common sense explanations around complex
motivations of perpetrators just will not do. The discipline of psychoanalysis has
much to teach about the inner workings of the psyche. Moreover, without a
background in psychoanalytic literature, the historian has no way to articulate
her own anxieties around disturbing material. Without at least the awareness of
what defense mechanisms are and what they do, the historian is at the mercy of
her own repressions. And these repressions and resistances will determine, to
a certain extent, what it is the historian chooses to write about or not write about.
What gets excluded from history, then, has much to do with what it is historians
can psychically handle. It would, therefore, behoove the historian to have some
understanding of her own psyche before attempting to recover the past.
The question becomes what is it we are using psychoanalytic notions to
do? Do we use these notions to think through complex historical issues, or do
we use them to shut thinking off? If we use psychoanalytic notions in
reductionists ways, we are using them incorrectly; we are using them to shut
down thinking and emotion. But psychoanalytic notions do not have to be used
reductionistically. In fact, Peter Gay points out that both historians and
psychoanalysts work against reductionism “As discoverers and documentors of
overdetermination, psychoanalysts and historians, each in their own manner,
are allies in the struggle against reductionism, against naive and crude
monocausal explanation" (1985, pp. 74-75). Pathologizing labels such as
survivor syndrome, post-traumatic stress syndrome, obsessive-compulsive
disorder tend toward reductionism. These labels squash out the depth of the
complexities around the human psyche. These categories gloss over the radical
difference of suffering. It becomes problematic to box people into categories
and attempt to fix them with a label. I find these practices normalizing and
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oppressive. Diagnostic categories can also scar because they stigmatize, and
stigmas do not easily go away. But, as I have pointed out throughout this
chapter, there is much more to psychoanalytic theory than labeling. If anything,
psychoanalytic theory should point out how strange we are. Human beings
cannot be labeled.
Early psychobiographies on Hitler tended to demonize him. Rappaport
(1975) diagnoses Hitler as an “ambulatory schizophrenic” (p. 210); Binion
declared that Hitler suffered from “oral sadism" (1976, p. 170); Waite argued that
Hitler suffered from “anality and sadism" (1977, p. 149); Walter Langer
suggested that Hitler was “neurotic bordering on schizophrenia" (cited in
Rappaport, 1975, p. 208); Waite (1977), Erikson (1976) and Bromberg (cited in
Rappaport, 1975) suggested that Hitler suffered from borderline personality
disorder. But Waite (1977) cautions that when we demonize Hitler we exonerate
him. “To dismiss Hitler or Himmler as mad men or fiends, incomprehensible to
“normal" people, is to say that critical judgment of them is not possible (1977,
xvii). In later chapters I will tease out some of these studies in more detail. But
for now I want to introduce certain trends in psychohistory. These trends are
interesting to follow because they demonstrate a real shift in the ways in which
psychoanalytic notions have been used.
Like psychobiographies, social psychohistories tended to pathologize
Germans. Adorno (1950) and Fromm (1941/1969) argued that Germans
suffered from sadomasochistic upbringings and had a tendency to develop
authoritarian personalities. Some argue that Germans suffered from “infantile
helplessness" and “passivity” (Reich, 1933/1945, p. 26). But these kinds of
explanations are reductionistic and simpleminded. Not ail Germans are
obedient, passive, sadistic or sadomasochistic.
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A turn in Holocaust scholarship in the 1980s signals a complete reversal
of some of these early theories. Browning (1998), Goldhagen (1997), Lifton
(1986); and Kelman (1976) argue that Germans were not “inherently evil"
(Lifton, 1986, pp. 4-5) and most Germans did not demonstrate sadistic
tendencies. As Lawrence Langer suggests, “sadism or psychotic rage” do not
explain mass murder (1998, xii). Browning, Goldhagen, and Lifton declare that
those who were complicit in crimes during the Holocaust were quite ordinary. It
was the “ordinariness of most Nazi doctors" that stunned Robert J. Lifton (1986,
p. 4). Even the category “ordinary Germans,” which is used by Browning,
Goldhagen and others, does not help us understand much. What is an ordinary
German? Who is ordinary? But I think the point here is that Holocaust scholars
emphasize that sometimes mass murderers are not psychotic maniacs, or
sadistic lunatics; they are sane, everyday human beings.
Christopher Browning (1998) argues in the beginning of his study around
Police Battalion 101 that his aim is not to demonize the perpetrators. Browning
claims that historians must reject demonization.
My analysis departs from what has been done in the field of
psychohistory in many ways. As a curriculum theorist, I argue that a broad
understanding of the Holocaust is key. Both the memory text of history and the
memory text of novels need to be examined. Curriculum theory allows me to
cross borders and cut across narrow fields of inquiry. Again, I argue that it is not
enough to read history. Literary representations are just as important to
examine as historical ones. So my task is broader than the task of, say, a
psychohistorian. And I think I bring unique insights to Holocaust texts because I
am not merely adding historical insights to literary ones. From the perspective of
curriculum theory, I am able to analyze these texts from a particular point of
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view. A social psychoanalytic hermeneutic around Holocaust texts turns on the
notions of unconscious traces, transferences and countertransferences and
defense mechanisms. A post-Freudian reading of Freud, an analysis of Klein
and Fairbairn and the insights of Laplanche broaden the scope of my
investigation by allowing me to ask questions which most psychohistorians
have not asked because, for the most part, they only draw on Freud.

79

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

CHAPTER 3
REPRESENTATION AND ANTI-SEMITISM
Maxine Greene suggests that “the educative task is to create situations in
which the young are moved to begin to ask, in all the tones of voice, ‘why’"
(1995, p. 6). The “why" Greene refers to could point to questions around
existence, being: why am I here? The “why” might also point toward the horizon
of the self, identity. Why am I this way and not that? Why am I who I am? Why do
I think this way about myself? Why do I experience the world in this way?
Suzanne de Castell suggests that “the formation of self [is an educator’s]
project" (1996, p. 28). The why of self concerns not only a self who thinks but a
self who feels as well. And the self who feels may not feel very well. The self
who does not feel well may feel exiled, alienated, marginalized. And so the
educator’s task is to ask why.
Curriculum theorists might recognize that feeling bad about oneself
affects the ways in which one interacts with others. But engagement with our
world cannot be healthy if the self feels bad. Negative feelings about oneself
may be co-complicated with how others define who we are and how we then
internalize those negativities. The “why” of education might become, then, a
question about naming. Why do others name or define me the way they do?
Why do I internalize these negative namings?
Identities are produced, not in isolation, but in relation. As Madeleine
Grumet points out “Relation is basic to education” (1995, p. 16). Relations
between us, as we walk through our lives in schools, tend to be unhealthy
because they are not interrogated deeply enough. Understanding relations
is fraught with difficulties, of course. Understanding what we know about
ourselves and others, and how we define others and how others define us, is a
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highly complex, problematic enterprise. The unhealthy self cannot relate in a
productive way to the other. William Pinar explains:
We are what we know. We are, however, also what we
do not know. If what we know about ourselves- history,
our culture, our national identity- is deformed by
absences, denials, and incompletenesses, then our
identity-both as individuals and as Americans, is
fractured. This fractured self is a repressed self. Such
a self lacks access both to itself and to the world. (1995, p. 23)
Identity, thus, also has to do with our relations with memory, history and culture.
And this memory comes to us through texts. uDeformed” selves, as Pinar points
out, do not understand how interconnected they are to memory, history and
culture. Formation of self, then, has much to do with how we are always already
inscribed in the texts of our culture before we arrive on the scene and how we
interact with these texts and how we might struggle against these texts. Susan
Griffin remarks that “perhaps we are like stones; our own history and the history
of the world are embedded in us

It is said that the close study of stones will

reveal traces from fires suffered thousands of years ago" (1992, pp. 88-89).
Memory, history and culture webs us to events; pasts are sedimented in our
very being. Interrogation of these sedimented pasts, these traces, becomes
necessary for the process of self formation.
Memory, history, culture and identities are also co-produced, in part, in
relation to textual representations. But as Jan Jagodzinski explains “Society is,
at once, both an open and closed system; we are caught by our representations
of it, at the same time we struggle to change these represenations” (1997, p.
25). We may try to push the stone of self up the hill, like Sisyphus, but upon
arrival at the top of the hill, the stone of self may fall down again into the
sedimentation and inscription of culture and memory. It is the educator's task to
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interrogate the struggle of Sisyphus as we are caught between culture and the
re-invention of ourselves. This re-invention is continual and it is complex.
My own struggle concerns Jewish self formation against a backdrop of
centuries of what I term Jew hatred. Therefore, I am interested in examining
relations between those representations of Jews in texts that have already been
handed down to us by Jew haters, and the process of Jewish self
representation and self formation. The hermeneutic circle between how Jews
are defined by others and how Jews define themselves may be insidious and
difficult to break. Jews may introject cultural inscriptions by others and graft
these inscriptions onto themselves in the form of self hatred. Although these
circles of hatred are hard to break, I will argue that there are ways around these
difficulties. Opening spaces and rupturing places between representations by
others and self-representation become key.
In Western culture since about the third century, it has been Christians
who have had the power to define and represent Jews. Educators must
remember that students and teachers may be Jews and Christians and come to
that place we call school with the traces of these very complex theological
memories sedimented and grafted onto their skins. Curriculum theorists cannot
under-estimate the importance of understanding how these theological
memories, traces, emotionally and intellectually affect our lives in schools.
Although school is the place that is supposed to be neatly separated from
religion, it is not. Students and teachers grow up in traditions and bring them
into the classroom, even if only in quiet ways, even if the question of religion is
never raised. The traces of these traditions mark the text of school life. These
markings, these stains, cannot be ignored. Ignoring these stains is dangerous.
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The historical memory of Jewish-Christian relations has been stained
with violence. Christians, since the third century, have represented Jews in
violent and pejorative ways. Old stoney representations of Jews remain in the
collective unconscious or consciousness of many Christians. Jews have been
exiled and marginalized for centuries, and we remain, in many ways, exiled in
the classroom and in the academy by Jew hatred. Although there is much
debate over the current climate for Jews in America, the presence of Jew hatred
can never be under-estimated. Under many unturned stones lie the bedrock of
hatred. Jew hatred is like an an invisible poison that permeates all of our
relationships and damages us all. Most often, though, the problematics of Jew
hatred remain hidden. These are stoney “silences our pedagogies ought
somehow to repair” (Greene, 1995, p. 47). But the repair can never be
complete. The damage done to Jews is centuries old, and Jew hatred pervades
our culture in all sorts of insidious ways. Thus, I do not offer up a healing
pedagogy; I only suggest some ways to better understand how representations
of Jews by Jew haters have been introjected into the self-representations of
Jews and how this injection or introjection has been a dangerous one for
Jewish self-formation. And these things have everything to do with life in
schools and scholarly life. Scholars, too, are Jews and Christians and other
religious denominations, carrying the rocks and webs of culture up and down
the Sisyphusean hills in and beyond the academy. Madeleine Grumet tells us
that curriculum “is the process of making sense with a group of people [about]
the systems that shape and organize the world that we can think about together”
(1995, p. 19).
Judaism and Christianity are complex theological social systems that
have shaped us and have organized the ways we think about life. However,
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Judaism and Christianity have been strange bedfellows for centuries.
Christianity is a complex system which, by and large, has had the power to
name, to control, to supress, to define and to represent Jews. Ours has been,
historically, an unhealthy relationship. I am skeptical that many of us have
engaged in healthy dialogues around these complexities. Certianiy, Jewish and
Christian fundamentalists cannot dialogue at all. And ultimately, as Myles
Horton points out, dialogues “don't change men’s hearts" (1990, p. 103). Still,
Paulo Freire suggests we must attempt to understand “the spirit of the culture...
the soul of the culture" (1990a, p. 131).
How I respond to representations of Jews in texts may determine how I
feel about myself as a Jew and how I feel in relation to others. The tricky thing
about reading texts is that we tend to merge with what we are reading
psychologically. Wolfgang Iser comments that in the process of reading “text
and reader.. . merge into a single situation, the division between subject and
object not longer applies” (1978, pp. 9-10). If I merge with texts in the process of
reading, how do I then protect myself, psychologically, from the assault and
violence of representations of Jews by Jew haters. Can I protect myself? Selfidentification with representations that are Jew hating produce self-hating Jews.
I am certainly not immune from this phenomenon. Reluctance to grapple with
my Jewish identity comes out of, perhaps, an unconscious self-hatred.
I will argue that self-identification with Jew hating representations,
however, can be disrupted. And one way to disrupt these negative
identifications is by first becoming outraged. Jan Jagodzinski says that “The
sense of outrage belongs somewhere at the limit of the fram e... for it signifies
an almost unbearable desire, an uncontrollable temper, a body which cannot
be contained" (1997, xi). So it is the feeling of outrage that moves me to
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interrupt these negative representations of Jews. But these interruptions do not
go without difficulties. The outrage must not harden one’s heart and result in
Christian-bashing. Outrage must move one to expose, though, texts written by
writers who have perpetuated hateful representations of Jews. The dangers of
representation are, perhaps, obvious as we live in a post-Holocaust age.
Although, certainly, textual representations in themselves cannot account for the
why of the Holocaust.
It is when textual encounters move me emotionally that I begin to find
productive ways in which to deal with these kinds of issues. Ironically, though,
as David Jardine points out, the encounter “does not begin with me. It only
begins when something happens to me in my reading of a text, when something
strikes me, tear me open, ‘wounds’ me and leaves me vulnerable and open to
the world" (1995, p. 110). Something has happened to me studying these texts,
these violent representations. I have grown outraged but I realize that my
outrage must move toward a systematic analysis around issues of
representation and self-formation. By engaging in a systematic analysis of these
texts I hope to undo stoney, rigid, simplistic representations of Jews. Hopefully
my analysis may point toward ways that might “intervene in the dominant modes
of representation” (Jagodzinksi, 1997, p. 139). Intervention becomes possible
partly through what I term jagged imaginings which move us to undo rigidity.
Deborah Britzman (1995) teaches that
Imaginative thinking can move us beyond the
constraints of nostalgia and the anxious impulse
to arrange history without an awareness of what
it is that structures our destinies or how the inherited
contexts and practices constrain our possibilities, (p. 76)
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Jagged imagining is a way that might allow us to question culturally
inherited representations. But re-imaginings cannot completely overturn that
which we imagine against, for imagining against something implies a certain
friction with that something. That something of tradition always remains, even as
a trace or stain. Further, we must not simply re-place one static image with
another. Doing this only causes paralysis. And as Robert Musil writes, we must
attempt to avoid "paralysis and rigidification" (1914/1990, p. 56) in our thinking.
Jagged imagining, re-inventing how we might represent ourselves, also means
embracing a willingness to walk on or near a precipice. Imagining against
tradition is risky. Paula Salvio remarks that
Resistance to regulatory control and culture’s
continual attempts to grip the body is, in reality
(and particularly in schools), wrought with forms
of resistance that are marked by painful struggle,
misunderstandings, confusions, and feelings of
betrayal. (1997, p. 248)
But we will always, in some ways, be gripped by culture, no matter how
much we struggle against it. The grip of a stoney body, a stoney body of
representations, however, can be disrupted by attempting to dissolve partially
the stone by digging into the layers of cultural sedimentation. Jewish
representations become problematic because they have become stoney,
reified, hardened and wedged into historical memory. Moreover, my
understanding of what representation in itself means may determine how I
interpret what I read and how these readings may affect my very identity.
There is no essential Jew; there is no essential representation of a Jew.
There are as many kinds of Jews as there are pebbles on a beach. And like the
changeableness of pebbles, Jews are changeable too. If anything, Jewish self
representation and identity are elusive. Suzanne de Castell tells us that “finally,
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this place of ambiguity... must be our destination in all our journeys” (1996, p.
31). Perhaps we do not have a final destination or end place, but the journey is
one that is not certain or clear. We take this walk one step at a time. As Paulo
Freire says ul am sure that we make the road by walking” (1990b, p. 6).
Because the notion of representation is highly compelx, I would first like
to examine different ways of understanding what representation might mean
and the possible effects of representation. More specifically, I will examine how
Jews are represented historically by what I term Jew hating texts.
Understanding the Notion of Representation
Recall, object relations theory teaches that self and object
representations are co-complex because of unconscious transferences and
internalizations of the object. James Grotstein suggests that
internal objects whether Kleinian or Fairbairnian
are third forms-neither the external person, nor
merely split off parts of the self. They are in fact,
phantasmically altered, transformed montages.
(1994, p. 118)
Internal objects are co-mingled impressions of self and other. Self
representations and object representations become difficult to untangle. How
the self perceives the other and the other perceives the self depends upon a
complex unconscious relationship. Stephen Mitchell (1998) points out that at an
unconscious level, individuation of self from other becomes difficult to untangle
because primary process thinking knows no division. Mitchell declares that
Because on a primary process level minds are
permeable, interactions are co-constructed, and
time is not linear but simultaneous, separation into
the neat catagories of secondary process /me/ you,
then/ now... can never be complete, (p. 56)
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Identity formation is always in relation with the other. Unconscious
transference may maintain rigid patterns of perception. Significant others who
get internalized in early childhood shape the ways in which we perceive others
later on in life. Recall, Laplanche (1999) criticizes Freud and others who offer up
what he terms a ‘subjectivist' (p. 73) position around the notion of
representation. Laplanche claims that subjectivist positions
reduce the other to the subject’s perception of
of the other... nothing in this approach allows the
other any place other than the depths of
subjectivity, (p. 73)
Laplanche argues for a “third reality" (p. 80) which is “implanted" (p. 80) by the
other into the self. This enables us to speak of the other as other and not
subsume her representation under a radical subjectivity which would reduce
her to my perception of her. The other is separated from the self. The other's
alterity is due to her own internal “alienness” her own “internal alterity” (p. 220).
The perception of the other, though, is always already overlayed with
transferential relations from the past. Transference confuses any clear
separation or individuation between self and other. Whoever we are in relation
to the other, this relation is clouded and co-complexified by the ghosts of
internal objects. These co-complex internal objects are dynamic and have a life
of their own. The compulsion to repeat old patterns of relations with new others
continues throughout life. These ghostly internal objects are guided by primary
process thought which knows no time, division, or negation.
Secondary process thinking marks a site of organization, rationality,
categorization. This is what Freud called the reality principle. The reality
principle suggests that in order to function in reality, the psyche must divide
things up or else it will get lost in the flow of time. Dualities and opposites,
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although constructions, help us function in the real world. However, the primary
process hovers right below the secondary process and these processes are in
fact co-mingled. Stephen Mitchell (1998) comments that for
Lowewald [a psychoanalyst] there is a perpetual
tension between primary process and secondary
process as organization, through which experience is
generated. The distinctions between me and you... now
and then are logical distinctions.. . . All these distinctions,
he argues, are not given, but rather are constructions.
(p. 56)
The ego must be able to make these distinctions and categorize in order to
function in the world. If we were to regress to primary process thinking we could
not distinguish between objects, and time would flow seemingly without end;
like a dream, life would would become halluncinatory, an Alice in Wonderland
experience. But because primary process thinking always overlays secondary
process thinking, the unconscious guides us. Secondary process thinking
separates out thoughts and distinguishes between now and then.
When we talk about representation on the secondary process level, what
we are talking about are distinctions and separations between things.
Philosophical debates, unlike psychoanalytic ones, draw on secondary process
thinking to separate this and that. When we talk about images and referents,
appearances and reality, signifiers and the signified, we have moved into the
realm of secondary process thinking. Let us now move from the psychoanalytic
register around mental representations to the philosophic register around the
notion of representation. These two kinds of discussions mark different ways of
talking about this idea.
Understanding what representation means is no easy task. The classical
understanding of representation implies that two things, p and q, are somehow
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connected. The thing p may represent the thing q. That this represents that
usually suggests that an image may represent a corresponding reality. In this
sense, then, represention clearly and distinctly separates lived experience into
two things or two realms. Further, the image p is a mere copy of the real thing q.
Since Plato, q has been associated with reality, truth, the given; p, on the other
hand, is a mere appearance, a mere copy of the real. The phenomenal (the
appearance) realm and the noumenal (the real behind the appearance) are
therefore split apart. The trick, then, is to get behind appearance in order to get
at truth.
Many modernists since Descartes have appropriated this way of
understanding representation. Jan Jagodzinski (1997) tells us that for the
modernist, representation collapses onto the term mimesis. Representation
means likeness, sameness. In other words, the image may mirror its referent;
the image may reflect its referent. More concretely, the image, say, of a cat I
conjure up in my mind is simply a copy of a real cat in the world. Therefore, the
cat in my mind is like a mirror image of the real cat. But the image of the cat in
my mind has less value than the real because it is a mere copy, a copy cat. The
real has more value because it is true; it coincides with the given.
Texts also conjure up images in my mind. A text may discuss, for
instance, a cat. The words, then, point to an image of a cat. From the words on
the page, I then imagine a picture of a cat in my mind. Thus, texts too can serve
as mirrors to the real. Texts about cats, that is, may correspond to real cats in the
world. Wolfgang Iser comments that “semblance, then, appears to be a basic
ingredient of representation” (1989, pp. 242-243).
Photographs, like texts, may also be thought of as corresponding to their
referent. Realist photographers, who embrace the modernist position of
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representation, believe that the photographic image can neatly mirror that which
is photographed. For instance, Roland Barthes claims that a photograph of a
pipe “is always and intractably a pipe" (1981, p. 87). Further, Barthes declares
that “every photograph is somehow co-natural with its referent" (p. 76). Thus, for
realists like Barthes, the photographer's frame of reference does not matter, for
the photograph simply corresponds to a reality independent of the
photographer's cultural frame in which she is situated. The photographer, says
Kevin Robins, is a “passive” spectator of the real (1995, p. 30). Realist
photographers, then, think of themselves as nothing more than “recorders of
reality" (p. 30).
Like realist photographers, writers, such as Christopher Isherwood,
describe the process of writing novels in much the same way photographers
take pictures. Isherwood describes writing about Berlin during Hitler's rise to
power as if he were a realist photographer. He considers himself to be nothing
more than a passive spectator of the world waiting to capture images in words,
like a photographer who acts as a passive recorder of reality as he shoots
pictures, capturing images. Isherwood says “I am a camera with it shutters open,
waiting, quite passive, not thinking.. . . Someday, all this will have to be
developed, carefully printed, fixed “ (1959, p. 1). For Isherwood, then, the eye/ “I”
is like a camera allowing the real to press in on the self, as if the real were
completely external to the body. The real is viewed as an independent thing or
realm that can be gotten at by fixing it, by catching it, making it still, by stopping
time. What my eye/ “I” sees can be shot with a camera or recorded in words.
John Bloom suggests that the “still image [for realist photographers]
marks a death ritual driven by an assumed capacity to know the world” (1993,
p. 3). Killing images, stilling time, history, capturing truth and boxing it into a
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frame leads to what I term massive hysteria, which is an overload of anxiety.
This anxiety sets in because images keep arriving on the scene, refusing to be
stilled. That is, images continually slip through the frame. And it is this slippage
which leads to nervousness. We can no longer be certain what the image is.
Issues of representation, then, have much to do with how the West has
understood what images are. Since Plato, images have had a second class
status because they are considered nothing more than shadow. In fact, these
shadows interfere with the quest for truth; they get in the way of understanding
ideas. Plato and others have driven a wedge between ideas and images,
denigrating images. Western philosophy has been a history of epistemological
problems which are caused, in part, because images attempt to creep into what
is considered the real. Since Descartes, and even perhaps before the arrival of
modern philosophy which I would date around 1659 with the death of
Descartes, philosophers focused on problems around how we know ideas, not
images. Images lie. Philosophers do not like lies. And because images lie, the
West, according to W.J.T. Mitchell (1994) fears images. Mitchell claims that the
fear of images is nothing new.
The fear of the image, the anxiety that the “power
of images" may finally destroy even their creators
and manipulators, is as old as image making itself.
Idolatry, iconoclasm, iconophilia, and fetishism are
not uniquely “postmodern” phenomena, (p. 15)
Many Christians and Jews think that so-called idol worshiping is foolish
or even evil because images of the godhead are not real. This kind of thinking
leads to dangerous, exclusive, ways of being in the world. This kind of thinking
can lead to religious wars. This Eurocentric way of thinking is what drives
missionaries to convert so-called “primitive” people to Christianity. But if
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Christians and Jews are made in the image of God, does this not mean then
that we are not real? Are we mere copies of God? And if we are copies of the
real (God) why is it that people like Hitler exist?
Classical understandings of representation are highly problematic. Part
of the problem is the eye/ “1." Representation as an act of seeing seems to me a
narrow way of understanding how we move through the world. I approach the
world in various ways. I listen. I feel. I smell. I touch. I desire. And my being is
merged-with-the-world, not separated from it. My merging-with-the-world, thus,
makes it difficult for me to get a grip on my surroundings in neat and tidy ways. It
is perhaps arrogant to assume that I can know the truth of things, the truth of the
world. Classical representation squashes out the mystery of being-in-the-world.
It presupposes that I can know things with certainty and I can, therefore,
conquer and control that which I know.
However, lived experience is much more complex and elusive than
classical notions of representation allow. I cannot fix time or history in the eye/
“I" of my camera. Moreover, there are many problems around the notion of
correspondence itself. If I am merged-in-the-world and cannot get a grip on my
surroundings, how can I say with certainty that p corresponds to q? As JeanPaul Sartre points out “the relationship between the image and its object is very
obscure" (1948, p. 21).
The postmodern turn suggests we have arrived at a crisis. The crisis of
representation, stated simply, is this: What you see is not what you get. P, in
other words, does not correspond to q. Thomas Docherty points out that
"the perception of an image involves us in a specific deception or irony with
respect to the status of the real" (1996, p. 23). Thus, this postmodern paradigm
shift around the notion of representation points toward obliterating the given, the
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real, while elevating appearances, images. Plato is turned on his head. Many
postmodern thinkers, though, still talk about representation by using visual
metaphors. Representation continues to be a discussion, for the most part,
around the visible. According to Docherty, Jameson "argues that it is not the
modern but rather the postmodern which is "essentially a visual culture” (1996,
p. 21). Likewise, W.J. T. Mitchell claims that the postmodern era is a turn toward
the "pictorial” (1994, p. 15). But this turn toward the pictorial, according to
Mitchell, differs from classical understandings of representation, for pictures do
not correspond to the real. Mitchell comments that the postmodern turn is "rather
a postlinguistic, postsemiotic, rediscovery of the picture [image] as a complex
interplay between visuality, apparatus, institution, discourse, bodies of figurality”
(1994, p. 16).
Culture, then, in all its various manifestations, serves as the intermediary
between what we see and what we get. In fact, culture constructs, produces and
may even determine what we see in the first place, and it may also determine, in
many ways, how we interpret what we see. The always already of culture
haunts the whole interpretive process around representation. The crisis of
representation is that “the camera portrays something other than what we see”
(Bloom, 1993, p. 3). And Foucault reminds us that "it is in vain that we say what
we see; what we see never resides in what we say” (1966/1994, p. 9). Or as
Homi Bhabha declares, "there can be no such immediacy of a visualist
perspective, no such face-to-face epiphanies” (1994, p. 50).
Representation is re-configured in postmodern discourse.
Representation is a re-presentation of a re-presentation of a re-presentation.
What is presented before us is a copy of a copy of a copy. What we see is
always already constructed through culture glasses. But these glasses do not
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help us see better; they convolute and complexify what we see. P represents
what? It represents p re-presenting p, while q slips away into oblivion, into
nothingness. Wolfgang Iser (1989) claims that representation, in this sense, has
nothing to do with a pre-given reality, for there is no such thing. Perhaps the
given, or pre-given, is just another construction, another phantasy made up to
control the viewer’s perception of the world.
The crisis of representation becomes disturbing when one attempts to
discuss how historical events such as the Holocaust are to be represented. If
there is no real, no given, how can we determine whether historians’
representations are real or true? How can we even say that real events happen
if the real is actually a copy of a copy? Jan Jagodzinski teaches that
The crisis of representation... is to question the
accuracy of any representation.. . . If all representations
are artificially and often arbitrarily constructed, the
question of what and who to believe can lead to
suspicion, skepticism, cynicism, and even paranoia. (1997, p. 39)
By what criteria do we judge the accuracy of a representation? If one
representation is as good as the next, how can we tell who is telling the most
accurate story? Or is there no truth to tell? The notion of accuracy haunts us
especially in the face of the so-called revisionist movement of pseudo-historians
who claim, in one way or another, that the Holocaust is a myth. Does the
postmodern crisis of representation allow for this kind of thinking? Does this
crisis open the door to any discourse? Petra Munro asks, “When history is no
longer about represention [in the classcial sense] what then? (1997, p. 3) The
“what then” is the crisis about which I am most concerned. And the “what then”
leads Wolfgang Iser to question “whether one could continue to speak of
'representation' at all” (1989, p. 249). But how can we describe what we see?
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A more moderate and convincing position around the re-working of the
notion of representation is W.J.T. Mitchell’s. Mitchell (1994) suggests, first, that
representations are not only visual, but also verbal. He declares that
representation is like a “visible language, a form that combines sight and sound,
picture and speech” (1994, p. 14). Further Mitchell argues that images are not
separated from words, as Sartre (1948) and others hold, but are rather “already
immanent in the words, in the fabric of description" (1994, p. 99). By collapsing
images and words, in what Mitchell calls “image-texts” (p. 91), we avoid
dualisms that split lived experience up neatly into categories. Image-texts,
Mitchell declares, are always already “a site of conflict, a nexus where political,
institutional, and social antagonisms play themselves out” (p. 91).
Representations, then, are “not a homogeneous field or grid of relationships
governed by a single perspective” (p. 419). Stressing that representations are
couched in a “cultural field" ( p. 57), Mitchell points to the complexities of
interpreting how we experience our world. The seer is also hearer and engages
in an active way with the text of the world. Martin Lister calls this engagement
“interactivity” (1995, pp. 19-20). No longer am I a passive eye/ “I," a spectator
who allows the world to pass by, but rather I am an active being who is merged
with the woof and web of the world. I am an active being who is interconnected
in elusive ways to cultural texts. Mitchell also suggests that we ought to think of
representation as a “set of relationships” (1994, p. 47) and not as a “kind of
object” (p. 420). Representation is a “process in which the thing is a participant”
(p. 470). Although Mitchell’s position is perhaps the most useful way I have
found to talk about the notion of representation, I still think that as long as our
discourse uses the word representation itself to describe the way we
experience the world, it will always conjure up subject-object dualisms. The
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“thing” Mitchell talks about as being a participant in the process of
representation is still something which resides outside of the person who
experiences it. Further, representation still conjures up the appearance/ reality
split postmodems have tried to overturn. Thus, the crisis of representation is
also a crisis of language.
Jan Jagodzinski (1997) suggests that what is important for scholars to
think about are the possible “effects” (p. 90) of representation. And I argue that
one of these effects that tends to get overlooked in the debate over
representation is the emotional response we have to textual representation. Of
course, the emotional response is not separated from the intellectual one, and
in fact, they are interconnected in highly complex ways. But I think scholars
need to pay more attention to how they feel when trying to understand what a
particular representation means. Emotional responses to texts emerge with all
sorts of complexities and ambiguities associated with reading and interpreting.
Interpreting texts, though, cannot become a productive or generative act if I
have not sorted out my emotional response to the text with which I am working.
And if I feel outraged by the way in which subjects are represented in texts, what
am I to do?
Historical Overview of Anti-Semitism
Here, I would like to examine what I term Jew hating texts and I would
like to suggest that unexamined emotional responses to these texts, these
representations, lead to internalizing hate. Internalization leads to self-hatred.
Self-hatred damages. What is disturbing to me is that, as Linda Nochlin points
out, Jews and anti-Semites have “the same representational trajectory” (1995,
p. 10). Therefore, it becomes crucial to examine Jew hating texts in order to
understand how the Jew has been created. Once we grapple with this, it
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becomes possible to break the inscription of Jew hatred by re-imagining who
we are. I will also argue that my understanding of the notion of representation
may determine how I interpret and interact with these texts, and this ultimately
affects how I construct my own image of who I am. If I understand representation
to mean that images in the text correspond to real people in the world, then my
interpretation of this text may collude with Jew hatred. However, if I understand
representation to mean that images in the text do not correspond to real people
in the world, then I may resist the image in the text, not appropriate it, and
perhaps avoid taking up self-hatred. But if the images in these texts do not
correspond to real people in the world the question might arise as to why I
should take these texts seriously in the first place. If these images are bizzare
phantasies of anti-Semites why should I bother reading them at all? I will argue,
indeed, that these representations of Jews by Jew haters are utter phantasy and
do not have anything to do with real Jews. These representations spring from
paranoia and hatred. If I am concerned about the emotional effects of
representation and examine these texts as events that co-arise with my own
identity formation, I might take them very seriously because I understand that
texts are co-textual with my very being. No matter what I think of these texts, they
will impact my own self-formation.
Who is the anti-Semite? Perhaps to ask the question is immediately
problematic because anti-Semites are produced out of many cloths. Jean-Paul
Sartre(1946) argues that there is an essential anti-Semite. Sartre declares that
the anti-Semite “has chosen hate” (p. 18). And hatred is a “passion” (p. 17) that
“involves the entire personality of the anti-Semite” (p. 33). Sartre argues that
anti-Semitism is not just an “opinion” (p. 33) but a way of being in the world.
Further, anti-Semitism is “a basic sadism” (p. 46) and thus the anti-Semite has a
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“profound sexual attraction toward Jews” (p. 46). But perhaps there is no
essential anti-Semite, just as there is no essential Jew. Paul Rose (1990) points
out, as against Sartre, that when one examines many German anti-Semites,
their profiles are quite contradictory. German anti-Semites, says Rose, are often
“simultaneously revolutionary and national, “left” and “right"" (xvi). Rose tries to
suggest that within the character of a single individual, all of these contradictory
stances around Jew hating emerge. Martin Luther and St. Paul are good
examples of these contradictions. They both despised and felt at certain times in
their lives benevolence toward Jews.
Ernst Rappaport (1975) argues that the anti-Semite has introjected his
hatreds during early childhood. Both parents and teachers, says Rappaport, are
responsible for cultivating Jew hatred. Ackerman and Jahoda (1950) argue that
introjection, imitation and conformity shape the anti-Semite. Freud (1920-1922)
suggested that imitation is key when looking at the formation of aggression
within groups. The horde mentality allows defense mechanisms to
vanish, unleashing all sorts of hatreds. Freud suggests that group ties are
bound by thanatos and eros. Freud claims that, at bottom, group ties are sexual.
Is there something sadistic about the anti-Semite, as Sartre (1946) claimed?
Ackerman and Jahoda (1950) argue that the anti-Semite suffers from
““paranoia,” “character disorders,” “sado-masochism” and other “psychotic"
personality types” (p. 25). Adorno (1950), Fromm (1941/1969) and Horkheimer
(1950) also argued that anti-Semites are sadistic.
However, recent Holocaust scholarship questions these earlier positions
around the nature of the anti-Semite. Lifton (1986), Browning (1998),
Goldhagen (1997) and Langer (1998) argue that German anti-Semites, for the
most part, were not sadistic. And even if some were, Langer argues that “sadism
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and psychotic rage" cannot explain mass murder (1998, xii). These scholars
contend that anti-Semites were “ordinary Germans," not sadistic psychopaths.
When scholars suggest that hatred is caused primarily by introjection,
they are suggesting that hatred is internalized from without. This internalization
is then projected back out onto scapegoats. As I mentioned earlier, this is most
fundamentally a Fairbairnian or Kohutian position. People are not natual born
killers, these analysts would argue; they become killers because the
environment encourages this. Fairbairn and Kohut would argue that when
young children are abused by significant others, this early introjection of the bad
object permanently ruins the child. The child becomes self-hating and then
projects this hatred onto the world and onto the other. But what is it that he
projects? The anti-Semite projects that shadow side of himself which he
cannot integrate; he projects his heart of darkness onto the other, he rids
himself of any negativities. Peter Loewenberg (1995) explains this complicated
move of projection:
The delusional position of Jew haters is that they
must persecute the Jew because they themselves
are persecuted by the Jews because of the projective
quality of the fantasies of persecution
Jews are
always demagogically accused of the very crimes
that are about to be committed against them___
Those who martyr and kill Jews actually are
expunging the asocial anti-religious, ambivalent
part of themselves, (p. 188)
The cycle of introjection and projection continues throughout life, as Melanie
Klein teaches. But ultimately it is projection that marks the anti-Semite. As
Ackerman and Jahoda (1950) remark, it is “the mechanism of projection [which]
permeates the entire personality of the anti-Semite" (p. 56). A Kleinian
interpretation of the anti-Semite might suggest that he is stuck in the paranoid100
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schizoid position. Recall, here human subjectivity is guided by bizarre
phantasies of the mother as bad breast. She is the persecutor. These
phantasies have no basis in reality; the badness comes not from the mother but
from the child’s phantasies that the mother is bad. The implication is that
original sin lies within. Hatred is not brought about by external factors, but it is
bom actually within the heart of humanity. Klein would argue that human beings
are natural born killers. Aggression is innate. And Freud would agree.
Who is the anti-Semite? Who knows. What makes him hate remains a
mystery. Anti-Semites are everywhere and are every type of person imaginable.
They are American, German, Austrian; they are Christian, Muslim and athiest.
There is no essential anti-Semite as Sartre would have us believe. But some
scholars feel that the basic characteristics of anti-Semitism are “uniform"
(Yardeni, 1990; Rose, 1990; Carmichael, 1992; Nicholls, 1993). These scholars
suggest that there is a certain continuity about anti-Semitism because of its long
and intense presence. However, Wistrich (1990/1991) argues that antiSemitism, in spite of this continuity, continually changes form. Although Jew
hating texts have been a continuous phenomena throughout Western history,
specific images and representations of Jews have changed over time, to fit the
times.
There is much debate in the literature around the term anti-Semitism
itself. The word itself did not appear until 1879 as it was coined by Wilhelm
Marr. Therefore, some historians and theologians insist that when we are
talking about Jew hatred we need to draw a distinction between what many
theologians term anti-Judaism and anti-Semitism. There is little consensus
here, though. When exactly anti-Semitism begins is debated. Some argue that
we can draw a distinction between these terms even before the arrival of the
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nineteenth century. For example, Gavin Langmuir (1990) suggests that we can
begin to call Jew hatred anti-Semitic with the appearance of irrational
phantasies Christians had about Jews in the medieval era. It is this irrationality
that makes them anti-Semitic. Langmuir names four such irrational phantasies:
that Jews ritually crucified Christian children, used
human blood and flesh in their rituals, tortured the
wafers of the Eucharist, and sought to destroy
Christendom by sowing the Black Death, (p. 302)
If we want to talk about irrational phantasies Christians had of Jews, we
can trace these even farther back in history to perhaps the biblical John who
calls Jews devils (Lazar, 1991). Why does Langmuir draw the distinction
between anti-Judaism and anti-Semitism where he does historically? Is he
trying to exonerate the early church by suggesting that anti-Judaism, because it
was not irrational, was not as bad or as morally reprehensible as medieval Jew
hatred? Heiko Oberman warns that “The search for the root [of anti-Semitism]
conceals the dangers of wishing to absolve Christianity entirely in every period"
(1984, xi).
Anti-Semitism and anti-Judaism basically underscore the same agenda:
Jew hatred. When scholars attempt to drive a wedge between these two terms,
John Weiss tells us that they tend to miss the “strong influence of Christian antiJudaism on modern secular racism” (1996, x). Thus, the terms anti-Judaism and
anti-Semitism conceal more than they reveal. And one of the things that they
conceal is that both, in many ways, are forms of hatred. It is one thing to be
against Judaism as a system of ideas, but it is another thing to hate the
followers of this religious movement and to persecute and kill them for their
beliefs. Anti-Judaism and anti-Semitism are nothing more than euphemisms for
Jew hatred. Thus, I suggest we call this thing what it is: Jew hatred.
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Nicolas de Lange claims that the word anti-Semitism is “itself antiSemitic in that it assumes the existence of a Semitic (i.e. Jewish) race” (1991,
pp. 21-22). Semitic, Robert Wistrich explains, was a term that described, first,
language groupings “including Hebrew, Arabic, Aramic, Babylonian, Assyrian,
and Ethiopian” (1991, xvi). So-called Aryan languages were associated with
Sanskrit, Greek, Latin, Celtic and Gothic (Poliakov, 1975). Leon Poliakov
suggests that in the nineteenth century William Jones attempted to show that
Sanskrit, Greek, Latin, Celtic and Gothic had similar linguistic structures.
Poliakov argues that the point of this assumption was to “attribute preeminence
to the Indian language" (1975, p. 311). August Wilhelm Schlegel also claimed
the “superiority" (p. 312), Poliavok tells us, of the Indian language. These
languages were considered to be Ayran.
According to Lewis Hopfe (1991) the word Aryan means noble and was
used in the nineteenth century to describe people who lived in Iran prior to
about 1750 B.C.E. and spoke an early version of Sanskrit. Some of these
Iranians or Aryans are said, by some scholars, to have conquered the
Dravidians or pre-Aryan natives of India. Other scholars are not so sure. The
Dravidians could have perished from some natural disaster before the Aryans
arrived on the scene. The Aryans were responsible for developing both
Zoroastrianism in Persia, which is present day Iran, as well as Hinduism in
India. Poliakov (1975) declares that the word Aryan was coined by Johann
Gottfried Rhode and was made respectable among academicians by Oxford
scholar Max Muller.
Poliakov suggests that the trouble for Jews started when the “West
decided to establish a new geneaology for itself” (1975, p. 321). When people
such as Rhodes and Muller legitimated the supposed superiority of a so-called
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Aryan race, they invented a new way to think about themselves, a way that
denigrated the Jews. Christians wanted to detach themselves from their
historical relatedness to Jews. Still, Poliakov points out that “the Ayran m yth...
was modeled on the biblical myth while trying to free itself from it” (1975, p.
312). Once Christians udiscoveredn their new roots, their relatedness to IndoEuropean Iranians or Aryans, they could boast of their supposed superiority
over the Semites, or the Jews. This new-found geneaology served, in effect, as
a justification for oppressing the other, the Jew.
It is no accident that the term anti-Semitism arrived on the scene when it
did. In 1879, when Wilhelm Marr coined this term, Jews had been already under
fierce pressure to assimilate into European culture. And many Jews did
assimilate, perhaps following the lead of Moses Mendelsohnn. Those who
assimilated and dropped the old style of dress, and the use of Yiddish, began to
blend into European culture. However, Poliakov declares that “the more like
Christians they became, the more mysterious, elusive and frightening they
appeared” (1975, p. 460). Thus, naming Jews “Semites" was a way to define
the other, supposedly in a clear and distinct term, just precisely at the moment
when Jews began to look and sound like everyone else. In addition, the notion
of a Jewish race or a “Semitic” race, then, served to drive the wedge between
Christians and Jews even deeper. The notion of race served to oppress. Robert
Wistrich points out that Ernest Renan and Christian Lassen “popularized the
racial concept of ‘Semites’” (1991, p. 47). Today, much of our discourse take
these notions of the Semite and anti-Semite for granted. These terms, however,
are social constructions which now have become very difficult to untangle.
Anti-Semitism as a political movement emerged, according to Nicholas
de Lange, "between the Franco-Prussian war and the Second World War”
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(1991, p. 21). Robert Wistrich (1990) traces the anti-Semitic political movement
to the 1890s. Wistrich and Rose (1990) agree that anti-Semites politically were
both leftists and rightists, and sometimes both simultaneously. Disturbingly,
Wistrich points out that it was historian Heinrich von Treitschke who “gave
academic legitimacy and respectability” to the first anti-Semitic movement in
Berlin, led by Adolf Stoecker (1991, p. 59).
However we choose to define anti-Semitism, its premises can be traced,
without a doubt, to early Christianity. It can be traced as far back as Paul who
lived around 50 C.E.. Leon Poliakov insists that “a history of anti-Semitism is
first and foremost a theological history" (1975, p. 397). Thus, at this juncture I
would briefly like to trace this theological history in order to show how pervasive
Jew hatred is in Christian doctrine.
Robert Wistrich (1991) says of the biblical Paul that it was he who was
“most responsible for the detaching of Jesus from his Jewish background, for
the shifting of guilt for the crucifixion from the Romans to the Jews" (pp. 14-15). It
was not until Vatican II, in 1962, when the Roman Catholic Church formally
retracted this position. Jew hatred, thus, stems primarily from this belief that
Jews are nothing more than Christ-killers.
Unlike Paul, the biblical figure John talked about Jews in language that
was much more vitriolic. Mosche Lazar relates that John was the first Christian
writer “to transform the Jews from human beings into a mythical and monsterous
race” (1991, p. 44). John is the first Christian writer, says Lazar, to “identify the
Jews with the devil” (p. 44). Some theologians attribute the book of Revelation
to John, others attribute it to John’s disciples. Nonetheless, John’s teachings
about the Jews and the end time or the eschaton instigated, in part, the actual
apocalypse which occurred between 1933 and 1945 for European Jews. Of
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course, Christian teachings cannot be blamed for the Holocaust. Certainly there
were many other factors leading up the that event. Still, Christian theological
doctrine against Jews had much to do with fostering Jew hatred.
Unlike the biblical writers, the church fathers, or the patristic writers,
codified Jew hatred in what was called “the adversos Judaeos tradition"
(Ruether, 1974, p. 137). Rosemary Radford Ruether explains that the church
fathers defined Christianity by what it was not. These writings against the Jews
became webbed into the very definition of what it meant to be a Christian. In
order to be considered a real Christian, then, you had to hate the Jews. If not,
you were thought to be a heretic. Ruether claims that the church fathers all
wrote tracts against the Jews. Cyprian, Tertullian, Augustine, Origen, Eusebuis,
Chrysostom all engaged in Jew hating dogma. Along with these, Robert
Wistrich (1991) adds even more names to Ruether’s list. He tells us that Gregory
of Nyssa, St. Jerome and St. Ambrose wrote Jew hating tracts too. Jews were
imaged by Chrysostom as “theives, grave robbers, and sorcerers" (Ruether,
1974, p. 143). Jews “sacrificed their children to demons" (p. 128). Whatever the
Jews were charged with, Ruether points out that it was “axiomatic in the
adversos Judaeos tradition that Jewish reprobation is permanent and
irrevocable” (p. 144).
Even though the patristics were filled with Jew hatred, they felt, at least
until the Inquisition, that Jews had a place in God’s world. Jeremy Cohen
suggests that it was Augustine “who had ordained the survival of the Jews... so
that they would convert at the end of days” (1982, p. 14). Changes, though,
toward the Jews could be seen after the death of St. Anselm around 1104 C.E.
Cohen (1982) claims that according to Amos Funkenstein, Anselm’s followers
justified killing Jews because it seemed the ‘reasonable’ thing to do. The real
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changes in attitude toward Jews, however, came during the Inquisition.
Franciscans and Dominicans were responsible for the move from tolerance to
murder. “It was they who developed the papal Inquisition... [the Franciscans
and Dominicans] directed the burnings of the Talmud” (Cohen, 1982, p. 13).
Along with the Inquisitors, Martin Luther, an early reformer and initiator of
what later became known as Protestantism, raged against the Jews. Luther's
three writings against the Jews, That Jesus Christ was Born a Jew (1523/1962):
Against the Sabbatarians: Letter to a Good Friend (1538/1971); and The Jews
and their Lies (1543/1971), became deeply etched in the hearts and minds of
Germans for centuries to come. Paul Rose notes that "Luther legitimated
hysteria and paranoia in a major European culture" (1990, p. 8). Luther was not
alone in advocating this. There were others like Johannes Pfefferkorn who,
according to Heiko Oberman (1984), distributed the highest number of
pamphlets against the Jews during the early Reformation. However, Pfefferkorn
was relatively unknown. Luther was not unknown, especially after 1517 when
he nailed his Ninety Five Theses on the door of the Wittenberg Church in
Germany.
When we trace Luther's writings, it becomes apparent that he changes
his position around Jews as he grows older. By 1538 Luther grows more and
more angry toward Jews. By 1543 he is a fierce Jew hater. Paul Rose suggests
that scholars who support the thesis that there was a “young pro-Jewish,” but an
“old anti-Jewish” Luther are nothing more than “apologists” (1990, p. 7). Rose
claims that Luther was always an anti-Semite and “throughout his life Luther
longed for the destruction of Judaism” (p. 7). I would like to make two comments
about Rose’s claims. First, I do not consider myself, in any way, an apologist for
Luther because I argue that it was not until 1538 that we can say that Luther
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was a Jew hater. I do not hold, however, that Luther was ever “pro-Jewish." He
was tolerant of Jews in his early days. But tolerance does not mean pro-Jewish.
Secondly it is impossible to determine Rose's claim that Luther always
longed for the destruction of Judaism. We do not see this kind of language until
1538. If Luther did long to destroy the Jews, he does not say it until 1538. It is
hard to say what Luther wished for all along. Thus, Rose’s claim, I think, is
exaggerated.
Here, I want to show how Luther's attitudes toward Jews evolved
between 1523 and 1543. Let us first turn to Luther's 1523 work entitled That
Jesus Christ was born a Jew. Luther wishes to persuade Jews to convert to
Christianity. "I hope that if one deals in a kindly way with the Jews and instructs
them carefully from Holy Scriptures many of them will become genuine
Christians” (1523/1962, p. 200). I suppose conversion of Jews could be
interpreted broadly to mean “destruction of Judaism” (Rose, 1990, p. 7). But I
take “destruction" to mean something much more radical like burning down
synagogues. Luther argues in this early work that Jews are, in a way, important
for Gentiles because “Jews are of the lineage of Christ” (p. 201). We hear
echoes of St. Paul, who in the Letter to the Romans suggests that Christians are
like branches and Jews are like roots of the same tree; thus, Jews should be
respected because they are historically related to Christians, and Judaism
serves as the foundation for Christianity. It is clear that both Paul and Luther felt
torn by the presence of Jews; they expressed both benevolence and hostility
toward them. Luther wants to “help" (p. 229) Jews “by the law of Christian love”
(p. 229). He declares “we must receive them cordially, and permit them to trade
and work with us” (p. 229). But Luther does not remain friendly toward Jews.
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In 1538 Luther's tone begins to change toward the Jews. In Against the
Sabbatarians: Letter to a good Friend. Luther has grown frustrated, it seems,
because his mission to convert Jews has not been successful. Luther
comments, “the Jewish people have become very stubborn because of their
rabbis. As a result they are very difficult to win over” (1538/1971, p. 65). In this
piece, Luther talks much about the “terrible sins" (p. 67) of the Jews. The worst
sin, according to Luther, is that the Jews killed Christ. The Jews “must have
committed gruesome and terrible sins previously unheard of on earth” (p. 67).
And for these “gruesome" sins the Jews “deserved complete destruction" (p.
71). Here is the passage to which Rose (1990) probably refers.
It is not entirely clear why Luther turned against the Jews in his later
years, but he did, and by 1543 Luther’s words become scandalous and almost
unbearable to read, especially for Jews. In On the Jews and their Lies. Luther
sets the stage for what is to happen in Europe. It is disturbing to note that the
Nazis reprinted this material and distributed it throughout Germany. It is here
that some might begin to draw connections between Luther and Hitler. Others
might contend that this connection is inappropriate because, for one thing, the
two men lived centuries apart. And it must seem almost blasphemous for
Lutherans to even think that this connection might be possible. Nevertheless,
Paul Rose (1990) suggests that Luther and Hitler “remain uniquely
charismatically German figures. They were both charismatics in whom
revolutionary and reactionary impulses flowed together.. . . It will not do to
dismiss these parallels as pure accidents” (p. 8).
Like Paul Rose, Erik Erikson (1962), in a psychobiography called Young
Man Luther, suggests that there is a connection between Luther and Hitler.
Erikson declares that “Hitler was a totalitarian leader. Luther became the leader
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of a rebellion to o ... trends in him [in Luther] may have prepared his nation for
the acceptance of a leader like Hitler” (p. 109). Erikson claims that Luther, like
Hitler, suffered from borderline personality disorder. Robert Waite, who also
suggests that Hitler suffered from borderline personality disorder, tells us that
“borderline patients characteristically show paranoid tendencies. They...
fantasize about their 'magical omnimpotence’. .. [they have] an impulse to self
destruction... [they are] oral-aggressive... narcissistic... [they have] phobias
about dirt, feces” (1977, p. 357). Luther, Erikson claims, matches the borderline
personality profile: He suffered from “suspiciousness, obsessive scrupulosity,
moral sadism, and a preoccupation with dirtying infectious thoughts” (1962, p.
60). Luther also suffered from occasional psychotic episodes. The most famous
episode that has been passed down to us from chroniclers of Luther’s life
concerns the devil. Luther hallucinated that “the devil [was] sitting on a rainpipe
outside his window, exposing his behind to him” (Erikson, pp. 58-59). Erikson
remarks that Luther was “compulsively retentive” (p. 176).
Upon analyzing Hitler's mental topography, many scholars point out that
his behavior was, in many ways, very much like Luther's. Later I will tease out
what it is some of the psychobiographers of Hitler have to say. However, for now
I would like to raise a few questions. Erikson offers an interesting psychological
portrait of Luther. But I think making comparisons between Luther and Hitler is
problematic. Whenever we compare two individuals we tend to oversimplify.
Diagnosing Hitler and Luther as borderline personalities, labeling both as
having the same character type, reduces them to the same. One of the
dangerous implications here is that these characterological portraits suggests
that there is some innate thing or essence lurking in the psyche of all Germans.
There is no essential Germanness and I think that this is the implication of
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arguments like these. Even if Luther and Hitler were borderline personality
types, they were still radically different men who lived in different eras. Both,
however, were products of culture, of a Christian culture which has always
perpetuated anti-Semitism. Still, Erikson’s psychobiography is important and it
does give us some insight into Luther's ravings. However, I caution that
psychobiographies that claim to get into the mind of their subject are suspect
because it is impossible to know what it was that really motivated Luther.
In On the Jews and their Lies. Luther gave “advice” to Christians about
what they should do with Jews. And it is this so-called advice that is really
frightening, especially for post-Holocaust readers. Luther declares, “F irst.. . set
fire to their synagogues or schools and... bury and cover with dirt whatever will
not burn” (1543/1971, p. 268). Luther goes on to say that if Moses “were alive
today [he] would be the first to set fire to the synagogues and house of the Jews”
(p. 269). Luther’s advice continues:
I advise that all their prayer books and Talmudic
writings be taken from them ... I advise that their
rabbis be forbidden to teach... I advise that safe
conduct on the highway be abolished completely.. .
I advise that usury be prohibited to them, and that
all cash and treasure of silver and gold be taken
from them and put aside for safe keeping, (pp. 269-270)
Luther also says in this piece that the Jews are “base, whoring people” (p. 167).
Their “law must be accounted as filth” (p. 167). Jews are like a “defiled bride..
.an incorrigible whore and evil slut” (p. 166). And thus, Luther put the nail in the
coffin for European Jews. What gives these rantings legitimacy is that Luther
was basically the founder of Protestantism. However, other Protestant
reformers, unlike Luther, did not feel this way toward Jews. John Weiss points
out that Luther “was the only important Protestant leader who believed in the
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irredeemable corruption of Jewry. John Calvin and Ulrich Zwingly.. .were not
obsessed with the Jewish refusal of Christ” (1996, p. 25).
Along with Luther, many Catholics during the Counter Reformation
argued that Jews were evil and must be dealt with. Pope Paul IV, according to
John Weiss, decreed that the Reformation “was a Jewish-inspired plot to
destroy the Vatican" (1996, p. 30). Robert Wistrich recounts that the Counter
Reformation brought with it the "introduction of ghettos in the second half of the
16th century, first in Italy and then in the Hapsburg Empire” (1991, p. 37). Thus,
Catholics were no friend to Jews either.
Ironically, when the church lost its grip on the West and secular culture
gained a foothold, especially during the rise of scientism, Jewish oppression
increasingly worsened, although in some regions Jew hatred seemed to fade.
However, in Austria and Germany it did not fade; It got worse. John Weiss
(1996) declares that it was during the Napoleonic era that Jew hatred began to
grow. Moreover, Robert Wistrich (1990) claims that it was not difficult for secular
culture to embrace Jew hatred. In fact, Wistrich comments that "the task of
integrating anti-Semitism into the mainstream of central European culture was
greatly facilitated b y... Luther, Kant, Goethe, and Fichte... Hegel, Feuerbach,
Schopenhauer, Richard Wagner” ( p. 39). Interestingly enough, Leon Poliakov
(1985) declares that Germans were far surpassed in the intensity of their Jew
hatred by the French, especially during the Dreyfus Affair (1898-1900).
European Jew hatred, no doubt, was much more dangerous than it ever
has been in the United States. However, David Gerber contends that “European
images [of Jews] were embedded in the American consciousness in the first half
of the 19th century” (1986, pp. 22-23). In spite of the fact that European imagesstereotypes- of Jews crept into American culture, many historians seem to
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agree that America has always been an exceptional place for Jews. Americans
seem to tolerate Jews more so than Europeans. This toleration is termed
“American exceptionalism” (Gerber, 1986, pp. 9-10). The idea that America is
an exceptional place for Jews has gone basically unchallenged until around the
1970s. Since the 1970s many argue that the description of America as an
exceptional place for Jews is not entirely accurate (Gerber, 1986; Dinnerstein,
1994; Learner, 1986). This position presupposes that Jew hatred is virtually
absent in America. But David Gerber claims that the “lack of anti-Semitism in the
American past’ has more to do with “the concerns of historians" (p. 9) than with
the experiences of Jews living in America.
it seems that historians have been so concerned to show how Jews have
helped build America as a nation that they omitted the story about Jew hatred
because they felt it would make things worse for Jews (Gerber, 1986). And so
historians sanitized and erased Jew hatred in America. Historians, keepers of
memory, altered the ways in which Jews talk about living in the United States.
Jew hatred is here and has been here since the Puritans arrived. But why Jew
hatred in America did not lead to the brutalities it did in Europe is difficult to
answer. Lucy Dawidowicz suggests that America s history of non-violence
against Jews has to do with Puritan doctrine. Puritans embraced a “philoHebraic strain” (1982, p. 29) and “encouraged a neutral interest in Judaism
[and] at times even a favorable one" (p. 29). Perhaps, in part, Puritan philoSemitism kept back the tide of hatred. But philo-Semitism is merely the flip side
of anti-Semitism and one wonders why these extremes did not lead to overt
violence.
It was not until 1994 that American Jew hatred was grappled with in an
extensive way. Leonard Dinnerstein compiled the first “comprehensive survey
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(1994, vii) of anti-Semitism in the United States. Another alarming facet of Jew
hatred in America is the ways in which university and school officials handled
Jewish presence in their institutions. Many universities developed policies to
keep Jews out. Dinnerstein (1994) claims that Harvard, Princeton, Williams,
Yale, The University of Pennyslvania, Columbia and a host of others limited the
number of Jewish students and faculty allowed in their institutions. Dinnerstein
declares that
before the 1920s few Jews had earned doctorates...
This was especially true in the disciplines of English
and History where it was thought inconceivable for
a Jew to transmit or comprehend the culture or
traditions of an American Christian society, (p. 87)
Universities were not alone in discriminating against Jews. David Gerber says
that between 1920 and 1945 “Jews in Minneapolis... were never employed in
public schools” (p. 28). And, of course, this was no accident.
Times have changed and Jews in America certainly have it better today
than in the past. But Jew hatred still thrives. Under every unturned stone, hatred
is getting ready to be born. And in Europe, notably in Germany, Jack Zipes
(1991) warns that Jew hatred is on the rise again. The message here is that
Jews must never become complacent. Mortimer Ostow wisely points out that he
is not
reassured by the fact that for American Jewry, this
might be called a golden age... Jews have enjoyed
similar golden ages in the past, in Babylonia, in Spain,
in Italy, in Poland... and yet changes in the political,
economic, or military situations have brought each
golden age to an end whereupon anti-Semitism revived.
(1996, pp. 1-2)
Thus, historical memory teaches that hatreds brew around every comer and it is
crucial to keep awake and sniff out odors of hatred. Hatred must be undone.
114

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Effects of Anti-Semitic Representations
Throughout the long history of Jew hatred, troubling images or
representations of Jews have appeared in almost every country in the West.
What is interesting about these representations is how varied they are. In fact,
Linda Nochlin comments that “only mutally exclusive categories would seem
large enough to encompass the totality of our iniquity” (1995, p. 7). At this
juncture I would like to paint a montage of these hideous images. The question I
will ask here is, How do these representations affect Jewish subjects?
Let us begin with Peter the Venerable (1092-1156). Peter the Venerable
called the Jews “beasts" (Cohen, 1982, p. 28). During the thirteenth century,
Jewish males were thought to be sexually “damaged" (Gilman, 1995, p. 75)
because of circumcision. Not only this, Gilman explains that some thirteenth
century Christians believed in “Jewish male menstruation. Thomas de
Cantimpre... presented the first ‘scientific’ statement of the phenomenon"
(1986, pp. 74-75). In around 1350 Jews were imaged as “bribers, secret killers,
sorcerers, magicians” (Wistrich, 1991, p. 29). Further, in medieval art, “Jews
were portrayed as agents of Satan, with evil faces, horns and a tail........
Sometimes the Devil might be seen in a painting or sculpture as riding on the
back of a Jew” (1991, p. 29). John Weiss claims that during the 14th century
Jews were imaged on “the sides of cathedrals... as scorpions or pigs” (1996, p.
19). During the Reformation, it was believed that Jews could “transform
themselves into demons and serpents” (p. 24). Napolean called the Jews
caterpillars who attempted to “ravage the countryside” (Poliakov, 1975, p. 226).
Poliakov says that Schopenhauer “vented against the ubiquitous “Jewish foul
odor” (1985, p. 7). Schopenhauer was not the only one to think that Jews had a
foul odor. Sander Gilman explains that this supposed foul odor of Jews could
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be traced back to the medieval era. Gilman explains that this odor was
connected with a mythology connected with the goat and the devil.
The smell of Jews, the foetor Judaicus, is
always associated with the Other. For Jews it is
a quality ascribed to them by the medieval anti-Semitism
that is linked with the sexualized image of the goat.
For Jews, like the devil, are horned and have a
goat’s tale and a goat’s beard. (1986, p. 174).
Paul Brienes (1990) comments that all of these types of representations
of Jews are ultimately “overshadowed by Nazism’s dead Jewish bodies” (p. 17).
Here I would like to turn to twentieth century images of dead Jewish bodies that
are displayed on the internet by the Holocaust Museum in Washington (1997).
Questions around representation become particularly difficult for many reasons
I hope to explore.
First, I would like to examine different ways of understanding these
photographs. Understanding these images as a source of evidence that the
Holocaust happened is the most obvious reason the Holocaust Museum has
such an exhibit on the internet. As against the rising tide of Holocaust deniers,
these computerized images prove that, indeed, the Holocaust happened. Thus,
the displays are important in a crude way. Here it is easy to be more
sympathetic with the realist view that photographs reflect their referent. As
Roland Barthes suggests, “the photograph [ or the computer image] is indifferent
to all intermediaries: it does not invent" (1981, p. 87).
If we understand these images from a constructivist stance, whereby the
image is constructed by the photographer looking through the grids of culture,
we might think that “photographs are as much an interpretation of the world as
paintings” (Sontag, 1977, pp. 6-7). Some scholars like W.J.T. Mitchell (1994)
might argue that these images are no less ‘real’ because they are constructed
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through cultural grids. Mitchell does not reduce everything to imagination or
phantasy; he complexifies how we understand the ways in which
representations or images are produced. However, when we begin to question
how these images were produced troubling questions enters the picture. Jan
Jagodzinski insists that we must ask the question: “Whose images are they?”
(1997, p. 139). According to Daniel Goldhagen (1997), most of the photographs
of Holocaust victims were taken by Nazi SS. The reason, he says, that we have
so many photographs is that the Germans insisted on taking them,even against
the wishes of their commanders. Goldhagen tells us that these photographs
were distributed among Germans and even placed in family albums. And if
someone wanted copies of the photos, they too, were available.
Most of the photos we find on the internet at the Holocaust Museum web
site were taken by Germans. Knowing that many of these photos were
displayed in family albums and were considered trophies by German police and
Nazi SS may undermine the viewer’s willingness to continue viewing this
internet site. Goldhagen comments that these photographs make certain that
“the victim’s shame would be displayed for years to come” (1997, p. 296). There
is something almost obscene about viewing these images. In fact, some might
even argue that viewing pictures like these is not dissimilar to the viewing of
pornography. W.J.T. Mitchell argues that the ““taking of human subjects by a
photographer... is a concrete social encounter, often between a damaged,
victimized, and powerless individual and a relatively privileged observer, often
acting as the 'eye of power’” (1994, p. 288).
The power relationships between photographer and that which is
photographed certainly demand interrogation. And in the case of the Holocaust
photos, we can see a dear power relation, with the victim losing every time.
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These photo-images affect both emotional and intellectual registers more
intensely than, say, images we read about during the medieval era. The images
produced out of the medieval era seem so remote and bizarre that the reader
may simply shake her head. But when viewing photos that are not so far off in
the distant past, we begin to understand the emotional impact images can have
on viewers. Further, we begin to see just how tangled the emotional and
intellectual registers are when attempting to sort out what is going on between
images, viewer, computer, photographers.
Intellectually, I can understand why these images are on the internet. At
one level people need to know that this event happened. We need to squash
revisionists’ myths at every turn. The internet is a good opportunity to get this
message across because it is global. However, emotionally, I think these
images are potentially damaging both to the memory of the victims and living
relatives of victims. In a way the victims’ memories are desecrated. There is
something really awful about this web site, but exactly what it is I do not know.
As Mitchell points out, uWe still do not know exactly what pictures are, what their
relationship to language is, how they operate on observers" (1994, p. 13). I
worry about how these images operate on me and on others because their
potential effects could be damaging to one’s psyche. Images and
representations are interdependent events with the eye/ T of both my intellect
and my emotions, with my very process of self-formation. But I am uncertain
about the impact of such an encounter. Homi Bhabha tells us that
the image-a point of identification- marks the site
of an ambivalence. As representation is always
spatially sp lit-it makes present something that is
absent-and temporally deferred: it is the
representation of a time that is always elsewhere
a repetition. (1994, p. 51)
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The site of ambivalence confuses my sense of identification with these
images. The distance I put between myself and the images, in some ways,
contributes to a sense of guilt that I feel, because I was graced by being bom
late and being bom in America and not in Europe. What makes me feel bad,
though, is that I think this web site is cheap. Susan Sontag reminds us that “the
main effects [of viewing photographs are] to convert the world into a department
store... every subject is depreciated into an article of consumption" (1977, p.
110). The consumption of corpses, or of dead bodies or near dead bodies, can
be had on this web site. Simply click on the word 'corpses' and a series of
images appear on your computer. The viewer can consume thousands of
images of corpses if she wishes. Photograph # 11472 reads “A wagon loaded
with corpses intended for burial at Buchenwald." Photograph # 74819 reads
“Corpses in the Woebbelin concentration camps.” Click on the word 'women'
and you can see many photographs of women about to be executed.
Photograph # 76461 reads “A woman about to be executed in Belzec
concentration camp.” Photograph # 43195 reads “German police and Ukrainian
collaborators in civilian clothes look as Jewish women are forced to undress
before their execution.”
After clicking on various places on this web site, after viewing hundreds
of photos like these, one simply becomes numb to them. Susan Sontag (1977)
explains that “After repeated exposure to the image it... becomes less real” (p.
20). She comments that “images anethestize” (p. 20). And this would be the
crime. The effects of viewing these photographs on the Jewish subject are not
clear. The effects of reading anti-Semitic texts are not clear either. It becomes
difficult to avoid internalizing hatred. But we must continually try to undo the
hate. Self-hatred is destructive. Keeping psychological distance intact when
119

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

enountering anti-Semitic texts is crucial. But I do not think that it is possible to
completely break the inscription. Texts get introjected into readers in strange
ways that we really do not understand. But perhaps trying to articulate feelings
and responses to these texts is a start.
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CHAPTER 4
MEMORY AND HISTORY
Asked by a reporter if he had forgiven the Nazis,
Wiesel answered: “I didn’t speak about forgiving.. . .
Nobody asked me to forgive, nobody authorized me
to forgive. I speak on behalf of memory without
hatred, and I think memory, in my case, is a shield
against hatred”. (Kemptser & Chen, 1999 p. 22)
Elie Wiesel tells us that remembering the Holocaust does not mean
forgiving the perpetrators. Remembering the Holocaust does not mean making
“meaning’’ out of it either. Lawrence Langer comments that “When asked if there
were any meaning in the Holocaust, historian Raul Hilberg is said to have
replied “I hope not.”” (1998, xvi). The Holocaust and its remembrance is difficult
and yields difficult memories devoid of meaning. But this lack, this void, this
meaninglessness does not necessarily slide into nihilism because memory
work, as I see it, is a form of justice. As Edith Wyshogrod points out the memory
worker makes “ a promise to the dead to tell the truth about the past” (1998, xi).
Of course, this “truth" is not absolute but rather yields “truths” which reflect
differing perspectives and interpretations. Some truths are more adequate than
others. A radical relativism will not do.
The construction of memory, as Freud (1937-1939) explains, is also a
reconstruction of the past. And in spite of the complexities of interpretation,
memory work should attempt to get at that “kernal of truth" (Freud, pp. 267-268)
we call the Holocaust. But that kernal of truth is not exactly a construction or a
reconstruction, but a third thing; it is a translation. And that translation is always
already other. The text of the Holocaust is always a stranger to us and must
remain so if we want to avoid the trap of arrogance and domestication.
Translations of this event must always be tentative. Response to the call of
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doing interpretive work beckons. So we listen with caution and care.
Psychoanalytic memory work with Holocaust survivors is both a process of
construction and reconstruction. As analyst Dori Laub explains,
Indeed, historical reality [of the survivor’s memory] has
to be reconstructed before any other work can start.. . .
[Once the memory is reconstructed] the theraputic process
of constructing a narrative... [and] the re-externalization of the
event--has to be set in motion. (1992, p. 69)
Freud compares the process of memory work to archaeological excavation. He
contends that the “work of constructing [memory], or, if it is preferred, of
reconstructing, resembles to a great extent an archaeologist’s excavation of
some dwelling place that has been destroyed and buried” (1937-1939, p. 259).
The old sites of memory exist alongside the new ones; the ruins remain even if
they are buried. Holocaust survivors live alongside their memories and it is
unlikely that the memories fade. Ironically, Holocaust memories may intensify as
the survivor ages.
Paul Ricoeur suggests that memory workers “owe a debt to the past, a
dept of recognition to the dead" (1990, pp. 142-143). Remembering the dead,
remembering the victims and survivors of the Holocaust, is clearly an ethical
imperative. Not only is memory work an ethical imperative, it is also a religious
one. For Jews, Yerushalmi (1982) contends that memory is “felt as a religious
and ethical imperative" (p. 10). Yerushalmi explains that “Altogether the verb
Zakhar [to remember] appears in its various declensions in the bible no less
than one hundred and sixty nine times" ( p. 5).
Memory work is tied to loss, especially for Jews. When we examine the
etymology of the word memory, Edward Casey reminds us that MEMOR” the
Latin root means “to grieve" and the Greek uMERIMNAmmeans “sorrow”" (1987,
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pp. 273-264). Yet how can we remember an event that is so hideous as to
seem beyond representation, beyond thinkability, beyond understanding? And
how can a third generation Jew like myself remember this event? How can I do
justice to a memory that is three generations removed from me? With caution
and care.
We must be cautious never to domesticate the memory of the Holocaust
by making it more comfortable. This memory is difficult and unbearable, too
difficult to take in psychologically at times. We must never assimilate the
memory into our own lifeworld, but perhaps live alongside it: to remain a
stranger to it. We must never make the strange familiar. As Richard
Stammelman stresses
The extremity of the genocidal condition, its
unimaginability and horror, generate a difference,
a strangeness, an alterity lying beyond the powers
of thought, language, and memory. (1995, p. 267)
This memory refuses to be made into the same, the sameness of other
atrocities. This is a uniquely Jewish tragedy, not simply a humanitarian one.
Researchers must remain strangers to the event of the Holocaust, especially if
they did not actually live through this event. To say that research around the
Holocaust grants more understanding or better understanding may be a trap, a
trap of arrogance. What we understand is very little indeed. The complexities of
remembering the Holocaust are overlayed by the difficulties of psychologically
dealing with loss. Difficulties also abound because of the ways in which
memory comes to be inscribed in one's individual consciousness and memory
traces. Difficulties also abound because memory of the Holocaust may be
silenced within Jewish and German families. Silence haunts. Silence hovers.
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Collective and Personal Memory
Memory is not monolithic. Different kinds of collective memories abound.
Historical representations, oral histories passed down through generations,
literary representations, film, artwork, museums and other kinds of memorials all
point to our collective memory of this event. Iwona Irwin Zarecka remarks that “A
collective memory-as a set of ideas, images, feelings, about the past--is best
located not in the minds of individuals but in the resources they share" (1994, p.
41). Memory inscribed in individual consciousness tends to be blurred with the
collective because we are always already bom into a collective social setting.
The point here is that memory is never solipsistic, although it is individually
formed; yet it is always already culturally produced. There is a blurring between
my own personal memory and the memory that is handed down to me by my
family, school, and other cultural institutions.
George Herbert Mead (1913/1964) claimed that the self is social;
therefore, selfhood does not arise in a vacuum. Like Mead, Maurice Halbwachs
(1992) agrees that memory is not private or personal but rather it is primarily
social. "Yet it is in society that people normally acquire their memories” (1992, p.
38). Against these positions, I will contend that memory is not primarily social,
nor is it primarily personal; rather, it is a complex combination of both.
Collective memories arise for all sorts of political, ideological and
psychological reasons. Collective memory has everything to do with the politics
of national identity. Collective memory “defines such key ingredients as pride,
shame, fear, revenge

It is central to an understanding of nationalisms

(Markovits & Reich, 1997, p. 9). The collective memories of heroes and
resisters, rhetoric that is robed in anti-Fascist myth, overlays former East
Germany. These myths of Communist resisters of Fascism served to erase East
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German complicity in the perpetuation of crimes against Jews during the
Holocaust. Shameful national memories may tend to be repressed for decades.
Vichy, and the relatively late acknowledgement of France’s complicity with the
Holocaust, signals repressed memory. Maurice Halbwachs insists that we only
remember events in what he calls “collective frameworks" (1992, p. 40) which
are shaped by culture. “Collective memory is invoked to heal, to blame, to
legitimate. It has become a major idiom in the construction of identity, both
individual and collective." (Markovits & Reich, 1997, p. 9). These collective
frameworks function as frames which actually limit what it is we are able to
remember. For example, an American collective framework might be limited by
the mere fact that we were bystanders during the Holocaust. Bystander
perspectives, which are not monolithic, differ radically from victim or perpetrator
perspectives. Further, American culture might be limited in its “collective
framework” by its Puritanical character, as well as by its difficulty dealing with
race, ethnicity and violence. The American “collective framework” still may be
limited in its refusal to see Jews as Jews, Jews as other. Jewish Americans who
do not assimilate are still marginalized and are considered too Jewish. But at
the end of the day, the American “collective framework” is highly complex and
elusive. The notion of a “collective framework” becomes problematic because it
suggests that there is, in this case, an American character, an essential
Americanness. But America is made up of so many different kinds of people that
it becomes difficult to say what a collective framework is after all.
Memory is not only collective, it is also intensely personal. As Suzanne
Langer tells us “memory is the great organizer of consciousness. It simplifies
and composes our perceptions into units of personal knowledge. It is the real
maker of history” (1953, p. 263). And of course memory is not one thing, nor is it
125

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

even uone faculty” (Warnock, 1987, p. 14). Memory is dense and scaffolded both
horizontally and vertically over time and place. Some memory traces haunt
while others vanish. Mary Warnock remarks that “memory images are like
guests. Some are invited, even sought after, others invite themselves, they are
welcome or unwelcome” (1987, p. 16).
Recalling personal memory, especially of the Holocaust, becomes
complex because as Ruth Linden (1993) points out that “As we fashion the
stories of our lives, memories naturally blur with subsequent interpretations of
remembered events" (x). And memories seem to come up from deep recesses
in the psyche, arriving on the scene in their own time. Memories seem to have a
life of their own. Patricia Hampl suggests that “there's precious little order to the
slides [of memory] in the rotating carousel [of the mind]. Beyond that confusion,
who knows who is running the projector?" (1997, p. 66). The otherness of
memory leaves unconscious inscriptions, traces deposited in the sites of the
body. Memory is embodied and memories pain and course through the body.
At the end of the day memory is fuzzy.
Not only is memory fuzzy, its relation to history is fuzzy too. Saul
Friedlander (1993) and Eric Hobsbawn (cited in Friedlander, 1993) suggest that
memory and history have a fuzzy relation. In fact, Hobsbawn declares that
there is a twighlight zone between history and memory
between the past as a generalized record which is open
to relatively disspassionate inspection and the past as
part of, or background to, one's own life. (1993, viii, cited
in Friedlander)
This fuzziness between memory and history is also due, in part, to the fact that
“Memory is the raw material of history, whether mental, oral, or written, it is the
living source from which historians draw” (LeGoff, 1992, xi). And as Carl Becker
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declares, history is, in fact “the artificial extension of social memory” (1935, p.
248). However, Halbwachs argues that social memory differs from the notion of
history. For Halbwachs, collective memory is completely antithetical to history.
Markovits & Reich point out that for Halbwachs, “history is universalistic,
[whereas] collective memory is particularistic... history is timeless, collective
memory is an expression of feeling" (1997, p. 14). But bifurcations such as
these make little sense. History is the systematization of memory. History is
about the particular and may have universal significance, even if it does not
explain universal laws or apriori principles. Doing history involves both
cognition and emotion. History is both time-bound and subjective. Historians
work out of their own memories and the memories of their subjects. And
historians' renderings of the past are clearly affected by the ways in which they
remember the event itself, if, that is, they are writing about recent history. If
historians repress their own memories around the event that they are working
on, their interpretations will reflect this repression. Memory, however, is not the
same thing as history and I argue that history should not be collapsed onto
memory. As Jacques LeGoff stresses, this move would be “naive” (1992, xi).
Collapsing memory onto history or, conversely, polarizing memory and
history reduces the complexities of the past. Both of these ways in which to
explain memory suffer from the disease of a Cartesian logic which is an infantile
wish phantasy to move toward simpler and simpler ideas. Should not
explanations of the past be complexified?
Polarizing memory and history also results, usually, in valorizing history
at the expense of memory. Halbwach’s position clearly valorizes history at the
expense of memory. Memory is reduced to emotion and feeling, fragility and
unreliability. Early Holocaust scholarship appropriated this kind of position. One
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of the unfortunate consequences of such a position is the exclusion of voices of
the victims. Holocaust victims have been othered from their own history.
It is important to note that historians do not simply remember historical
events, they systematize events by relying on documents. Even though
documents are forms of memory, because they are constructed by human
beings who remember, doing history is still different from remembering. But
historians, if writing about recent history, do remember, and the ways in which
they remember ultimately shape their constructions of the past. Thus, history
and memory overlap in uncanny ways.
I think that memory, because it is the very stream out of which we operate
as human beings, is the larger category under which history is subsumed.
Therefore, I want to privilege memory, since it shapes consciousness,
perception, and lived experience in general. If anything, privileging memory
complexifies our notion of history because it risks getting lost in “the
unconquerable flow of time" (LeGoff, 1992, vii). History is a form of memory of
course, but it is not the same as memory. To signify this co-complex
interrelation, I term history a memory text. I emphasize that memory and history
are overlapping categories, yet they are not the same.
Whatever history is, it is ultimately ambiguous. Paul Thompson points
out, though, that "All history depends ultimately on its social purpose” (1988,
p.1). History may sen/e as a "justification of war,” as an "escape,” as a form of
what Thompson calls “Bland contemporary tourism which exploits the past as if
it were another foreign country to escape to . . . purged of social suffering,
cruelty and conflict" (1988, p. 1). Or some may feel that the purpose of history
may be to master and control the past. To write about history, in other words, is
a way of feeling that one is in control of the past. But the past is forever slipping.
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The dream of a “total history" corroborating the
historian's own desire for mastery of a documentary
repertoire and furnishing the reader with a vicarious
sense o f... control in a world out of joint has of course
been the lodestar of historiography from Hegel to
the Annales School. (LaCapra,1985, p. 25)
Before the discipline of history separated from philosophy of history in the
nineteenth century, philosophy of history, especially as instantiated in Hegel
and Marx, embraced a passion for control and mastery by offering up total
systems, or grand metanarratives and apriori principles, to which history might
adhere. Historical idealism was outstripped by historical empiricism and like
historical idealism, empirical studies, like Ranke’s and Bury’s, attempted to
match “facts" with reality in a correspondence-like fashion. But already in 1752
the epistemological basis of [history's]... ideal of
impartially copying or representing the real was
put into question... the German theologian Johann
Martin Chaldenius, elaborating a position outlined
by Leibniz and Bayle, made the concept of point of
view fundamental. (Grossman, 1990, p. 230)
Point of view, or interpretation, undermines the historian’s quest to master and
control the past, because interpretation and translation admit of slippage
between the signifier and the signified.
Some feel that the purpose of history serves to bolster national pride and
national identity,especially when a nation suffers from an embarassing past.
History, accordingly, is re-written to suit national and political agendas and
ideologies. For others, the purpose of history may revolve around the notion of
“conversation” (LaCapra, 1985, p. 36) with the past. LaCapra contends that
“historiography is dialogical in that, through it, the historian enters into a
“conversational" exchange with the past.. . . The problem is the nature of the
conversation” (1985, p. 36). For me, though, the purpose of history is ethical.
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Edith Wyshogrod remarks that the historian who embraces an ethics of
remembering “the historian when bound by a responsibility toward the dead for
whom she claims to speak becomes... the heteroiogical historian" (1998, p. 3).
The heteroiogical historian “feels the pressure of an ethics that is prior to
historical judgment” (p. 3). This “ethics of an ethics... would bring the dead to
life” (p. 3).
Constructing historical narratives opens questions around the ways in
which historians rely upon imagination. It opens questions around whether or
not history and fiction overlap. Georg Iggers suggests that history and fiction are
overlapping categories because the historian must rely on imagination. But he
stresses that history is not fiction. Iggers tells us that,
The panel on “Fictionality, Narrativity, Objectivity”
at the International Congress of Historical Sciences
in Montreal in 1995, was to occupy a middle position,
to recognize, as Roger Chartier formulated it, that
while “one among many forms of narration, history
is nevertheless singular in that it maintains a special
relation to truth. More precisely its narrative constructions
aim at reconstructing a past that really was. (1997, pp. 1-2)
I will argue that history, or what I term, the memory text of history, occupies this
middle position between construction and reconstruction and takes up a place
where a third thing resides. This is the third thing of translation (Edgerton,
1996).Translation is not exactly a correspondence and not exactly a fiction, but
something else, something complex, a translation of the other, the other of
history and the other of memory. And I argue that although history is “subject to
fiction” (Munro, 1998), it is not the same as fiction. Although historians draw on
imagination to construct narratives, history-making is constrained by the
discipline of history, and it is constrained in its attempts to make truth claims.
Thus, history and fiction, although overlapping, are not the same. As Paul
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Ricoeur suggests history and fiction are two different things, although both draw
on narrative and imagination. Historians do attempt to get at the reality of the
past. Fiction writers do not necessarily do this.
Whatever may be said about the selective aspect
of gathering, conserving, and consulting documents
or about their relationship to the questions historians
put to them, or even about the ideological implications
of all these maneuvers, the recourse to documents does
indicate a dividing line between history and fiction.
Unlike novels, historians’ constructions do aim at
being reconstructions of the past. (1990, pp. 142-143)
There is always already a tension between what has actually happened
in the past and our present interpretation of that event. There is a co-complex
interrelation between knowing what we remember and yet not fully
understanding what memory is in the first place. Part of the problem is that
memory is shot through with unconscious traces which may become manifest
as reversals, projections, resistances and transferences. The strangeness of the
unconscious or the otherness of the unconscious shapes memory in uncanny
ways. Memory is subject to many uncanny aporias.
This chapter will examine the aporias of memory and the aporias of
historical understanding as they have relevance to doing memory work around
the Holocaust. I will argue that the memory text of lived experience becomes
complexified because of unconscious traces. Memory and the unconscious are
inextricably tied. Memory of the Holocaust is subject to our own unconscious
operations. The memory text of history is also complexified because historians’
renderings of the past are indelibly marked by the unconscious.
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Memory, the Unconscious and the Holocaust
Edward Casey (1987) remarks that memory is “thick" (p. 265). Memory has a
“depth not easily penetrable by the direct light of consciousness... [and it is]
resistant to conceptual understanding [because it is] sedimented in layers" ( p,
265). Casey further declares that memory is “gappy” (p. 72) and this gappiness
results in “undefined and unlocalized particles of space” (p. 72). Thus,
memory’s gappiness can never fully recapture exact representations of the past,
but only “pastiches” (p. 72). And these pastiches come to us in what Casey
terms a “quasi-narrative” (p. 44) form primarily because “what is lacking in
memory is a proper narrative voice, the voice of an authoritative narrator who
spins out the tale” (p. 44). These quasi-narratives are situated first in what
Casey calls primary memory, but are more properly located in secondary
memory or recollection proper. In order to remember at all, an event must have
some “persistance” (p. 39). The “just-lapsed” (p. 39) memory traces must have
“prolongation” (p. 39) to be remembered at all. But unless the memory is an “ex
perience” (41), that is, unless the memory jolts us in some way as being
different from the perception of the just-passing by, recall will not happen later.
Primary memory, then, “occurs so continually and often so imperceptibly that we
rarely notice it at all" (p. 49).
The operation of actually recalling memory traces belongs to the realm of
secondary memory. Secondary memory is a form of “remembering again or
re-remembering” (p. 51). The function of secondary memory for Casey is “that of
rescuing former experiences from oblivion” (p. 50). And these recollections are
embodied and “emplaced” (p. 182). The body serves as an “intra-place" (p. 196)
or interior site which “opens out onto place,” (p. 182) as an exterior site. In other
words, memory for Casey, occurs in the interior place of the body but memory
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also flows outwards toward the world. Thus, memory has a kind of elastic quality
that stretches over places and bodies.
I draw on Casey's work because he stresses that memory is embodied.
And it is an embodied memory that pains Holocaust survivors. Memory literally
pains in the body. Because of the workings of the unconscious, memory is
subject to displacements and these displacements are embodied.
Psychological displacement is marked, as John Fletcher explains, by
Affective reactions that separate from and appear to
forget their circumstances of their genesis, becoming
bound to very different representations; the somatization
of hysteria... free-floating anxiety... transference [are
embodied memories that have been displaced]. (1999, p. 29)
Somatizations may manifest bodily traces such as sweaty palms, quickened
heartbeat, numbness, headaches, anxiety, panic attacks, nightmares,
depression, dissociation, phobias, paranoia, manic speech, defensive
reactions, psychosis and hallucinations. Memories that get repressed manifest
in displaced forms which get acted out in sites in the body. Displacements mark
a site that is out of joint with current lived experience. It would seem that nothing
in the present situation would warrant these somatizations. Memory traces
leave residues if they do not get worked through, at least partially.
These psychological interruptions of memory become sedimented over
time, especially for Holocaust survivors. When memory is repressed and
pushed down into the registers of the unconscious, the repressed returns and
haunts. Aaron Hass (1996) explains that it was William Niederland, who in
1964, coined the term “survivor syndrome,” (p. 1) which describes many kinds of
displacements of memory from which Holocaust survivors often suffer. Some of
the symptoms of displaced memory, according to Niederland include, “chronic
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anxiety, fear of renewed persecution, depression, recurring
nightmares... anhedonia... social withdrawl, fatigue... hallucinations, and
depersonalization" (cited in Hass, p. 8). However, diagnoses such “survivor
syndrome" are problematic because they tend to reduce suffering to stable
categories which serve to simplify what it means to suffer in the first place.
Pathoiogizing and categorizing reduces suffering to sameness and
squashes out the “alien-ness” (Laplanche, 1999, p. 67) of suffering. And the
suffering caused by the Holocaust is nothing strangers to this event can
imagine. Diagnoses presuppose that we can understand this kind of suffering.
These diagnoses, therefore, tend to domesticate and trivialize. Paula Salvio
remarks, “We might ask ourselves what we use these diagnoses to keep
ourselves from thinking about” (1999, p. 186). Diagnosing Holocaust survivors
keeps us from thinking about the unintelligibility of what it is survivors must
endure over a life time. And this pain that memory brings is not something that
can be reduced to a this or a that. Suffering is personal and idiosyncratic,
strange and alien.
Like Casey, William James's (1890/1950) work on memory helps to raise
questions relevant to Holocaust survivors. James argues with Casey that,
basically, there are two kinds of memory, “elementary memory” (p. 646) and
“secondary memory" (p.648) or “recollection" (p.646). Primary memory, if it is to
exist at all, must have a certain “endurance" (p. 643), what James terms a
“substantive state” (p. 643). This substantive state results in an “after
consciousness" or “after-image" (p. 645) of the event. The difficulty of grasping
this after-image is that it “blends in” (p. 645) with subsequent after-images. “The
just-past” (p. 646) blends in with fresh impressions. If this primary memory is
recollected later, it is not recollected in an originary form but it is remembered,
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rather, through the lenses of the present. Primary memory is recollected or re
presented in “the nearward portion of the present space of time and [is not a
representation of] the genuine past” (pp. 646-647). The genuine past, says
James, is always already gone and what we recall is the “belief” that we
remember the event. James declares that “Memory is the feeling of belief in a
peculiar complex object” (p. 652). The genuine past is remembered in highly
imaginative ways because we cannot capture the “genuine past” or the “just
past” any longer. Secondary memory, or recollection, is not located around a
singular event, but rather it is layered over by “associations” (James,
1890/1950, p. 650). James explains that
the more facts a fact is associated with in the mind,
the better possession of it our memory retains. Each of
its associates becomes a hook to which it hangs when
sunk beneath the surface. Together they form a network
of attachment by which is woven into the entire tissue
of our thought, (p. 662)
But we generally do not recollect all of these associations, James claims.
Rather, we select this and that. In fact, James argues that “selection is the very
keel on which our mental ship is built" (p. 680).
Does James focus too much on the conscious activity of memory? Is it the
case that most of our memory is selected consciously? Or does the unconscious
operate in uncanny ways shaping what is remembered and what is forgotten?
Unwanted memories and repressed memories arrive in their own time, arising
out of the unconscious. Certainly, Holocaust survivors’ nightmares attest to this.
These are unconscious memories that survivors do not consciously select. It
seems that repressed memories select themselves as the unconscious pushes
them upward, unwanted. Freud suggests that most of our so-called conscious
lives, which includes our memories, are covered-over in unconscious traces.
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James declares that the more associations one has with an event the
more likely one is "in possession of if (p. 662). This may be the case
sometimes. But when memory is horrific, the rememberer, in many instances, is
not in possession of the memory; rather the reverse is true. The memory is in
possession of the rememberer. The rememberer, that is, seems possessed.
Freud and Breuer certainly would adhere to this. Before the advent of
psychoanalysis proper, Freud and Breuer engaged in the hypnotic method to
release their patients from buried memories. These patients seemed to be
possessed by their memory.
Charolotte Delbo, a Holocaust Survivor, remarks about the “alien-ness"
(Laplanche, 1999, p.67) of her own memory. She says she feels possessed by
memory’s strangeness. “I live in a twofold being” (1990, p. 3). This twofold being
lives in the everyday postwar world and in Auschwitz simultaneously. Delbo
comments that it is not that she lives "with Auschwitz... [but she] lives next to if
(p. 5). Possessed by the memory of Auschwitz, Delbo becomes dissociated from
herself and often talks in the third person.
For all these years she has done little things,
gone through the little motions of everyday life
she listens to the sounds of life moving around
her. She hears only the wind blowing across the
icy plain, the shouts of the female guards
She
smells only the smell of the crematoriums. She hears
only the voices of her friends who tear her away from
her dead sister’s body. (p. 6)
Clearly unwanted memories kept Delbo prisoner during her life.
Memory disturbs and interferes with everyday life. Disturbances of
memory are due to unconscious traces. These kinds of disturbances and
interferences suffered by trauma seem to undermine the neat and tidy
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epistemologicai schematization that both James and Casey offer. What does it
mean to have a primary and secondary memory? Why do these distinctions
even matter? What is significant about them? For Holocaust survivors, memory
does not seem to follow a clear chronology and it does not seem to break down
into tidy distinctions between the here and now, the first and the second, the
there and then. Memory lacks coherence. Memory interrupts and breaks into the
everyday. Memory brings nightmares. Perhaps the more associations one has
with an event, if that event is traumatizing, the more it gets repressed. But
repressed memory returns. When repressed memory returns, it takes its own
idiosyncratic path, a path that is marked by displacements and reversals. The
memory and its
unconscious inscription, however, behaves quite
differently from a single memory or copy [ what James
would call the genuine past] of what was once
conscious: for making conscious the representation
does not automatically abolish the unconscious
inscription and its effects. (Fletcher, 1999, p. 36)
Memory traces have a life of their own, traveling across an unconscious
trajectory that offers up strangeness.
In spite of my criticisms of James, I think his work is important for several
reasons. The notion of associations, one that would become very important to
Freud, is crucial when doing memory work. To freely associate opens the doors
of the unconscious. In analysis this is the goal. But free association does not
come easily, for it is blocked by secondary process thinking. This is why dream
work, for Freud, became key to opening the doors to the unconscious. To freely
associate around dreams opens the doors to blocked memories. Consciously
trying to remember traumatic events is made difficult by the psyche's own
censorship and resistances. Whether associations help us remember more or
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the genuine past, as James would put it, is really not as important as the latent
thoughts and state of mind that these repressed memories currently create. And
the associations are not peripheral either. They tell us much about the ways in
which the rememberer gathers and collects remnants from her past. The
gathering and collecting of remants are just as important as the actual event
itself.
James's notion of belief and the way in which belief is inextricably tied to
memory is crucial. I think he is onto something when he asserts that memory is
shot through with belief. To have believed something to have been true does
not make the memory of the event less real. Even if memory is covered over
with belief and imagination, it still clues into something important about the
rememberer’s complex relation with her past. Paul Thompson remarks that
History [or memory], in short, is not just about
events, or structures, or patterns of behavior, but
also how these are experienced and remembered
in the imagination. And one part of history, what people
imagined happened, and also what they believe might
have happened. .. may be as crucial as what did happen.
(1988, p. 139)
Belief, associations, imagination are all important because they tell us about
the ways in which memory gets inscribed in all kinds of different emotional
registers. All of these seemingly peripheral and unimportant feelings
that surround the actual memory become clues to the ways in which
unconscious traces shape memory. Thus, belief, associations and imagination
are not peripheral at all; in fact, they beome central when thinking about the
complexities of memory.
Unlike Casey and James, Henri Bergson (1988) complexifies the
memory through the notion of “duration" (p. 83). Bergson seems to emphasize
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more than Casey or James that memory, as a function of time, rather than of
place, is, as Patrick Slattery might suggest uprolepticn (1999, p. 30). A proleptic
sense of time is without rigid boundaries. Past, present and future blend
together. The categories of past, present and future, which are of course
constructions, may be a function of the ego and secondary process thinking.
Time experienced in a more regressive way has no boundaries; it is free
flowing. And it is this sense of time and memory that Bergson offers to us. For
Bergson, sometimes the past overtakes and blurs with the present. "Our
consciousness of the present is already memory” (p. 151). No sharp distinctions
exist between that which is remembered and that which is experienced in the
here and now. Experience is always already beginning to be remembered as it
is happening.
Bergson does not draw a distinction between the categories of
perception and memory. He seems to blur these to suggest their co-complexity
and interrelation. Bergson declares, “Your perception, however instantaneous,
consists then in an incalculable multitude of remembered elements, in truth,
every perception is already memory" (p. 150). Memory, if it is to "survive” (p. 66),
“must constantly mingle with our perception of the present and may even take
its place” (p. 66). For Holocaust survivor Charlotte Delbo, past and present
overlap. Recall, she remarks that she lives in two worlds simultaneously. She
lives in the postwar world doing everyday things, and at the same time, she
lives alongside Auschwitz. Auschwitz is there with her always and overtakes the
present. Bergson claims that “successive perceptions... extend over a certain
depth of duration” (p. 70). "Memory condenses... appears to us all at once,
although [it happens in moments that are] successive” (p.70). But for Holocaust
survivors, successive moments of time seem to stop. Memory condenses,
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becomes displaced and takes on a life of its own. Memory has its own uncanny
pattern. But this pattern seems to be jagged and haphazard.
Bergson’s notion of duration may not be incompatible with loss. Jean
Laplanche (1999) explains that “loss is probably co-extensive with
temporalization itself... [mourning is] an affect with a duration... it occupies a
lapse of time” (p.242). Traumatic memories get lodged in voids and lapses and
they seem to return in their own time and have their own “depth of duration"
(Bergson, 1988, p. 70). For Holocaust survivors, time may be experienced
differently than, say, third generation Jews after Auschwitz. Memory may
overlap with the present, remaining unintegrated. Memory may lack coherence,
yielding up, as Casey would say, only “gappiness" (1987, p. 72).
Bergson does not deny that memory and the unconscious are related.
However, he does not discuss the unconscious much at all. It is Freud who
takes up the notion of the unconscious and its complex relation to memory in a
systematic way. Unlike Bergson, Freud draws a distinction between perceptions
and memory traces, making the former less complex than the latter. “A trace is
left in our psychical apparatus of the perceptions which impinge upon it. This we
may describe as a memory trace; and to the function relating to it we give the
name memory" (1900b, p. 538). Perceptions, Freud tells us, form “associations"
(p. 539) when connected. But many of our memories and their associations are
unconscious. Freud declares that we only realize this through the study of
dreams. “It may happen that a piece of material occurs in the context of a dream
which in the waking state we do not recognize as forming a part of our
knowledge” (1900a, p. 11) But it is not a literal dream that yields up the memory
but the associations that the dream yield that are crucial for “recovering
memory" (Pinar, 1991, pp. 173-174). What becomes difficult, though, is that the
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psychic apparatus shields itself through "resistance” and "censorship”
(Freud, 1900a, pp. 143-144). Thus, it is what is not said and not remembered
that becomes key to doing dream work. What is repressed is forgotten but still
remains in the ruins, buried. Freud claims that "Both memory and trace and the
affect which is attached to the idea are there once and for all" (1893/1899, p.
42). What we remember we never really forget; the contents of memory become
repressed and are pushed down into the unconscious.
When we try to recollect our memories, repressed memories are
censored by what Freud terms ‘screen memory.' Freud remarks that
"Recollections... whose value lies in the fact that it represents in the memory
impressions and thoughts of a later date whose content is connected with its
own by symbolic or similar links, may appropriately be called screen memories"
(1899/1989, p. 126). In other words, screen memories serve the function of
screening difficult memories by producing other memories that are closely
connected and associated with that actual event, but are not the original
memory. The originary memory is screened because it is too painful. Freud
believed that what is unconscious and repressed could be made conscious
though analysis and dream work. But until unconscious memory traces are
made conscious "acting out” (1911-1913, p. 150) wins the day. Acting out is a
way of not remembering. Freud terms this repetition compulsion. He declares
that in repetition compulsion,
the patient does not remember anything of
what he has forgotten and repressed, but acts
it out. He reproduces it not as a memory but as
action; he repeats it, without of course knowing
that he is repeating it (1911-1913, p. 150)
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And it is this acting out or repetition compulsion that lies at the heart of
transference. In order to undo transferential relations, which Freud thought
inappropriate to the current situation, it would become necessary to trace back
through the ruins the path toward repressed memory. Freud comments that
through analysis one could be able to make the unconscious conscious
through what he called “intentional recollection” (1900a, p. 54). This intentional
recollection attempts to lift memory traces that block recollections. The
“reconstruction" of memory would be possible through the patient’s
“construction" of narrative and dream work (Freud, 1937-1939, pp. 267-268).
Memories are repressed and pushed into the unconscious because they are
too overwhelming.
Freud’s earliest work on repressed memory was tied to incest. Freud's
seduction theory turned on the idea that all repressions were due to incest. But
in 1897 he abandonded this theory. As John Fletcher points out, even though
Freud abandoned this theory, Laplanche argues that traces of it can be found
throughout Freud's work. Fletcher says
As Laplanche has argued, the 'turning point’ of
1897, the abandonment of the seduction theory,
does not represent a clean or absolute break. Elements
of the theory persist in different form s... the acknowledgement
of the traumatic power of actual events, infantile sexuality
and the dominance of two theories of the drives. (1999, p. 9)
Laplanche (1999) suggests that Freud actually “domesticates” (p. 67) the notion
of the unconscious. He domesticates it by “reducing it" (p. 66), by taking the
“alien-ness" (67) out of it. Freud claims that what is unconscious can be made
conscious again and transference can be resolved at the end of analysis.
Laplanche (1999) argues that these clean resolutions serve only to domesticate
by making the strange familiar. Laplanche reappropriates Freud's seduction
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theory by claiming that we are always already seduced by significant others. We
are seduced by “enigmatic messages” (p. 80) that get "implanted” (p. 258) in our
psyche. These messages are for the most part beyond translation. Laplanche
argues that Freud went astray when he abandoned the seduction theory
because all of life, for Laplanche, is about seduction.
One reading of Freud might suggest that if repressed memory, in the
case of Holocaust survivors, were made conscious, the sufferer of memory
would be "cured” because the repressed would stop returning in unhealthy and
bizarre ways. This reading also suggests that transference and acting out, the
compulsion to repeat, will just go away after the Holocaust survivor endures
analysis and works through her nightmares, depression, anxiety or
depersonalizations. However, this reading of Freud tends to simplify what it
means to be a Holocaust survivor.
We must keep in mind, though, at the end of Freud’s life, he became
more and more skeptical about the prospects of psychoanalysis (1937/1991).
He was well aware that going through analysis guaranteed little. And, in fact, he
argued that psychotics were unbeatable. It was Jung’s work with schizophrenics
that changed the minds of those in the psychoanalytic community who were
weary about the prognoses of psychotics. Nevertheless, Freud, at least early
Freud, seemed confident that analysis could offer up a cure. Paula Salvio
(1999) terms this kind of thinking an "epistemology of cure" (p. 186) and she
suggests that it "invoke[s] a cultural desire for an imaginary ‘ending’" (p. 185) to
suffering. Salvio argues that we must move beyond this epistemology of cure to
admit that suffering does not just go away through analysis. There is no way to
work completely through Holocaust memories. This implies a getting better
when there was no illness to begin with. Laplanche’s (1999) post-Freudian turn,
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his post-Freudian reading of Freud moves beyond what Salvio terms “a
narrative of closure” (1999, p. 185). Again, Laplanche suggests that if we
remain open to our own otherness in relation to the other’s otherness, and if we
understand the aporias and complexities of the strangeness of the unconscious,
the task of recovering memory becomes much more difficult. There is no cure for
repressed memory because it was never pathological to begin with.
The Memory Text of History: The Unconscious and the Holocaust
At this juncture, I would like to turn to what I call the memory text of
history. Here I will examine different positions on what it is that historiography
might be. What is it that allows us to think historically in the first place? In what
ways do historians' unconscious inscriptions shape history? Here I am
interested in the aporias of historical understanding as these have implications
for reading Holocaust texts. First, let us turn to Hegel.
Hegel’s (1837/1987) work around the philosophy of history is
scandalous, for it serves as a justification of evil, what theologian John Hick
calls “dysteleological evil" (1978, p. 362). Dysteleogical evil is massive evil.
Hegel contends that all historical events, whether evil or not, have a final
purpose: a telos, a justification. And this final purpose and justification is the
self-consciousness of God. God comes to himself (Hegel's God is male) through
history. Ultimately, for Hegel, history is the story of divine providence. Hegel
explains that “divine providence is wisdom endowed with infinite power which
realizes its own aim, that is, the absolute, rational, final purpose of the world”
(1837/1987, p. 15). Hegel’s God is all knowing and all powerful. But is this God
good? How could a good God allow the Holocaust to happen? How could this
event be part of God’s divine plan? Primo Levi, a Holocaust survivor, writes
“Today I think that if for no other reason than that an Auschwitz existed, no one
144

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

in our age should speak of providence” (1996, p. 158).Theodicists and
theologians attempt to exonerate God from crimes like these by re-defining the
notion “God.” The formula that God is all knowing, all powerful and all good gets
re-done to save God from accusations of evil. For some, especially process
theologians like John Cobb (1975) and David Griffin (1973), God is all knowing
and all good, but not all powerful. Since God is not all powerful, he could not
prevent the Holocaust. God gets off the hook.
Another argument some offer, like John Hick’s (1978), is what is called
the free-will defense. Here, Hick contends that God endows human beings with
free will, so human beings are free to do as they please. Thus, human beings
get blamed for bad events because they are free to choose evil or good. God
gets off the hook again. If evil gets injected into God, then we might do away
with the notion of God altogether, for who needs an evil God? But is the problem
of evil this simple? Theodicies tend to split evil and good into neat and tidy
categories. The problem with theodicies is that they tend to suggest that evil is
an absolute category. But upon examining the Holocaust, it seems to me that
this notion of evil gets complexified by the very fact that perpetrators were not
demons; they were human beings, ordinary everyday Germans. I am not
exonerating or excusing Germans who were complicit in crimes against Jews; I
am suggesting, rather, that individuals are neither good nor evil; they are
complicated. These absolute categories, I think, serve to simplify. Marion
Kaplan (1998) points out that it was only after Kristallnacht in 1938 that Jews
began to realize that they were in real danger. And what made it hard for Jews
to leave Germany, according to Kaplan, is the fact that many Germans remained
friendly to Jews. This became confusing because Germans were giving Jews
mixed messages. How could anyone believe what the future would bring?
145

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.

Human relatedness is much more nuanced and complicated than the splitting of
good and evil. Theologians and theodicists, at the end of the day, continue to
exonerate God by re-defining him. Perhaps they need to think again. Perhaps
theologians should listen to Elie Wiesel (1986) who put God on trial in his novel
entitled The Trial of God. Rabbis put God on trial but continued to pray. The
question that some might raise is how Jews could keep their faith after
Auschwitz. The black sun of Auschwitz has made many Jews more religious. I
think my turn back to Judaism is partially a result of my work on the Holocaust.
But still, many Jews of my parents’ generation are secular and not religious. Is
this a result of the Holocaust? Or perhaps it is a result of the pressures of
assimilation? I leave these as open questions. And so Jews respond to life after
Auschwitz differently.
More arrests, more terror, concentration camps
the arbitrary dragging off of fathers, sisters, brothers.
We seek the meaning of life, wondering whether
any meaning can be left. We are but hollow vessels,
washed through by history. (Hillesum, 1983, pp. 28-29)
These are the words of Etty Hillesum. She died in Auschwitz at the age of
twenty nine. It is through her words that I hear the echoes not only of Wiesel, but
of Hegel. The specters of Hegel can be heard in her words as she says "We are
but hollow vesels, washed through by history.” Hayen White (1987) comments
that Hegel's philosophy of history "wears such a face of regularity, order and
coherence that it leaves no room for human agency" ( p. 21).
“We are but hollow vesels" throughout which spirit runs. Hegel's
philosophy of history is the adventure of spirit as it makes its way through the
world. Anything or anyone in the way of spirit is destroyed. We are but hollow
vessels. "World history goes on within the realm of spirit” (Hegel, 1837/1987, p.
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30). The spirit of which Hegel speaks is derivative of the Christian notion of spirit
or the holy ghost. But spirit, for Hegel, differs from the Christian notion, because
it is divided into an objective and subjective side. The subjective side of spirit is
nature, matter, human life. But this subjective side that moves through us is
unconscious of itself. Hegel claims
World history begins its general aim-to realize
the idea of spirit-only in an implicit form ... namely,
as nature-as an inmost, unconscious instinct. And the
whole business of history... is to bring it into consciousness.
(p. 30)
In the meanwhile, spirit works itself out against itself. “Spirit is at war with itself
(p. 69). Spirit is alienated from itself because the subjective side continually
gets in the way of the objective side. Human beings, that is, continually get in
the way of God's purposes. The objective side of spirit reflects Gods will and is
conscious of itself. It is “the operation of coming to itself (p. 23). And it comes to
know itself through freedom. “World history is the process of the consciousness
of freedom" (p. 24). However, as spirit progresses toward its self-consciousness
it also necessarily becomes “connected with the degradation, destruction,
annihilation of the preceding mode of actuality" (pp. 38-39). Thus, history is not
happy but filled with conflict, struggle and pain. Hegel claims that “history is not
the soil of happiness. The periods of happiness are blank pages in if (p. 33).
Hegel also refers to history as a “slaughter bench” (p. 27). For what purpose,
Hegel asks, is this slaughter bench? For God’s divine purpose. Did God, then,
will the slaughter bench of the Holocaust?
I awoke on January 29th at dawn. In my fathers’
place lay another invalid. They must have taken
him away before dawn and carried him to the
crematory. There were no prayers at his grave.
No candles were lit to his memory. His last word
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was my name. A summons to which I did not
respond. (Wiesel, 1982, p. 108)
Did Hegel’s God will the slaughter bench of six million Jews? If so
Hegel's God is a scandal. This scandalous God is also a reasoning God for
Hegel. Sometimes Hegel even talks as if reason is God. Reason, says Hegel, is
“the law of the world and that, therefore, in world history, things have come
about rationally" (p. 11). Like spirit, reason “determines itself in absolute
freedom” (p. 15). Sometimes Hegel refers to reason as the Idea. The Idea, this
transcendent something, is the prime mover of the world. The Idea, Hegel
declares “remains in the background, untouched and uninjured” ( p. 43) while
the “particular exhausts itself in the struggle and part of which is destroyed" (p.
43). Human beings are destroyed, in other words, in the process of world history
while the Idea remains safe and unharmed. Hegel calls this movement of the
Idea in history the “cunning of reason" (pp. 43-44). Reason is cunning because
it destroys whatever gets in its way while remaining free from injury.
Like spirit, the Idea divides into two parts: the absolute part and what
Hegel calls “absolute free volition” (p. 32). The absolute Idea is God or the
“substantial fulness of content” (p. 32). Free volition is the movement of the
universe, the movement of people in the universe. However, “God and the
universe have separated and set each other at opposites" (p. 32). The Idea
“uses an external phenomena which in history present themselves directly
before our eyes” (p. 26). History uses us as it pleases, we are but “hollow
vessels” (Hillesum, 1986, pp. 28-29).
Some individuals throughout history, however, intuit God’s purposes,
according to Hegel. Here the subjective and objective sides of spirit coincide;
here God's fulness of content and free volition coincide. “World historical
148

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

individuals,” (p. 39) or heroes coincide with God's purposes. But I wonder what
kind of heroes Hegel is talking about? World historical individuals, if they
coincide with God’s purposes, must also coincide with God’s selfconsciousness. Hegel’s dream (or nightmare) then is about consciousness. The
goal of history is to get rid of what is unconscious. To me, Hegel squashes out
the mystery of life because the unconscious is this mystery. Hegel’s system
smacks of what Freud called the “arrogance of consciousness” (1909-1910, p.
39). Hegel believed that world history would fulfill its purposes by spirit’s
becoming ever more conscious of itself. But what exactly is this consciousness
of which Hegel speaks? It is God, it is spirit, it is reason, it is little more than a
mythical creature floating around, disembodied, pulling human beings into its
web and closing off the future. Hegel’s notion of consciousness is a ghost in the
machine of history. The ghost of consciousness has pre-arranged the universe.
The already-made, the apriori principles to which world history is to unfold,
weaves world history together without gaps, holes, or broken threads. Human
beings need not worry, because God already has made up his mind, he has a
plan. What God wants, God gets.
Of course, world history does not happen according to a plan. The
coursings of history happen in chaotic, violent and unpredictable ways. A
Kleinian interpretation of Hegel might suggest that the Godhead, or the
objective side of spirit, represents the good breast; the demonic, or the
subjective side of spirit, represents the bad breast. The bad breast projects all of
its hatred onto the world.
A Laplanchian reading of Hegel might suggest that the otherness within
the self of God takes on demonic properties as it lashes out and destroys part of
itself. The self of God, or the subjective side of spirit, cannot manage its own
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difference within, it cannot manage otherness. Thus the repressed otherness
projects its hatreds onto the world. The split-off self of the Godhead masters and
controls world history. World history is controlled through violence. History is the
unfolding of violence.
Hegel's system is sadistic. Spirit seems to take pleasure from the
ruthlessness and cunning of reason. The polarization of good and evil,
unconsciousness and consciousness, objective and subjective sides of the
Godhead serve as defense mechanisms against complexities of God, world,
self and history. These kinds of dichotomies wipe out ambiguities and
unresolvabie paradoxes of lived experience. Hegel seemed afraid of
uncertainty and the aporias of historical understanding. He seemed to have
world history sown up into a box. And out of this box comes Pandora’s
scandals.
The metanarratives of “consciousness," and “reason" have been
deconstructed and questioned with the advent of post-structuralism and post
modernism. The notion of “reason" has been demonized, especially since the
Holocaust. Some scholars even blame “reason” and “progress” and “modernity"
for the rise of Hitler and the Nazis. The specters of Hegel have appeared in one
form or another in the writings around the Holocaust. The world of reason, its
progress and perfection, is the “kind of universe dreamt up by the philosophers
of the Enlightenment" (Bauman, 1995, p. 199). Zygmunt Bauman believes that
modernism, with its penchant for reason, perfection, progress and optimism
created the very conditions necessary for the Holocaust to occur. Bauman
claims that Hitler was the “offspring of the modem spirit, of that urge to assist
and speed up the progress of mankind toward perfection” (p. 199). The
Holocaust was a “kingdom of reason, the ultimate exercise in human power
150

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

over nature” (p. 198). Recall, Hegel's rational God willed a perfect kingdom as
spirit comes to itself through the destruction of anything that gets in its way.
Bauman suggests that our era is the “age of the camps" (p. 193). Bauman
declares that the camps are places where difference is wiped out, where
“efficient killing, scientifically designed and administered genocide” (p. 193)
occur.
Like Bauman, Tony Kushner (1994) calls for a critical look at modernity
suggesting that modernity and liberalism created the conditions for the
Holocaust to occur. The lack of response on the part of Great Britain and the
United States had much to do with the ways in which both of these countries
embraced modernity and liberalism. Liberalism actually prevented these
democracies from responding to the crisis until very late. The “liberal
imagination," (p. 55) Kushner contends, worked against itself. That is, liberal
ideas of tolerance, progress, optimism and reason made it impossible for
people to “think the unthinkable" (p. 74). Although Kushner points out that
responses were not monolithic, generally speaking the United States and
Britain did little to help the Jews. And this non-response was due in large part to
liberalism and optimism. People in the West thought the crisis would just go
away. Disturbed by the non-action of the free world, Elie Wiesel writes
the free world didn't care whether Jews lived or
died, whether they were annihiliated one day or
the next. And so the sealed trains continued to
shatter the silence of Europe's flowering landscapes.. . .
I freeze every time I hear a train whistle. (1995, p. 74)
Uke Bauman and Kushner, Christopher Browning (1992) claims that
Susanne Heim and Gutz Aly argue that reason and modernism set the stage for
the Holocaust. Browning comments that for Heim and Aly, the Holocaust

151

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

became possible primarily because of “the rational means employed by
technocrats” (1992, p. 60). Heim and Aly suggest that the Final Solution was
carefully and rationally planned out by an “intelligentsia [who].. . cooperated
closely with one another in an interdisciplinary fashion" (cited in Browning p.
60). These so-called “technocrats” embraced a “common vision and way of
thinking-sober problem solving and rational” (p. 60). The specters of Hegel are
echoed here.
Bauman, Kushner, Heim and Aly all feel, in one way or another, that
modernity itself, reason as the stepchild of modernity, created the very
conditions that allowed the Holocaust to occur. But perhaps this kind of
thinking is too simplistic, too reductionistic, too monocausai. How does one
make the move from ideas about modernity to actions of mass murder? What
happens between reason and killing? How does “the cunning of reason”
(Hegel, 1837/1987, pp. 43-44) turn into the cunning of murder? I do not think it
is enough to say that modernity and reason caused the Holocaust. As Saul
Friedlander points out, the “major features of modernity itse lf... do not alone
constitute the necessary cluster of elements... leading from persecution to
extermination" (1997, pp. 2-3). Jeffrey Herf drives this point home.
The message of the Nuremberg trials was that
human beings and their political decisions had
made Auschwitz possible--not being, fate,
destiny, instrumental reason, the Enlightenment,
modernity, or the West. (1997, p. 208)
The tropes of the Enlightenment, instrumental reason, fate and modernity, when
used to explain or perhaps explain away the cause of the Holocaust, serve as
defense mechanisms which cover over human complicity. The trope of
modernity, when applied to the Holocaust, explains little about the makings of
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Auschwitz or the ways in which ordinary Germans perpetrated horrific crimes.
Individuals made choices and these choices are what moved history along.
Unlike Hegel, Marx felt that individuals make history. Marx and Engels
insist that The first premise of all human history is, of course, the existence of
living human individuals" (1845-1846/1987, p. 147). Many times, Marx refers to
"man" as the center of history. And this emphasis on human agency runs
counter to Hegel. Hegel's history is one that could press on without human
beings. In fact, it is humankind that gets in the way of God's self-consciousness.
Marx and Engels stress that human beings are central to history. "Its [history's]
premises are men, not in any fantastic isolation or abstract definition, but in their
actual, empirically perceptible process or development under definite
conditions" (pp. 149-150). But the historical journey is not without difficulties.
Our “alienation" and “self-estrangement" (1844/1987, p. 74) thwart the advance
of history. Marx is not talking about alienated spirit after the fashion of Hegel, but
rather he is talking about alienated self-actualization. The worker is alienated,
both by the end product of labor and by the very activity of labor itself. Marx
claims that
Whatever the product of labor is, he is not. Therefore
the greater this product, the less he is himself. The
alienation of the worker in his production means not
only that his labor becomes an object, an external
existence, but that it exists outside himself, independently,
as something alien. (1844/1987, p. 72)
Labor, itself, alienates and it is the very activity of labor that causes "loss o f...
self" (1844/1987, p. 74).
Bertrand Russell (1972) and Jean-Paul Sartre (1968) agree that, even
though Marx's philosophy of history is usually termed dialectical materialism
(because Marx sometimes says that history makes us as we make it) still;
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human agency seems to weigh heavily over against the pressures of external
circumstances. While Sartre (1968) praises Marx’s emphasis on human
agency, Russell denounces it. Human beings are not the center of all things.
Russell declares that
Marx has many grave shortcomings. He is too
practical, too much wrapped up in the problems
of his time. His purview is confined to the planet,
to Man. Since Copernicus, it has been evident that
Man has not the cosmic importance which he
formerly arrogated to himself. (1972, p. 788)
It seems that Marx calls for a centering of the self in the scheme of things.
Alienation of the self signals loss for Marx. But perhaps this understanding of
the self is too simplistic. Unlike Marx's call toward centering the self, Laplanche
(1999) suggests that what psychoanalysis teaches is just the opposite. In what
he terms the “Unfinished Copernican Revolution,” (p. 52) Laplanche calls for a
“de-centering" of the self (p. 52). The self is “de-centered" by the “alien-ness" of
the unconscious (p. 62). The unconscious “is precisely not our center, as it is an
“ex-centric center" (p. 62). The “other thing" (p. 62) of the unconsioues always
makes us strangers to ourselves and to our own actions. We are both strangers
in our being and in our doing. But this condition of strangeness does not
prevent us from social engagement; it enhances it by keeping us open to the
radical alterity of the other.
Thus, unlike Marx, Laplanche complexifies the notion of the self and
turns the concept of alienation on its head. Alienation or alien-ness becomes an
asset not an impediment. In spite of the fact that I think Marx undertheorizes
around notions of self and agency, I do think, however, that he is correct to say
that human beings do indeed shape history and shape their lives. And like
Jeffrey Herf (1997), I believe that when we examine the Holocaust we must
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understand that the perpetrators made decisions to do what they did and they
were not guided by anything other than their own conscience or lack of
conscience. Still, human beings are not radically free, as Marx might suggest.
Rather, freedom is always qualified and strained by institutionalized racism,
sexism, homophoia, anti-Semitism and classism. But for Marx and Engels,
human beings can overcome circumstances even if they are “not free to choose
their productive forces” (1845-1846/1978, p. 137). Unlike Hegel, Marx and
Engels suggest that history will be toppled not by criticism, not by
resolutions into self-consciousness or transformations
into “apparitions," “specters," “fancies," etc., but only
by the practical overthrow.. .revolution is the driving
force of history, (pp. 156-157)
Conflicts will be brought on by class struggle and capitalism. Class struggles
are caught up in the material forces of economic production. Terry Eagelton
(1976) comments that for Marx “ Yorces’ and relations of production forms...the
economic structure of society; or what is more commonly known by Marxism as
the economic ‘base’ or ‘infrastructure’" (p. 5). The superstructure, Eagelton
points out, “produces laws and politics, [and] a certain kind of state" (p. 5). For
Marx, Eagelton contends, “certain... forms of social consciousness” (p. 5)
produce ideology that serve to “legitimate the power of the ruling class” (p. 5).
The forces of economic production and class struggles will be resolved
with the development of the Communist State. Marx and Engels suggest that
Communism is the “specter... haunting Europe” (1844/1987, p. 203). The
bourgeoisie will eventually “disappear in the face of modern industry” (p. 219).
Accordingly, the proletariat will emerge victoriously as a mature form of
Communism births itself. Communism will move toward the future and will be a
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postive transcendence of private property...
the real appropriation of the human essence
[Man’s centering ego] by and for man; Communism
therefore is the complete return of Man to himself, (pp. 102-103)
Clearly, Marx returns to a Ptolemaic universe where humankind re-centers itself
in the world. Not only are human beings re-centered, but struggle will be
overcome and the dialectic of history will resolve itself. Communism will win out
and at last a happy ending to history will occur.
It is obvious that Communism has been a disaster. And it is also obvious
that there is much more to history than class struggle. The narrowing of history,
the reigning in of history, through the supposed adherence of real events to
apriori principles suggests that Marx, not unlike Hegel, was uncomfortable with
contingency, complexity and chaos. Again, I argue that pre-conceived systems
like Hegel's and Marx's serve as defense mechanisms against the unknown,
against the very instability and uncertainty that surround us, against our own
strangeness and our own inner alterity and our position as strangers in the
world. However, Marx's fundamental premise that human beings make history
is an important one which has been overshadowed by the specters of
structuralism, especially within the discipline of Holocaust historiographies.
Since the 1980s overriding principles governing these debates have
turned on arguments between intentionalists (Davidowicz, 1975/1986;
Goldhagen 1997; Friedlander, 1997) and structuralists (Hilberg, 1961/1985;
Mommsen, 1966; Browning, 1992/1998; Broszat, 1969/1981). I will discuss
these debates in subsequent chapters, but for now I wil suggest that the
argument between intentionalism and structuralism turns on the question of
whether subjects produce history or whether history produces subjects.
Intentionalism, much like Marxism, stresses that human agency and human
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choice make history, while structuralists, much like Hegel, stress the function of
social structures like institutions and the role these have in making history. It
seems, for the structuralists that human agency gets overshadowed by larger
socially constructed institutions. It is as if institutions and social apparatuses
have a life of their own, a driving force of their own. Intentionalists tend to stress
the orderliness and know-how of the Third Reich; structuralists tend to stress the
chaos and happenstance of the Third Reich.
Lucy Dawidowicz (1975/1986) suggests that ultimately the problem with
the structuralists’ argument is that they have no way to determine
blameworthiness. Davidowicz contends that structuralists cannot hold actors
accountable.
Structuralists regard political decisions as the
by-product of th e ... structures or functions, and
not as an expression of the will or intention of
the States’ leaders. Accordingly, no human agent
can then be held responsible for decisions or for
their consequences, (xxvii)
As Charles Maier (1988) points out, Saul Friedlander criticizes structuralist
approaches because they tend to obscure blame. Maier contends that “In
Friedlander's view [structuralists]... dissolve guilt for the horrors of Nazism.
Reponsibility for an unspeakable crime becomes diffuse and elusive” (p. 95).
Maier claims that structuralists might counter these charges by arguing that
responsibility for the crimes of Nazism shifts from a few leaders to the “whole
Nazi apparatus” (1988, p. 95). Thus, blame seems broadened.
I find that this debate over intentionalism and structuralism, although
important, too narrow. It frames perspectives of Holocaust scholarship in a
certain way that sanitizes history. This debate serves to obscure and shift
attention away from the hideousness of the Holocaust. Intentionalism and
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structuralism are signifiers that operate to keep certain questions at bay and
keep certain horrible thoughts abstracted and unreal. Windows into the world of
Holocaust victims undo these abstractions. The window into the world of this
horrific memory is beyond the thinkable. This haunting is beyond imagination.
Passages from this past, passages of personal experience like the one below,
sink into the unconscious in ways that abstractions do not.
They started the motor and the two Gestapo men
began to pour some liquid, like water, on the Jews.
But I am not sure what while pumping, they were
connecting the hoses to the other containers, one
by one. Apparently, because of the slaking of the lime,
people in the pit were boiling alive. The cries were so
terrible that we who were sitting by the piles of clothes
began to tear pieces of stuff to stop our ears.
(Biskupi, cited in Langer, 1998, pp. 21-22)
Reading a passage like this one demands a certain psychological readiness on
the part of readers. The intentionalist-structuralist debate serves as a defense
mechanism against dealing with this kind of emotionally gritty material. Victims’
and survivor’ voices are hardly heard in historians' renderings and part of the
reason might not just be epistemological, it may be psychological too. Many
cannot stand reading these kinds of horrific narratives, and so they exclude and
erase them.
The Vicissitudes of Historiography
Alongside philosophy of history, the writings of historiography were often
subsumed under the category of literature. But with the rise of scientism and
positivism, history gradually became a discipline in and of itself. Eventually
history departed from both philosophy and literature. In contrast, during the
seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, history and literature were closely
related, if not inseparable. Lionel Grossman (1990) explains that the “relation of
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history to literature was not notably problematic. History was a branch of
literature” (p. 227). Crafting history was considered an art by many. The debates
over history’s artistic or scientific foundations continued long after the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Croce and Travelyan (cited in Stem
1973) argued that the craft of doing historiography was artistic. Dilthey (19071910/1962) suggested that historiography was a “hermeneutic art” (p. 139).
Marc Bloch (1954) declared that “the very idea that the past as such can be the
object of science is ridiculous” (p. 122). R.G. Collingwood (1922/1965)
suggested that historiography embraced both art and science. Leopold von
Ranke and J.B. Bury (cited in Stern, 1973), believed that historiography was a
science. Some commentators suggest that questions around whether or not art
and or science serve as the foundations of historiography are misguided. Hans
Kellner remarks that
the problem is not whether history is best conceived of
as art, a science, or both, or neither, but whether art
or science or something else is the most adequate
representational model for historical consciousness.
(1989, p. 34)
The connection between literature and history began to disintegrate,
when literature, especially during the Romantic era (eighteenth and ninteenth
centuries), became elevated to the level of the “sacred" (Grossman, 1990, pp.
228-229). Conversely, with the rise of scientism, history writing modeled itself
after the natural sciences, which sought to name univeral laws governing
human relations. Grossman comments that
The separation of literature and historiography
was institutionalized, by the breakup of what had
once been the republic of letters--a society in which
the historians, both of the Enlightenment and of the
Early Romantic period... had mingled freely w ith ...
novelists, poets, philosophers. (1990, p.223)
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The idea of interdisciplinarity, then, is nothing new. But with the age of
specialization and separation of the disciplines, with the rise of scientism and
positivism, interdisciplinarity fell out of fashion. What was in fashion during the
late seventeenth century and early eighteenth century was history writing as
“active reflection" and “judgment’ (Kellner, 1989, p. 5). But some thought that to
judge historical actors anathema. Marc Bloch argues that historians should
never judge their subjects. “Are we so sure of ourselves... to divide the
company of our forefathers into the just and the darned?" (1954, p. 140)
Similarly, Tony Kushner (1994) suggests that Holocaust historians should not
condemn but explain. But I think that historians can and do make judgments.
Even if they think they are not judging, they are by the mere selection and
omission of material. As R.G. Collingwood declares, “We are making a
judgment" (1924-1925/1965, p. 50) in what it is we wish to represent.
Interpreting material in particular ways is already an act of judging.
It is interesting to note that many historians, John Weaver (1994)
explains, do not consider historical scholarship legitimate before the arrival of
Leopold von Ranke. Ranke, who lived from 1795 to 1856, marks a turning point
in the discipline of history. Many consider him to be the father of modern history.
Weaver remarks that
The tradition of history writing is thought to have
begun with Leopold von Ranke... the tradition defines
history as an almost strict recounting of the diplomatic
and political events of the past. According to the
principles of historicism, the historian was not to
interpret any contemporary viewpoints or theories
into the past because if done correctly, the spirit of
the past era would come through the historian's
recounting. Historicism will dominate as a way of
writing history... well into the 20th century, (p. 6)
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Ranke believed that the historian could let the facts speak for themselves
without any extraneous interpretation. The historian was to seem the invisible
arbiter of facts. The historian's voice was to vanish amidst a mountain of
evidence. But Carl Becker (1935) comments that “to suppose that the facts
[could] speak for themselves is an illusion. It was perhaps the illusion of those
historians of the last century who found some special magic in the word
“scientific" (p. 249). And Marc Bloch (1954) declares that to let facts speak for
themselves “effaces" the historian (p. 138). Historians cannot efface themselves,
though. The historian and her writings are one, no matter how much she tries to
be dispassionate.
Ranke and Bury both engaged in doing what might be termed historical
realism. They believed that words can mirror reality; facts can copy reality and
capture the past. Fritz Stern remarks that “J.B. Bury’s lectures of 1903 may be
taken as the culmination of that earlier mood of certainty. .. the historian's task
was to reconstruct the past. . . to establish cause and effect in history, just as the
natural scientists did” (1973, p. 20). But as I mentioned earlier, not all historians
agreed with the so-called scientific nature of history; not all adhered to the naive
belief that facts correspond to reality in an exact fashion. Grossman (1990)
explains that Chladenius, Leibniz and Bayle understood already in the 1700s
that interpretation and “point of view” (p. 230) undermine correspondence
theories when applied to historiography. If everyone is different, if everyone
operates out of his or her own perceptions, how can facts correspond in any
neat and tidy way to reality? Hayden White (1978) comments that
four major theorists of historiography rejected the
myth of objectivity prevailing among Ranke's
followers. Hegel, Droysen, Nietzsche, and Croce
all viewed interpretation as the very soul of
historiography, (p. 52)
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But Ranke and Bury won the day. Historical realism won out over against
constructivism. John Weaver (1994) argues that the dominant mode of history
writing still resembles Ranke's. Historians, though, are well aware that their
interpretations shape their texts. But that historians of the Holocaust, for
instance, do not overtly interpret their representations is commonplace. They
might offer a few introductory remarks about their point of view, but they tend to
shy away from being overly speculative, overly philosophical, or overly
interpretive. This is problematic because the facts do not speak for themselves.
Weaver (1994) explains that history has been considered a social
science since the 1960s. And still, most traditional accounts of history focus on
political and diplomatic issues. These top-down approaches, as Tony Kushner
(1994) calls them, ignore broader social categories. Recently, though, in
Holocaust scholarhip there is a movement toward doing what is called
Alltagsgeschichte, or everyday history (Kushner, 1994; Browning, 1998;
Kaplan, 1998). These bottom-up approaches examine the histories of labor
movements, women’s struggles, police battalions and other facets of everyday
life under the Nazis. However, Alltagsgeschichte has been criticized by some
who feel that it might tend to avoid discussing the more important issues that
concern high level officials who became ultimately responsible for setting
policies during the rise of the Nazis (Friedlander, 1997). But Christopher
Browning argues that Alltagsgeschichte “becomes an evasion, an attempt to
"normalize” the Third Reich, only if it fails to confront the degree to which the
criminal policies of the regime inescapably permeated existence under the
Nazis” (1998, xix). Still, the bulk of Holocaust historiography takes a top-down
approach and most sources attempt to explain political or military struggles. It is
interesting to note that the History channel on television follows this pattern as
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well. Many of the Holocaust documentaries presented on the History channel
take top-down approaches. Cultural histories, or everyday histories are absent.
The Vicissitudes of Historical Interpretation
Michel Foucault (1966/1994) comments that since the middle of the
seventeenth century, during what he termed the classical age, textual
interpretation, or exegesis, turned on the notion of "resemblance" (p. 17). The
exegete's task was to reveal hidden meaning in the original text. Once this
hidden meaning was revealed, the exegete’s explanation was supposed to
resemble the original text as closely as possible, thus the phrase a close
reading.’ “Search for meaning is [always about bringing] to light a resemblance"
(p. 29).The exegete’s goal was to produce true copies or at least "similitudes”
(p. 30) of the original. Foucault notes that “commentary halts before the
precipice of the original text, and assumes the impossible and endless task of
repeating its own birth within itself” (p. 81). The purpose of writing commentaries
or doing exegetical work was to mirror back the text, to try to get it right, to
attempt to get a likeness, to reveal the truth concealed and buried within the
text.
Wilhelm Dilthey stressed these principles. He considered the work of the
historian a “hermeneutic art” (1907-1910/1962, p. 139). And even though the
historian “stands in the midst of the ruins,” (139) his goal is to get behind the text
to get at the truth[s] of history. In order to tell the truth[s] of history, which “are
universally valid” (p. 69) the historian must “determine the inner side” [of the
mind of historical actors] (p. 69). Dilthey argued that “Actions and their
permanent outward results constantly help us to reconstruct the mental content
from which they arose” (p. 76). Dilthey offered up a psychological hermeneutic.
Some consider him to be the father of psychohistory. When we examine the
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bulk of the work that has been done in psychohistory, especially
psychobiographies, the goal seems to be to get behind the mind of, say, Hitler
(Rappaport, 1975; Binion, 1976; Waite, 1977; Langer, cited in Rappaport, 1975;
Erikson, 1976; Bromberg, cited in Rappaport, 1975). But is it really possible to
get inside the mind of anyone? Can we ever really know what motivates
people? Can we ever determine what people’s intentions are? And does
diagnosing historical actors help? Even if the diagnosis of borderline
personality disorder is correct when applied to Hitler and to Luther, what is it
that we do not learn about these people?
Like Dilthey, R. G. Collingwood (1946) offers another kind of
psychological hermeneutic when thinking about doing historiography. Like
Dilthey, Collingwood suggests that the historian, if he is to get at the truth of
history, must “think himself into... the thought of its agent" (p. 213). The
historian must attempt to delve into “the thought in the mind of the person by
whose agency the event comes about" (pp. 214-215). Again, Collingwood
assumes that we can actually get into the mind of historical actors.
When hermeneutics is used to reduce complex phenomena, to reveal a
truth hidden behind a text, it becomes inadequate to its task. Hermeneutics
should not be reductive, but productive and generative. To suggest that we can
know what it was that made Hitler tick presupposes too much. Assuming that we
can get behind texts to reveal truth suggests that truth stops somewhere, that
truth must be absolute. Truth with a capital T is nowhere to be found. But the
proliferation of interpretations around a single event suggest that many truths
may emerge. But these truths do not lie behind the text. They emerge in the
complex interaction of reader and text. Doing good interpretive work does not
clarify truth, it complicates truthfulness.
164

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Jean Laplanche (1999) calls for an “anti-hermeneutics" (p. 88). He
worries that hermeneutics always works to squash mystery out of texts. “The
notions defense, conflict, compromise, condensation... lose all their impact
when psychoanalysis is reduced to a new version of hermeneutics" (p. 88).
Even so, I think we can use hermeneutics to complicate rather than reduce and
therefore I am not willing to renounce hermeneutics once and for all. If
interpretations of texts, of history are done sensitively they will generate rather
than reduce ideas. Interpretations are always tentative and partial. And what it is
that gets represented as Holocaust scholarship depends on the interpretation
given by the historian. The shifting and changing trends in Holocaust
historiography change the ways in which this event will be remembered by
generations to come. New interpretations might not generate new material, but
perhaps new interpretations will reflect the growing concerns of the next
generation. With every new interpretation comes a new strangeness. As Dilthey
stresses, “Interpretations would be impossible if expressions of life were
completely strange. It would be unnecessary if nothing strange were in them. It
lives, therefore, between these two extremes" (1907-1910. p. 77).
The strangeness of interpreting historical texts lies not in our ability to get
at the mind of the author or even to get at the workings of our own mind,
because much of our lives are covered over in unconscious traces. Rather,
strangeness in interpreting historical texts comes out of sites of liminality, slips
of the tongue, or what Freud would call parapraxes, proliferations of doubles,
repetitions, ghosts, reversals, internal objects, uncanny transferences. As Hans
Kellner points out, “historical thought” becomes open through “the problem of
disjunctiveness, interference, and destruction of information" (1989, p. 34). The
destruction of information has much to do with the ways in which historians
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repress difficult materials. As Hayden White (1978) comments, “there are
always more facts in the record than the historian can possibly include in his
narrative representation" (p. 51). And it is what the historian chooses to throw
away or exclude that might offer clues to her own psychological resistances to
her material. “By filling in the gaps,” White contends, the historian interprets
(p.51). But what is it about these gaps and lapses and absences that become
troubling? It is in the not-said that we should turn our attention.
It becomes clear in Holocaust scholarship that gaps in historical
representation emerge around victims, women, gays and lesbians. These
representations in Holocaust studies have been, for the most part, considered
“unfitting subjects" (Talburt, 1999, p. 59). We must disturb the memory text of
history and examine these unfitting subjects, as Susan Talburt might call them.
These historical subjects are considered “unfitting” by many traditional
historians because matters of gender and sexuality are taboo and are not
considered appropriate to discussions around the Holocaust. But there is a
movement, albeit a small one, mostly by feminists and queer theorists, to move
these so-called unfitting subjects into the discussion. Historical writing shapes
memory by erasing subjects.
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CHAPTER 5
MEMORY TEXT OF HOLOCAUST HISTORIES
Haftling: I had learnt that I am HaWing. My number
is 174517; we have been baptized, we will carry
the tatoo on our left arm until we die. (Levi, 1996, p. 27)
The definition of Haftling is prisoner. But the word prisoner does not and
cannot capture what it must have been like to have lived through Auschwitz.
Primo Levi survived Auschwitz, but forever remained a prisoner to its memory.
The memory of Auschwitz, though, eventually overpowered and killed him.
Primo Levi committed suicide, like many other Jews returning to life after
Auschwitz.
Through the prisms of memory, the term “Holocaust" arrived on the scene
in the 1960s, but not without debate. This is a contested term, a contested site of
representation which serves “to separate this particular massacre from other
historical instances of genocide” (Marrus, 1987, p. 3). But some Jews are
offended by the term Holocaust. Berel Lang (1990) explains that the word
Holokautima, which is found in the septuagint, is a “Greek translation of the
Hebrew Olah, which designates the type of ritual sacrifice that was to be
completely burned" (xxi). But the Holocaust had nothing whatsoever to do with
the divine. There was nothing divine or sacred about it. Lang (1990) points out
that many Jews prefer the term “shoah" which means “wasteland" or
“destruction” (xxi.) The term shoah is taken from the book of Isaiah and
Proverbs. Whether one embraces the term Holocaust or shoah, the crucial and
significant point here is to respond to the event in an intellectually and
emotionally senstive way. With “non-postponable urgency” Emmanuel Levinas
remarks, the other, “face” of the other, demands a response (1969, p. 212). The
others of this wrenching history demand a response; the face of six million
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dead others demands attention. And so respond we must. Levinas, a Holocaust
survivor, declares that we must respond to the call before it is too late.
With the indulgent attitude toward mortality which
we call the historical conscience, each of us has to
wait for the occasion and recognize the call addressed
to us. To respond to the call of the perishable instant!
It must not come too late. (1995, p. 184)
An historical consciousness and conscience should be an ethical one. Doing
work on the Holocaust is an ethical task, and I feel that I have been called to
address this difficult memory; I have been called out of my own unconscious,
called out of a place that has no name. As a third generation American Jew, a
third generation Jew after Auschwitz, I feel that it is my responsibility to grapple
with this event. As Geoffrey Hartman claims, “the enormity of the event. . .
blocks thought and leads to a black hole that swallows the haunted interpreter"
(1996, p.1). Indeed, I am haunted by the memory of Auschwitz. But in spite of
being haunted by this horrific past, I am bound by a “promise of truthfulness"
(Wyshogrod, 1998, p. 10) to remember the Holocaust, to remember both the
living and the dead, to remember my Jewish ancestors.
The memory of the Holocaust is unique, a particular Jewish tragedy. One
of the important points about the term “Holocaust” is that it designates the
uniqueness of this tragedy. Michael Marrus stresses that “Holocaust specialists
have presented a strong case for the “centrality" of anti-Semitism in Nazi
ideology, or the “uniqueness” of the Holocaust, even by the grim standards of
20th century massacres” (1987, p. 8). As David Weinberg (1996) points out, it
was the trial of Adolph Eichmann that drove this point home. “Of particular
significance was the emphasis that the Israeli prosecutors placed on the
specificity of the Jewish tragedy” (1996, p. 22). The Holocaust was not merely
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a humanitarian tragedy, it was rather a specifically Jewish one. It was not a
tragedy like other tragedies. Charles Maier (1988) claims that “suggesting the
comparability of the Final Solution to other genocides opens the way to
apologetics. It facilitates a literature of evasion” (p. 1). The Holocaust signifies a
radical alterity that must not be subsumed under the notion of the same. The
attempt to subsume the Holocaust under the notion of the same, to suggest, in
other words, its likeness or resemblance to another tragedy smacks of
“normalization" (Maier, 1988, p. 70). To think that the Holocaust is like
something else is to trivialize it.
The position which allows for comparability is one that is embraced by
neo-conservative historians in Germany. Neo-conservatives often compare the
Holocaust to Stalinist crimes. Charles Maier explains that
The central issue has been whether the Nazi
crimes were unique, a legacy of evil in a class
by themselves, irreparably burdening any concept
of German nationhood, or whether they are comparable
to other national atrocities, especially Stalinist terror.
(1988, p. 1)
The debate around the issue of comparability surfaced during what is termed
the Historikerstreit in Germany in the 1980s. Fiercely opposed to comparability,
Jurgen Habermas charged neo-conservative historians like Andreas Hillgruber,
Ernst Nolte and Joachaim Fest with “relativizing” the Holocaust (cited in Maier,
1988, pp. 1-2). Ernst Nolte, in a move of projection, shifts blame from the Nazis
to the Bolsheviks as the “original perpetrators of global annihilations “(cited in
Freidlander, 1993, p. 34). Saul Freidlander explains that, according to Nolte, the
Nazis acted out of desperation and “copied the Bolsheviks” (p. 34) because
they feared that if they did not kill Jews in camps, the Bolsheviks would kill the
Germans. The Historikerstreit entertained debates like these. And the key issue
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here turns on national identity.The question becomes, how could historians
frame history in Germany to bolster national identity and national pride? If they
shifted blame to other perpetrators, or if they leveled the Holocaust and
suggested that it was similar to other tragedies, the hope was that Germans
would not feel so bad about having been complicit during the rise of the Third
Reich. Jurgen Habermas suggests that the Historikerstreit signaled a "new
nationalism" (cited in Maier, 1988, pp. 1-2). This new nationalism served to
erase the past, or at least re-write it so as to become more palatable.
Comparisons between victims and victimizers also works to unwrite
history. The so-called Bitburg Affair demonstrates this morally repugnant
stance. The year was 1985, the 40th anniversary of the end of the Holocaust.
When President Reagan visited the Bitburg cemetary in Germany, where both
the Wehrmacht (German army) and Nazi SS are buried, Jews protested. The
protest concerned two issues. Initially President Reagon did not wish to visit a
concentration camp. As historian Raul Hilberg points out, Reagan declared that
he did not want to go to a concentration camp because he did not wish to
“reawaken the memories and so forth, and the passions of time" (cited in
Hilberg, 1986, p. 19). After pressure, however, and as an aside, Reagan did visit
Bergen-Belson. But to make matters worse, he then compared Jewish victims
with Nazi SS, who he also considered “victims" of history. “ “Reagan: F in
history,” a French newspaper headline declared" (Hartman, 1986, p. 11). It is
repugnant and offensive, especially for Jews, to level victims and victimizers.
Many Jews were offended at Reagan's visit for another reason: Nazi SS
were buried at Bitburg. Why honor perpetrators of horrible crimes? Would
Reagan’s visit have created such controversy if SS had not been buried there?
If he would have only commemorated the Wehrmacht would it have made any
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difference? This depends upon what it is people think about the German army
and their role in the Holocaust. Jose Brunner points out that revisionist historian
Andreas Hillgruber has argued that the Wehrmacht
fought in the name of their nation and protected
their families and women from death.. .rather than
aiding and abetting genocide--their deeds were
not only innocent but heroic. (1997, p. 269)
But evidence to the contrary abounds. It has long been known by historians that
not only were the Wehrmacht soldiers not innocent but rather they were directly
complicit in “aiding and abetting genocide.” Omer Bartov explains that the
Wehrmacht was deeply involved not “only” in killing pows and partisans... but
also, in a direct and massive manner, in the implementation of the Final
Solution" (1997, p. 172). Thus, it does not make sense to draw a dear
distinction between Nazi SS and the Wehrmacht, for they were both guilty of
war crimes. Hence, Reagan’s visit to Bitburg probably still would have created
controversy even if Nazi SS were not buried there, while his Bitburg visit was
aimed at reconciliation with Germans, it turned out to be an utter disaster, and if
anything, it further alienated Jews.
I saw people being sent to the gas chamber. I lived
a block opposite the gas chamber and could see from
my window people going into the building. There was
a tall chimney and I could see flames coming from
inside the building and never saw these people come
out. (Szafran, cited in Zeiger, 1960, p. 186)
Dora Szarfran’s deposition taken at the Eichmann trial is a reminder that
these mass murders were carried out by human beings, who were doctors,
teachers, soldiers “ordinary Germans” (Browning, 1998; Goldhagen, 1997,
Friedlander, 1997). The smoke from the crematoriums is said to have been so
thick that it produced a black cloud which hung densely overhead. The smoke
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could be seen for miles around. The smoke was so thick that it made the sun
turn black, hence the metaphor the “black sun of Auschwitz." The smoke
covered the walls of the train station at Auschwitz. People said they could smell
burning flesh for miles away. How could they do it? I ask this question to myself
every day. How could they do this? When I attend synagogue and look around
at all these Jewish people, at all these Jewish children, the question rings in my
ears, How could they do it? I am aghast.
A crisis of representation and erasure of memory is happening now
around the Holocaust. The so-called revisionist historians are, as Pierre VidalNaquet (1992) suggests by the title of his work on Holocaust denial, “Assasins
of Memory.” Revisionists claim that a) the Holocaust is a hoax, b) that the
numbers of deaths reported are exaggerations, c) that the gas chambers did not
exist, d) that the Holocaust was actually a Jewish plot to acquire the state of
Israel. Deborah Lipstadt comments that the United States Holocaust Memorial
Council receives many complaints from high school teachers that their students
believe these fallacious claims. Lipstadt explains that
High school teachers have complained that when
they teach the Holocaust in their classes, they
increasingly find students who have heard about
Holocaust denial and assume it must have
legitimacy. (1993, pp. 3-4)
This is troubling especially since the last generation of Holocaust survivors are
dying off, and within one generation they will not be able to testify to the horrrors
through which they lived. The burden of memory is on us.
That the Holocaust happened, that six million Jews were massacred is
historical reality. As Georg Iggers explains, “historical accounts refer to a
historical reality, no matter how complex and indirect the process is by which
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the historian approximates reality" (1997, p. 147). A historical reconstruction
attempts to get at the truthfulness of the event. A construction, a narrative, may
shift our viewpoints around the event, but still it leaves the truthfulness of the
event intact. Louis Mink remarks that “of course our interpretations and state of
knowledge may change, but either Caesar visited Britain or he didn’t" (1987, p.
93). But doing interpretive work around the Holocaust is not just about changing
states of knowledge. It is also about changing states of the psyche. Repression
and its unconscious formations alter our viewpoints around historical events.
Repressed memory might determine beforehand what it is an historian exludes
in her interpretation. Interpretation of historical reality does not mean anything
goes; it does not mean that radical relativism will do. Some interpretations are
better than others; some interpretations are completely inadequate, some are
outright lies.
Scholarship around the Holocaust is generally divided into three areas:
perpetrator, victim and bystander histories. Historians tend to specialize in one
domain or another, rarely crossing boundaries. Saul Friedlander worries that
Holocaust historiography has become too specialized and fragmented so as to
obfuscate. Friedlander remarks:
the image of the Nazi era presented by German
and foreign historians, in becoming so diversified
and complex, is perhaips blurred: the sheer multitude
of specialized studies on the minutest aspects of this
epodi tends to erase the sharp outlines of certain
central issues, be they conceptual or ethical. (1993, pp. 5-6)
The balkanization of Holocaust scholarship can produce for the
researcher an overwhelming array of material which may become difficult, if not
impossible, to sift through. What I would like to do here is to tease out some of
the broader questions that are raised when looking at the three broad areas of
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Holocaust scholarship (perpetrator, victim and bystander historiographies) to try
to touch on key issues that Freidlander worries are being obscured. I argue that
psychological mechanisms such as transference, repression, denial, projection,
reversal and introjection may shape and determine what gets represented as
Holocaust historiography in the first place.
Perpetrator Histories
The first time I came face to face with a German
soldier was in 1940, when I was ten and a half.. . .
The Germans wore goggles, black leather jackets,
shiny high boots. In their powerful mechanized
equipment they looked like giants from outerspace.
At that moment I felt we had lost the war.
(Jeruchim, cited in Rosenberg, 1994, p. 139)
German soldiers seemed like giants from outerspace, says Holocaust
survivor Simon Jeruchim. It is this seemingly alien nature, this bizarre portrait of
Germans, that echoes in many early Holocaust histories. Social
psychohistorians (Reich 1933/1945; Adorno, 1950; Horkheimer, 1940; Fromm
1941/1969) and psychobiographers (Binion, 1976; Rappaport, 1975; Waite,
1977; Erikson, 1976) tended to emphasize the pathological, and hence alien
nature, of German society. According to Peter Marthesheimer, German’s
willingness to follow Hitler, “led to the psychopathology of a whole nation" (cited
in Markovits & Noveck, 1996, p. 406). Wilhelm Reich argued that Germans,
under the sway of Hitler and his Nazi henchmen, got themselves embroiled in
“a psychotic situation” (1933/1945, p. 29). Martin Broszat suggested that the rise
of Nazism was, in part, due to “the general pathology of German nationalism"
(1969/1981, p. 29).
According to Wilhelm Reich, German pathology was caused by “sexual
regression" (1933/1945, p. 26). Reich argued that German men became willing
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to “submit” (p. 25) to “authoritarian order" (p. 25) because they were
“masochistic” (xi). Boys suffered at the hands of authoritarian fathers and
consequently felt that they needed to identify with someone, namely Hitler, who
could satisfy their masochistic needs. Hitler, the sadist, then filled the gap
psychologically for German men especially. Reich comments that
Sexual regression aids political reaction not only
through this process which makes the mass
individual passive and unpolitical but also by
creating an interest in actively supporting the
authoritarian order. (1933/1945, p. 26)
The so-called “mass individual" or collective German culture, had a basic flaw,
an “irrational structure" (xvi) that allowed for the very condition of “fascism" (xvi)
to arrive on the scene. Reich remarks that “fascism is not the deed of a Hitler or
Mussolini, but the expression of the mass individual” (xvi).
Like Reich, Adorno (1950) suggested that German collective
psychopathology was due to what he termed the “Authoritarian syndrome" (p.
759). This syndrome was caused by a tendency toward a “sadomasochistic
resolution of the Oedius complex” (p. 259). Similarly, Erich Fromm (1941/1969)
declared that German society had a “symbiotic relationship" (p. 246) with
Hitler, as he was the sadist and Germans masochists. The “authoritarian
character” of German society allowed for the
Simultaneous presence of sadistic and masochistic
drives. Sadism was understood as aiming at unrestricted
power over another person more or less mixed with
destructiveness; masochism as aiming at dissolving
oneself in an overwhelmingly strong power and
participating in its strengths and glory, (p. 246)
Unlike Fromm, Reich and Adorno, Ackerman and Jahoda (1950) claim that
Germans, because they had authoritarian parents, were afraid to show
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weakness, and consequently became sadistic. And as Robert J. Litton (1986)
stresses, many “early descriptions of Auschwitz and other death camps focused
on the sadistic and viciousness of Nazi guards, officers and physicians" (pp. 1415).
All of this pathologizing of German society is, however, problematic. To
suggest that all Germans behaved in sadomasochistic ways is to essentialize.
Of course, there are many accounts of sadistic camp guards and passive
German citizenry. But as Marion Kaplan (1998) points out, many Germans
exhibited neither sadistic nor masochistic behavior. And as Robert J. Lifton
explains, “sadism and violence alone would not account for the killing of
millions" (1986, pp. 14-15). One of the most serious problems of these early
studies, aside from essentialism, turns on blameworthiness and responsibility. If
German society is pathologized, if Germans have collectively gone mad and are
considered alien and abnormal, they can be exonerated from perpetrating
crimes, for who would try the insane? “To dismiss Hitler or Himmler [or collective
German society] as madmen or fiends, incomprehensible to “normal" people, is
to say that critical judgment of them is not possible” (Waite, 1977, xvii). Germans
are not demons. Germans are not aliens from outerspace. Germans are people.
Since at least the 1980s scholars have stressed that German crimes were
committed by ordinary people. Robert J. Lifton comments that what troubled him
while doing research on the Nazi doctors was,
the ordinariness of most Nazi doctors... [who were]
neither brilliant nor stupid, neither inherently evil
nor particularly ethically sensitive, they were by no
means demonic figures-sadistic, fanatic, lusting
to kill. (1986, pp. 4-5)
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Langer (1998), Kelman (1976), Browning (1998) agree with Lifton that
Germans, by and large, were neither sadistic nor psychopathic. Like the label
“psychopaths", the label uauthoritarianismnconceals more than it reveals. It
keeps us from thinking about the complexities of the responses and actions of
perpetrators. To say that all Germans have authoritarian characters is to
essentialize and simplify. Like the label “authoritarian" the term “Fascist” also
becomes problematic because it too conceals more than it reveals. Wilhelm
Reich claimed that Fascism was the “basic emotional attitude of man in an
authoritarian society” (1933/1945, ix). Reich contended that Fascism was a
“mixture of rebellious emotions and reactionary social ideas” (x). But the term
Fascism explains little. Saul Friedlander argues that
“’Fascism” as an overall tag... shielded many of them
[Germans] from the specificity of the Nazi past, and
such ideological generalizations became deeply
embedded in subsequent historical discourse. (1993, p. 125)
Recall, East German historiography became saturated with rhetoric of
anti-Fascism. Communists blamed former West Germans for the Holocaust.
West Germans were referred to as “Fascists." But this anti-Fascist rhetoric is
problematic because not only does it obscure, it shifts the onus of blame onto
West Germany. Jeffrey Herf explains that
The dominant German Communist anti-Fascist
discourse suggested that its exponents were
“anti-Fascists” who were only incidentally
German and thus only incidentally bound up
with the burden of German history. (1997, p. 56)
The East German government has traditionally only honored Communist
resisters of Fascism. Communists in the former East Germany just three years
after the war “abolished the Jewish anti-Fascist Committee and arrested its
leaders" (Herf, 1997, p. 119). Herf remarks that with the recent opening of the
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Stasi Archives in Berlin, historians have learned that Communists who helped
Jews found themselves in trouble with the police. And many Jewish
Communists, along with their non-Jewish compatriots landed in jail. Herf relates
that
those who returned from Mexico... those Communists
such as [Paul] Merker, [Leo] Zukerman, and others who
in the spirit of Communism wartime anti-Fascism, had
emphasized Jewish issues. .. now fell under a cloud
of espionage accusations, (p. 64).
Anti-Fascism also meant “government initiated anti-Semitism” (p. 117). Jeffrey
Peck (1996) is not confident that the Former East German mentality has
changed much with reunification.
Early Holocaust scholarship also embraced what is termed the
Sonderweg thesis. Before 1933 Sonderweg , which means special path,
suggested that Germany was superior to other nations. After all, Germany
produced Beethoven and Bach. And all major German historians, John Weaver
(1994) claims, appropriated this position of superiority before 1933. Weaver
explains that after 1933, Hans Ulrich Wehler argued that Germans had taken
the wrong path. Now, Sonderweg designated deviance. German historians felt
that “somewhere Germany had gone wrong” (Maier, 1988, p. 103). Martin
Broszat (1969/1981) claims that while Germany may have progressed
economically, she lagged behind socially and politically. Like Broszat, Thorstein
Veblen argued that
Germany had borrowed Britain’s advanced technological
achievements without having had time to internalize
the values of workmanship and democracy... The concept
of a lag between economic and political modernization
continued to mark influential historical interpretations.
(cited in Maier, 1988, p. 104)
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However, the Sonderweg thesis has come under attack. Charles Maier
stresses that Germany “was hardly a feudal society” ( p. 108). Maier asks what it
is German historians mean when they suggest that Germany diverted from the
West? What “West" are they talking about? And exactly what were Germans
diverting from? Maier argues that the Sonderweg thesis is nothing more than “a
complacent or apologetic notion that Germany had been seized by “demonized”
forces" (1988, p. 106). After 1945, then, the implication is that Germany was no
longer off track, but squarely on track once again. The Sonderweg thesis
implies that after 1945 everything was fine again in Germany. Germans, after
the war, for the most part, were not held responsible for their crimes, so that in
fact, many were put back into positions of power. Former Nazis became judges,
teachers, and attorneys. Scholars stress that there was an uncanny continuity
between pre-1945 and post-1945 German society. Thus, the Sonderweg thesis
has been dismissed by many historians primarily because it served as an
apologetic.
More recently, Holocaust scholarship has been guided by the
intentionalist-structuralist debate. Christopher Browning (1992) comments that
the intentionalists “explain history through the ideas and decisions of
individuals [and these historians emphasize] the “continuity" of Hitler’s goals
and “the central role of Hitler (p. 3). Conversely, structuralists stress
“improvisation and cumulative radicalization produced by [the] contradictory
nature [o f]... chaotic decisions]” (Browning, 1992, p. 3).
Intentionalists argue, generally, that Hitler had a “blueprint" (Goldhagen,
1997; Dawidowicz, 1975/1986) or a program or plan to murder the Jews all
along. Dawidowicz looks to Mein Kamof for evidence of Hitler’s plan. Other
historians, Christopher Browning (1992) explains, look to Hitler’s 1939
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Reichstag speech. It is here that Hitler talks of a “bloody solution" to Germany’s
problems. Browning comments that
The programmatic view is based primarily upon the
statements made by Hitler, such as those in the late
1920s threatening a “bloody” solution through the
sword or his famous 1939 Reichstag prophecy that
the outbreak of war would mean the destruction of
the Jewish race. (p. 26)
Some caution that in spite of these early pronouncements of murder, in spite of
Hitler’s ravings in Mein Kampf. it becomes difficult to prove whether he actually
intended all along to commit mass murder. Saul Friedlander remarks that the
Holocaust was not a “predetermined enactment of a demonic script. .. [nor was
it] haphazard, involuntary, imperceptible and chaotic” (1997, p. 5). Lucy
Dawidowicz (1975/1986) claims that structuralists offer up an apologetic
because they obscure blame. “By removing the moral aspect of decision
making in the Hitler era, the structuralists initiated a new cycle of apologetics"
(xxvii).
The intentionalist-structuralist debate echoes ideas found in both Hegel
and Marx. Recall, Hegel’s work suggests that history produces subjects.
Subjects have little agency, as spirit moves through the world. Of course,
structuralists are not mystical like Hegel,and they certainly do not argue that
history is akin to some spiritual entity moving like a phantom through the world.
However, structuralists do argue that Nazi “apparatuses” functioned in ways to
move history. This kind of explanation leaves little room for human agency. The
notion of an “apparatus” seems obscure. What is an apparatus? How can we
assign blame to an apparatus? The rhetoric of apparatuses (Hilberg,
1961/1985) obfuscates and may serve to depersonalize and sanitize what it
was that individual perpetrators did. Apparatuses do not kill, people do. People
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bleed, people die. Perpetrators have names and faces.Upon reading
depositions taken at the Eichmann trial, it becomes very clear that the rhetoric of
apparatuses conceals the human complicity, the humanness of crimes
perpetrated.
I identify Number 21 on photograph Z/4/7 as an
SS kitchen chief of number 1 kitchen at Belsen.
I have been told that his name is Erich Basch___
I was standing near the door to the kitchen. There
was a girl prisoner... Basch... when he was about
3 meters from her he fired 2 or 3 shots... at this girl.
I saw the girl fall to the ground and blood coming
from her head. (Siiberberg, cited in Zeiger, 1960, p. 172)
The above particular perpetrator was named Erich Basch. Erich Basch was not
an apparatus, he was a human being who shot and killed a girl at point blank
range. Daniel Goldhagen (1997) stresses that historians should attach faces
and names to perpetrators. He wants to "restore them to their identities" (p. 6).
Goldhagen declares that he wants to let the reader see that these were people
who killed and these people get garbed in what Goldhagen considers to be
“obuscating labels, like "Nazis” and "SS men” (p. 6). Goldhagen stresses that
we should call "them what they were, Germans” (p. 6).
Intentionalists, like Goldhagen, argue that subjects produce history and
are responsible for their actions. This position echoes that of Marx’s. Here,
intentionalists stress that we can examine what individuals did and make
judgments about their actions and hold them responsible for crimes.This is the
power of the intentionalist argument. Clearly Eichmann was an individual, not
an apparatus, and he had to be held responsible for what he did.
Raul Hilberg's (1961/1985) early work anticipated structuralist accounts
of perpetrators. Michael Marrus comments that Hilberg’s work "offers a
magesterial synthesis on a scale that no one has matched before or since...
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[Hilberg’s] remains the most important book that has been written on the
subject" (1987, p. 48). Although Marrus praises Hilberg, others criticize him and
consider him a scandal. Hilberg writes in his memoirs that for thirty years he has
"almost been buried under an avalanche of condemnations” (1996, p. 137).
Hilberg argues, generally, that Jews were passive and did not resist the Nazis,
and in fact uhasten[ed] their [own] destruction” (1961/1985, p. 28). Hilberg
contends that “In many cases they failed to escape while there was still time and
more often, still, they failed to step out of the way when the killers were already
upon them” (p. 26). Hilberg contends that "Jewish institutions [were]... an
extension of the German bureaucratic machine” (1996, p. 127). Jews were led
like sheep to slaughter. And I think it is this image which has gotten Hilberg in
so much trouble. Oscar Handlin and Arno Lustiger (cited in Hilberg, 1996) and a
host of other Jewish historians since Hilberg have tried to overturn this image.
Responses of Jews were quite complex and it is this complexity that Hilberg did
not take into account (Kushner, 1994).
Contrary to what Hilberg maintains, Yehuda Bauer (1989) suggests that
Jews did resist. Bauer explains that
In the Generalgouvernment there were three armed
rebellions.. . . four attempted rebellions at Kielce,
Opatow, Pilica, and Tomaszow Lubelski... [there were]
rebellions in six concentration and death camps
Kruszyna, Krychow, Minsk Mazowiecki... Sobibor, and
Treblinka. (1989, p. 143)
Still Bauer points out that Jews could not always resist because they had little
access to guns. Without guns, resistance was impossible. Jews fought back with
what they had and did what they could do but the Nazis were just too strong. In
the camps, according to Hermann Langbein (1996) there was organized
resistance. This, he writes, is a fact that tends to get overlooked or obscured.
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It is little known that there was resistance in the
camps~in defiance of an inconceivably brutal
and totally effective system of terror-resistance to
the killing of human beings... not just individual
resistance, but organized resistance, (p. 2)
And so the debate about resistance rages. The image of Jews passively
marching like sheep to slaughter has been the impetus for these counter
arguments. And it was Hilberg who initiated the debate. I do think he
undertheorized around the complexities of Jewish responses. It seems that
scholars can come to little agreement on how much or how little Jews actually
reisisted.
I consider Hilberg to be a structuralist, not in the same way as Broszat
(1969/1981) or Mommsen (1966), because unlike them, he argues that Hitler
was responsible, and unlike them, he argues that the actions of the Nazis were
carefully throught through. Hilberg remarks that the Nazis knew just what they
were doing. But Hilberg's discourse is similar to structuralist discourse. He
argues that the Nazi “Apparatus" (p. 55) churned like an “engine of destruction"
(p. 55), like a “sprawling” and “far-flung bureaucratic machine” (p. 53). It was the
“sheer mechanism of destruction” (xi) that concerned Hilberg. Robert J. Lifton,
like Hilberg, remarks that it was the “bureaucracy of killing: the faceless,
detached bureaucratic function” (1986, p. 15) of murder that allowed
perpetrators to carry out such hideous acts. The bureaucratic nature of mass
murder allowed for a “routinization” (p. 15) of killing to numb the perpetrators
enough so that they could detach themselves from what they were doing.
What exactly is an “engine of destruction?” Why all this mechanistic
language? Lawrence Langer writes that “the very image of machinery

tends

to obscure individual offenders and obscure the identity and the catalyst of the
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very culprits who initiated and carried out the crime” (1998, xii). And it is this
mechanistic language that becomes troubling for me. Although I understand
that Hilberg attempts to suggest that the Holocaust was a much more complex
web of complicity than one might assume, but I believe that this web is made up
of people, and it is to these individuals we should turn. Structuralists’ accounts
of the Holocaust, like this one, suggest that people do not produce history, but
rather historical structures (mechanisms, networks of power, engines of
destruction and so forth) sweep people into the web of history, events.
In spite of my criticisms, I want to suggest that Hilberg’s work is important.
He does complexify the web of complicity. He attempts to locate perpetrators in
a broader network of power structures; he attempts to show how intertwining
systems of bureaucracy aided the process of carrying out mass murder. But
most of all, Hilberg becomes important because he is one of the earliest
Holocaust scholars to suggest that Nazi SS were not the only group of people
who became complicit. Hilberg stresses that “All components of German
organized life were drawn [in]” (1992, p. 20). If this is the case, then ordinary
Germans became just as blameworthy as Nazi SS.
Martin Broszat (1969/1981), structuralist par excellance, argues that the
Nazis operated as “a growing system of rival power groups” (xi) who
“improvised" (xi) in the form of a ”polyocrac[ies]” (xi) which competed for power
with Hitler. These so-called polyocracies engaged in a “wild proliferation of
National Socialist power” (p. 139). Broszat’s portrayal of the Nazi era is one of
utter and complete chaos. The Nazis lacked any “direct and systematic
leadership" (xi). Thus, Broszat is led to the conclusion that “below Hitler there
was no overall political responsibility" (xi). But how could Broszat maintain such
a claim? In one sentence he exonerates all Germans complicit in Holocaust
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crimes. Lucy Dawidowicz (1975/1986) calls Broszat’s interpretation “bizarre”
(xxvi). She criticizes him for offering up a “science-fiction-fantasy of government
by automation, robutistically driven by an internal law of motion” xxvi). And not
only does Broszat rule out political responsibility of middle and lower eschelon
leaders, according to Dawidowicz he also suggests that Hitler's place in all of
this was secondary. Broszat “downgraded Hitler's role,” (xxvi), Dawidowicz
suggests. The implication here is that the rise of the Nazi era was so chaotic
and so haphazard that it becomes hard to pinpoint the real culprits. But is this
just an apologetic? Broszat claims that Germany suffered from a “collective
neuroses" (1969/1981), a society out of control, a society gone mad. And a
society gone mad cannot be held responsible for its actions. Something is out of
joint here. Broszat’s work signals, to me, repression.
Repressed memory shapes historians’ work. And one can get a better
understanding of perhaps why Broszat writes about the Holocaust in the way
that he does when one examines his so-called “plea for historicization." Broszat,
in a well known debate with Saul Friedlander (1997), argues that German
historians must become more objective by separating their own personal
memory of the Holocaust from their rendering of the Holocaust in historical
accounts. Broszat declares that he does not want to distance himself from the
event; he wants to lessen “the moral loading” (cited in Rusen, 1997, p. 123) of
writing about the event. But still, it seems to me, that in spite of his claim, he
does distance himself from the past. And he wants German historians to
become more objective so that they can do their work without emotional
upheaval. It seems that Broszat wishes to repress the memory of the Holocaust,
by suggesting that it is necessary for historians to separate their memories of
the event from the work that they do around the event. How is this possible?
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When the memory gets repressed, the historiographies produced end up being,
as Lucy Dawidowicz puts it, bizarre. Jorn Rusen comments that,
by historicizing National Socialism, Broszat wishes to
overcome the historical estrangement of Germans and
their identity in relation to that era. Friedlander interrogates
this project, wondering whether a normalization in the
historical patterns of German identity can be achieved at
the cost of neglecting the special quality of National
Socialism in historical perspective. (1997, p. 119)
Here again, for so many German historians the question turns on
national identity and national pride. If historians are old enough to remember
the Holocaust, how can they write history pretending that remembering the
event is irrelevant? Here we see the implications of drawing sharp distinctions
between history and memory. Friedlander has often argued that these sharp
distinctions cannot be drawn, that the relation between history and memory is
fuzzy, especially if the historian works on recent history. Personal memories of
Auschwitz and of the Nazi era have got to affect the writings of German
historians. And it seems to me that Broszat’s plea to separate memory and his
refusal to admit that this memory affects historians, sounds the Freudian theme
of negation. But for Freud, a negation signals an affirmation of some sort. For a
very strong ‘no’ a very strong ‘yes’ lurks in the unconscious (1925/1989).
Broszat doth protest too much. I wonder what it is that he does remember and
why this memory bothers him so much for him to call out for forgetfulness.
Broszat's plea serves as a defense mechanism against his own memories.
Christopher Browning, unlike Martin Broszat, calls himself a moderate
structuralist. He takes a "middle position” (1992, p. 5) between intentionalism
and structuralism. Browning argues that the Nazi regime was divided by
"factionalism and infighting” (p. 76). Planning "emanated from the center with
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receptivity and accomodation in the periphery" (p. 76). Taking up the
“evolutionary position” Browning still contends that Hitler was ultimately
responsible.Like other structuralists, Browning suggests that the Nazis, because
they embraced a sort of evolutionary scheme, improvised as they went along.
The important move that Browning has made, I believe, is toward doing
what is termed Alltagsgechichte. Unlike most perpetrator histories since Hilberg,
Browning does not focus on “middle-echelon perpetrators" but rather he
focuses on the “little men" (Browning, 1996, p. 27). Because Browning’s work
attempts to humanize and not demonize the killers, because he suggests that it
is human beings who kill, it is the human conscience that makes decisions and
shapes history, I would consider him closer to the intentionalists than the
structuralists.
Christopher Browning’s (1998) work, entitled Ordinary Men: Resen/e
Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland, has been overshadowed
by Daniel Goldhagen’s (1997) Hitler’s Willing Executioner’s: Ordinary Germans
and the Holocaust. The Goldhagen controversy, which I will discuss later,
caught the eye of the popular press and consequently led to submerging
Browning’s book into the background. What is interesting is that both books
deal with a similar topic: ordinary German complicity during the Holocaust.
Ordinary men, who were not Nazis, but who were reserve police, willingly
engaged in brutality, murdering innocent people. Ordinary men willingly
murdered Jews. Yahuda Bauer (1997) attributes Goldhagen’s popularity, at
least with lay readers, to his simplistic argument.
I believe that the real reason is the very simplicity
of the argument, its manichaen (black and white)
character. A complicated phenomenon is seemingly
explained in the most simple fashion: the Germans
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killed the Jews because they wanted to; they wanted
to since the mid-nineteenth century, and maybe
before that too. And that’s all there is to it. (p.71)
Unlike Goldhagen’s simple explanation, Browning offers up what he calls a
“multilayered approach” (1998, p. 215). His treatment of police reserve battalion
101 is complex. He does not demonize, yet he does not exonerate either.
Browning’s, is a more sympathetic approach than Goldhagen’s. Goldhagen
tends to demonize Germans. Thus, I prefer Browning’s to Goldhagen's portral of
ordinary German complicity.
Browning bases his book on “judicial interrogations” (xviii) of 125 men
who served in reserve police battalion 101. These interrogations were
conducted in the 1960s. Browning’s research led him to believe that not only
did some of these men repress their memories of what they did to Jews, but
some lied outright. What is disturbing is the way in which many of them,
according to Browning, utilized projection, to cover over their hatred for Jews.
Browning describes this projection as it had implications for Germans’ relations
with Poles. He comments that
While the policemen’s testimonies offer scant
information concerning German attitudes toward
Poles and Jews, they contain very frequent and
quite damning comments on Polish attitudes toward
Jews. (p. 155)
Germans often considered Poles second class citizens; in fact many Germans
hated Poles and many Poles were anti-Semites. But the very “omission" (p. 73)
of policemen’s own Jewish prejudices during these interrogations reveals
something about their attitudes toward Jews. It is in the not said that we begin to
understand something lurking in repression. Browning contends that the men of
reserve police battalion 101 were given the choice of not participating in
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shooting Jews, of “stepping out” (p. 71). Only 12 out of 500 men took up the offer
of Major Trapp (who was affectionately called Pappa Trapp). Why did only 12
men step out? Browning suggests that most of the policemen felt the “pressure”
to conform (p. 71) and had “a lack of time for reflection" (p. 71). Goldhagen
(1997) refutes these claims. He suggests that Browning is merely excusing here
and that Germans murdered because they wanted to. Conformity and lack of
reflection had nothing to do with it.
Browning asks, “How did a battalion of middle-aged reserve policemen
find themselves facing the task of shooting some 1,500 Jews in the Polish
village of Jozefow, in the summer of 1942?” (p. 3) They faced the task initially
with difficulty. Some of the men displayed “sheer physical revulsion" (p.74),
some expressed “resentment’ and “bitterness" (76). The Jozefow Massacre was
carried out essentially by what Americans would consider the equivalent of a
national guard unit made up of weekend warriors, not professional soliders.
These were not professional soldiers; they were everyday men, middle-aged
men, far beyond the age for military service. Nonetheless, these ordinary men
killed Jews by the scores. Some were killed in a face off. Some were killed at
point blank range. Browning explains that
When the first truckload of 35 to 40 Jews arrived, an
equal number of policemen came forward and, face
to face, were paired off with their victim s... Kammer then
orderd the Jews to lie down in a row. The policemen
stepped up behind them ... and on Kammer’s orders
fired in unison, (p. 61)
But the policemen did not alway aim well. Skulls were blown off, blood
splattered everywhere. Some of the policemen intentionally missed. If they did
not aim right they had to shoot several times. The account that Browning
portrays is completely disgusting and gruesome. Some perpetrators became
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sick and threw up; some ran into the woods in hysterics. “When the men arrived
at the barracks in Bilgoraj, they were depressed, angered, embittered, and
shaken" (p. 69). However, Browning stresses that after a while, the policemen
became numb to what they were doing. After killing ten or twenty Jews or more
"they became increasingly efficient calloused exectutioners” (p. 77).
It is interesting to note that in Goldhagen’s account of police reserve
battalion 309, it seems that the men had little difficulty in killing. Goldhagen’s
portrait of ordinary Germans is quite different. He gives the impression that they
were natural bom killers who suffered little from pulling the trigger. Browning, on
the other hand, tries to paint a more complex picture. But he does not exonerate
or apologize for the men of reserve unit 101. He simply paints a picture that is
probably more truthful than Goldhagen's.
Browning relates that not only were reserve policemen involved in killing
villagers, they were also directly involved in the Final Solution. Resen/e police
were involved in the Einsatzgruppen in 1941 in Russia where they mowed
down scores of Jews with machine guns. It was after this event, that the
Germans decided to use gas instead of guns because gas was more efficient
and caused Germans fewer psychological problems than shooting their victims
face to face. It is interesting to note that in post-war trials, the leader of the
reserve police, Kurt Daluege denied that these men had anything to do with
direct executions. And it was this kind of myth that protected ordinary Germans
from feeling, in any way, responsible. Often, one hears the protest that Germans
were simply following orders, or that the reserve police and regular army were
not complicit; they were only doing their duty. But stepping out of the line of duty
was not a punishable offense. Germans had choices.
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Browning points out, unlike Goldhagen, that “ordinary Germans" were
“not of one mind" (p. 216). The irony about reserve police battalion 101 is that
most of the men were from Hamburg, which according to Browning, was one of
the “least Nazified” (p. 48) cities in Germany. These men were not really
interested in politics. Some of them, Browning suggests, were not anti-Semites
at all. These ordinary men were not raving, murderous lunatics who thought
only about killing Jews. Rather, these men incrementally became killers; their
transition from ordinary men to mass murderers was not without difficulty.
Unlike Browning’s sympathetic, complex portrayal of the role ordinary
Germans played in the Holocaust, Daniel Goldhagen’s (1997) portrayal of
ordinary Germans is unrelenting, unsympathetic and outright demonizing.
Goldhagen is an intentionalist, although he would probably refuse the label
because he argues that the intentionalist-structuralist debate a “misnomer” (p.
10). Goldhagen, however, argues in typical intentionalist style. Hitler, he
contends, had a “blueprint" (p. 86), a map, a program, if you will, for the
Holocaust. And this blueprint could be traced back to Mein Kampf. Hitler
intended all along, says Goldhagen, to murder the Jews. Not only that, but the
“Nazis were remarkably consistent" (p. 132) and “Hitler never waivered” (p, 134)
from his plan. Recall, Browning contends that intentionalists usually argue for
“continuity" (1992, p. 3) of Hitler’s goals and this is just what Goldhagen
suggests here. For Goldhagen, unlike Broszat, the Nazi era was not one of
chaos and disorganization. Hitler and his henchmen knew just what they were
doing. Goldhagen argues that Germans killed Jews because they wanted to
and because Germans embraced, what he terms, “eliminationist anti-Semitism”
(p. 132). This so-called eliminationist anti-Semitism was “shared” (p. 132)
among all Germans. Clearly, anti-Semitism is more complex than this, and I find
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it hard to believe that an entire nation shared one brand of anti-Semitism. It is
also unlikely that all Germans wanted to kill Jews. Perhaps many Germans
wished that Jews would emigrate, but I cannot believe that all Germans wished
for the mass annihiliation of Jews.
Unlike Browning, Goldhagen contends that ordinary Germans “would
easily become genocidal executioners" (p. 185). This claim is in stark contrast to
Browning’s. Recall, Browning went to great lengths to demonstrate the
difficulties many Germans had when they initially began killing Jews.
Goldhagen refutes this claim and says it was easy. Germans were natural bom
killers. Why did they do it? Because they wanted to. Goldhagen declares that
“it is cognition and values, and only cognition and values, that in the last instant
moves someone willfully to pick up his hand and strike another” (p. 21).
Goldhagen argues that the men of reserve police battalion 309 “became
instantaneous Weltanschauungskriegen, or ideological warriors" (p. 190).
Goldhagen has been taken to task by other historians for several
reasons. First, his explanation is monocausal and simplistic. There were many
causes for the Holocaust and although anti-Semitism was an important factor it
was not the only factor. Further, Goldhagen has oversimplified this term as well.
There are many brands of anti-Semitism and not all kinds lead to murder. It is
ironic that Goldhagen stresses that “studies of the Holocaust have been marred
by a poor understanding and or under-theorizing of anti-Semitism” (p. 7). I think
he has got a poor understanding of the complexities of this term. And I argue
that not all Germans embraced an “eliminationist” model of anti-Semitism.
Historically, there have been many varieties of anti-Semitism as I have shown in
a previous chapter. Hans Mommsen argues that Goldhagen oversimplifies his
entire approach to the Holocaust, he reduces the complex to the simple. He
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is driven by the determination to deny every
mixture of ideological fanaticism, of psychopathological
aberration, of moral indifference and bureaucratic
perfectionism, even of “the banality of evil” (1997, p. 36)
Although, I do not agree with Mommsen’s explanation here, the point is that
Goldhagen narrows his explanation so much as to make it sound as if his is the
absolute and authoritative understanding of the Holocaust, which basically boils
down to the fact that all Germans wanted to kill Jews because they all embraced
a deadly variety of anti-Semitism. Mommsen does point out that Goldhagen’s
argument implies that the collective German spirit embraced an "innate” (1997,
p. 36) kind of anti-Semitism, even though Goldhagen denies this charge. But
one does get the impression that Goldhagen suggests the collective guilt of
Germans, since this anti-Semitism must have been innate. Goldhagen denies
this, but all the same, this is the impression one gets from reading his work.
Among historians, the notion of collective guilt is no longer a tenable one. Since
at least the Eichmann trial, most historians would suggest that what is at stake is
individual guilt and individual responsibility. Further, the notion that Germans
had some “innate" thing that caused them to kill is untenable also. There is no
essential Germannness. All Germans are different.
Goldhagen has also been taken to task for making errors. He suggests
that, for instance, he is the first historian to discuss the role of ordinary Germans
in Holocaust historiography. Pollefeyt and Colijn remark that Von der Dunk
criticizes Goldhagen’s “distorted depiction of Holocaust literature to underlie his
own originality and he finds especially steep Golhagen's contention that he is in
fact the first one to focus on ordinary executioners” (1997, p. 5). Other scholars
are upset at Goldhagen’s arrogance. Yehuda Bauer (1997) comments that his
“overbearing attitude" and his refusal to “take into account “(p. 62) the works of
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other historians simply will not do. In Goldhagen's notes at the end of the book,
he takes to task every major Holocaust historian and argues that that their ideas
are completely misguided. He says that ordinary Germans did not kill because
they were coerced, which is what Sarah Gordon argues (p. 490); they did not
kill because they were “blind followers of order" (p. 490) which is what
Friedlander, G.P. Gooch, Stanley Milgram, and Hannah Arendt argue; they did
not murder because of “social psychological pressure” (p. 490) which
Goldhagen suggests is Browning’s contention; they did not kill because they
were “petty bureaucrats” (p. 490) which is Heim and Aly’s and Mommsen’s
position. No. According to Goldhagen, Germans killed because they wanted to.
Each of these other historians has something to offer but it seems that
Goldhagen dismisses all of the them.
I attended a Goldhagen lecture in New Orleans.When people asked him
questions he was very arrogant and dismissed nearly every questioner. I
thought him a very defensive young scholar. And this becomes evident in his
work. Pollefeyt and Colijn remark that Goldhagen's “book is of no value to
historians. There are no new, previously unknown facts” (1997, p. 5). Well, I
would not go this far. I do think that what Goldhagen has done is to cause a
terrific uproar in the historical community, while for the general reading public
he has become a sort of cultural hero. His book is widely read by lay persons
and has been translated into many languages. He is known world-wide. His
book is one of the few in recent years to capture so much public attention. And I
think that lay readers like his book because it is a very emotional one. His anger
comes out on nearly every page. I must say that on my first reading I was swept
up in his book as well. And yet in spite of all the criticisms, I think that Yehuda
Bauer (1997) is right to point out that Goldhagen has brought the problem of
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anti-Semitism out into the open once again. This is a problem that gets buried, I
think, in all the minutiae of Holocaust scholarship. And Goldhagen has raised
popular consciousness in such a way that most historians have not. Most
everyday people never read history. They are confronted with the past, and with
the Holocaust through popular culture, primarily through film. It is amazing that
Goldhagen’s work has captured the attention that it has. But still this does not
make his book a good one either. The Holocaust memory will not die. These
controversies, these contested sites of representation attest to this. And scholars
must remember that we are talking about the struggle to come to some kind of
understanding of this event. And sometimes this struggle is fraught. The burden
of memory proves heavy.
May 1944: a transport arrives at Auschwitz-Birkenau...
Elie Wiesel, age fifteen, his father, mother, and little
sister, Tzipora, are among them. Separated by the
SS, the boy loses sight of his mother and sister, not
fully aware that the parting is forever.
(Berenbaum & Roth, 1989, p.371).
We must not lose sight of the fact that debates and controversies around
what it is scholars do when they talk about the Holocaust may serve to repress,
distort, distance, rigidify and alter memory of this horrific event. We must never
forget that ultimately we are talking about the murder of six million Jews. We
must never forget that history is about people. Getting lost in scholarly debates
might serve to prevent the researcher from really thinking about these horrors.
Intellectualization serves as a defense mechanism to keep emotion at bay.
Researchers must try to avoid the trap of intellectualization.
The literature on perpetrators is immense and continues to proliferate.
Nothing has been written about so much and we still know so little. I have
painted a very broad picture of some of the debates in Holocaust historiography
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around perpetrators. I tried to highlight what I thought some of the major issues
have been. My picture is partial and incomplete. Earlier, I suggested that
historians are subject to the workings of their own psychological repressions.
Although we can never get into the mind of an historian to find out why it is that
he or she represented the Holocaust in a particular way, we can assume that
emotional responses and transferential relations with subject matter matters.
These responses shape what it is historians write about and exclude. I am
convinced that unconscious traces are deposited in these texts, and it is these
strangenesses that defy translation. There is always a remainder, a something
left over, an ineffable residue lurking in these texts. Historians cannot even
begin to capture the hideousness of Auschwitz; Auschwitz leaves us with traces,
screen memories and disgust. There is always something left over, something
beyond representation, phantoms lurking between the sites of historiography
and the actual past. Memory of this event haunts. Like Friedlander (1997), I
believe that historians who can remember the event cannot separate that
memory from their work. And if they attempt to repress the memory, their
representation of the event tends to reflect this repression in some way. The
memory of the event and its subsequent historiography are interconnected.
Victim Histories
In most Holocaust historiography, victims’ voices do not appear much.
Tony Kushner explains that,
The first major historians of the Holocaust, Leon Poliakov
in France and Gerhard Reitlinger in England [notably two
non-Germans] were in close agreement that the voice of
Jews themselves would be used sparingly in their
narratives.. . . ‘Authenticity’ was thus required and it was
assumed that evidence from the victim was somehow
less... objective. (1994, p. 3)
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It seems a symptom of repression, on the part of historians, that victims are not
included in the traditonal accounts of the Holocaust. Part of the problem is the
distinction historians make between history and memory. When these two
categories are dialectially opposed, memory is seen as something beside the
point, unreliable and soft. Is it that historians have a difficult time dealing with
the emotional horrors that victims report? Is it easier, psychologically, for
historians to examine train schedules, rather than look at painful accounts
of unthinkable suffering? Many historians claim that it is more important to do
histories of perpetrators than victims because if we are to understand why or
how the Holocaust happened, we must first examine perpetrators. Of course this
is true. But still, I find it curious that victims’ voices are absent from most
perpetrator historiography.
Even though perpetrator accounts of the Holocaust have managed to
exclude victims’ voices, one can turn to other kinds of writings to hear what they
have to say. The repressed has returned, in fact, in a great proliferation of
memory. Victims’ voices are scattered in diaries, The Diary of Anne Frank
(1989); The Diary of Eva Heyman, (1981); Child of the Holocaust (1988); The
Diary of Etty Hillesum (1983); in memoirs, Delbo (1990); Levi (1990); Bettelheim
(1971); Wiesel (1995); Anger (1981); Freidlander (1979); Geve (1987); Nir
(1989); in studies about children , Lukas (1994); Rosenberg (1994); Klarsfeld
(1996); Kamenetsky (1984); Stein (1994); Wardi (1996); Boguslawska (1975);
Dwork (1991); Eisen (1988); Holliday. (1991); Lifton (1988), in studies on
ghettos, Ringelblum (1974); Cholowski, (1980); Gutman, (1984); Heydrecker
(1990); Katz (1970), Marks (1975); in studies on camps, Donat (1979); Kogan
(1975); Dobroszycki (1984); LeChene (1971); Smith (1995); Langbein (1996).
Victims’ voices are scattered throughout these and many more writings.
197

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

As a curriculum theorist it is my responsibility is to uncover historical
memory that has been most repressed and most marginalized. The two most
marginalized memories of the Holocaust are those of women, and gays and
lesbians. Generally speaking, issues around gender and sexuality are still
considered taboo subjects for many who do work on the Holocaust. Thus, the
literature around these two subjects is limited, in comparison with the enormous
amount of literature on perpetrators. I will therefore tease out some of debates
on gender and sexuality and then move to a discussion around repressed
memory and what it is that psychoanalysts and psychotherapists have
discovered while working with Holocaust survivors and their children.
As I mentioned earlier, one of the unfortunate consequences of driving a
wedge between memory and history, is the validation of history and the
denigration of memory. Memories of victims have traditionally gotten squashed
out of Holocaust narratives. And when memories of victims appear, they are
distorted primarily because victims and survivors have been portrayed as an
"amorphous mass" (Hilberg, 1992, x). And this facelessness of victims is partly a
result of the way in which historians have couched their debates. Abstractions
tend to wipe out humanness. Isaiah Trunk explains that,
One of the results of this one-sided concern
with the Nazi aspect of the war and the Holocaust
is the mistaken notion that, within the immense
bureaucracy and techology of genocide, the Jewish
victims were passive objects of the “process." (1979, ix)
The rhetoric of apparatuses, technocrats, machines, networks of power, shape
not only the way we understand perpetrators, but also shapes the way we might
think about victims. The absence of victims in these accounts gives the
impression they were not even part of their history, that they were led like sheep
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to slaughter. Saul Friedlander (1997) remarks that this assumption needs to be
interrogated. The responses of victims is far more complex than one might think.
Friedlander comments that
In many works the implicit assumption regarding
the victims' generalized hopelessness and passivity,
or their inability to change the course of events... have
turned them into a static and abstract element of the
historical background, (p. 2)
Jewish responses to the rise of Nazism differed of course. Some fled,
some hid, some believed they could live with Hitler and just ignore him. But as
Yehuda Bauer (1989) points out many more Jews fled than is commonly
remembered. Bauer comments that “Contrary to conventional wisdom, most
German and Austrian Jews, some 410,000 out of 700,000, did manage to leave
the Third Reich" (p. 146). And gender made a difference here too. Women were
more eager, by and large, to leave Germany than men. Marion Kaplan declares
that “As emigration became more and more crucial, women usually saw the
danger signals first and urged their husbands to flee Germany” (1998, p. 63).
Men were more reluctant to leave because they were tied to their businesses.
But in the early years, if men decided to leave, some left without their wives
because they thought only men would be endangered. In fact, women were in
greater danger than men. Joan Ringelheim (1993) suggests that more women
than men were deported from the Lodz ghetto to Chelmno death camp. More
women than men were deported from Theresienstadt to Auschwitz. And while
more men arrived than women in the OP (displaced persons) camps in 1945,
this was because more women had been killed. Ringelheim argues that men
were put in camps that “offered some possibility for survival" (p. 399).
Schindler’s List included only 200 women, while 1,000 men were asked by
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Schindler to work for him. Some Jews who were lucky enough to appear on
Schindler’s list survived the Holocaust. Ringelheim stresses that,
The numbers begin to show a stark and disturbing
reality. It can no longer be doubted that being male
or female mattered... Sexism attended anti-Semitism
.. . as it attends all forms of racism... Anti-Semtism, racism
and sexism were not separated in the theory of the
Nazis, (p. 400)
Women were also targeted if they had children or were pregnant. These
women were killed immediately upon arrival in the concentration camps. Gisella
Perl, a Jewish doctor who was deported to Auschwitz, performed as many
abortions as she could to save women from being sent to death. She remarks
that she did not believe what it was the Nazis were doing to pregnant women
until she witnessed their executions with her own eyes.
A few days after the arrival of a new transport, one
of the SS chiefs would address the women, encouraging
the pregnant ones to step forward because they would
be taken to another camp where living conditions were
better.. . . Group after group of pregnant women left Camp
L. Even I was naive enough... to believe the Germans,
until one day. (1993, p. 113).
Perl comments that one day she saw these women being executed. If women
got past “selection," Sybil Milton contends they faired better than men. Milton
claims that “women appear to have been more resiliant than men, both
physically and psychologically to malnutrition and starvation” (1993, p. 227).
Still, more women than men died during the Holocaust. Women were subject to
medical “experiments,” as were gay men, and this was also a factor in higher
mortality rates. Rittner and Roth (1993) explain that that so-called Ravensbruck
“Rabbits,” as the Nazis called them, or women at Ravensbruck, were subjected
to “tortuous medical “experiments” [which] wasted women.. . infections were
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induced, limbs amputated, and wartime wounds replicated" (p. 9). Gay men also
suffered due to these so-called "experiments.” Klaus Muller reports that "At
Buchenwald... an SS doctor performed operations... the insertion of a capsule
which released testosterone; some of the men died during the operation” (1980,
p. 12). These so-called medical experiments are beyond comprehension. One
of the most difficult books for me to read, emotionally, was Robert J. Litton’s
(1986) work on Nazi doctors. There is something so insideous about the part
that doctors played in the Holocaust. Doctors’ roles in the Holocaust are often
overlooked. The doctors decided, willy-nilly, who would live and who would die.
They were waiting at the off-ramps when Jews stepped outside of the trains.
They decided, left or right. One side meant death, the other life. They were
there, at the killing sites, at the crematoriums. The Nazi doctors orchestrated the
Holocaust more than some would like to believe. Women and gay men became
the largest number of victims, in part, because the Nazi doctors decided that
they might benefit from experimenting on them.
Some scholars argue that the emphasis on gender and sexuality distorts
the memory of the Holocaust and turns it into a debate over sexism or
homophobia (Fagin, Ozick cited in Rittner & Roth, 1993). These scholars argue
that if the Holocaust is made into an example of sexism, for instance, the larger
picture is lost. However, it makes little sense to separate out racism, sexism,
homophobia and anti-Semitism. I think we get a fuller picture of the Holocaust
when a multilayered approach is taken.
Not all women were led like sheep to slaughter. Some women were
engaged in underground movements, some were involved in revolts. Sybil
Milton declares that "There were open revolts in which women participated at
Sobibor, Treblinka, Auschwitz, and possibly Bergen-Belson” (1993, p. 231).
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Isaiah Trunk (1979) suggests that lower and working class Jews adjusted better
than middle and upper class Jews. By implication, lower and working class
women were probably more likely to be involved in active resistance like the
camp revolts, while middle and upper class women resisted in other ways. Of
course middle and upper class women had a better chance to escape Germany
simply beause they had the money to get out. Similarly, Eastern European and
Western European Jewish women responded differently. The more assimilated
Jewish women were with their Christian neighbors the better chance they had
of surviving. And because, for example, Jewish women in Western Europe were
not assimilated, as were their husbands due to business exchanges with
Christians, they had “no extended Christian family to protect them” (Ofer &
Weitzman 1998, p. 14). Middle class Jewish women were not forced to work
and their isolation from Christian neighbors hurt them. But in Poland, Ofer and
Weitzman suggest, the situation for women was very different. Because women
were mostly working class, they were forced to assimilate with Christians and
Poles generally. Thus, their ability to speak Polish helped them “pass” (p. 4) and
hence some would escape.
Sara Horowitz (1998) points out that women have traditionally been
represented by men in Holocaust historiography. These representations have
been distorted. “In many narratives by men, women are portrayed as peripheral,
helpless, and fragile, as morally deficient; or as erotic in their victimization” (p.
367). But Rittner and Roth paint a different picture. These scholars explain that
many women were resistance fighters. But Ruth Linden (1993) cautions that not
all Jewish women were resistance fighters and to give this impression is false.
Linden comments that “Scholars now recognize that there was indeed,
significant Jewish resistance... Yet an oversimplified, idealized view of Jews as
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“victims”. .. or self-conscious resistance fighters has obscured our
understanding” (1993, pp. 84-85). The point here is that women’s experiences
during the Holocaust differed from one another. Class status, the ability to fight
back, assimilation, age, geography all affected the ways in which women
responded. Just as women experienced the Holocaust differently from men, so
too were experiences for heterosexuals and homosexuals different. Gender and
sexuality mattered.
Currently, there is little documentation on lesbian experiences during the
Holocaust. There seems to be more literature on gay men, but still there is not
very much literature on this group either. Vera Laska explains that “while
homosexuals were treated in a manner that even within the concentration camp
framework was ghastly. . . the lesbians, were seldom hunted down for special
treatment” (1993, p. 263). As Klaus Muller suggests, “only gay men were made
criminals under Paragraph 175. We know much less about the persecution of
lesbians" (1980, p. 11). Richard Plant comments that “Most lesbians managed
to survive unscathed. Fortunately, they fell outside the universe of Himmler’s
sexual obsessions” (1986, p. 116). If lesbians did survive the camps, the
memories are yet to be written. Sybil Milton suggests that lesbian life stories
during the Holocaust are virtually non-existent primarily because of the
“inhibitions of survivors and historians” (1993, p. 231). Perhaps it is the
historians’ homophobia that keeps these memories hidden. Historians, the
keepers of memory, have painted a picture of the Holocaust that makes lesbian
experience invisible.
1934 marks a turning point in the history of gay life in Germany. Richard
Plant (1986) explains that when Hitler demolished the SA, and ruthlessly had its
chief Ernst Roehm, who was homosexual, murdered, the pace of arresting gay
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men increased. "During a 15 week period in 1934, the Berlin Police and the SS
arrested more homosexuals than the Weimar Police did in 15 years" (Plant,
1986, p. 90). Heinrich Himmler was one of the chief architects behind the
murder of Roehm. For Himmler, homosexuality
was to be diagnosed as a contagious disease. The
plague was highly dangerous because it affected the
young
Himmler was repeatedly to urge chiefs of
the Hitler Youth to purge former leaders of the old
Rover youth movement, which... he judged to be
strongly homoerotic. (Plant, 1986, p. 102)
It was paragraph 175 that, in 1935, made it illegal to even look as if you were
gay; and if anyone suspected gay activities, the suspicion alone could get you
arrested. And so when gay men were put in camps they were subjected to
brutal treatment. Pierre Seel recalls a scene in which a gay man is literally torn
apart and killed by a German Sheperd.
The loudspeakers broadcast some noisy classical
music while the SS stripped him naked and shoved
a tin pail over his head. Next they sicced their ferocious
German Sheperds on him: the guard dogs first bit into
his groin and thigh, and then devoured him. (Seel, 1997, p. 43)
Not only were gay men subject to brutalities such as these, they were also
"treated with contempt by their fellow prisoners" (Muller, 1980, p. 13). Unlike
their fellow prisoners who were liberated after the war, gay men never felt
liberated. Pierre Seel remarks that "liberation was for others" (1997, p. 88). Gay
men were treated as criminals not only in Germany but also in France. In fact, in
Germany Paragraph 175 was not repealed until 1969 (Plant, 1988), and in
France homosexuality became legal only in 1982. Because gay Holocaust
survivors were considered criminals, they did not receive restitution from West
Germany after the war.
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Heinz Heger, whose memoirs were made into the 1979 play Bent by
Martin Sherman recalls some of the meaningless tasks Nazis forced gay men to
perform. These tasks were meant to humiliate. And humiliate they did.
Our work, then, was as follows: In the morning
we had to cart the snow outside our block from the
left side of the road to the right side. In the afternoon
we had to cart the same snow back from the right
side to the left. (1980, p. 35)
Bent was eventually made into a film and it is here that we see the scene Heger
describes above. In a Beckettian landscape, two men carry snow with their bare
hands back and forth all day. Hermann Langbein (1996) comments that this
kind of meaningless “work" occured in many camps. Langbein contends that,
Since work was intended as punishment, many performed
meaningless tasks, the kind that really wears a person
down. Only members of units that were charged with
maintaining the operation of the camp and its
workshops escaped such demoralizing activities as
swiftly carrying rocks to a certain place and then
carrying them back the same way. (p. 15)
The humiliation of these tasks, according to Heger (1980), resulted in many
suicides, as men would run into electrified fences or throw themselves
in front of carts filled with rocks and clay and “human bodies would fly through
the air, and limbs would be crushed to pulp" (Heger, p. 35). Of course, there are
many acounts of sexual torture carried out by SS guards. Pierre Seel comments
that after liberation, he “returned as a ghost" (1997, p. 91). Klaus Muller remarks
“ours is an empty memory” (1980, p. 13). During the course of my research I
was disturbed to discover that literature concerning gender and sexuality was
limited. This signals a denial of memory. Jews are not just Jews. We are
engendered, Jews are heterosexual, homosexual, queer.
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The repression of memory is evident in the lives of many Holocaust
survivors. And it is to these various repressions I would like to turn. More
specifically, I want to examine what it is that psychoanalysts and
psychotherapists have discovered in their work with Holocaust survivors. It is
important to keep in mind, though, that no matter what psychoanalysis teaches
about the human psyche and its vicissitudes, it cannot define what it means to
suffer, nor can it name the pain of Holocaust survivors. To think that
psychoanalysts have the answer is simply naive. However, psychoanalytic
theory may help us to keep Auschwitz strange.The otherness of this event must
be kept intact, otherwise it risks domestication.
Bergman and Jucovy (1990) suggest that psychoanalysts felt illequipped to treat Holocaust survivors, especially during the early years after
liberation. “The theoretical position of psychoanalysts, many of whom were
classically Freudian... did not appear sufficient to conceptualize and explain
the bewildering array of symptoms" (Bergman & Jucovy, 1990, p. 8). The
bewildering testimonies of Holocaust survivors demand a different kind of
listening. “Listening with the Third Ear," the title of Theodor Reik’s (1948/1998)
work on psychoanalysis, might help to hear these voices in a way that lends an
otherness to Holocaust survivors' experience. As Brent Davis remarks,
Listening, rather, is more toward an imaginative
and conscientious participation in the unfolding
of the world. Immediate, intimate, implicating, and
interactive" (1996, xxvi)
A conscientious participating when listening to Holocaust survivors’ memories
means that readers/listeners must have a certain psychological readiness to
allow survivors to speak without censorship, without censoring the unconscious
of the other or the other of memory. The immediacy of experiencing Holocaust
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survivors’ memories requires a certain kind of distancing. To keep intact what I
call the not-me of the event is crucial, especially for the reader/listener who did
not actually live through the black sun of Auschwitz. Still, in spite of attempting
to remain psychologically distant, readers and listeners will experience some
kind of traumatic effect through the listening. Sheldon Roth (1995b) states that
there are three kinds of trauma: one is external, another is developmental, and
the third is intrapsychic. Roth claims that “those of us not directly involved can
be traumatized by the third, intrapsychic conflict” (p. 88). Thus, listening with the
third ear might open one up to this kind of conflict. It is nearly impossible to
avoid psychic upheavals while working with the texts of the Holocaust. Reading
survivors' testimonies and Holocaust texts generally impacts not only the ways
in which we approach “difficult knowledges” (Britzman, 1998, p. 119), but it also
affects the ways in which we approach the other. Transferential relations with
these texts mark the reader in uncanny ways leaving her changed. The “Ruins
of memory” (Langer, 1995, pp. 195-196) leave their traces in our skin.
1938, the year which marks Kristallnacht; was a decisive moment in the
history of Jewish and German life. As I stated earlier, it was not until
Kristallnacht that Jews began to fear that their lives may be in danger. Marion
Kaplan (1998) explains: “Psychologists who studied refugee memoirs
determined that almost 40% of memoir writers did not give up psychologically
until 1938 or 1939" (p. 129). It became enormously difficult to understand what
was happening and part of the problem, Kaplan suggests, is that “normalcy” of
“German daily life” (p. 9) prevented Jews from grasping the severity of their
situation. Ambivalent messages from German friends and signs of “loyalty” (pp.
43-44) made it even more difficult to believe that Nazis would kill Jews, that
most of German society would become complicit one way or another. So many
207

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

underestimated Hitler's power. As I mentioned earlier, even Sigmund Freud
had a difficult time leaving Austria. Peter Gay traces Freud's reluctance to leave.
1 93 8.... Freud refuses to believe it, in any event,
he says he is too old to leave the country
1938
Nazis march into Austria, greeted by cheering
throngs.. . . March 1 5 .... Ernst Jones reaches Vienna
persuading a most reluctant Freud that it is time
for him and his family to leave.. . . March 22
Anna
Freud [is] summoned to [the] Gestapo... the trauma
persuades Freud to make every effort now. (1989, xlvi-xlvii)
If Freud had difficulty leaving, difficulty believing what was happening,
imagine what it must have been like for the everyday person, for the nonintrospective person, for working class non-political people or for middle class
Jews who were apolitical. Not only did Freud underestimate the power of Hitler
and the complicity of German society, he also underestimated the callousness
with which many of the perpetrators would eventually carry out their crimes. Dan
Bar-On (1993) explains that Freud said in 1930 that horrific atrocities could not
be perpetrated without psychic splitting. Freud believed that perpetrators of
hideous crimes “could not remain psychologically intact for long. Guilt feelings
of great intensity might drive them crazy or kill them’’ (Bar-On, 1993, p. 195). But
Bar-On points out that Germans, by and large, did not go crazy and hardly any
committed suicide after Auschwitz. The converse, however, was true for Jews.
Many suicides had been reported after Kristallnacht, in the ghettos, in camps
and upon liberation and even afterwards. The burden of memory killed German
Jews (and Jews from other countries outside of Germany), not German nonJews. However, there is evidence that subsequent generations of Germans
have suffered psychological damage from the effects of denial and repression.
Like her father, Anna Freud underestimated the psychic effects of trauma
in children who survived the Holocaust. Kestenberg (1990) explains that Anna
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Freud thought that young children who had survived the horrors of the camps
would heal relatively easily after the war. But Kestenberg claims that Freud was
wrong on this. Young children did not heal easily; in fact, they suffered deeply.
This early impression [of Freud’s] was not born out by
the facts.. . . Shalom Robinson (1979) in an
Israeli mental hospital revealed that the
psychic damage to children traumatized
during the Holocaust was most severe in
those who were persecuted before the age
of three, (p. 85)
This psychological damage suffered by survivors cannot be defined, named or
“cured.” To label this suffering is to trivialize it. Post-traumatic stress syndrome,
survivor syndrome, depressive reactive disorder, reactive aggressive disorder,
are labels that trivialize and reduce suffering to neat and tidy categories. Jack
Terry remarks that
The survivor has been avoided, blamed, “syndromized;"
exploited and rarely understood.. . . I suggest that the
unconscious contempt for the survivor plays a role
in generalizations and clarifications such as
“survivor syndrome." (1984, p. 139)
Pathologizing survivors is troublesome and highly problematic. It is difficult,
however, to avoid doing this because classical psychoanalytic theory is
pathologizing. But again, a Laplanchian or post-Freudian reading of
psychoanalytic theory may help us not to pathologize, but rather to translate
these so-called symptoms as a form of radical otherness and strangeness.
We turned toward the grave and then he turned
around and asked, 'Whom shall I shoot first?’. ..
I did not answer. I felt him take the child from my
arms. The child cried out and was shot immediately.
And then he aimed at me.
(Yosselesvka, cited in Gilbert, 1985, p. 421)
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Mass graves, shootings, torture, burnings, beatings, gassings, medical
“experiments,” starvation are simply unimaginable, unthinkable and in a certain
sense beyond representation. Most acadmics know nothing of this kind of
torture. Yet academics writing about the Holocaust must remember this fact. It is
arrogant to assume that we can understand fully what these experiences were
like. Holocaust memory bums a hole in one’s psyche. There is always a lack, a
void and an otherness that marks these memory texts.
Martin Gilbert (1985) reminds us that in 1941 the death camp at Chelmno
was up and running. “The first 700 Jews were being transported to the death
camps at Chelmno... Roosevelt’s day that would ’live in infamy’ was also the
first day of the Final Solution" (p. 240). But Roosevelt, as we will discover later,
did not give a whit about the fate of the Jews. The trains kept rolling into
Auschwitz and America and Britain did little to rescue the Jews.
When Jews were first deported to the camps, psychologically, they had to
turn to stone or they would not be able to survive. Defense mechanisms such as
dissociation actually helped some Jews survive. Martin Wangh explains that,
Profound psychic schock enveloped those who
newly arrived at the death camps.. . . Shock was
followed by apathy. Recovery from these states
would occur only by means of psychic splitting...
denial... numbing, derealization. (1984, p. 197)
Jews who could not allow defense mechanisms to operate lessened their
chance of survival. Yet, even if defense mechanisms were intact, it did not
necessarily make a difference, because Germans murdered indiscriminately.
Still defense mechanisms saved some, at least for a while. Kaplan reports that
“a recurrent theme in Victor Kelemperer’s diary was his and other's attempts to
deaden their feelings” (1998, p. 53). Camp life did not offer chances to grieve.
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Delayed grief haunted many Holocaust survivors long after liberation. In
fact, Yael Daneli stresses that expressing grief while in the camps probably
would have threatened survival. “During the war, mourning endangered victim’s
lives. As with any prisoner’s behavior which might have slightly deviated from
that of the totally obedient automaton the Nazis expected, grieving had to be
supressed" (1989, p. 428). Delayed grief returns in all kinds of somatizations.
Repressed grief comes back. There seems no end to it. As Dori Laub points out,
The trauma is thus an event that has no beginning, no ending, no before, no
during and no after. The absence of categories that defines it lends a quality
of otherness” (1992, p. 69). Despair, which is marked by a “lapse of duration”
(Laplanche, 1999, p. 242), tells much about the workings of the unconscious. As
Freud suggested, the unconscious is timeless, it knows no division between
past and present. Holocaust survivors' nighmares attest to this. An event that
happened years ago gets replayed over and over again as if the events which
transpired happened yesterday. Repressed memories find a way of returning
through unconscious traces, splitting the ego and continuing to push against
consciousness. Dina Wardi explains in her work with Holocaust survivors that,
We thus witness an excessive use of the
mechanisms of defense, denial, and
compartmentalization, which became vital
for the preservation of some basic integrity
of the ego. But the excessive use of these
mechanisms necessarily lead to structural
changes in the ego itself. Emotional experiences
that flood and terrify the ego eventually bring
about internal splits and rifts. (1996, p. 13)
Structural changes in the ego are marked by continual utilization of defense
mechanisms when they are no longer needed. Depersonalization, numbing,
depression set in and get sedimented over time. Memories haunt.
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The old, the sick and the babies... were
placed on stretchers and taken to the edge
of the huge mass graves. There, the SS man
Irrman shot them and pushed them into the graves
with his rifle. (1985, Reder, cited in Gilbert, p. 414)
It is simply impossible to integrate these kinds of memories into the psyche. The
notion of working through the past is probably naive. There is no working
through the Holocaust. Perhaps there is only a coping with.
Holocaust survivors and psychoanalysts Nicolas Abraham and Maria
Torok suggest that traumatic memories get “lodged" like “phantoms" (1992,
cited in Raskin, p. 27) in the psyche. These memories are not wholly repressed
but they hover in a place that is located between remembering and forgetting,
between the unconscious and the conscious. These phantoms, then, get
introjected or “implanted” (Laplanche, 1999, p. 258) in another and this is what
Torok calls “transgenerational haunting” (cited in Raskin, p. 27). Sometimes
transgenerational hauntings are triggered by secrets. What is muffled reappears
in ghostly forms. Many Holocaust survivors, especially immediately after
liberation, entered into a pact of silence about what it was that they
experienced. But these secrets and these silences mark subsequent
generations in uncanny ways. Rashkin explains that Abraham and Torok
believe that,
The unspeakable secret suspended with the
adult is transmitted silently to children in
“undigestable form and lodges within him
or her mental topography as in unmarked
tomb of inaccessible knowledge.” (1992, pp. 127-128)
These entombed memories leave “cryptic traces of an unspeakable drama" (p.
157) in another, in an infinitely regressive infinitely “repressive family history” (p.
157). Like Abraham and Torok, Shaton and Rosenfeld (cited in Kestenberg,
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1989) feel that memory gets “encapsulated" or “intrapsychically jailed" (p. 386)
neither exactly repressed or denied but marking a site between repression and
denial, between forgetting and remembering. Memory haunts and hovers like
ghosts. Distance in time from these memories does not bring psychological
distance for many. In fact, the reverse may be true. Aaron Hass points out that
“As most [survivors] enter old age, a phase characterized by reintegration,
reinterpretation, and reminiscence, trauma that had been successfully buried
may come to life” (1996, p. 23). This Freud would call failed repression.
Repression has failed because memories which have been buried now push
through to consciousness. But the memories that surface do not mirror the
original memories; they take on their own shapings and coursings.
Precisely how generations pass along repressed memory is not clearly
understood. These are “enigmatic messages" (Laplanche, 1999, p. 80) that get
transferred from one generation to the next. Whether surivors tell their stories to
their children or not, intergenerational trauma is likely, if not unavoidable. And if
survivors keep secrets, these secrets somehow get “implanted" (Laplanche, p.
259) into their children's psyches. And children will phantasize about their
parents’ experiences during the Holocaust whether or not it is spoken about.
Dori Laub and Nanette Auerhahn suggest that it does not matter whether the
child actually witnessed his or her parents’ persecution. “Children imagine
trauma or, rather, experience it through identification” (1984, p. 153).
A symbiotic relation usually develops between parents and children if
they are Holocaust survivors, analysts reveal. It is this symbiosis that causes
children of Holocaust survivors to suffer later on in life. While the children want
to understand their parents' experiences, their parents become enmeshed
through the telling or not-telling of their pasts. Many times the children, for the
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parents, symbolize “all the relatives who perished” (Wardi, 1996, p. 6). Thus, the
children have, it seems, a double identity. Dina Wardi explains,
Many survivors preserve the memory of family
members in their children and name them after
dead relatives
This is not a mere identification
with those who perished, but a more complex
mechanism- A transportation of the world
of the past; during the course of which a
divided ego is created in which two or
more idenities exist simultaneously, (pp. 94-95)
Usually girls, who are referred to as “memorial candles” (Wardi, 1996, p.
31), carry the burden of memory. When survivor’s children reach the age of
thirty or so they sometimes seek therapy. And one of the reasons they seek
therapy, according to Wardi, is that they have difficulties individuating
themselves from their parents. Maud Mannoni (1999) explains that another
reason children seek therapy is guilt. Child survivors, even second generation
children who were bom after Auschwitz, may suffer from a terrible sense of guilt,
especially when the “survivor [or children who were bom after Auschwitz]
reaches the age when his own parents were deported” (Mannoni, p. 39). These
guilt feelings may result in what Mannoni considers “serious somatizations...
depression, fractures, angina” (p. 39).
Intergenerationai trauma even into the third generation is real and
refuses to just go away. Of course, the ways in which these memories affect
second and third generation Jews vary widely. As Dominick LaCapra suggests,
“especially in cases of severe trauma, one may never fully transcend tlie past
and that one should be...respectfully attentive to the voices of victims” (1994, p.
3). Being respectfully attentive requires that we listen “with the third ear” (Reik,
1948/1998). Listen to Emmanuel Ringelblum’s (1958) report about Auschwitz:
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A great many dispatches are arriving from Oswiecim
[Auschwitz] with news of the death of inmates. People
are forced to exercise under showers for three hours
there; this produces inflammation of the lung[s] and death.
(P- 38).
Ringelblum's reports from Auschwitz refuse assimilation into consciousness. A
third generation Jew like myself, without actually having experienced the
Holocaust, cannot imagine what this must have been like. I do believe that
difficult memories like this one mark the unconscious in ways that cannot be
named. Freud commented that “the unconscious of one human being can react
upon that of another without passing through the conscious" (1915, p. 194).
Because Holocaust memory texts are so difficult to deal with emotionally, I think
that the reception or introjection of these texts bypasses consciousness,
depositing residues into the unconscious. What happens there is a mystery.
Sometimes these images will re-appear in strange forms in nightmares.
Sometimes the reader of these texts changes in uncanny ways. Robert J. Litton
explains that after he finished his research on Nazi doctors he was no longer
the same.
As I reached the end of this work, many people
asked me what it had done to me. My answer has
usually been, “A great deal," followed by a change
of subject. The truth is that it is still a little too early
to tell. One cannot expect to emerge from a study
of this kind spiritually unscathed. (1986, xiii)
I would add to Lifton’s comments that one cannot expect to emerge from this
work psychologically unscathed either. The unconscious messages transferred
from text to reader and the reader's transferential relations with these texts
shape and re-shape the reader’s unconscious in uncanny ways.

215

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Bystander Histories
Holocaust scholarship has moved in its own uncanny ways since the
1960s. It has moved from what Tony Kushner calls “Hitlercentric" perspectives
to “one incorporating the role of ‘ordinary people’ in its execution, the
involvement of non-Germans in the occupied or Nazi influenced countries, the
impact on Jews themselves and the presence of bystanders" (1994, p. 11).
Thus, at this juncture I would like to turn first to two collaborating countries,
France and Italy, and then examine two bystander countries, Britain and the
United States. Here I am interested in looking at the complexities of response to
the Holocaust and the ways in which repressed memory and psychological
denial play a role in shaping the memories of the Holocaust in these various
countries.
One of the disturbing facts about collaborators is that there were so many
willing non-Germans who were not only complicit but directly involved in
carrying out brutalities against Jews. Latvians, Lithuanians and Ukranians
actually volunteered their services to aid the Germans during the actions of the
Einsatzgruppen in Russia in 1941. Here scores of Jews were mowed down with
machine guns. Paul Webster remarks that in France, under the leadership of
Rene Bousquet, “There was no lack of French police ready to work directly for
the Gestapo. By the end of the war, it was estimated that about 30,000 French
were working with the Nazis” (1991, p. 108). Many Italians were willing partners
in crime too. In spite of the fact that 85% of Italian Jews had survived the
Holocaust, 6,800, according to Susan Zucotti (1996), were deported and
murdered. And when Germany occupied Italy in 1943, Eichmann sent to Italy
“Jew hunters” and “thousands of Italian Fascists... were eager to help” (xxvi).
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What becomes difficult for me not to repress is the fact that so many
European countries collaborated with the Nazis. Raul Hilberg (1992) reminds
us that collaborating countries included: Italy, Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary,
Slovokia, Croatia, Norway, France and The Netherlands. We can also add
to this list Switzerland. Tom Bower comments that in November of 1940,
two hundred of Switzerland’s financial and political
leaders-the pillars of that nation-petitioned their
government to show greater sympathy toward the
Nazis.. . . While Europe shuddered before the apocalypse,
Switzerland was aligning itself with e vil.. . . The hopes of
many refugees ended in Switzerland and they were
murdered soon afterwards. But their money remained
secure, too secure, in Switzerland's banks. . . . A country
whose citizens...boasted to their neighbors about their
enviable wealth, was quite knowingly profiting from
blood money. (1998, xiii-xiv)
It is difficult as a Jew to take in, psychologically, the fact that we have been so
despised as a people historically. Do these hatreds ever die? While in Rome
this summer, I saw spray-painted on a wall near the Collesium, “The Holocaust
was a hoax.” I know that anti-Semitism is alive and well but I have difficulty
believing that Holocaust deniers and Jew haters are everywhere, even in
Rome. This constant reminder that Jews are still despised unsettles me
continuously. According to Albert Memmi, Jews live in a “pathogenic condition”
(1966, p. 268). Lawrence Kritzman comments that for Memmi “Jewishness can
never be anything beyond the mere reification of torment, the reflection of a
problem that the Jewish subject internalizes” (1995, p. 105). The question is
how not to internalize hatred. But this presents difficulties especially when much
of Europe and America has had a history of anti-Semitism.
One of the few countries that has not had a history of anti-Semitism is
Italy. And this was one of the reasons I wanted to travel through Italy this
217

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

summer. I was shocked to see anti-Semitic graffiti in Rome. But then again, Italy
did collaborate with the Nazis, although their collaboration was not total and did
not come close to the visciousness of Vichy. The history of Italy usually brings to
mind Fascism and Mussolini. Of course, there is more to Italy’s history than this
but these seem to be the lasting impressions that many Americans share about
Italy. Many Italian intellectuals, Furio Columbo suggests, have traditionally only
remembered the past in this way too. Italian intellectuals “felt purified by the
great wave of the anti-Fascist crusade, by participation in the Resistance...
Fascism had not only been defeated by the Allied troops. It had been beaten by
partisans.. . . But in that manner an entire past was erased and the Holocaust
was forgotten" (1996, xi). The internal resistance against Fascism covered over
and repressed the memory of Italy’s collaboration with the Nazis, although, by
and large, most Italians were not involved and not complicit.
The question that Suan Zuccotti (1996) raises around Italian
collaboration is important. She asks why Italians became complicit in the first
place since anti-Semitism never really took hold in Italy. Daniel Carpi explains
that "There is widespread agreement among scholars.. . that Italy was a
country, (or even the only country) where anti-Semitism did not strike roots”
(1994, p. 241). Nevertheless, racial laws, roundups and deportations were
carried out in Italy. 6,800 Jews were deported and murdered. In light of the fact
that Italy never had a history of anti-Semitism, Italy’s complicity becomes
puzzling. It is crucial to understand that in France, it is estimated that 76
thousand Jews were deported to concentration camps and Marrus and Paxton
(1981/1995) contend that only 3% of those deported survived. In Italy 6,800
Jews were deported. These numbers tell two different stories.
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Zuccotti (1996) believes that so many Jews survived in Italy because
unlike France, Poland, Belguim and The Netherlands, which were occupied
by the Nazis for five years, “the Holocaust began late in Italy [and]... by
September 1943 most Italians had heard about the deportation of Jews” (pp.
272-273). Moreover, most Italians wanted nothing to do with deporting Jews.
Scholars agree that Italians did everything they could to save Jews in the
occupied territories of Greece, Southern France and Tunisia. Zuccotti explains
that Italians "resorted to every imaginable scheme and subterfuge to resist
repeated German demands for the deportation of Jews. They ignored
Mussolini’s directives” (1996, p. 75). Not only did the Italians ignore Mussolini,
they ignored the Nazis and they ignored the Vichy police as well.
The irony, though, is that Jews living on Italian soil were not protected
from arrest and deportation. Jews were arrested and deported and betrayed by
Fascists and non-Fascists alike. Unlike Jews in other countries, Italian Jews
who were summoned to the police, by and large, did not show up. Zuccotti
remarks that "Italian Jews seemed to have shared with their Catholic
compatriots an amiable inclination to ignore the law” (1996, p. 275).
Like Italy, France has traditionally suffered from repressed memory about
its collaboration with Germany during the Holocaust. Until the 1970s, the French
generally erased Vichy’s complicity. David Weinberg declares that "for more
than three decades after liberation, French society denied its painful wartime
past and ignored the fate of its Jewish inhabitants under Vichy” (1996, p. 31).
Stanley Hoffman (1981) reports that the first book written on Vichy by Robert
Paxton was greeted with hostility by the French reading public. And it was not
until the mid 1980s that the Ministry of Education in France agreed "to include
discussions of French complicity in the deportation process in classroom
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textbooks” (Weinberg, 1996, p. 36). Elizabeth Bellamy argues that France has
taken longer to come to terms with repressed memory of the Holocaust than
Germany. She suggests that
The psychic phenomena of memory, forgetting,
melancholia, and repression all converge on
vichy as the locus of France's characteristic...
“inability to mourn” and they serve as a vivid
demonstration that Frances’Aufarbeitung has
been delayed much longer than Germany’s. (1997, p. 13)
Wyman (1984/1998) and Bellamy (1997) agree that France, before the 1970s,
engaged in a myth of resistance, what Bellamy calls “France's customary
narratives of resistance heroism" (p. 14). But even in the resistance movement
anti-Semitic attitudes were prevalent. Traces of repression, in the form of denial
and reversal, are evident in the ways in which French officials, immediately after
the war, rationalized Vichy's complicity.
These rationalizations and denials manifested themselves around many
different issues. In post-war trials one of the most blatant examples of repressed
memory is that many argued that France became complicit with Germany
because of coercion. Robert Paxton explains that,
Marcel Peyrouton traced the anti-Jewish
legislation of 1940 to German pressures
and said that the Germans threatened
10,000 hostages in 1942 if the French did
not tighten those laws even further. (1975, p. 142).
But scholars generally agree that Vichy’s anti-Semitic policies were
homegrown. The Germans did not care what the French did. They never
threatened the French and they did not demand any kind of anti-Semitic
policies be set in place. The French, it seems, wanted to demonstrate to the
Germans that they could be even more anti-Semitic than the Germans, so as to
win German approval. But as Robert Paxton contends, “Neither diplomats nor
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soldiers at Berlin cared a fig for Vichy’s internal acts” (1975, p. 142). Vichy
authorities wanted to out do the Nazis. And on one occasion they did. Here I am
thinking of the deportation of children from Vichy to Auschwitz. It is estimated
that about 6,000 children in 1942 alone were deported, without the approval of
the Germans. Even the Germans shuddered at Vichy. Marrus and Paxton report
that what transpired at Vichy shocked the world.
During 1942, according to Serge Klarsfeld's
estimate, 1,032 children under the age of 6
years old were sent to Auschwitz from France,
along with 2,557 between 6 and 12, and
2,464 between 13 and 17. (1981/1995, p. 263)
This would be the greatest shame of Vichy. It is unthinkable that children under
the age of six would be put on cattle cars and shipped off to Auschwitz.
Children! I am aghast. Klarsfeld (1996) has maintained that after this horrific
event occurred, the Catholic Church stepped in to intervene and help prevent
more incidents such as this one. But Paul Webster (1991) writes that Klarsfeld is
mistaken about this. Webster claims,
there are other French historians, even inside
the Catholic Church w ho... point out that both
Cardinal Gerlier and Cardinal Suhard went to
see the head of State on 29 October 1942 to
pledge their loyalty at a time when deportation
trains were still leaving. (1991, p. 132)
It becomes very difficult to believe that the Church would actually pledge loyalty
to Vichy. But, of course, we now know that the Church was compliant all along.
The Church has recently justified their silence during the Nazi era, claiming that
they remained silent to save Jews. Clearly this is a move of denial.
Xavier Vallet’s postwar trial defense offers up a similar kind of reversal.
Vallet was responsible for setting anti-Semitic policy. Vallet argued that
because the French mainly hunted foreign-born Jews and that anti-Semitic
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policies were directed toward them, that Vichy actually engaged in a policy in
which “Jews had been saved. Vichy, the argument went, had served as a
shield" (Marrus & Paxton, 1981/1995, p. 344). But in point of fact 76 thousand
Jews were deported from Vichy. How does Vallet rationalize that?
Like Vallet, police chief Rene Bousquet, in a move of reversal, suggested
during the postwar trials that he was, in fact, “defiant” (Webster, 1991, p. 107)
against the demands of the Nazis. But this clearly was not the case.
Recent research has destroyed the image
of a defiant Bousquet, which he projected
during his trial. He often lied over his
responsibility in planning the round-ups,
even covering up a crucial meeting with
SS chiefs. (Webster, p. 107)
Like Bousquet, Pierre Laval, who conducted the deportation of children from
Vichy to Auschwitz, pretended that he was a “lone wolf" (Paxton, 1975, p. 67)
who got in over his head and kept his “colleagues in ignorance" (p. 67). But
according to German archives, this lone wolf image is untrue. Paxton reports
that we learn from these archives that Vichy’s complicity was “much more
broadly shared” (p. 67). And like Bousquet and Laval, Marshal Petain was
portrayed in postwar trials as a “manipulated old man" (Webster, 1991, p. 7). Yet
this portrayal is not accurate either. Marrus and Paxton claim that it was not a
coincidence that anti-Semitic laws came into existence just twelve days after
Petain’s arrival in office. Marrus and Paxton (1981/1995) explain some of the
implications of setting in place anti-Semitic laws:
The law of 22 July 1940-rushed into effect only
twelve days after Marshal Petain’s role as head of
state... Eventually over fifteen thousand lost French
citizenship... including about six thousand Jews___
The law of 4 October 1940
authorized prefects
. . . to intern foreign Jews in “special camps." (p. 4)
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Clearly, this is not the work of a “manipulated old man.” This is the work of a
man with a mission. Twelve days after taking office, Petain began to ruin the
lives of Jews with the stroke of a pen. Petain knew just what he was doing.
Denial and reversal take time to get worked through. It has taken French
society many years to begin to come to terms with their collaborationist past.
Bellamy (1997) and Hoffman (1981) agree that, at least since the 1970s, France
has begun to “lift the veil of repression" (Bellamy, p. 14) and to remember its
complicity.
Although Italy, France, Britain and the United States played radically
different roles during the Holocaust, there does seem to be a consensus among
scholars about a fundamental attitude that ran through all four countries:
indifference. Even after the war, the French continued their attitude of
indifference. Hoffman remarks that, “Simone Weil, who survived deportation,
told of the indifference with which Jewish survivors were met when they
returned to France” (1981, x). Like the French, many Italians, at least those
Italians who were not living in occupied territories during the war, remained
indifferent Furio Columbo (1996) explains that although “many Italians never
became enemies of the Jews or informers for the Germans... [they did not
oppose]. . . the racial laws [but] simply pretended to avoid seeing the
implications” (xiii). To pretend that the racial laws did not exist or to rationalize
them was to remain, in essence, indifferent to the Jews. But in occupied
territories, Italians were anything but indifferent.
Similar to Italy and France, Britain remained, for the most part, indifferent.
Wasserstein reports that although Churchill was sympathetic to the Jewish
tragedy, he was blocked by “his subordinates [who got submerged in] an ocean
of bureaucratic indifference and lack of concern" (1988, p. 395). Feingold
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(1995) suggests that the United States State Department was being bogged
down with “indifferent... decision makers” (1995, p. 175). David Wyman
declares that neither the British nor the American government officials gave one
whit about the Jews. In fact, “the American State Department had no intention of
rescuing large numbers of European Jews” (1984/1998, xii). Roosevelt
demonstrated, “indifference to so momentous an historical event as the
systematic annihilation of European Jewry [which]... emerges as the worst
failure of his presidency” (Wyman, xv).
Against these scholars, Tony Kusher (1994) suggests that the term
“indifference" is not helpful. Kusher claims that “indifference" is too simplistic a
term to explain the complexities of response to the Holocaust. By and large,
Britain, especially upon examination of labor movement responses, was not
indifferent, but rather “essentially ambivalent” ( Kushner, p. 46). Kushner
attempts to suggest that responses to the Jewish tragedy were not monolithic.
And indifference seems to suggest a monolithic response.
I think Kushner is correct here, and he is right to point out
that there were a variety of responses to the Jewish catasrophe. And at
the end of the day, it is really quite impossible to tell what it was people felt, if
they felt anything at all. However, the actions of the Allied countries leads me to
believe that government officials, for the most part, in both Britain and the United
States did not care enough or do enough to save European Jews.
In both Britain and the United States top government officials blocked
opportunities for refugees to escape Europe at every turn. This seems to
suggest more than an attitude of indifference; it seems to reveal contempt. And it
is this contempt for Jews that disturbs me. Perhaps seemingly sympathetic
responses served as gloss for a deeper hatred for Jews. If British officials were
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truly sympathetic, they would have acted differently. But the White Paper policy
remained intact through the duration of the war. The White Paper policy limited
the numbers of immigrants allowed to go to Palestine to 75,000. But as
Wasserstein points out, “barely half... had been admitted" (1988, p. 52). Part of
the rationalization for not allowing many refugees into Palestine sprang from
paranoia that German spies would be among the refugees and threaten “the
international security of Palestine” (1988, p. 49).
A similar kind of paranoia filtered into the U.S. State Department.
Feingold refers to this paranoia around Jewish refugees as a “security
psychosis" (1995, p. 172). By 1940, immigration to the United States was
impossible. Breckenridge Long, who was Head of the State Department,
argued that “Germany had infiltrated the refugee stream with agents” (Feingold,
p. 172). But spies were never discovered.
David Wyman (1984/1998) remarks that the U.S. State Department
amassed what he called Paper Walls, which made it nearly impossible for
refugees to land on U.S. soil. These Paper Walls were made up of “four feet
long” visa applications. Refugees found themselves in an Orwellian nightmare
because they had difficulty reaching American Consuls in Axis territories, and
those who escaped from Axis territory were not thought to be in danger and so
there was no need for them to come to the United States. Wyman explains that
“where Jews were in acute danger, in Axis-held territories, there were no
American Consuls to issue visas. But those who escaped to countries where
consuls continued to operate were not [considered to be] in acute danger”
(1984/1998, p. 127). The U.S. State Department, in short, made certain that
European Jews would not be able to reach American soil. The chief architect of
these Paper Walls was Breckenridge Long. Long, was dearly a Jew hater.
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Long, an early admirer of Hitler and Mussolini
came to head the Special Problems Division of
the State Department almost by accident
It was
the caprice of this single individual that could
make the difference between life and death, (p. 86)
It is hard to imagine that the Head of the U.S. State Department was an admirer
of Hitler and Mussolini.
Information about the Holocaust was known. Since Kristallnacht in 1938
German policy toward Jews was no secret. However, both Britain and the
United States censored news and even cut it off. Walter Laquer (1981) explains
that in 1942 the Jewish Telegraphic Agency received word from a certain
Reigner from Europe that approximately four million Jews had been
exterminated. But Breckenridge Long cut off such reports after yet another
telegram was sent. And in Britain Reigner's telegraphs were completely
dismissed. Officials dismissed the reports as “Jewish Agency 'sob
stufTcalculated to engender greater sympathy for Zionist efforts to get more
refugee immigrants into Palestine” (1996, Cesarani, p. 607). It was not as if the
British did not know what was happening. Cesarani reports that as Jews were
being deported to Auschwitz from Hungary these “deportations were known in
Britain virtually as they took place" (1996, p. 609). But the British government
did little to help the Jews.
What is perhaps the most scandalous of all is that the Allies, when they
had the chance, never bombed the rail lines to Auschwitz, which could have
potentially saved many Jews. Wyman (1984/1998) contends that Roosevelt was
urged by The Jewish Committee to consider bombing the rail lines but he never
did. It was not that the rail lines were located in some remote region; it was not
that bombing the rail lines would have thwarted the war effort either. In fact,
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Wyman declares that ua total of 2,700 bombers traveled along or within easy
reach of both rail lines on the way to targets in the Blechhammer-Auschwitz
region" (p. 311). But because "rescue was not part of its mission" (p. 307) the
military bypassed Auschwitz as the sealed trains continued to their destination.
William Rubenstein (1997), an ultra-conservative historian, argues that
bombing the rail lines at Auschwitz would have done little to save Jews.
Rubenstein’s position reflects that of the Franklin Roosevelt Institute which
seems to suffer from denial. In Rubenstein’s (1997) work he argues, against the
grain of Holocaust scholarship, that the United States actually had a “liberal"
immigration policy toward Jews and that Roosevelt did everything in his power
to move the war effort forward. The thrust of Rubenstein’s argument is that no
matter what Roosevelt would have done he could not have saved Jews anyway.
But clearly, many scholars argue that Roosevelt could have made a difference
but saving Jews simply did not interest him. It is difficult to understand why the
Allied countries abandoned the Jews, as the title of Wyman's book suggests.
And it is even more difficult to face squarely the fact that our own President
Roosevelt turned his back on Jews at a time when they needed him most.
Feingold (1995) remarks,
The president, so beloved by American Jewry,
did not have the spiritual depth to fathom the
crucible being experienced by European Jewry,
the historical insight and intelligence to understand
the meaning of Auschwitz for his time in history, (pp. 176-177)
I remember how much my own grandparents loved Roosevelt, like so many of
their generation. How shattered they would be if they only knew the truth.
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CHAPTER 6
MEMORY TEXT OF HOLOCAUST NOVELS
Historical novels are an expression of memory. Like the craft of doing
history, novel writing is a kind of systematization of memory. Writers organize,
select and narrate. Novel writing, however, is not reducible to memory, since
writers, even if drawing on their own memories, are constrained by the narrative
form. Memory seems not to be constrained in the same way, although we
remember via “quasi narration" (Casey, 1987, p. 44). Edward Casey argues that
what is lacking in memory is a narrator who tells a story. Memory is more like a
“pastiche" (p. 72). Even novels that are written in the form of a pastiche seem
more tightly woven than memory itself. Personal memories function out of sites
of repression, denial and projection and may therefore determine, to a certain
extent, the ways in which novelists select, imagine, and construct the past.
The writings of historians share certain features with the writings of
novelists. But I suggest that, at bottom, historical writing is not reducible to the
writing of historical novels. History shares with literature its narrative and
imaginative form. History is both a construction and reconstruction of the past. I
maintain that history constructs the past by drawing on memory, perception and
imagination. Historians select and omit events and express their thoughts by
narration. Further, historians attempt to reconstruct the past by drawing on
archives, artifacts, testimonies and other kinds of documents. Although
historians rely on imagination to systematize and interpret, they are ultimately
constrained by the methodology of the discipline in order to ensure that they get
at an approximation of the truth about the events of the past.
Novels that are historical rely on narrative to express the imagination of
the writer. These novels, like historical texts, are constructions that draw on
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memory, perception and imagination. Novelists, too, select and omit what they
deem relevant to their stories. Historical novelists may also draw on artifacts,
archives, testimonies and other kinds of documents, but they do not have to use
evidence to support their claims in the same way that historians do. History
writing and the writing of novels around the Holocaust, if they are to do justice to
the memory of the Holocaust, might follow Edith Wyshogrod’s lead that the
“promise of truthfulness” (1998, p. 10) be maintained.
Psychologically, fiction may evoke different kind of transferential relations
in the reader than historical accounts of the Holocaust. Reading Holocaust
novels may trigger more intense emotional engagement than reading historical
texts. And the emotional response of the reader is complexified by her relation
not only to the text but to the otherness that the text evokes in her own
unconscious. Peter Brooks (1987) comments that,
The advantage of such a transferential model,
it seems to me, is that it illuminates the difficulties
and productive encounter of the speaker and
listener, the text and the reader, and how their
exchange takes place, (pp. 12-13)
This exchange takes place, as one unconscious (the text) interferes with
another (the reader). Andre Green remarks that the text will inevitably “leave
behind... scattered traces of the primary process on which it is constructed”
(1986, p. 338). Because these scattered traces of unconscious processes get
introjected into the reader’s psyche, it becomes important to become aware of
the ways in which different kinds of Holocaust novels affect the reader.
Realism, metaphor and irony deposit different kinds of traces in the
reader’s psyche. Novels written by Jews and novels written by Germans who
are not Jewish impact readers differently, depending upon their own ethnicity

229

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

and gender. Therefore, I suggest that researchers, if they are to grapple with
what I call the memory text of Holocaust novels, need to read broadly. Different
genres written by both Jews and Germans help readers experience different
kinds of transferential relations with the memory of this event as it gets handed
down to us in fiction. This chapter will examine Holocaust novels written by both
Jews and German non-Jews. But first, I would like to turn to some of the debates
over Holocaust novel writing.
Writing Holocaust fiction is not wholly acceptable, especially in Jewish
circles. In fact, for some Jews writing fiction around the Holocaust is considered
anathema. Alvin Rosenfeld (1980) reminds us that it was Adorno who claimed
early on that turning the Holocaust into art is “not only impossible but perhaps
even immoral” (p. 13). Lawrence Langer remarks that “there is something
disagreeable, almost dishonorable, in the conversion of suffering of the victims
into works of art" (1975, p. 1). Some, like George Steiner, call for silence.
Steiner argues that art trivializes (cited in Langer, 1975). Like Steiner, Reinhard
Baumgart and Michael Wyshogrod feel that the Holocaust should not be turned
into art (cited in Rosenfeld, 1980). Following Adorno, Baumgart declares that
Holocaust literature does a terrific injustice to victims because it domesticates
and exploits. Sara Horowitz claims that “in the ongoing initial discourse about
the Holocaust and its representation, the status of imaginative literature as a
serious venue for reflection about historical events comes repeatedly under
question” (1992, p. 1). Literature that glorifies suffering, that exploits victims,
that offers redemptive messages, that turns suffering into “an affirmatively
posited transcendence” (Adorno, 1966/1995, p. 361) does indeed run counter
to an ethical sensibility and does not do justice to the memory of the Holocaust.
These scholars are right to point out the pitfalls of writing fiction around the
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Holocaust. But I argue that there are other ways of writing fiction around the
Holocaust which avoid these problems. And the alternative to artistic
expressions of silence is not a good one. Silence represses memories; silence
shuts off and shuts out literary representations leaving a void in the heart of
memory. Silence cannot be maintained because the repressed returns. And the
repressed returns in ways that haunt, in ways that will do tremendous damage
to Jewish and German psyches. Dori Laub comments that “silenced memory...
finds its way... through an uncanny repetition of events that duplicate... the
traumatic past” (1992, p. 65). For survivors, memories, if not written about, talked
about, thought about, get repressed and surface in nightmares, somatizations,
depersonalizations and depressions. However, writing about the past in an
imaginative way does not always undo repression either. Sometimes writing
fiction re-traumatizes. It is no coincidence that so many Jewish Holocaust fiction
writers have committed suicide. There is nothing liberating about writing
Holocaust novels. Writing is a way of coping.
One of the most obvious worries, especially for Jews, is simply that fiction
lies, that it fabricates and falsifies. Holocaust fiction, for some, seems to “add
nothing substantial to our understanding of those events but instead gives
fodder to the historical revisionists” (Horowitz, 1992, p. 20). Many people
believe that (legitimate) historical accounts are more appropriate than literary
ones. However, historians are not the only keepers of memory and certainly
their interpretations are not the most authoritative. Novelists have something to
say about this past, and imaginative constructions evoke emotional responses
in ways that historical accounts do not. Both historical and literary
representations of the Holocaust, if they do justice to the memory of the victims
and survivors, have something to offer. I argue that if we are to call ourselves
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educated people, it is crucial that we read novels alongside historical texts.
Neither form of representation should be placed over against the other. Both are
equally important in shaping our understanding of this event. Literary and
historical representations help us keep the memory of the Holocaust alive.
Yehuda Bauer remarks that reading historical accounts actually enrich our
readings of fiction.
Without a return to the arduous task of actually
knowing something about the Holocaust, the
symbolic descriptions that occupy, quite
legitimately, the center of the literary stage
in Holocaust literature, become just another
escape route for the superficial. (1988, p. 7)
I do not believe that literature is "escapist.” Maxine Greene (1995) and
Mary Aswell Doll (in press) argue that literature grounds us in lived experience.
Doll suggests that fiction is not “mere"; rather, it can serve to "disturb the status
quo. Feelings thought to be central get routed. Peripheral imaginings begin to
take roof (in press). Fiction is not fluff. As Doll suggests, fiction is about living
and dying and there is nothing superficial about that. Reading historical
accounts alongside literary ones helps us to encounter different perspectives
and thus broaden our experience as readers. James Young argues that "literary
and historical truths may not be entirely separable” (1988, p. 1). And because
they are not entirely separable it makes sense to read them both.
Many argue that literary representations of the Holocaust are indeed
appropriate expressions of memory. Yet, there is much disagreement about
appropriate genres. More conservative scholars contend that the realistic novel
best represents the Holocaust (Rosenfeld, 1980; Lang 1990: Bosmajian, cited in
Ryan, 1983; Trommler, cited in Ryan, 1983). Realist novels James Young terms
“docu-novels” (1988, p. 51) because they are written in a documentary style.
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These scholars feel that literary representations of the Holocaust should attempt
to get at the truth of this event. And it seems that the assumption here is that
truth is unmediated. The documentary style, accordingly, is the closest thing to
the real because words can represent things. Sara Horowitz claims that Berel
Lang, for instance, calls for the “bare chronicle” (1992, p. 20). Hamida
Bosmajian argues against using metaphor and irony because they merely
serve as a “psychological defense against memories that threaten to become
overwhelming” (1983, cited in Ryan, p. 19). Rosenfeld declares that “there are
no metaphors for Auschwitz” (1980, p. 27). Frank Trommler claims that
metaphor “obscures the reconstruction of the German past” (cited in Ryan,
1983, p. 19).
It seems to me that what undergirds the argument for what Young calls
“docu-novels” (1988, p. 51) is the belief that texts can correspond to reality,
unproblematically. This assumption is what I have called the classical position
around representation. But texts do not correspond to reality in neat and tidy
ways because they are mediated by language, perception, memory, repression,
projection and all kinds of complex psychological mechanisms. Texts are
translations of events and these translations are slippery and necessarily
perspective. But perhaps the real issue underneath these debates around
genre has little to do with the genre itself. The real issue, Sarah Horowitz says,
(1992), turns on truth.
At issue is not simply the stylistic competence
of a particular writer but also the truth, authenticity,
and morality of the writing, its connection with the
philosophical, political, metaphysical implications
of the Nazi genocide, (p. 25)
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Truth is not absolute. Nowhere do absolute truths exist. Scholars, therefore,
who argue for the legitimacy of documentary style fiction are, I think, naive. I
think they suffer from literalism.
Mary Aswell Doll (in press) makes a strong case against literalisms. She
argues that “the problem is not illiteracy but rather literalism s.. . . Texts are
everywhere being literalized:copied” (in press). The idea that fiction must
literally represent truth or literally represent the events of the Holocaust lacks
depth and is built on what I consider to be a misguided presupposition. No
matter how literal one tries to be, no matter how much one attempts to match up
words with memories of past events, slippage is everywhere. Memories have
memories of their own. And words canot capture, in a neat and tidy way, the
past. Imagination, belief, repression always interfere with representations.
However, it is understandable why Holocaust survivors felt the necessity
to tell the truth, to tell their story in a documentary way. Aharon Appelfeld
explains
The first writing about the Holocaust was
in the documentary style
To write about
oneself, about one’s personal feelings,
seemed selfish and vulgar... .The interior
was locked away. (1994, x)
Appelfeld continues by saying that for many survivors “deviation from memory
was sinful” (xii). But Appelfeld remarks that he could not get a likeness to his
past and his memory was too slippery and changeable. And the harder he
tried to write in a documentary style, the more stifled his writing became. Ernst
Van Alpen points out that for many “literary representations of the Holocaust are
especially valued if they make people think of literature as little as possible”
(1997, p. 18). Appelfeld (1994) argues that testimonies, memoirs and
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documentary novels serve actually as repressive mechanisms because they
bury emotions. Documentary novels serve to block deeper emotions, says
Appelfeld.
If you read the many collections of testimony
written about the Holocaust, you will immediately
see that they are actually repressions, meant to
put events in proper chronological order. They
are neither introspective, nor anything resembling
introspection, but rather the careful weaving
together of many external facts in order to veil
the inner truth. (1994, p. 14).
As against Appelfeld, I argue that testimony and memoirs are important
genres when examining the Holocaust. The question is, What do people use
testimony for? Is it used to block thinking and feeling? If so Appelfeld’s
contention is right. Testimony, if used to just report facts, is a way of not thinking
and not feeling and may sen/e as a repression. However, if testimony is used to
unblock thinking and feeling, if testimony is used to communicate with others or
to communicate with the self, then it does not serve repressive ends. If writing or
testimony or memoir aims at capturing the literal truth, whatever that is, it lacks
depth, in part, because I believe that it censors primary process thinking. Docurealism is the kind of writing that is guided by secondary process thinking,
writing that gets hedged in by categories, rationalizations, dates, times, places,
names and so forth. But because writing is always already a translation, an
embellishment, it still leaves traces of primary process thought in the text. If the
writer censors deeper emotions, these traces get blocked and repressed. When
writing moves against the unconscious and censors, it reads without depth and
texts tend to get flattened out. The novel, then, becomes explanation. And surely
a novel could be more than this. James Macdonald teaches that if
understanding is merely rational, as it is in docu-realism, it serves to cut off
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emotion. A text that gets flattened out because it squashes feeling dulls. James
Macdonald teaches that thinking needs to embrace feeling or it
leaves out the thinker, his or her own horizon
or place in the universe, with its associated urges
feelings and impulses. The main purpose of
rational thought is to explain things, so that
we may predict and control things. Explain
means to "flatten out." (1995, p. 173)
If the writer were more open to primary process thought, free association and
dreams, the text might open out toward unconscious traces. Here, a deeper text
surfaces. It is here, in the mode of primary process thinking, that metaphor finds
a home. Metaphoric texts do seem richer and deeper than texts that attempt to
get a likeness; metaphor opens the doors of perception and leaves the
otherness of the text open rather than closing it off.
James Young comments that "part of the impulse [against metaphor] may
stem from a traditionally positivistic attitude toward metaphor as a frivolous and
merely decorative and trivializing influence" (1988, p. 19). And this attitude may
also be a move against unconscious processes that open texts out onto many
layers and levels. Texts are like dreams in that the latent and manifest content
compete for attention. Freud (1900a/1900b) suggests that it is not so much the
manifest content that is crucial; it is the latent content of a dream that is
important. It is here that the trajectories of associations and jagged wanderings
open out onto the otherness of lived experience. Metaphors evoke these kinds
of openings.
The use of metaphor in Holocaust novels does not mean that the text
does not point toward the horizon of truth[s]. Metaphorical writing, at least for
me, seems to deposit more disturbing traces in my psyche. I respond to
metaphor in more emotionally intense ways than I do to documentary texts.
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Documentary texts serve their purpose, of course, but I simply prefer Holocaust
novels that are metaphorial because they seem to move me more intensely.
Thus, metaphorical writings are not forms of defense mechanisms, as
Bosmajian (cited in Ryan, 1983) claims; on the contrary, I feel that literalisms
and documentary realism can serve as defense mechanisms. I argue that an
openness to the otherness of the unconscious keeps us from turning Holocaust
literature into a glorification of suffering. Lawrence Langer remarks that
The will of the reader is drawn into an autonomous
milieu of the work of art and is subtly transformeddisfigured... to see imaginatively both the relationship
between empirical reality of the Holocaust and its
artistic representation in the work of literature, and
the fundamental distinction between both of these
worlds... The reader is temporarily an insider and
permanently an outsider, and the very tension
resulting from this paradox precludes the possibility
of ‘ pleasure’’ Adorno mentions. (1975, p. 3)
That readers are permanently outsiders to the event, if indeed they have
not actually experienced the black sun of Auschwitz, is what openness to the
otherness of the text ensures. And this is why we cannot say after reading
Holocaust fiction that we understand the event in any absolute way, because
we never will. But these texts do provide “a framework for responding” (Langer,
1975, p. 2). And respond we must. Holocaust fiction writers, I believe, have an
ethical responsibility to approximate the truthfulness of this event, whether they
tell their tales in an ironic, metaphoric or realistic mode. But truthfulness does
not mean literal truth. Fictional accounts must do justice, in some way, to
Holocaust memory.
Holocaust novels written by Jews and German non-Jews are important
for us to read. However, some argue that German writers, who do not
represent Jews in their novels, should not be considered part of the Holocaust
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canon. Alvin Rosenfeld (1980) argues that Gunter Grass should not be included
in the Holocaust canon because Jews are rarely represented in his texts.
Dismissing German writers, as if they have nothing to say, erases memory and
further represses the German past. Rosenfeld misses a crucial point about the
invisibility of Jews in German texts. This invisibility tells much about the ways in
which German writers have not come to terms with the past. The absence of
Jews in Holocaust texts signals what Dan Diner calls a “negative symbiosis"
(cited in Gilman, 1995, p. 43) between Germans and Jews. The glaring absence
of Jews in these texts may signal the presence of negativity Germans feel
toward Jews and or the presence of negativity in Germans themselves around
this event. The cloud of memory haunts Germans. But the memory Germans
bury is inextricably tied to Jews.
A German psychotherapist, in an interview with novelist Ursula Hegi
(1997), contends that her “Germanness plays an important role with Jews [she].
.. works w ith... It has to be acknowledged. We have to understand that we
understand each other through that. Over and around and through that”
(Katherina, cited in Hegi, p. 273). Whatever “Germanness” means, it always
already means a symbiotic relation with Jews; Germans carve out their
identities in the ways in which they absent Jews from their psyches or their
worlds. What happened in Germany between 1933 and 1945 cannot be erased;
Jews will always leave traces in the psyches of Germans. Freud (1925/1989)
might suggest that it is to these negations that we must turn because
underneath the no is a yes. No, Jews do not appear in German novels. Yes,
Jews haunt Germans. Jews are present in their absence. Germans and Jews
will always be in complex interrelations with Germans. Difficult memory haunts
and entangles whether we like it or not. And so it is to this difficulty we must turn.
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The ethical responsibility of Holocaust fiction wirters, according to Aharon
Appelfeld (1994), is to counter facelessness, the facelessness Germans
imposed on Jews during the Holocaust. Jews were reduced to numbers, to
subhuman creatures, to massless ash. “In their explicit wickedness, the
murderers reduced Jews to anonymity, a number, a creature with no face. And
in fact, years of suffering slowly erased the image of humanity from within the
Jews” (Appelfeld, 1994, p, 22). It is to the face of the other we must turn. But the
face of the other is not abstract; it is the face uof the individual, the individual
whose father and mother gave him a name, taught him their language, gave
him their love, and endowed him with their faith” (Appelfeld, 1994, pp. 21-22).
The continued facelessness of the Jew in German fiction attests, perhaps, to a
failure to see Jews as Jews, to see Jews as human beings. And this failure to
see the other as other is due to all kinds of psychological resistances to the
memory of the Holocaust. It is up to second, third and fourth generation
Germans to put the face of humanity back on Jews, to see Jews as Jews and to
put them back in their writings, back in their expressions of memory.
Jewish Novels
At this juncture, I would like to turn to Holocaust fiction written by Jewish
writers. Cynthia Ozick’s (1989a) Rosa and The Shawl (1989b) are two
companion pieces about a Holocaust survivor named Rosa. Rosa's daughter
Magda was murdered in a concentration camp by a Nazi guard. Magda was
thrown against an electrical fence and died instantly. The memory of this haunts
Rosa, ruins her life and drives her beyond the bounds of sanity. Rosa clings to
the shawl in which she tried to hide Magda before the Nazi flung her daugher
against the fence, before Magda was electrocuted. Magda haunts Rosa.
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Rosa is a detached shadow of herself. “Someone who is already a
floating angel, alert and seeing everything, but in the air, out there not touching
the road” (Ozick, 1989, p. 13). She is a “madwoman” (p. 13) who is but a mere
“shell” (p. 16) of a human being. Those who escaped from the horrors of the
camps, Rosa suggests, are now “burned out" (p. 16) and resemble “scarecrows"
(p. 23). The narrator of this novel describes Rosa as being “skinny” (p. 23) like a
“ragged old bird with worn feathers” (p. 23).
Rosa calls herself a “shell" (p. 16) of a human being. Sander Gilman
(1995) contends that the issue of invisibility is pervasive among German Jews.
“There are dangers in being too visible a Jew in Germany today” (p. 34). Gilman
suggests that many German Jewish writers, especially women writers, attempt
to negotiate a space between their feelings of invisibility and their need to
become visible through their writing. But because they are afraid to come out
with their Jewishness, it makes the writing task all the more difficult.
Ozick’s character Rosa emphasizes how the very discourse about
“survivors” makes her feel worse, more invisible. “Consider also the special
word they used: Survivor. Something new. As long as they didnt
have to say human being. It used to be refugee... A name like a number...
Blue digits on the arm .. . . They didn’t call you a woman anyhow” (pp. 36-37).
Rosa points out that the term survivor is obfuscating. It serves to take away the
face of the individual and the individuality of suffering; it is a term that conceals
and covers over. And the word survivor also erases the engendered nature of
suffering. Rosa declares, “They didnt call you a woman” (pp. 36-37). As Marion
Kaplan stresses, “There is a relation between gender and memory” (1998, p. 8).
And there is a relation between gender and suffering. Women suffered
differently from men while in the concentration camps as I pointed out earlier.
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Rosa, in Ozick's novel, gives back to the individual her face and drives home
the point that Holocaust survivors are not numbers and are not without gender.
Aaron Hass (1996) remarks that frequently “Jewish survivors are often seen as
a unitary phenomenon" (p. 7). But Rosa’s deconstruction of the term survivor
interrupts preconceptions that level survivors into one massiess, faceless thing.
Lawrence Langer (1998) comments that Ozick “refuses to tell a story of the
triumph of spirit, the vindication of suffering through transcendence... closure is
impossible” (p. 123). Rosa is a madwoman who talks to her shawl and pretends
that her daughter is alive. She never assimilates into her new life after
Auschwitz she is always clinging to memory, clinging to her dead daughter.
Like Ozick’s Rosa, Greta Weil's (1984) unnamed narrator in Mv Sister.
Mv Antiaone is also a Holocaust survivor who feels detached from herself
psychologically, haunted by facelessness. “A strangeness that eludes dear
definition but seems to be growing steadily. A sense of distance between myself
and other, myself and objects" (p.11). The narrator dedares that she
is “being hollowed out” (p. 76) by life after Auschwitz. Recall, Rosa in Ozick’s
novel referred to herself as a mere “shell” (p. 16). Both of these characters,
then, experience feelings of detachment, derealization, depersonalization and
invisibility. Dina Wardi (1996) teaches that Holocaust survivors who seek
psychological treatment suffer from “an excessive use of the mechanisms of
defense, denial and compartmentalization" (p. 13). Defense mechanisms such
as detachement and depersonalization helped Jews to survive while in the
camps, but their continued use lead to “internal rifts and splits [in the ego]”
(Wardi, 1996, p. 13). In Rosa’s case, the rifts and splits became manifest by
psychotic episodes. Unlike Rosa, the unnamed narrator in Weil's novel flirts with
insanity but never actually crosses the border. “I am distraught almost to the
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point of madness. I brush along the wails, getting gray paint on my clothes, cob
webs in my hair, yet I lack the strength to run through the wall, to go really mad”
(p. 77).
Weil's narrator is unnamed perhaps because she feels she has no
identity, no face.The Germans have succeeded in making her faceless. She has
introjected their poison. This unnamed narrator asks whether identity loss is
such a bad thing after all. “Is loss of identity really such a mistake? Would I have
been better to remain a German Jew in Munich all my life? (p. 148). Remaining
in Germany probably would not have been a good move for her. Sander Gilman
(1995) suggests that Jews who remained after the war are, in the last analysis,
“masochists” (p. 42). But being a maschoist has its advantage, Gilman
contends. He says that German Jewish writers, who are masochists for living in
Germany, are able to gain a certain amount of “control" (p. 47) over their sadistic
counterparts, non-Jewish Germans. The Jewish writer is able to create “worlds
of words, they can function in a position of dependence while claiming their own
control over the world" (pp. 43-44). A “negative symbiosis” (Diner, cited in
Gilman, 1995, p. 43) signals this sado-masochistic relation between Jews and
Germans. Some suggest that dialogue between Germans and Jews is
impossible. Jack Zipes suggests that Jew are seen by some Germans as
“potential Nazis” (1991, p. 9) primarily because of the tensions in the Middle
East. Zipes explains,
What matters is that there is a great tendency
among Germans to operate on Jews as stereotypes,
and this tendency has been exploited by anti-Semities
to transform Jews into Nazis. This operation is
typical of the new German-Jewish symbiosis put
forth by Henyrk Brodker, one of the most outspoken
critics of German anti-Semitism... it is the German who
will never forgive the Jews for Auschwitz, (p. 23)
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In a move of reversal, some Germans see themselves as victims of
history, while Jews have become the perpetrators. Some of Ursula Hegi's
(1997) interviews with Germans reflect this position. Joachim says to Hegi, “And
yet this[is] constantly thrown in their faces: Look at what your grandparents did.
No race wants to be responsible for what its ancestors did. It’s exactly the way
Jews were being discriminated against" (p. 168). Hans-Peter, another
interviewee, says to Hegi, “I feel a connection to blacks because I too have
been prejudiced against” (p. 141). The perpetrator’s grandchildren see
themselves as the victims of history. They often comment that they are sick of
hearing about the Holocaust. But these remarks signal a refusal to take
responsibility for at least discussing the ways in which second and third
generation Germans might intelligently criticize their parents and grandparents.
A critical memory would not lapse into victimization, which, for Germans, is
completely inappropriate. Germans are not victims of history, Jews are. Attitudes
like these among Germans signal repressed memory and denial and these
attitudes foster a lack of social and moral responsibility. Part of the problem
here, too, is that most Germans never make contact with Jews, at least in
Germany. And this absence creates the space for bizarre phantasies to emerge
about Jews. Katharina Ocshe points out that in Germany “the probability that a
non-Jew would ever meet a Jew is very small” (1991, p. 113). Thus, hostility
cannot be worked out if German Jews and German non-Jews do not talk face to
face.
This negative symbiosis between Germans and Jews is evident in the
language used to talk about these two groups of people. Ocshe reveals that in
Germany today there is much debate over how Jews are to be named. If nonJewish Germans address Jews as a separate group by saying, for instance,
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Germans and Jews live in Germany, a problem arises. This division between
Germans and Jews “robs the Jews of their citizenship, as if they were also not
Germans” (Ocshe, 1994, p. 114). Further, Ocshe comments that “those who
prefer the expression “Jews in Germany” or “German Jews" reject the label
“Jewish German” as inappropriate. For the “Jewish German" the expression
“Jews in Germany” is an exclusionary term” (p. 114). Difficulties around the
discourse of Jews and Germans is a symptom of the difficulty Jews have living
in Germany and signals the difficulty non-Jewish Germans have managing
difference. A common phrase for Jews living in Germany is that they sit on their
suitcases (Rapaport, 1997).
So to answer Weil’s narrator’s question, then, about remaining in
Germany, one would have to say that it would not have been the best place for
her. Having to deal with the complexities of negative symbiotic relationships
with Germans would create a tremendous strain for a Jew. Although it is
probably not impossible for Jews to live in Germany, some Jews probably live a
good enough life there now.
Weil’s narrator expresses a terrible sense of guilt for surviving the
Holocaust. In fact, guilt consumes her. It is for this reason that she
psychologically aligns herself with Antigone, for Antigone is her opposite and
her heroine. Antigone “sneaks out under the cover of darkness to where
Polyneices lies unburied

Protest! Protest!

She pulls up clods of earth

with her bare hands, throws dirt on the bloody flesh” (1984, p. 15). Antigone did
what she could never do, bury the dead. Unburied Holocaust victims haunt her.
And for not being able to even throw dirt over the dead, to grant the dead the
dignity of a proper burial, she punishes herself by being buried in guilt.
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Psychoanalysts are in agreement that many survivors suffer from guilt.
This, analysts term “surivor guilt.” In order to incorporate the dead into living
memory, the survivor becomes attached to guilt and to mourning. Yael Daneli
comments that
Survivors fear that successful mourning may
lead to letting go thereby forgetting the dead,
and committing them to oblivion.. . . Many children
of survivors also share this sentiment and, like
their parents, hold onto the anhedonia, guilt,
shame and pain. (1989, p. 440)
I doubt that Holocaust survivors can ever experience so-called “successful”
mourning whereby they let go and go on, but the investment in grief and the
investment to the dead keeps them trapped in what Abraham and Torok call a
“crypt” (cited in Rashkin, 1992, p. 157). Encrypted memory perpetually haunts
because it hovers between memory and forgetting.
Like Ozick and Weil, Ida Fink’s (1997) collection of short stories called
Traces is also about women survivors of the Holocaust. Only here, the reader
sees traces of these characters, as if traces are the only thing left. We only get a
brief glimpse into the lives of various characters. Eugenia, Sabina and Julia are
underweight to the point of being nearly invisible, faceless. Eugenia is “petite
and fragile" (p. 72) with “thin legs" (p. 97); Sabina is “tall, and thin" (p. 97) and
her hair is “thin, lanky and limp” (p. 97). These women are wasting away;
survival after Auschwitz does not mean liberation. Eugenia “proclaimed that she
wished to die in an automobile accident” (p. 71); Sabina has a “startled
expression, as if she knew in advance that the world and its inhabitants had
nothing good in store for her” (p. 97); Julia “floated away... and soon ail one
could see was the black cloud rising above her” (p. 184). The Holocaust has left
its indelible stain on these women. And they remain faceless, invisible and
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haunted. These characters had introjected and incorporated into their bodies
the bad object of Nazi dehumanization. They have become perpetually
depersonalized. These women could never again regain a sense of self, forever
they would remain fragmented and detached. There can be no liberation from
the Holocaust. “Memory is not only a spring flowing from the well of the past, but
also a tomb, whose contents cling like withered ivy to the mind” (Langer, 1991,
pp. 195-196). Memory is not only a “monument to ruin” (Langer, pp. 195-196)
for Holocaust survivors, it is also a monument to ruin for children and
grandchildren of survivors, for second and third generation Jews after
Auschwitz.
In Cheryl Pearl Sucher’s (1997) novel entitled The Rescue of Memory.
readers are introduced to a Jewish character named Rachel who is the
daughter of a Holocaust survivor. She is not, however, “rescued" by memory;
rather, she wishes she could be rescued away from it. Rachel is torn between
remembering and forgetting as her father continuously tells her his nightmarish
stories. Rachel says at one point, “The truth was, I wanted to forget’ (p. 95). But
she cannot forget and, in fact, insists that her purpose in life is “collecting
remnants of memory” (p. 96). But she suffers nightmares of her dead mother
and scores of other family members killed during the Holocaust. And even
though the war is long since over, Rachel confesses that “Emily and I often
stayed awake at night waiting for disaster to come” (p. 100). Aaron Hass (1996)
states that “many children of survivors await a repetition of the persecution their
parents experienced. Their homes [are]... shaded by ominous clouds and
peopled with ghosts and demons” (p. 7). Rachel is a “memorial candle” (Wardi,
1996, p. 31). She is chosen by her father as the bearer of memory. Wardi says;
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According to Heller (1988), the survivors tended
to choose girls more than boys for the role of
‘memorial candles,’ perhaps because the
Halacha prescribes that it is the mother's
religion rather than the father’s that determines
the religion of the child, (pp. 31-32)
Wardi suggests that being the burden of a ‘memorial candle’ is sometimes too
great. It creates a double identity, an enmeshed identity not only with the
parents but with all the dead relatives who perished during the Holocaust.
Rachel, in Sucher’s novel remarks that,
Each year on the Day of Atonement, I attend my
father’s synagogue to say a prayer in honor of
the souls whose name I have been given.
Inscribed on the raised copper plates and
illuminated by lemonflame bulbs, the names read
Ruchel Wallfisch and Channah Sureh Greenblatt
Bathed in the pale golden light,
I wonder what else of theirs is mine. (p. 30)
Rachel wonders about difficulties in individuating herself from her father
too. She sees his face whenever she looks into the mirror. Symbiosis with
surviving parents and with the dead is what brings children of Holocaust
survivors into therapy (Wardi, 1996). These children have difficulty carving out
their own identities. They also suffer from guilt. These complexities for children
of Holocaust survivors transcend any neat and tidy diagnosis. Kestenberg
(1990) reports that there has been considerable debate over whether or not to
label symptoms “under the heading of ‘survivor's child syndrome” (p.83). But
Kestenberg suggests that this label is simply not accurate because symptoms, if
any emerge, are too various to be reduced to this label. It is hard to avoid
"transgenerational haunting” (Rashkin, 1992, p. 22). Transgenerational
haunting is real. It can ruin lives. And it seems that psychoanalysts are baffled
by these uncanny ghosts. Sammy Speier comments that even the language
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analysts use to describe these hauntings is problematic. It seems that these
hauntings appropriate a language and a coursing of their own.
The implications of the experience of concentration
camp survivors for the psychic illness of their children
are much debated today; even the term “psychic
illness” shows that the traditional diagnostic
vocabulary of psychic illness is insufficient. (1993, p. 63)
Speier suggests that there are no sufficient diagnoses for people who have
“grown up with the fear of extermination" (p. 63). I argue against pathologizing
Holocaust survivors and their children. Pathologizing and diagnosing covers
over the horrors of suffering. It keeps us from thinking about the complexities
and the individuality of suffering (Salvio, 1999).
At this juncture I would like to contrast these novels written by Jewish
women with novels written by Jewish men. I argue that gender matters in
matters of novel writing, in matters of memory. Memory is engendered.
Texts written from a “male frame” differ from those written by women.
Bruno Schulz’s (1934/1977) novel The Street of Crocodiles is a
surrealistic tale. Schulz’s narrator anticipates the danger to come, as the Nazi’s,
or crocodiles, begin crawling the streets. The narrator of this novel tells readers
about his mad father. “He remained for long periods without moving, except to
flap his arms like wings" (p. 43). Engaging in “childlike self-absorbed twittering,"
(p. 49) he thinks that he is at once a bird and a cockroach. Kafka's (1916/1992)
novel The Metamorphosis, like Schulz’s novel, allows readers to witness the
transformation of Gregor Samsa, who turns into a roach. Like Kafka's Samsa,
Schulz's narrator explains that his father
lay on the floor naked, stained with black
totem spots, the lines of his ribs heavily
outlined.. . . He moved with many-limbed,
complicated movement of a strange ritual, (p. 115)
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Soon, however, this hallucination fades and the narrator reports that after his
brother came home with news of the end of the world (I assume he is referring
to the Nazi accession to power), his father “put his head in the chimney shaft of
the stove” (p. 157) and when he opens the flue his father sees through "its dark
abyss, where a smiling homunculus slept forever in luminous sleep, enclosed in
a glass capsule, bathed in florescent light, already adjudged, erased, filed
away” (p. 160). The Jews of Europe had already been adjudged, erased and
filed away as Hitler arrives on the scene in 1933.
One interpretation of this story could suggest that the narrator’s father is a
raving lunatic. But at a certain level, the father understands what is happening
and he anticipates what is to come, albeit in a psychotic state. The streets are
filling up with crocodiles. These crocodiles, these ugly horrible Nazis, are taking
over and will soon come for their prey. They are coming.
Instead of becoming emaciated, as many of the characters did in novels
written by women, Schulz’s character becomes larger than life to the point of
becoming surreal. This complete and utter alienation from others drives him to
transform his being into other beings. He changes his face into that of another.
He removes his face and becomes transformed into a creature, a non-human
creature. Jews were hunted down like subhuman creatures; Eichmann called
his men Jew Hunters, and he sent them everywhere to capture their prey. The
feeling of being hunted down like subhuman creatures is unthinkable. Yet it was
this feeling of being hunted that drove many Jews to despair and even suicide.
Those who intuited that they could not escape took their own lives. Like many
others, Schulz did not have the chance to escape. But he did not take his own
life, it was taken from him. Schulz was murdered in 1942. Ficowski explains:
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On November 9,1942, on the streets of
Drogobych... there commenced a so-called
action carried out by the local sections of the
SS and the Gestapo against the Jewish
population. “Black Thursday,” brought death
to some one hundred and fifty passerby.
Among the murdered... was Bruno Schulz,
a former teacher of drawing at the local
high school. (1977, p. 13)
There was nowhere to run by 1942, for the crocodiles were everywhere. And
hardly anyone was willing to help Jews. The free world would “cast a cold eye"
(Yeats, 1938-1939/1989, p. 325).
Schulz’s text is written like a dream or a nightmare. It is couched in
metaphor and surrealistic imagery. It forever slips through interpretations and
leaves marks of unconscious traces on the site of interpretation itself.
Analyst Andre Green talks about the difficulties of doing interpretive work
around texts. He suggests that we treat a text as if it were the unconscious of
another person. Green remarks,
When the analyst ventures outside the analytic
situation, in which he is in direct contact with the
unconscious, as it were, he must proceed with
caution. The work of art is handed over to the
analyst; it can say nothing more than is incorporated
in it and cannot, like the analysand, offer an
insight into the work of the unconscious. (1994, p. 47)
Whether we are analysts or not, Green's comments become important because
he suggests we move with caution when doing interpretive work. The text is not
an analysand, but it is the text of an other. Someone writes a text and leaves her
traces in that text. But the writer has vanished; she is no longer present. Her
absence, though, is marked by traces deposited in the site of the text. We move
cautiously and offer tentative interpretations, never approaching arrogance by
claiming that one has got the authoritative interpretation.
250

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Interpretations around metaphorical images become slippery because
metaphor resonates with primary process thinking. Time is slippery, place is
slippery, things converge in uncanny ways. This is a world that is, as Martin
Stanton (1997) would say, out of order. A smiling homunculus, birdman and
roachman all exist simultaneously. Schulz's text evokes strange transferential
relations, feelings that cannot be named, thoughts that refuse categorization,
ideas that refuse clear understanding, always slipping, slipping into unnamable
horrors. Immersed in the vortex of being, immersed in the coming to power of
Hitler, one could not possibly know the implications of what was to come.
Schulz captures the confusion and sinisterness of Germany during the early
1930s. Something out of joint signaled doom.
Unlike the surreal landscape of Schulz's novel, Simon Wiesenthal
(1976) writes a realistic novel entitled The Sunflower, which tells the tale of a
Jew who grapples with the problem of forgiveness upon encountering a dying
SS solider. This is the story of Simon, a Jew who survives the Holocaust. This is
also the story of Karl, a Nazi who dies in a hospital during the Holocaust. Simon
tells about his first encounter with Karl. “Although the place was in semi
darkness I would now see a figure wrapped in white, motionless on the bed. I
tried to trace the outlines of the body” (p. 34). Karl needs to “confess” (p. 35) his
crimes to a Jew, to Simon, so that he can feel absolved of his sins before death.
Simon comments “I began to ask myself why a Jew must listen to the confession
of a dying Nazi soldier" (p. 39). Karl tells the awful tale of setting a house ablaze
with Jews inside and finishing them off with the toss of a hand grenade.
Wiesenthal's story is based on real events that not only happened to him during
the Holocaust but happened to millions. In fact, Martin Gilbert (1985) reports an
event that occured in Bialystok Russia in 1941. Szymon Datner recalls that
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From everywhere, the unfortunate people were
driven in the direction of the great synagogue,
which was burning with a great fire, and from
which horrible cries came out. (cited in Gilbert, pp. 160-161)
According to Martin Gilbert, 800 Jews died in this fire.
Karl, the SS man in Wiesenthal's novel, is one of the many Germans who
burned Jews alive during the Holocaust. Karl begged forgiveness from Simon
the Jew. It is not insignificant that Karl is wrapped from head to toe in gauze and
is blinded by his gauze. Karl is blinded by his act, he is blinded by his guilt and
blinded by his request for absolution. Simon, however, sees that forgiveness is
impossible. In fact, during Karl’s testimony, Simon remains silent. Karl's
punishment is silence. Simon declares, "I stood up and looked in his direction,
at his folded hands. Between them there seemed to rest a sunflower... without
a word I left the room” (p. 55). The sunflower might be a metaphor for dying with
dignity, a death visited by flowers on the grave and by “butterflies” (p. 20).
The Bitburg cemetary might be such a place, a place where Nazis and
the Wehrmacht soldiers are buried in Germany. But for Jews there were no
graves, and there was no such thing as death with dignity. Simon, in
Wiesenthal's novel, remarks “for me there would be no sunflower. I would be
buried in a mass-grave, where corpses would be piled on top of me” (p. 20).
The Judeo-Christian tradition teaches that we must always forgive, no
matter what. The virtue of absolute forgiveness seems inscribed in our skins.
But this teaching falls short in the face of Auschwitz. I argue that the virtue of
absolute forgiveness be unlearned. Sometimes it is better not to forgive. Rabbi
Barri Dov Schwartz reminds us that Wiesenthal once said that the Church “will
fail us through its forgiveness" (cited in Wiesenthal, 1976, p. 5). Herbert
Marcuse suggests that “the easy forgiving of such crime perpetuates the very
252

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

evil it wants to eradicate” (cited in Wiesenthal, p. 169). Martin E. Marty
comments that “non-Jews and perhaps especially Christians should not give
advice about Holocaust experiences to its heirs” (cited in Wiesnthal, p. 172).
Marty remarks that forgiveness around this issue may be little more than “cheap
grace” (p. 177). Cheap grace slides down the slippery slope to forgetting. Marty
says, “will we not soon forget to tell these stories?” (p. 174).
My experience reading these texts has been what I term a “continual notme." As a Jew I identify with Jewish people who have suffered and died during
the Holocaust. But this identification is partial because I did not experience
these things directly. On another level, I dis-identify with these texts because I
will never wholly understand these kinds of experiences. A potential danger
when reading fiction is psychological merging with characters. Many students
wish to identify with characters in fiction; they wish to find a kinship with the
characters. Many long for a mirror. But as Jacques Derrida warns, “the
misfortune would be the mirror itself' (1991, p. 200). I argue that a jagged edge
between my eye/ “I" and the text must always remain or I shall become
symbiotic with the text. Holocaust texts are other and must remain so. The
alterity and strangeness must remain. If I merge psychologically with the text I
may think that it is possible to understand what it was like to live through or after
Auschwitz. But this is impossible and it is arrogant.
At the end of the day I must separate myself from the text. Suzanne de
Castell teaches that we must engage in readings ““against the grain,” readings
which are not only against the grain of the text, but against the grain of the
world” (1996, p. 31). Reading against the grain is a way to open spaces
between my “I" and the eye of the text, or the unconscious site of the text, de
Castell argues that we must “refuse the literal” (p. 31). The literal is the mirror
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itself, the that's-me of reading, the identification and consequent submerging of
the reader into the text. The unconscious site of the text, the unconscious traces
deposited by the author, shatter this identification. Rather, a dialectical
movement between reader and text is necessary, an identification-disidentification, which keeps the otherness of the reading process intact. The
effects of literary representation of the Holocaust on the site of the reader must
remain mysterious. Perhaps it takes years to tell what it is these readings and
interpretations do to the reader.
For a Jew, the experience of reading Holocaust texts might be very
different from that of a Christian. For a German non-Jew, the experience is
still different. One’s situatedness makes a difference in the ways reading is
experienced. I also believe that it makes a difference if the author of the novel
writes from a Jewish or German non-Jewish perspective. It makes a difference if
the author is male or female. My reading of Holocaust novels written by
Germans produces a different experience than those written by Jews. But at the
end of the day, whether novels are written by Jews or Germans, I agree with
Lawrence Langer that, “all Holocaust art, whether memoir, biography, or fiction,
is built on a mountian of corpses, so it can never be an account of celebration, a
triumph of form over the chaos of experience" (1991, p. 127).
German (non-Jewish) Novels
Here I would like to turn to Holocaust novels written by non-Jewish
Germans. James Young remarks that "in every nations' memorials and
museums [and I would add works of fiction] a different Holocaust is
remembered, often to conflicting political and religious ends" (1993, ix).
Certainly, a different Holocaust is remembered by Germans than by Jews and
we see this as the Holocaust gets represented in myriad forms in German
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literature. German novelist Gunter Grass stresses the importance of
responsibility to confront the past.
The Germans... cannot evade their responsibility.
The more inoffensive they try to seem, the greater
the dread they inspire in their neighbors
No
amount of talk about the innocence of the Germans
who had not yet been bom or about the crimes
of other people can relieve them of their guilt. (1985, p. 76)
A member of Hitler Youth, a high school drop out, winner of the 1958 Grippe
47 Prize, Gunter Grass consumed by his own sense of guilt is driven by an
uncanny ethical responsibility to tell the story of the Holocaust over and over
again in his novels. Grass is unusual. He began writing Holocaust novels
shortly after the war and he began wrestling with what had gone wrong. But for
many Germans, this wrestling was belated. Margaret Mitscherlich-Nielson
writes,
After the defeat [of Germany] there was
first an abrupt derealization; the past simply
faded away like a dream
The manic effect
to undo, the enormous collective effort to
rebuild, a kind of national therapy, made
permanent denial and repression possible
for the majority of Germans. (1989, p. 406)
Against this backdrop, artists such as Thomas Mann, Klaus Mann, Heinrich Boll,
Gunter Grass, Christa Wolf, Ursula Hegi, Bernard Schlink and others write
about the Nazi era and refuse to remain silent, or sunk in denial. These German
novelists, each in their own way, have broken through the pervasive numbness
and repression that haunts many Germans still. Even third Generation Germans
are haunted by this uncanny feeling of numbness. Barbara Heimmansberg and
Christoph Schmidt comment that psychotherapists encounter many Germans
who are troubled by numbness and emptiness. These therapists tell us that
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often in psychotherapy we encounter people
of a peculiar emotional numbness and
emptiness; they can tell us nothing about
the causes and precipitants of their sudden
anxiety attacks, and if asked about their parents
they reveal a broad field of ignorance... diffuse
anxiety and feelings of guilt can be the half-erased
traces of the Nazi past. (1993, p.3)
Gunter Grass (1959/1964), in his novel The Tin Drum, describes a ritual that
Germans must undergo in order to shed a tear. Cutting an onion induces
weeping. But what kind of weeping is this? It is artificially induced. This kind of
grief is unreal.
However, early Holocaust novels, especially those by Thomas Mann,
Heinrich Boll and Gunter Grass, demonstrate a start, a struggle to at least begin
the mourning process. Now some may argue that their mourning is incomplete,
but at least they have begun the process. Whether these novelists were
driven by a sense of guilt or shame, or an ethical sense of responsibility,
whether they were driven by their own sadness, or numbness, they were driven,
and that they were driven needs to be recognized.
The ways in which German novelists grapple with the Nazi past varies.
Some novels demonize Germans. Others do not. Thomas Mann’s (1948/1992)
Doctor Faustus tends to demonize. Ursula Hegi’s (1994) Stones from the River
does not demonize. Novels that attempt to portray East Germans as victims of
history, like Christa Wolf’s (1980) Patterns of Childhood, lacks what I would
consider to be an ethical responsibility. Gunter Grass’s (1959/1964) The Tin
Drum, on the other hand, is ethically sensitive, for he insists that individuals
must take responsibility for crimes.
One of the interesting connections that has been made by Judith Ryan
(1983) around literary and historical representations of the Nazi era is that
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literary representations tend to parallel, in many ways, historical ones.
Literature and history, that is, follow, similar trajectories.
Changes in the novel form must be seen
as a response to changes in conceptualized
thought: if history is seen as determined by fate
or necessity, by recurrent or archetypal
configurations, this will be reflected in essentially
self-contained literary structures; if on the other
hand, history is seen as subject to change,
as a process that can be influenced— [literary]
forms... mirror this view. (Ryan, 1983, p. 21)
Fatalist views of history are, of course, nothing new. One might suggest that
Hegel’s was a fatalist view of history. Spirit moving through the world, killing
anything in its way, determined the path of history. Subjects do not produce
history, history produces subjects. Hegel had world history all sown up. At the
end of time, all contradictions would be solved. Interestingly, deterministic views
of history seep into Thomas Mann’s writings. He suggests that the Germany was
doomed since, at the least, Martin Luther. It was no coincidence that Hitler
sprang up from the heart of German soil. Germany was waiting for a Hitler to
come along. A turn in Holocaust historiography, since at least the Eichmann
trial, suggested that arguments around so-called collective guilt of Germans
would no longer be tenable. Historians have stressed over and over again that
individuals are to blame and it is to individual guilt that we must turn. Subjects
produce history. History is contingent upon individual decision making and
action. This is the intentionalist argument I spoke of earlier. There is nothing
deterministic about the rise of the Third Reich; it was created by individuals who
made decisions to do what they did. We hear echoes of the intentionalist
position in the writings of Gunter Grass. Peoples’ decisions shape history.
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Let us begin these inquiries into German Holocaust fiction with Thomas
Mann’s (1948/1992) Doctor Faustus. This novel is about Germany’s pact with
the devil. Adrian Leverkuhn declares that he is sought out by the devil. “But
seen Him I have, at last, at last: He was with me, here in this hall, He sought me
out’ (p. 222). “The Lutheran Leverkuhn” (p. 8) makes a pact with the devil, a
pact that will ensure the composition of the most perfectly wicked piece of music
that will flood the gates of hell. Serenus Zeitblom, the narrator, remarks that
Adrian's "lamentation" named after Durer’s woodcut of the Apocalpse
represents utter “soullessness! I will know that this is at bottom what they mean
who apply the word “barbaric" to Adrian’s creation" (p. 377). After Adrian’s
monstrous creation was written, Zeitblom comments that,
Germany had become a thick-walled underground
torture-chamber, converted into one by a profligate
dictatorship vowed to nihilism.. . . Now the torture-chamber
has been broken open. (p. 481)
This pact Leverkuhn made with the devil was an inevitable one. He was
“destined” to do this, he was “so afflicted by fate" (p. 3). “Fate has crowded the
German soul!" (p. 3) And this German fate suffered from “old-world,
underground neurosis" (p.37) which could be traced back to Luther.
Donna Reed points out Mann was familiar with the writings of Freud and
like Freud he believed in the “power of the unconscious” (1985, p. 101). Reed
claims that,
From Mann’s point of view, potential hysteria is
omnipotent, ready to repeat itself. He often makes
no historical distinctions between the irrationalism
of the Middle Ages, the pre-Nazi cult of instinct...
and the impassioned faces cheering Hitler, (p. 111)
Mann’s Leverkuhn, the melancholic, suffered from migranes. He was
emotionally cold, ruthless, arrogant. "What is afoot betwixt me and Satan; not
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much to it after all" (p. 141). His pact with the devil enabled him to achieve what
he called “the breakthrough" (p. 304). This so-called breakthrough was the path
toward evil. Zeitblom says, “O Germany, thou art undone” (p. 388), Germany has
become a “land self-maddened, psychologically burnt out" (pp. 481-482). “Our
essential Germanness is stained” (p. 482), says the narrator.
Thomas Mann's novel pathologizes and demonizes Germans. But this
pathology and demonization was determined beforehand by fate. Germany was
fated to do what it did. Like the Sonderweg thesis, which argues that basically
Germany was siezed by a madman, siezed by demons and took a deviant path,
took a wrong path, Mann argues that Germany was fated to become monstrous,
that path was sown into the soil of Germany from Luther on. But does Mann offer
up an apologetic? Does the demonization of Germany serve as an
exoneration? If being possesed by demons is beyond the control of individuals,
who is responsible for Germany’s crimes? Leverkuhn, or Doctor Faustus,
remarks “how little he was his own master” (p. 359). If a country has gone mad
and is not its own master who is to blame? The insane cannot be judged;
Germany cannot be judged. The demonization of the so-called German
character is no longer thought to be tenable because there is no “essential
Germanness" (Mann, p. 482) as Mann would have us believe. To suggest that
there is something innately evil about Germans is ridiculous. Germany was not
fated to carry out the Holocaust. Germans carried it out because they wanted to.
At least this is the message of Goldhagen’s (1997) controversial historiography.
Of course, things are much more complicated that that. But still, human beings
choose to take certain paths and must take responsibility for the path chosen.
“Fate” is a mythological creature. History is not determined by fate, but its path is
contingent. It is contingent upon decisions people make.
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Mann's notion of the troubled genius, the melancholy musician is highly
problematic, for it signifies a romantic notion of a melancholy Germany. To
romanticize over Germany’s la te ,” is an inadequate response to a Germany’s
failings. Julianna Schiesari explains that according to Aristotle, "all great men”
must suffer from melancholia" (1992, p. 6). But women suffering from
melancholia, Schiersari remarks, are thought to be merely hysterical and
weepy. It is the mark of male genius to suffer. But there is no necessary
connection between genius and illness. There is no necessary connection
between melancholia and genius. Gunter Grass criticizes Mann’s melancholic
Germany because it implies a “stasis” and an inability to act and change the
course of history. Judith Ryan explains that Grass,
points out in the Durer Lecture [in 1971]
that melancholy is essentially a function
of the belief in stasis; it is a response
to the assumption that the course of history
is not really open to change.. . . When resistance
seems virtually impossible, melancholy becomes
a substitute for action. (1983, p. 69)
Melancholia sounds a certain stuckness in time. A depressed Germany cannot
get out of its own way to do anything to stop the wheels of history. The
melancholic is stuck, glued to one place and one thought, one feeling, trapped,
immobile and helpless. Paula Salvio remarks that “What is dangerous about the
gaze of the melancholic is that it causes life (time) to flow out of objects-it
petrifies them ... one of the forgotten symbols of melancholy, Walter Benjamin
(1977) reminds us, is stone” (1998, p. 17). The stoney German character, Mann
suggests, prevents the stopping of Hitler. Germany becomes, in Mann's eyes,
the victim of its own melancholia. Zeitblom, the narrator of Mann's novel,
comments on the “evils” of Germany. Hell is a German creation, he says.
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There were years in which we children of
the dungeon, dreamed of a hymn of exultation,
a Fidelio, a Ninth Symphony, to celebrate
the dawn of a freed Germany-freed by herself.
Now only this can avail us, only this will be sung
from our very souls: the Lamentation of the Son
of Hell, the Lamentation of men and God... the most
frightful lament ever set up on this earth, (p. 485)
I suggest that a pact with the devil has nothing to do with some
mythological transcendent creature who comes to earth and possesses human
souls. Making a pact with the devil is the act of banishing one’s own devil, ones
own bad objects, one's own heart of darkness from one’s psyche. To banish the
otherness within the self is an invitation for all sorts of projections. To banish
one’s heart of darkness within one’s own soul is an invitation to the projection of
hatred onto others. Germany could not manage difference and banished the
other to concentration camps. Like a piece of music, Germany created the
concentration camps, the Nazi, and the ordinary German who killed, Germany
created its own hell and perfected it and Germany must therefore be held
responsible for its own creations. A creation is a human invention, not a
monster, although Germany’s was a monstrous creation.
Adolf Bartelmas, a railway employee in Auschwitz
said in his testimony at the Auschwitz trial that
in Frankfurt many years later that flames could
be seen at a distance of 15-20 kilometers and
that it was known that human beings were
burned there. (Laquer, 1981, p. 23)
The flames of the apocalypse are not mythological; the apocalypse was
Auschwitz, it marked the end of the world for European Jews.
Unlike Thomas Mann, Gunter Grass stressed that individuals in Germany
made choices and that they were movers of history and that therefore they were
responsible for the crimes of Germany. Choice and responsibility are themes
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that are found throughout Grass's Danzig Trilogy (The Tin Drum (1964/1991);
Cat and Mouse (1961) and Poo Years (1963/1986). The Tin Drum caused
terrific scandal in Germany when it was first published. John Reddick (1975)
says that about 40 law suits were filed against Grass and this novel “was
prominent amongst a number of books publicly burnt in Duseldorf by a religious
youth organization" (p. 4). This novel was thought to be obscene and offensive
to Germans. But I think the reverse is true. This novel is Grass's best and most
gritty work. Salman Rushdie remarks that "what Grass learned on his journey
across the frontiers of history was Doubt... he is quintessential^ the artist of
uncertainty” (1985, xiii). Further Rushdie comments that Grass is, "after all, a
metaphorical being” (xiv)
What draws me to Grass is his metaphorical writing and his unabashed
criticism of Germany. Frank Keele (1988) declares that “Grass's artistic
search for the causes of e v il... concentrates on minutiae: on subtleties of
language, of prejudice and political accomodation, of misplaced sexual and
religious fervor" (1988, pp. 4-5). Grass's uncanny ability to capture the minutiae
of everyday experience of German life, the heaviness of the 1930s, the
slowness in the Dog Years, the camivalesque atmosphere of German society,
the absurdity and seemingly normality of what Grass calls "the great crime”
(1985, p. 86) draws me in as a reader. Frank Keele remarks that “Grass has
said that in Danzig the Nazis ‘rise to power occured slowly, almost as a
microcosmic model, so that one could take notes" (1988, p. 4). Unlike Thomas
Mann, Grass sinks into the metaphors of ordinary life during the rise of the Third
Reich. Mann, on the other hand, transcends the ordinary taking readers into an
extra-ordinary transcendent, mythical realm. Conversely, Grass offers a picture
of German complicity from a bottom up perspective, akin to what historians call
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Alltagsgechichte. Gut Grass's novels are not couched in historical realism, but
metaphorical absurdity. And this metaphorical absurdity leaves traces of
otherness, strangeness and alienness that one does not necessarily feel
reading Thomas Mann. Normalcy and brutality are taken-for-granted modes of
being in Grass’s worldview. Grass's novels are quite chilling. Never does he
lapse into sentimentality, romanticism or nostalgia. Ever the harsh critic, Grass
“does not exempt himself from guilt” (Keele, 1988, p. 5). Grass tells us that he
became so bothered by his own complicity as member of the Hitler Youth that
he suffered nightmares about the possibility of doing the unspeakable. "I could
not swear that, if I had been six or seven years older, I would not have
participated in the great crime” (Grass, 1985, p. 86). Against the backdrop of so
much denial in Germany, Grass demonstrates a move away from denial, he
demonstrates a grappling with the Nazi past in a way that is gritty. This gritty
sense of responsibility Grass takes up is reflected in the Danzig Trilogy. But
here I would like to look at only The Tin Drum because of the three novels in the
triology, this one struck me the most. It is The Tin Drum that I think is Grass’s
best contribution to the German memory of the Holocaust.
The Tin Drum (1964/1991) is the story of a mentally ill Germany. In many
ways, Grass's novel parallels early psychohistories and psychobiographies of
the Nazi era. Recall, these early histories tended to pathologize Germans.
When we turn to page one of Grass’s novel, we are introduced to Oskar
Matzerath who is in a mental hosptial. Oskar comments that
Granted: I am an inmate of a mental hospital,
my keeper is watching me, he never lets me
out of his sight; and my keeper’s eye is the
shade of brown that can never see through
a blue-eyed type like me. (p. 15)
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This non-transparent blue-eyed type, has landed in a mental hospital because
he had a breakdown on November 9th, 1938 when the Nazis took the drum
store owner, Sigsimund Marks away. November 9th, 1938 dates Kristallnacht,
a day that signaled a turning point in German history, a day that begins the
breakdown of German society, and the date that causes many Jews to commit
suicide (Trunk, 1979).
Oskar’s story begins at his painful birth when he decided that he did not
want to progress past the age of three. “He had lost his enthusiasm even before
this life beneath the light bulbs began" (p. 49). Oskar decided that the only thing
that would keep him alive would be to acquire a tin drum. But he wanted to
arrest his growth nonetheless. Thus, he would fling himself down the stairs.
I noticed that the trap door leading to the cellar
was open
Above all, no harm must come to
my drum... from the ninth step, I flung
myself down, carrying a shelf laden
with bottles of raspberry syrup, (p. 62)
Landing on his head, Oskar remained stunted and dwarfed forever. Oskar’s first
choice had been made. He chose to become dwarfed. As Judith Ryan remarks,
"For Oskar, choice is the operative element.. . . He chooses not to renounce
Satan just as he chooses not to grow up" (1983, p. 61). Grass seems to suggest
that Oskar’s infantile regression is symptomatic of Germany's own infantilism.
Although Oskar declares that he wanted to be a "resistance fighter "(p. 124) as
he "disrupted six or seven rallies and threw three or four parades out of step
with [his] drumming” (p. 174), he ultimately chooses to join Bebra’s (or Satan’s)
circus. Bebra, another dwarf, continually tries to "justify" (p. 309) why he aligned
himself with Goebbels and Goering. Bebra warns Oskar that the Nazis are
coming and they will do whatever it takes to clear the way, including murder.
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They are coming, he whispered. They
will take over the meadows where we pitch
our tents. They will organize torchlight parades.
They will build rostrums and fill them, and down
from the rostrums they will preach our destruction.
(P-114).
Bebra’s rationalization to align himself with the Nazis was this: kill or be killed. If
he joined the Nazis, they would not have killed him, in other words. But the truth
of the matter is that nobody was coerced to join the Nazi party, nobody was
coerced to kill. In fact, as Christopher Browning (1998) teaches us "Pappa
Trapp," leader of police battalion 101, gave his men a choice not to kill Jews, a
choice to step out of the firing squad. But only 12 out of 500 made the choice not
to kill. And those who stepped out were not punished at all. And certainly
nobody was killed because they did not choose to kill.
Like Bebra, Oskar’s mother and father chose to embrace the Nazis.
When Oskar’s father joined the party, he proceeded to hang a picture of
Hitler above the piano. “The picture of the gloomy Beethoven... was removed..
. and Hitler’s equally gloomy countenance was hung upon the same nail” (p.
115). While Oskar's father wanted to “banish" (p. 115) Beethoven, his mother
“insisted” (p. 115) that Beethoven be placed “over the sideboard” (p. 115).
Oskar’s father felt that the old culture of Germany replaced the new. Beethoven
must be, therefore banished from the chronicles of history.
But the banishment of Beethoven caused Oskar’s mother to die. And her
illness and death started with eels. Out of a dead, decapitated horse’s head,
“small light-green eels were darting” (p. 150). Meanwhile, Oskar’s father “was
too busy to see Mama turn green* (p. 150). Mr. Matzerath was too busy running
around in his SA uniform to see that his wife was sickened by what had been
transpiring in Germany. Oskar’s mother intuited that Beethoven's move to the
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sideboard meant certain death for Germany. But what part did Oskar play in all
of this? Oskar asks, uWhat had my drum in common with the blood of Poland?"
(p. 226) Oskar’s part in spilling the blood of Jews began with his decision to join
Bebra's circus. But his complicity and guilt could be traced back even earlier to
the day he bought his tin drum. Our little drummer boy was very adept at
“shattering glass” (p. 64) [read Kristallnacht ]. But initially he only shattered
glass when someone threatened to take away his tin drum. And then, Oskar
screamed.
Oskar, who until then had passed as a
quiet, almost too well-behaved child,
succeeded in emitting that first annihliating
scream: the polished round crystal which
protected the honey-colored dial of our
clock from dust... burst... the destruction was
complete, (p. 66)
As Oskar mastered his screaming talent, he could destroy more and more
crystal, he could destroy more efficiently and more easily, even without any
provokation. It is not insignificant that “Hitler was known as the drummer”
(Keele, 1988, p. 140). When he gave speeches he screamed and pounded his
fists. His speeches sounded completely hysterical. Such incredible rage
emanated from the podium. This is probably why Binion (1976) suggests that
Hitler suffered from “oral sadism” (p. 170). When anyone threated to take his
power away he shattered glass; Kristallnacht marked the first shattering. The
killing sped up and became more efficient. Nobody dared challenge him,
nobody dared to take his drum of power away.
Unlike Thomas Mann, Gunter Grass suggests in this story that the
everyday family, the Matzerath’s made choices and were complidt in the course
that history would take in Germany. Germany was not fated to align itself with
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evil. For Grass, Germany chose that path. Grass’s novel, along with early
psychohistories, helps us to understand why people would so easily wish to
diagnose and pathologize Germans. In a way it is easier for us to diagnose, to
categorize, to suggest that they (Germans) are not like us (the West). They went
mad, we did not. This is a simple dichotomy which keeps people from thinking
about the unthinkable. We want so to explain the Nazi phenomenon, or perhaps
we want to explain it away with easy categorization. And this is what
pathologizing does, it explains things away. But the hideousness will not go
away. This splitting off of us from them, is a way to defend us against massive
hideousness, which I think Grass tries to depict metaphorically. Eels squiggling
around in a dead horse's head, winding up on the dinner table symbolizes the
grosteque nature of what it was the Nazis were doing. Quite frankly, Grass's
images are disgusting. Oskar’s mother manically shoving eels down her throat
until she dies [read Germans shoving Jews into ovens] captures the disgusting
and horrible things that the Nazis were doing. No need to be literal here. Grass
drives his point home metaphorically and it is through the metaphor that readers
experience a kind of pervasive horror. But some scholars are opposed to the
utilization of metaphor. Judith Ryan (1983) argues that it is appropriate for Jews
to draw on metaphors when writing Holocaust fiction, but not for Germans. She
suggests that when German writers utilize metaphor they obscure the “great
crime’' (Grass, 1985, p. 86). Again we hear the call to literalism. But as James
Young points out that
it becomes all the more puzzling when critics
persist in trying to know the Holocaust without
recourse to metaphor, as if it were possible to
write about literature, talk about it, or even
narrate its history without figurative language.
(1988, p. 89)
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And it is Grass’s metaphorical bent that makes his work so dense, so layered
over with unconscious traces. Eels, dead horse heads, dwarves and tin drums
may trigger unconscious responses in the reader that otherwise would lay
dormant. Unconscious responses open the reader to the otherness of the text.
Like Oskar Matzerath, Trudi Montag, another dwarf, is the main character
in Ursula Hegi's (1994) novel entitled Stones from the River. Through the eyes
of a four year old dwarf readers see another picture of everyday life in Germany
during the Nazi era. Trudi, however, is very different from Oskar. Her
dwarfedness gives her the power to “resist’’ “Hitler’s gaze" (p. 167). Trudi does
not demonize her fellow Germans for their complicity. Trudi comments that, “In
real life it was not that easy to tell who the villains were, and even if you could
identify them, they were not total villians. No one was entirely all of one thing"
(p. 168). Trudi gathers and collects stories from the “people of Burgdorf (p.
239). After the war she wanted to tell these stories, stories mainly of “complicity”
(p. 239), but she realized that nobody would listen.
Trudi would find very few who’d want to
listen because the people of Burgdorf
would be immersed in changing what
had happened into a history they could
sleep with,e//?e heile welt-an intact world
they could offer to the next generation, (pp. 361-362)
This intact world is, thus, something that the people of Bavaria also
wanted to offer to the next generation as depicted in the film Schreckliche
Madchen or the Nastv Girl (1990) directed by Michael Verhoeven. The English
translation “Nasty Girl” is misleading, for Schreckliche suggests terrible, fearful
or dreadful. What is dreadful for the townspeople of Bavaria is that a young girl
writes a book called Mv Home Town During the Third Reich. In the process of
doing research for her book, this young girl, or nasty girl, uncovers all kinds of
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dirt about her neighbors’ complicity during the rise of the Nazis. Everyone she
encounters lies and tries to cover up their involvement and complicity. The
townspeople make it very difficult for her to gain access to archives until she
wins a law suit which enables her to get the information needed to complete her
book. She ends up having to steal the files necessary to unlock the secrets of
Bavarian complicity. In the meantime, her life was in danger. Thugs kill her cat
and hang it on her front door. Thugs throw rocks through her car window. Thugs
toss an explosive into her home and nearly kill her. The townspeople of Bavaria
were determined to unwrite history. Director Michael Verhoeven states that this
film is a mixture of fact and fiction and was inspired by Anja Rosmus who
attempted to reveal the truth of her hometown. But Anja Rosmus became very
unpopular with her neighbors. Anja Rosmus found out about her neighbors.
Like Verhoeven's film, Hegi’s novel points to the ways in which Germans
have tried to re-arrange the past, so they could sleep better. Trudi Montag, must
have been considered a kind of nasty girl too, because she hid Jews in her
cellar. I would think that this would be total anathema for Germans. And spying
made this nearly impossible. Even children spied on their neighbors and
informed the SS when Germans transgressed Nazi policy. Trudi, though, hid
Erma and Konrad Neimann, Eva Sturm and others from the Nazis, while the rest
of Burgdorf was busy attending,
parades and speeches--some like the
taxidermist, because they genuniely believed
in their leaders; others like Herr Blau because
not to go would call attention to yourself. Most
practiced the silence they were familiar with,
a silence nurtured by fear and complicity, (p. 234)
But Trudi stresses that it was obedience more than anything else that allowed
Germans to become complicit. “You learned about obedience from your parents
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and all other adults, then obedience to your church, your teachers, your
government” (p. 10). Daniel Goldhagen (1997) explains that the argument that
Germans acted out a sense of obedience is nothing new. This theme, he tells us
has been popular amongst historians and psychoanalysts. Accordingly, Stanley
Milgram, Herbert C. Kelman, V. Lee Hamilton, Erich Fromm, and G.P. Gooch,
says Goldhagen, all suggest that it was obedience that made Germans do what
they did. But Goldhagen takes them to task and says that obedience had
nothing to do with it. Germans killed, he suggests, because they wanted to.
But Trudi Montag was not obedient and she was not duped by the Brown
Shirt thugs who marched through Burgdorf. The problem was, Trudi declares,
that nobody paid much attention.
The Nazi time came upon Bergdorf like a
Diet auf Schleichwegen --a thief on sneaky
paths-Herr Blau would say after the war.
To him and to many others in the town,
the men were unsympathisch, ridiculous
even, but surely not dangerous. Who really
paid much attention, (p. 194)
Gunter Grass claims that the Nazis moved in so slowly that one could almost
take notes. Similarly Hegi’s character Trudi remarks that “The people of
Burgdorf were drawn in gradually, almost imperceptibly” (p. 195).
In Hegi’s work called Tearing the Silence (1997), she remarks that,
Fifteen years ago I walked into a mailroom at the
University of New Hampshire, and when I overheard
two of my colleagues talk about a Holocaust
documentary, I backed away, unable to speak.. . .
I was still within the silence, though I wouldn’t
have defined it that way. (p. 14)
Though born in Germany, Hegi now resides in the United States and she
declares that it is the distance from Germany that has allowed her to "tear the
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silence" (p. 157). The past seemed erased for her as her parents, teachers and
relatives were ‘ reluctant” to tell her much (p. 15). Analyst Sammy Speier claims
that for Germans, "what is erased reappears in the children, who are patients
today, as emptiness, identity diffusion, bewilderment and confusion” (1993,
p.62). But what kind of a silence has Hegi tom? Her protagonist and heroine
Trudi Montag is the quintessential righteous Gentile who saves Jews by hiding
them in her cellar. Of course there were righteous Gentiles in Germany who did
save Jews. Certainly theologian Dietrich Bonnhoeffer and members of The
Confessing Church were examples of righteous Gentiles. Bonnhoeffer was
murdered by the Nazis when it was discovered that he was involved in a plot to
kill Hitler. Oskar Schindler was considered to be a righteous Gentile too. He
saved many Jews by allowing them to work for him. Schlinder’s list, the Jews
who he summoned to his factory, was well over 1,000. But by and large, and
this is the crucial point here, most Germans were not involved in any kind of
resistance movement to save Jews. Saul Friedlander drives this point home.
When pastor Umfried criticized the attacks on Jews
in his town, no church authority supported him; when
Jewish businesses were boycotted, no religious
voice was heard. .. when Jewish colleagues were
dismissed, no German professor publicly protested;
when the number of Jewish students was dramatically
reduced, no university committees or faculty members
experienced opposition. (1997, pp. 59-60)
For the most part, Germany "cast a cold eye” (Yeats, 1938-1939/1989, p. 325).
Trudi Montag, though, is an example of a righteous Gentile in Hegi’s novel.
Laypersons unfamiliar with Holocaust history may be mislead reading Hegi’s
work. It might be misleading to think that Trudi Montag represents a vast sector
of German society during the Nazi era. She would have been an exception.
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Another possible interpretation of Hegi’s novel is that Trudi sees herself
as a victim of history. She had the power to see through the Brown Shirt thugs
who marched through Burgdorf. And because she is a dwarf we might take pity
on her because she is ostracized and nobody would be willing to listen to the
stories of complicity that she gathers throughout the novel. This interpretation,
then, would suggest to me that Hegi has not torn the silence deeply enough.
Hegi, it seems, has not fully mourned this history. And it is mourning that
enables one to tear the silence. However, analyst Sheldon Roth declares,
that Germans will never be able to do this
[mourn for Germany’s past] and I will tell you
why.They will be tortured and I think it will
take generations for them. In order to mourn
you have to go back to the past and
openly fe e l!.. . . I think the mourning
process for Germans is definitely
different from what it is for us [Jews]
(1995a, pp. 233-235)
It seems to me that Hegi’s novel lacks a sense of mourning and lacks a sense of
grit, the kind of grit we see in Grass’s work. One wonders how Germans can
come to terms with the Nazi era, especially since many critics argue that former
West Germany had many continuties with the Nazi regime. Markovits and
Noveck write,
Germans refer to 1945 as Stunde Null, a
historical tabula rasa created by the end
of the war and the reestablishment of
democracy in the Federal Republic.
But a number of Germans as well as foreign
critics have questioned the validity of th is ...
They point to the many continuites between
the Nazi regime and the Federal Republic.
(1996, p. 401)
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Former Nazis were put in power positions after 1945. Some became judges!
Imagine that. Like the former West Germany, the former East Germany is still
trying to come to terms with its past and is still trying to undo the rhetoric of antiFascism. It was in 1991 that former East Germany officially took responsibility for
the Holocaust. Until then, this was completely denied. But just because rhetoric
has changed, actions have not. In Germany anti-Semitism is on the rise again.
Peck claims that,
Programmatic GOR State doctrine against
anti-Semitism, racism, xenophobia seems
to have had little effect on either the GDR’s
own citizenry or those in the former West
Germany, since Jewish cemetaries continue
to be desecrated. (1996, p. 449)
Many scholars worry that the strength of a reunified Germany will unleash even
more hatred. The tensions between former East and West Germany have
resulted in the current atmosphere where Turks and others have been killed
and brutalized. A stronger Germany does not necessarily mean a better one.
Someone who was opposed to reunification is Christa Wolf, a former
East German. She has written a popular novel called Patterns of Childhood
(1980). This novel has captured the attention of many who are interested in the
power of autobiography, memory and storytelling. The novel has been praised
for its gripping narrative, but criticized for its politics. Julia Hell explains that,
Critics have called Kindheitsmuster the
autobiography of a “victorious subject,"
a metaphor resonating with the novel’s
psychological and historical dimensions. ..
the novel demonstrates the “victorious”
emergence of the subject out of all those
components that are repressed, denied
splitt off...the novel plays with the SED's
self-characterization as victims of history.
(1997, p. 199)
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Christa Wolf’s story is narrated by Nelly. She looks back and recalls what
it was like as a five year old child to watch the rise of the Third Reich. What can
a five year old child do? Protest? Children were victims of ’‘Fascism” (p. 36).
Recall, former East Germans engaged in what is referred to as “Staatlich
Verordnete anti-Faschismus (State sanctioned program of anti-Fascism)n
(Wegner, 1995, p. 175). The former East German government has traditionally
only honored Communist “resistors” of Fascism. It would seem that Wolf
embraces this ideology and injects it into her story. Wolf’s fictional testimonial,
however, is powerful. Her novel from the start is quite evocative. Much of the
subject matter turns on the problems of repressed memory. For me, this
novel was particularly interesting. At first, though, I did not understand what it
was that Wolf was doing because I read her novel before researching East
German politics. I had no idea why the critics were skeptical of Wolf’s underlying
message. And it was upon my reading around East German politics that drove
home the point again that it is so important to read both historiography and
literature, otherwise, one does not fully understand what one reads. And I think,
at first, I was duped by Wolf’s writing. Still, I think that Wolf’s understanding of
repressed memory important. Nelly, the heroine of the novel, remarks that “The
present intrudes upon remembrance, today becomes the last day of the past.
Yet we could suffer continous estrangement from ourselves if it weren't for our
memory of the things we have done” (p. 4). But Nelly comments that she has
“encapsulated vaults of memory” (p. 69). Memory is imprisoned and hovers right
below the surface of awareness. Germans, says Nelly, “Ignore, overlook,
neglect, deny, unlearn, obliterate, forget” (p. 149) the past. But these denials
cannot be maintained. “Suddenly a wall to one of the well-sealed vaults of
memory breaks down” (p. 69). And when the vault breaks open, Germans
274

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

remember. But most Germans cannot break open this vault. And so they
engage in the narrative of, 'we did not know.' But when repressed memory is
lifted, “suddenly you know that everyone knew" (p. 69). Historians point out that
Auschwitz was no secret. Workers coming home from a day at the crematorium
talked. Walter Laquer explains that
Hundreds of civilian employees, Germans as well
as Poles, worked at Auschwitz, arriving in the morning
leaving in the afternoon.. . . Many technicians and workers
from various parts of Germany and the occupied
countries came to Auschwitz. (1981, p. 24)
Nelly struggles to break through repressed memory, to break through the
fog of the present to get at this horrific past. She wonders if she is successful.
Nelly asks “Has memory done its duty?" (p. 406) Has she admitted her own
“guilt and concealment” (p. 57) enough? And if one admits complicity is that
enough? Can repressed memory, once lifted, exonerate? Has Nelly conquered
her memory? Does she emerge as the “victorious subject" after all? (Hell,
1997). The novel does seem to suggest that Nelly conquers repressed memory.
But is repression that simple? A complex look at the nature of repression,
though, might suggest that repression never fully goes away. As Jean
Laplanche (1999) argues, most everything is “partly translated and partly
repressed” (p. 94). For Germans especially it would seem that repressed
memory is interminable. There is no getting rid of it in a dean sense. It is
impossible for Germans to think of this past without not thinking of it at the same
time. It is never clear how much of this past Germans can actually take in
psychologically. And it is not as if one suffers from repressed memory,
remembers what one has forgotten through therapy or novel writing, and then
puts the past to sleep once and for all. Traces of repression remain.
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Studying the Holocaust through literature is crucial for grappling with this
event. It is not enough to just read historiography. A more balanced curriculum,
one that examines both fictional and historical accounts broadens readers’
perspectives. As Mary Aswell Doll points out, curriculum theorists "have long
called for metaphorical ways of expressing the life of the mind” (in press).
Holocaust Fiction, when it is metaphorical, is especially powerful. But docurealist novels serve their purpose as well. When people argue that the
Holocaust as represented in literary form is inappropriate, perhaps they should
listen to Aharon Appelfeid as he teaches that,
One sometimes hears this argument and
warning: “Keep literature out of the fire zone.
Let the numbers and the well-established
facts speak.” I have no wish to belittle
that claim, but I do wish to point out
that the numbers and the facts were
the murderers' own well-proven means.
Man as a number is one of the horrors
of dehumanization. (1994, pp. 27-28)
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CHAPTER 7
UNDER THE SIGN OF DYSTOPIA
Interpreting one’s own curriculum theorizing requires memory work. To
remember why one does curriculum theory in the first place becomes key to
doing self-reflexive scholarship. Several possibilites might emerge. One
possibility might be that one does curriculum theory to offer hope to students
and colleagues in the academy. Another reason one might do curriculum work
is more despairing. One might do curriculum work to offer warnings. And these
warnings concern the dangers and worries of living in the world, the troubles of
lived experience. I want to offer warnings about hope. In order to do this,
though, I choose an inbetween place from which to speak. Distance from hope
and despair allows the curriculum worker to examine the dangers of each.
Being mired in hope blinds; being mired in despair causes deafness. I despair
about hope. To understand this, I stand in the middle; I take the middle way
between both. This is the way of the Buddha, the place situated between the
extremes. However, unlike the Buddha, I am not offering enlightenment; I am
merely attempting to get distance from the extremes of hope and despair in
order to better despair about hope. When I remember why I do curriculum work
in the first place, it turns on this paradox. To despair about hope becomes my
mantra.
Brent Davis suggests that “our schooling system can no longer robe itself
in the rhetoric of benevolence of hope" (1996, xxii). To disrobe the concept of
hope to find out what it conceals, then, is my task. I attempt to discover why
words like hope turn dangerous. Ernst Bloch says “It is a question of learning
hope" (1938/1986, p. 3). Bloch’s magisterial work entitled the Principle of Hope
is meant to convince readers of the necessity of hope. In order to live a better
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life and create a better world one must, he insists, learn hope. But I am not
convinced that learning hope necessarily leads to good things. If hope is
something that is, in fact, learned, can it be unlearned? Should it be
unlearned? What would it mean to live without hope?
What monster hides beneath the concept of hope? Utopianism. And it is
this that demands interrogation. Utopianism is a way of being-in-the-world that
embraces a rainbow at the end of each thunderstorm, that sees good in
everything and everyone, that makes claims to innocence. Utopianism is the
dream of equality, liberty and justice for all. Utopianism reaches toward heaven
and paradise.
The utopic teacher believes she can make the world a better place; a
utopic curriculum worker believes she can make the academy a better, happier
place. But wishing for this better, happier place tends to reduce the complexities
of lived experience into a recipe or method for happiness. That is, the purpose
of school, for the utopic teacher, is to teach young people how to achieve
happiness, how to create a better life. Toni Morrison warns: uHow exquisitely
human [is] the wish for permanent happiness, and how thin human imagination
[becomes] trying to achieve if (1998, p. 306).
Unexamined utopianism, the wish for happier places, is dangerous and
can even become deadly. Utopianism is dangerous because it may perpetuate
what I term the evil of innocence. Innocence is a refusal to hear the four
horsemen of the apocalypse descending, to acknowledge that bad people do
exist, to understand that equality is often gotten at the expense of liberty, that
justice is often incompatible with law. Utopianism offers up a deadly, naive
phantasy about an earthly paradise. School, for instance, as a possible
haven/heaven is the utopic teacher’s dream. To create a safe place for young
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people to learn is the dream. But more often than not, school is like prison;
school is a deadly place where murders occur, where drugs are exchanged,
where lives are destroyed. Even if school seems to be a safe place where none
of these activities occur, even if school seems far from the mad world outside,
violence, discontent and despair still seep through the school walls. There is no
haven/heaven on earth, and school is not a haven, for it is part of the larger
culture, the larger world, and this world can be a frightening place for young
people who are already involved in drug cultures or death cults. Further, if
teachers attempt to protect students from the world outside, they unwittingly
create more difficulties for them. Protecting students presupposes that school
and society are distinct. John Dewey teaches that school and society are not
separate. School walls are an illusion because culture and society are already
inside the school walls. Protecting students is a way of controlling them. And it is
this that is especially worrisome. John Weaver points out, “From a controlled
and manipulated curriculum, young adults leave schools wondering why the
world does not fit the one that was created at school" (in preparation).
A utopic curriculum, whether conceived as a blueprint, a static plan with
objectives and goals, or as a dynamic current of lived experience, runs the risk
of blinding and thwarting understanding. I argue that understanding the
complexities of life has little to do with rainbows and paradise; understanding
the complexities of what it means to be an educated person has little to do with
becoming happy or feeling better. If the goal of education is making citizens
happy, making them feel better about themselves, I think it is a thin and
unproductive enterprise. Certainly education should offer more than the dreams
of kindergarten, a child's garden, an eden. A dystopic curriculum seems more
adequate to the task of becoming an educated person. Dystopia is not myopia.
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Dystopia is a way of looking suspiciously at happy texts, happy histories, happy
memories. A dystopic curriculum seeks out monsters robed in the rhetoric of
utopian thinking. Happy texts, happy histories, happy memories tend to get
shoved down what George Orwell terms “memory holes” (1949/1977).
Memories that slip through holes have disappeared and are forgotten. Recalling
them becomes key. Recalling what is utopic thinking, what creates memory
holes to begin with becomes crucial. Utopic thinking cannot manage the other,
cannot manage difference, so it thrusts unhappy memories into holes and
forgets to retrieve them. There is no place for the other in utopias. Thus, a
dystopic curriculum looks for what Alan Block (1997) terms “lost articles." “A lost
article is unrealized, it requires the other to exist.. . . In discovering lost articles,
we engage in relationships which bear unique responsibilities” (p. 7). The
responsibility for dystopic curriculum workers is partly to remember how and
why the other got lost to begin with. What was it that forced the other out of the
picture, outside the frame? Utopias force others out. Utopias make others
faceless. Utopias turn the other into a number.
Utopias create happy places for those who fit the utopic dream. Those
who do not fit in are shut out. Schooling, then, built on utopian thinking forces
students and teachers into a “homogenizing process [which] can become
totalitarian in its demands for conformity” (Egan, 1997, p. 11). Utopianism can
become a form of totalitarianism because it offers a total vision, a grand
metanarrative of the perfect life, a life without glitches or idiosyncracies. Further
utopianism offers up “the illusion of order” (Weaver, in preparation). John
Weaver reminds us, moreover, that illusions limit understanding. Weaver
remarks that the “forms of knowledge we sanction through our work and the
illusions we impose upon the world [limit] what can be created and imagined in
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schools and in universities” (in preparation). If curriculum is ordered only
around orthodox canonical readings, orthodox ways of thinking emerge. If a
Holocaust curriculum is ordered only around canonical historical texts and
historical debates, only one kind of thinking emerges, the historical. I argue for a
broadening of texts when studying the Holocaust. Reading Holocaust fiction, as
I have pointed out, is considered inappropriate for some. Fiction, for some, is
thought to be less important than historical texts; it is considered mere fluff.
Some argue that the Holocaust should not be represented by fictional texts
because we cannot leam anything from them. But these are orthodox views
which I think too narrow and limit, ultimately, our understanding and memory of
this event.
One of the issues here turns on the importance of imagination and the
ways in which imagination enriches memory rather than depletes it. Orthodox
canonical ways of thinking squash out imagination. And what is squashed out of
imagination are other ways of thinking about the world, ways that might admit of
ambiguity and paradox. These other ways of thinking might allow for more
heterodox, idiosyncractic knowledges to appear on the scene.
If, however, curriculum is ordered around orthodox texts, whereby young
people read only how Plato's cave people emerge in the sun finally to be
enlightened, how Rousseau’s Emile lives happily ever after in his natural
solitude, how Aristotle's Nichomacheaus finally becomes the happy ethicist
bravely walking through life, then we have limited what students
can imagine by offering up these grand utopic visions, these grand narratives
of happy endings. And if we turn the Holocaust into a happy ending, a light at
the end of the tunnel, a story of bravery and courage, a story of faith and love,
we have done a great injustice to the reality of this event. Brought up on
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utopian stories, raised on grand metanarratives, inculcated into Plato’s brand of
enlightenment masks darkness that surrounds real events lived in real time in
real lives. The story line that suggests that at the end time redemption is at hand
only serves to conceal that tragic sense of life, that darkness and the black sun
of Auschwitz. Let us think again. And it is so difficult to rid our psyches of these
utopian metanarratives because of transference. The themes and plots of these
narratives get transfered onto narratives that are horrific. I stress that we must
work to undo these deeply ingrained beliefs in happy endings, especially when
we are dealing with Holocaust texts. There is nothing happy about the
Holocaust. I stress that my position is not nihilistic. Memory work is the work of
justice. It is an ethical project that dares to take the plunge into the unthinkable.
Memory work is a way of coping. There is nothing liberating about it. Liberation,
emacipation and hope belong to grand myth-o-narratives.
Curriculum workers need to remember why they might be mired in
utopian thinking. How did they “learn hope" (Bloch, 1938/1986, p. 3)? And what
are the consequences of this learned hope? Hope is, after all, a social
construction. It is to texts that I turn, to grapple with these questions, because it
is the always already of texts that are handed down to us in culture that produce
and influence the ways one might think about life. And it seems to me that there
is something deeply psychological about buying into the myth-o-narratives of
hope, benevolence, emancipation, liberation. And this psychological
transference might explain, in part, why many are wedded to these kinds of
concepts. There is something deeply psychological about the investments one
has to a particular way of viewing the world. Thus, this question about
utopianism is not just an epistemological one; it is a psychological one, too. The
unconscious transference of one kind of story (a fairy tale where the princess is
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rescued by the prince, for instance) onto another (that the Holocaust is a story of
rescue and resistance, which has been the pervasive myth of France's Vichy
until the 1970s) is key to understanding why interpretations of a most hideous
event can become yet another story with a happy ending.
In this chapter I will examine utopianism briefly in order to come to a
more adequate understanding of some of the philosophical underpinnings of
this way of thinking. Secondly, and more specifically, I will review the writings of
Charles Fourier, Pierre Tielhard de Chardin, H.G. Wells and Adolf Hitler. I argue
that utopian thinking, overwhelmingly, “others." And for these writers, whether
implicity or explicitly, it is Jewish bodies that are othered. And so Jewish bodies
are shoved down “memory holes” (Orweil, 1949/1977, p. 35) in order that they
will be forgotten, erased, mutilated or murdered. Moreover, and most
importantly, I contend that 2,000 years of utopian thinking in the West has
created the conditions, in part, for a Hitler to emerge and to write a blueprint for
the perfect killing dream.
Remembering Utopianism
Michael Clifford Spencer explains that the word utopia “was first used by
Thomas More in 1516 [and is] the Greek derivation [of] ou-topos... and means..
. “nowhere" or “happy place" (1981, p. 126). Immediately one might wonder
about the contradictory nature of the term itself. The term utopia is at once a
happy place that is a no place. If utopia is a place, it is someplace, located in
time and space; if utopia is a no place it is a nowhere, found neither in time nor
space, but rather only in imagination. Ruth Shklar suggests that classical
utopias, perhaps traceable back to Plato’s Republic, are no place; that is, they
are “contemplative only” (1966, p. 105), while modern utopias, which Shklar
dates around the nineteenth century, are a “summons to action" (p. 109). Thus
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Shklar contends that from Plato to Rousseau, utopias are thoughts about no
place. After Rousseau, utopias are thoughts in some place.
More generally, David Higgs summarizes trends in utopian thinking from
the sixteenth to the ninteenth century.
In the 16th and 17th centuries this longing
[for no place] was often a desire to return to
religious sources; 18th century utopias were
moral critiques, and the utopias produced
from the middle of the 19th century onward
draw much inspiration from science. (1978, p. 25)
These broad trends can be found in different kinds of writings such as political
philosophies, religious texts, fiction and science fiction. Curiously, Western
culture has been replete with utopic writings. In fact, Frank and Fritzie Manuel
explain that The profusion of Western utopias has not been equaled in any
other culture” (1979, p. 1). What is it about utopias that so fascinate the West?
Here there are at least two avenues of thought concerning this question. First,
some believe that human beings have a certain “utopian propensity” (Manuel &
Manuel, 1979, p. 5) which “springs from deep within the psyche” (Richter, 1975,
p. 45). That is, dreaming of a better place is part of the human psyche. It is an
innate something that is embedded in the core of being. It is, in other words,
natural to hope for a better life. However, this so-called natural way of thinking
essentializes. It presupposes that everyone, at bottom, has an essential longing
for better things. But pessimists and spoilers have always lived alongside
eternal optimists.
A more adequate way of thinking about the why of utopianism might be
captured by Ruth Levitas. She claims that utopian thinking is a social
construction. There is, then, nothing natural about it. Levitas declares that,
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utopia is a social construct which arises not from
a ‘natural’ impulse subject to social mediation, but
as a socially constructed response to an equally
socially conducted gap between the needs and
wants generated by a particular society. (1990, pp. 181-182)
Thus, Levitas argues that utopia is an invention of Western thought, not a
natural disposition. Still, the question as to why utopian thinking is so prevalent
in the West is shrouded in mystery. Why are so many invested in this type of
thinking? The answer is far from dear. From Plato through Rousseau, from
Charlotte Perkins Gilman to H. G. Wells, utopian ideas abound.
A shift in utopian thinking began to occur with the advent of World War I.
Erich Fromm comments that the First World War was to “destroy a 2,000 year
old western tradition of hope” (1977, pp. 258-259). In fact, Albert Soboul
reminds us that “according to Ernst Bloch, utopia is bom from the 'principle of
hope" (1978, p. 176). And if utopias spring from the prindple of hope, what
happens when the West becomes less hopeful? One would think that utopias
might wane or even disappear altogether. Although they have waned, they
have not disappeared. Some even call for the re-conceptualizing of utopias by
making them more feminist, open-ended and dynamic (Goodwin & Taylor,
1982). But still utopias like these involve some sort of quest for perfection. And
as Isaiah Berlin warns, “the search for perfection does seem... a recipe for
bloodshed” (1991, p. 18). Perfect societies are a call to uniformity and
conformity. This call causes othering. And so, as Adam Ulam suggests,
“perhaps we have reached a moratorium, if not indeed the end of utopias, and
perhaps this is not altogether a bad thing” (1966, p. 134). According to Richter,
Nikolas Berdyaev says that “the pressing problem of today is not how to reach
utopia but how to avoid if (1975, p. 7). I agree that utopias and utopian thinking
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should be left behind with the dinosaur. These old crusty, awkward, naive
creatures are dangerous and sometimes deadly. I do not argue that one should
attempt to rescue them by making them more feminst or open-ended, but I
contend that they be interrogated and dismantled and finally demolished.
In order to demolish utopianism, one might consider how utopian
thinking is connected to memory. As I have earlier explained, what I call
personal memory text is elusive, hard to pin down. When I remember something
I look back, I conjure up images in my mind of an event that is distanced from
me. Memories seem cloudy sometimes. Memories of yesterday will differ from
memories, say, of two years ago because time plays tricks on memory.
Sometimes yesterday's memories are more cloudy than that of two years ago;
sometimes older memories are more cloudy than yesterday's memories. Amos
Funkenstein reminds us that “personal memory-as first shared by Augustine of
Hippo-is likewise never pure memory. Most of our personal memories are...
also the memories of memories” (1993, p. 7). Thus, what I re-member is a reexperiencing of an event through a filter of memories. This complicates things.
This does not mean, though, that I cannot grasp my past lived experience at all.
I can, but it is mediated through complex re-presentations of memories.
Collective memory involves many intersecting memories, many people’s
memories across time and place. Funkenstein comments that collective memory
“can be characterized as a system of signs, symbols, and practices: memorial
dates, names of places, monuments... museums and texts” (1993, p. 6). The
collective and personal are interwoven and mediated through culture. Further,
memories change over time and consequently the meanings of our memories of
places and texts change. How I understand memory effects how I think about
the past, present and future. Much of utopian thinking tends to drive a wedge
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between past, present and future. Utopian thinking cuts a clear line between
time, as if time could be clearly demarcated. And it is this assumed demarcation
that sets up many difficulties for utopianism. Memory and time, however, do not
seem to be bifurcated in this way. As Henri Bergson suggests “there is simply
the continuous melody of our inner life" (1946, p. 176). Bergson claims that
events happen in a duration of time, a fluidity of past and present. However,
utopian thinking bifurcates past from present, present from future.
Not only is the present separated off from the past, in utopian thought, it is
denigrated. Utopian thinkers often feel that the Now is hell. It is curious that
Alighieri Dante (1307/1982) begins the Divine Comedy in hell, in The Inferno.
“Abandon Every Hope, who enters here" (p. 21). Hell is a place without hope
and the Now is this place. Utopian thinkers attempt, therefore, to escape the
Now, escape the present, in order to reclaim lost hope. The Divine Comedy is
the upward journey from hell to paradise. For Dante, to pull oneself out of hell
can be done only with God's grace. Even though Dante was critical of the
corruption of the popes, he offered a traditional Christian position, which was a
form of utopian thinking.
Utopian thinkers who have bad memories of the past usually tend to
construct futuristic utopias. Dante’s is a futuristic tale since one enters paradise
after death, after a long struggle in hell and purgatory. Utopias like H.G. Wells’s
(1967) A Modern Utooia. Charles Fourier’s (1808/1996a;
1808/1996b;1808/1996c;1808/1996d) The Theory of the Four Movements, and
Pierre de Chardin’s (1964) The Future of Man. are all brands of futuristic
utopias. For all of these writers, the future is idealized because the present is
hell and the past is backward. Looking to the future while denigrating the past
and the present becomes problematic.The future seems golden.
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Contrarily, utopian thinkers who remember the past as a golden age,
tend to construct utopias that attempt to claim the happy past. Nostalgic
longings for things remembered past are captured in the writings of Doris
Lessing’s (1981) Briefing for a Descent into Hell. Charlotte Perkins Gilman’s
(1915/1979) Herland. Rousseau's (1750/1938) Social Contract, and his
(1755/1938) Discourses on Inequality, and most disturbingly, Adolf Hitler’s
(1923) Mein Kampf. Bertrand Russell comments that, in fact, “Hitler is an
outcome of Rousseau" (1972, p. 685). I argue that not only is Hitler an outcome
of Rousseau, he is more broadly an outcome of 2,000 years of utopian thinking.
What is it that goes wrong when the past or future is idealized? Most
obviously, it is naive to think that things were better in the past or things would
be better in the future if I just create a new world. Transgressing the present is
impossible. I cannot step outside of the Now, I am steeped in it. The past is
always already influencing me; the future seeps into the present as well. More
importantly, though, it seems that transgressing involves violence. That is, in
order to create a new world which idealizes past or future, I may have to commit
violence.Therefore, utopian thinking nearly always moves through an
apocalyptic phase to reach its objectives. As Darrell Fasching teaches:
The modern mythos is at one and the same time
both apocalyptic and utopian. It is apocalyptic in
that it demands a decisive break with the past;
a break that in its more radical manifestations
is conceived of as requiring a revolutionary
battle between the forces of light and darkness.
It is utopian in that what is imagined to follow
this radical break. . . is a new utopian order. (1993, p. 23)
A brave new world requires transgression either from the old or from the new.
This brave new/old world, then, may require violence to achieve its ends. Hence
utopian thinking intersects and crosses over with apocalyptic thinking.
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This kind of thinking is even older than modernity. It may even be pre
modern. New Testament scholar Earl Richard points out that apocalyptic
literature (which has both apocalyptic and utopian elements in it) can be traced
back through “Exilic and post-exilic prophets, in the Book of Daniel, in
intertestamental literature, in the synoptic tradition” (1988, p. 398). Even further
back, Lewis Hopfe (1991) points out that already in Zoroastrianism, a tradition
older than that of Judaism, we find notions of heaven and hell here too. So it
could be that the utopian tradition may date back 3,000 years in the West.
Utopian thinking, generally speaking, falls into two broad categories.
Some utopias are framed in static terms (Plato, Rousseau, Gliman, Lessing,
Hitler); some in dynamic terms (Fourier, Wells, de Chardin, Hitler). Hitler’s
(1923) Mein Kampf and its subsequent realization in National Socialism can be
considered both a static and dynamic utopia. It was static in the blue print of
Mein Kampf and dynamic in its actuality in National Socialism. Joseph
Goebbels commented that Nazism “like all living beings, is in a state of
becoming" (cited in Hermand, 1992, p. 170). And as Saul Friedlander remarks,
the Nazis were “masters of improvisation" (1997, p. 326). What must be
emphasized here is that utopias that are dynamic, that admit of change and
process, are not necessarily better than static ones. In fact, it may be the case
that dynamism is even more dangerous. There is always room to change the
blueprint in order to justify killing more people who do not conform to the
utopian way of life.
Is there any harm, one might wonder, in having phantasies about a
better, happier place? Perhaps phantasies are harmless enough. When
phantasies become realized as prescriptions for living and are acted out in the
world, danger looms near. When the images of utopias become realized in the
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flesh, something happens that tends to lead to ruin. A phantasy island
becoming real hardens into stone something that was once dreamy. Are
dreamy phantasies innocent? Perhaps not.
Utopian thinking is a form of Pelagianism. Dystopic thinking is a form of
Augustinianism. Krishan Kumar explains that
Part of the interwoven story of utopia and anti-utopia
can indeed be interestingly told as the long standing
clash between Augustinianism and Pelagian traditions.. . .
The utopian... is a Pelagian. He denies original sin,
and believes that men can perfect themselves by
creating the right environment. The anti-utopian. ..
is Augustinian. He sees weak human creatures
constantly succuming to the sins of pride, avarice
and ambition. (1987, p. 100).
Pelagius, an eternal optimist, believed that human beings could pull themselves
up by their own bootstraps. Augustine, the eternal pessimist, was more
concerned with why people sin. Like Augustine, I do believe that what is worth
worrying about is why people do bad things. Unlike Augustine, though, I do not
believe that there is such a thing as “original” sin, for this presupposes some
sort of enduring character that is passed along generations. Certainly, I do
believe people sin, but there is nothing original about it, because sin is not
innate.
Utopian discourse is often trotted out in theological contraries such as
hope/despair, salvation/perdition, paradise/apocalypse. In order to achieve
hope, salvation and paradise, stages of the apocalypse must be acted out or
experienced along the way. To help citizens achieve the utopian goals, utopias
nearly always include some sort of educational blueprint which is meant to
inculcate citizens. But this utopian vision is usually achieved by wiping out,
eliminating or annihilating whoever gets in the way of its final objective. Those
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who are considered weak, impure, dirty or nonconforming must be controlled,
manipulated, or killed. Purity, strength and conformity are the keys to sustaining
a utopian world. At bottom, then, utopias concern the manipulation and
surveillance of bodies. As Foucault reminds us “It is always the body that is at
issue" (1979, p. 25).
The Four Horsemen of Utopianism
Let us now turn to the lour horsemen" of utopianism. I will first examine
Fourier, de Chardin and Wells, and finally I will treat Hitler's (19231 Mein
Kamof. Charles Fourier, (1808/1996c;1808/1996a) in The Theory of the Four
Movements, robes his utopian scheme in theological discourse. The four
movments of the “social, animal, organic and material" (p. 3), and what Fourier
calls the “destinies... [of] past, present and future" (p. 6), evolve and are
determined by “God's mathematical laws” (p. 36). Of the four movements,
Fourier calculates that the social “will progress uninterruptedly in two ages of
ascending and descending combinations. . . which will take about 7,000 years"
(1808/1996a, p. 44). Presently, we are living in an age of “ascending
incoherence” (p. 41) in which there is much “suffering” (p. 41). Fourier suggests
that this suffering is due to capitalism, modern industry and poverty. Fourier
believes that the earth and the other planets are created in cycles. These cycles
are moving, ever evolving. He tells us that the planets “can copulate" (p. 45).
Thus, planet earth was created out of a sexual act. The “first creation" (pp. 4546), of which there are many, Fourier compares to hell.
The first creation... filled land and sea with an immense
quantity of harmful animals... what could hell in its fury
invent that would be worse than rattle-snakes, bed-bugs,
the legions of insects and reptiles, sea-monsters. (pp. 45-46)
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Unlike Fourier’s account of creation, the biblical account in Genisis 2:4 of
the creation of the world was not hellish, but was a paradise, at least in the
beginning. With the advent of the Fall, of course, things went badly as the world
began to flood and the plagues rolled over the children of God.
Central to Fourier’s utopian world is the concept of God. God is both
transcendent and immanent, but he is mostly transcendent. God “reign[s] [over]
the combined order. .. which is the most beautiful of the divine conceptions” (p.
67). And the order of things are progressing in what Fourier terms a progressing
series. God is also immanent. Nicholas Riasanovsky explains that for Fourier,
“God, like man had both body and soul... he did sometimes appear as a
personality” (1969, p. 35). Thus, for Fourier, God is both immanent and
transcendent.
Further, God organizes society by what Fourier calls “passionate
attraction” (p. 15). And these attractions are sexual. So it is sex that orders the
world. Sexual relations are most healthy, says Fourier, if they are free.
Therefore, marriage is not part of this utopian world. Communal living and free
love are key to sustaining utopia. Communities called “phalanxes” (p. 15) would
be ideal. Michael Clifford Spencer explains that for Fourier a phalanx is “the
basically agricultural economic and social unit in harmony usually containing
about 1600 [people]” (1981, p. 181). Fourier thought that civilization and
modern industry brought about decline and disharmony. And in fact he blamed
this decline on the Jews. Fourier states that “civilized industry w as... a calamity
invented by God as a punishment” (p. 7). Thus, salvation involved living in
harmony free from disorder and “incoherence” (p. 13). What he really means to
say here is that salvation is life without Jews. Fourier's Jew hatred permeates
his texts; in fact, Fourier was a rabid anti-Semite, as I shall point out later.
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For now, let us move on to another brand of utopian thinking. Here let us
turn to the utopian thinking, which is also couched in theological language, of
Pierre Tielhard de Chardin. In The Future of Man (1964). de Chardin offers a
utopian vision which departs little from traditional Christian theology. Only here,
de Chardin attempts to combine pseudo-scientific talk about evolution (read
social Darwinism) with eschatology. de Chardin’s utopia ends up justifying
racism and supersessionism. The future of man for de Chardin is really about
the future of white supremacy and Christian imperialism.
de Chardin’s obfuscating language is cluttered with neologisms like
“noosphere" and uneogenesis" which confuses more than not and conceals a
very conservative kind of christological position. Like classical christology, de
Chardin's work exhalts Christ as the last and final savior and Christianity, as the
final word on religion. Christianity, for de Chardin, is the only right and true
religion. At least, this is the impression I get from reading The Future of Man.
The only difference between de Chardin's position and that of the classical one
turns on the notion of evolution. Evolution of the species, says de Chardin,
involves greater and greater love for Christ. In fact he claims that There is only
one evolution... the whole of the world’s industrial, aesthetic, scientific and
moral endeavor serves physically to complete the body of Christ" (p. 23). It
becomes hard to understand how the world can complete the body of Christ,
when de Chardin’s Christ has no body to begin with, de Chardin’s Christ is
cosmic, not embodied. He says Christ’s spirit, which is different from his body,
can “radiate through all centuries and all beings” (p. 94). This brand of what is
termed high christology leaves Jesus, the human being, out of the picture while
emphasizing the Christ part of Jesus, which is his divinity. A low christology,
which stresses that Jesus was a human being who suffered and wept, while
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participating in the divinity of God, seems to make more sense to me. But this is
not what de Chardin is offering.
de Chardin’s eschatological vision is that at the end time all people will
psychologically merge to agree upon the fact that Jesus was the Son of God.
Moreover, all human beings will become more and more alike in spirit, mind
and body in this belief, de Chardin declares that “psychic centration, phyletic
intertwining, and planetary envelopment... give birth to the noosphere” (p.
159). The noosphere is the mind of the world which will enfold upon itself
around the belief in Christ when evolution is complete.
Like Fourier, de Chardin’s vision is dynamic, progressive and evolving.
But these qualities do not make it more adequate than another more static
utopia. I wonder what happens to those who do not merge into the noosphere?
Not everyone believes that Jesus was the Son of God. Not all Christians believe
in a cosmic Christ, and not all theologians agree that high christology is an
adequate way to image Jesus, de Chardin allows no room for difference. What
happens to non-Christians in his utopic vision? He is silent on this issue, and it
is the silence that worries. In one way or another, many utopias, whether
explicitly Christian or not, set up schemes that do not allow for otherness. There
is only one way to salvation, one possible path toward the good, one way to
God. As Asher Moore points out “utopia involves standardization” (1978, p. 1).
Like de Chardin and Fourier, H. G. Wells (1967) in his Modem Utopia
robes his vision in theological discourse. He describes the leaders of this
futuristic society as “samurai” (p. 159). Samurai are priests who administer and
run the modem utopia. “The Samurai will be forbidden the religion of
dramatically lit altars, organ music, and Catholic ritual" (pp. 300-301). Wells
sounds like Martin Luther here in his dislike for embellishment and ritual. For
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the Samurai, God must be transcendent. Recall, for both de Chardin and
Fourier, God is a transcendent one, even though Fourier sometimes images
God in an immanent way. The image of a transcendent God is a conservative
one theologically. More liberal theologians, like John Cobb(1975) and David
Griffin (1973), talk about God as being both immanent and transcendent. This
position is termed panentheism. Unlike pantheism, whereby God is completely
immanent in the world after the fashion, say, of Spinoza, panentheism suggests
that God is both in the world and beyond it. If God is completely immanent, how
then do theologians solve the problem of evil. For if God is wholly immanent,
then God creates evil. If God, on the other hand, is completely transcendent,
how can I relate to him? But if God is both immanent and transcendent, the
problem of evil gets lodged in the heart of humankind. Thus the construction of
the notion of God is inextricably tied to theodicy.
H.G. Wells remarks that “the leading principle of the utopian religion is
the repudiation of original sin" (1967, pp. 299-300). Wells echoes Shklar’s
(1966) claim that all classical utopias are rejections of original sin. Recall,
Shklar dates classical utopias from Plato to Rousseau. Thus, it seems that
Wells’s utopia fits in with this classical model. What is it about the concept of sin
that bothers utopian thinkers? Looking into one’s heart of darkness is
completely antithetical to utopian projects. I wonder how one can build a utopia
without doing a little self work? How can citizens of utopias become better if
they do not admit that they have fallen somewhere along the way? Why is it that
many who do not look into their heart of darkness become wicked? Wells’s
utopian dream is monsterous really, perhaps because he could not integrate his
own badness in himself. His description of the leaders of utopia conjure up, in
my mind, images of Nazis. A Samurai is a "clean-shaven,” lean, muscular type
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who likes to engage in combat A Samurai is a warrior, a hero, a dashing
young, healthy swashbuckler. He is a
well-built man of perhaps five and thirty,
with the easy movement that comes with
perfect physical condition, his face is
clean shaven and shows the firm mouth
of a disciplined man
His general effect
reminds m e... of the knights templars. (1967, p. 159)
Hitler dreamt the knights templars into existence. Already in 1933, Hitler had an
“idealized image of the knight, the German knight, or the knight of the Teutonic
order” (Hermand, 1992, p. 239).
It is curious that all three of these writers robe their discussions in
theological language. What is disturbing is that this language serves as a gloss.
This gloss attempts to cover over and conceal violence. The paradox of slippery
theological and eschatologica! visions is that they offer up a hopeful picture, yet
it is only through oppression that this picture can be completed.
All three of these writers discuss how to better inculcate the citizens of
their utopian worlds through some sort of educational blueprint. This
educational blueprint ensures that citizens know how to fit in. Thus, education
means standardization. Standardized objectives and goals are key to
inculcating citizens, for everyone learns precisely the same things for precisely
the same reasons. While reading these utopian writers I was reminded of Alan
Bloom’s (1987) The Closing of the American Mind.
Bloom comments that “America tells one story: the unbroken, ineluctable
progress of freedom and equality” (p. 55). Like many utopian writers, Bloom
declares that
idealism as it is commonly conceived should
have primacy in an education, for man is a
being who must take his orientation by his
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possible perfection. To supress the
most natural of all inclinations... is ... to
throw out the baby with the bath. Utopianism
is, as Plato taught us... the fire with which we
might play because it is the only way we can
find out what we are. (p. 67)
Bloom's position, not unlike most utopian thinkers, is naive, exclusionistic,
conservative and dangerous. First, Bloom's assumption that America has one
story to tell is naive. American history is made up of many competing and
conflicting stories. Secondly, his insistence on the'primacy" of ideals in
education may serve oppressive ends. Whose ideals should we teach and
why? And for what purpose should we teach ideals? Thirdly, why should
perfection be an uorientationn at ail? The goal of producing perfect students
fosters the worst sort of competition. And furthermore, perfection is not a natural
inclination, it is a social construction. Perfectionism is dangerous for the soul.
Recall, Isaiah Berlin (1991) said that the quest for perfection means bloodshed.
Like Bloom, Fourier wants standardized educational objectives which
serve to inculcate citizens into the utopia of the four movements. Like Rousseau,
Fourier suggests that children should avoid cultural influences as long as
possible so as to not be corrupted by them. Unlike Rousseau, Fourier declares
that children should have no teachers. “The children teach themselves without
any external prompting or surveillance" (1808/1996a, p. 69). The children will
learn to become “constantly active" (p. 69) so as to build up their bodies at a
young age. Thus, education means activity, not reflection for Fourier. And
activity is standardized. Activities are done in a so-called natural enviomment
away from the dangers of culture. Fourier's educational blueprint is anti
intellectual, like Rousseau’s. And anti-intellectualism is dangerous because it
fosters all sorts of prejudices. An unreflective mind has difficulty working through
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tough issues. Further, Fourier suggests that culture can be split off from nature.
But there is no way to jump outside of culture. Nature is cultural. Even the way
we talk about nature is socially constructed. The always already of culture
shapes us even before we arrive on the scene. These sorts of romantic,
nostalgic visions of education fail because they begin on false premises and
are mired in illusions.
For both de Chardin and Wells, the goal of education in their utopian
worlds is singular. Citizens must learn standardized visions to realize the goals
of their societies. For de Chardin, Christian education is the only correct kind.
He says, in fact, “there is no institution other than Christianity” (1964, p. 36). And
the institution of Christianity must be run by Christian teachers. Wells, like de
Chardin, declares that “the whole world will surely have a common language”
(1967, p. 17). This common language is a common vision. Education must have
a “clear common purpose” (p. 128). Alan Bloom echoes in the background here.
I wonder how education can have a dear common purpose when people have
little in common to begin with. Why are these thinkers so invested in the quest
for commonalities? Further, it is not dear what educating citizens
means in the first place. If anything, education is a highly complex and
ambiguous process. Common purposes and standardized bodies of
knowledge, more often than not, serve oppressive ends. Brent Davis points out
that, for instance, standardized mathematics education has traditionally been
an enabler of scientific “advances,” of military
technologies, of normalizing statistical reductions,
mathematics has been associated with the
establishment and maintenance of power
imbalances contributing to large-scale destruction
of the planet; and the disenfranchizing and
depersonalizing the citizenry of Western
cultures... all in the name of progress___
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Mathematical knowledge has... become
coterminous with masculinist, Western,
bourgeois, and modernist regimes of power.
(1996, xxii)
It seems that standardized bodies of knowledge attempt to conceal their real
objectives, which are military and scientific imperialisms.
What is colonized, especially, in utopian writings are bodies. Bodies are
colonized, controlled, manipulated to fit into the utopian ideal. Those who call
for standardized bodies, like those who call for standardized bodies of
knowledge, cannot allow for difference. Nonconforming bodies, therefore, get
squashed. Recall, Fourier’s utopia is a perfect universe where harmony, peace,
and love reign. However, certain bodies do not fit into this picture. And these are
Jewish bodies. Fourier declares, “Jews are parasites" (1808/1996d, p. 261);
they are “the secret enemy of all nations" (p. 233).
Has there ever been a more contemptible nation
than the Hebrews, who never made a single
advance in the arts and sciences, and who were
distinguished only by their habitual crimes and brutality.
(1808/1996a, p. 64)
Leon Poliakov (1975) comments that nearly all of Fourier's writings contain Jew
hating diatribes like these. As a matter of fact, Poliakov (1985) states that along
with Fourier, many other French socialists (Fourier was a socialist) were antiSemites. For instance, P.J. Proudon writes in his diaries that he would have
liked to have called,
for the expulsion of the Jews from France, the
abolition of all their synagogues; denial to them
of all employment; the abolition of their cult
The
Jew is the enemy of the human race. This race
must be sent back to Asia, or exterminated. (1969, p. 228)
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The legacy of socialist utopias are deadly. F. A. Hayek (1994) draws a
connection between Nazism and utopian socialism. Certainly, Proudhon and
Fourier buttress Hayek’s thesis, although of course there are many brands of
socialism which do not. At any rate, Jewish bodies bug socialist utopic
discourse.
Like Fourier, Wells deals with bodies that do not fit into his utopian
scheme. And his "solution” to the "problem” of bodies that bug him, echoes
Hitler’s Final Solution. Wells cannot tolerate dirt or mess. Bodies that seem dirty
must be "punished” (1967, p. 110). In this utopia, apartments will have "no
corners to gather dirt” (p. 104). Moreover, those who are considered dirty or odd
will be dealt with.
It is our business to ask what utopia will do
with its congenital invalids, its idiots and
madmen, its drunkards and men of vicious
mind, its cruel and furtive souls, its stupid
people. .. its lumpish and unimaginative
people, (p. 136)
Wells declares that the way to deal with these lumpish, stupid people is simply
to get rid of them. "The species must be engaged in eliminating them” (p. 136).
Wells remarks, "Utopia will kill all deformed and evilly monstrous births” (p.
143). Hitler did just this. Daniel Goldhagen (1997) explains that in October of
1939 Hitler initiated what he called the "euthanasia program” (p. 143) whereby
he gassed to death the "congenitally infirm and insane” (p. 143). This so-called
euthanasia program was a sort of trial run to see how effective gas would be.
The trial run prepared that Nazis for the Jews. By the time the gas chambers
were up and running in 1941, Hitler had perfected his poison gas machines.
Some could kill up to 2,000 people at once. Imagine that!

300

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Along with eliminating the insane and lumpish people, Wells also
advocated that all members of the utopia be accounted for at all times by a
keeper of an index. Bentham's panoptican lives. Wells comments ua little army
of attendants would be at work upon this index day and night” (p. 165). Lucy
Dawidowicz (1975/1986) remarks that, similarly, Reinhard Heydrich, who was
appointed Gestapo chief in 1936, headed an “intelligence gathering agency” (p.
77) that began to “organize a card index of NSDAP opponents [read Jews]” (p.
78).
At this juncture I would like to examine Hitler’s (1923) Mein Kampf.
Disturbingly, Werner Maser explains that Hitler “had serious plans to become a
priest” (1974, p. 6). In fact, many historians comment on the religiousAheological
nature of Hitler’s vision of a National Socialist utopia. Saul Friedlander claims
that Hitler’s was a “decidedly religious vision, that of a German (or Aryan)
Christianity” (1997, pp. 86-87). Amos Funkenstein (1993) and Robert Wistrich
(1991) comment on the apocalyptic quality of Hitler's writings. And Jost
Hermand comments on Hitler’s “religious belief in the “resurrection” of the volk"
(1992, p. 171). Mein Kampf is shrouded in theological discourse and reveals
the “blueprint" (Dawidowicz, 1975/1986; Goldhagen, 1997) for the Holocaust. It
is a utopian vision that serves to inculcate through the destruction of bodies.
Educating citizens of the Third Reich that the Jews must be stayed was Hitler’s
dream. And this dream was couched in religious language. Hitler says “Thus
did I believe that I must act in the sense of the Almighty Creator: by fighting
against the Jews I am doing the Lord’s work” (1923, p. 25). Hitler really believed
that he had been called, like a prophet, to carry out the will of God. He uses
words like “providence” over and over again to suggest that the Final Solution
was fated by God. Consequently, Germans, says Hitler, had a “mission
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appointed for them by the Creator of the universe" (p. 94). The mission entailed
a "National resurrection” (p. 99) of "race... [and] purity of blood" (p. 94). This
mission could only be completed in "the spirit of fanaticism and intolerance in
which it attacks all others” (p. 141). Hitler called for “Salvation for the German
nation" (p. 54).
In order to inculcate the German nation's citizens into Hitler's Third Reich,
he offered up an educational blueprint that would focus on the practical. Hitler
remarks that "there were a great number of weak points in German education
before the w ar... a view to mere knowledge and very little with a view to
producing practical ability" (p. 107). Anti-intellectulism is Hitler's brand of
education. Hitler declared that education should teach young boys the value of
strong bodies, particularly through boxing. "There is no sport which encourages
the spirit of attack as this one does” (p. 167). In other words, education should
teach violence. Attacking opponents is the sport of learning. And education
“must be directed toward giving them [young people] a conviction that they are
superior to others” (p. 168). Here Hitler is talking about young so-called Aryan
youth. They should, in other words, feel superior to so-called Semitic, or Jewish
youth.
Jewish bodies, for Hitler, are diseased beings whose "spiritual
pestilence... [was what] the nation was being innoculated [with]” (p. 21). To
"fight with poison gas” (p. 11) against the Jews will return Germany to more
“healthy social conditions” (p. 10). It is this passage about poison gas that has
led some historians like Lucy Dawidowicz (1975/1986) to claim that Hitler
intended all along to kill the Jews.
Even right before Hitler committed suicide, he continued to believe that
he had been called by God to murder six million Jews. He felt totally justified in
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doing what he did. And he justified his actions in theological gloss. Hitler
declared in 1944 that
The gods love those... of whom they ask the
impossible and who ask them the impossible
of them. And when we do the impossible we
shall assuredly win the approval of Providence.
I may not be a light in the Church, a pulpiteer,
but deep down I am a pious man and believe
that whoever fights bravely in defense of the natural
laws of God and never capitulates will never
be deserted by the law giver, but will, in the
end receive the blessings of Providence.
(cited in Maser, 1974, p. 208)
Bromberg (cited in Rappaport. 1975); Waite (1977), Erikson (1976) all
suggest that Hitler suffered from borderline personality disorder. Laplanche and
Pontalis (1973) explain that the Term [borderline is] most often used to
designate psychopathological troubles lying on the frontier between neurosis
and psychosis, particularly latent schizophrenia presenting an apparently
neurotic set of symptoms" (p. 54). Borderline personality disorder, in other
words, signals that the individual's psyche founders somewhere on a
continuum between madness and sanity. This is a person who can function in
the world, but may have periodic lapses of schizophrenia. But some borderline
patients are more neurotic than psychotic and do not regress to a schizoid state.
Borderline personalities exhibit severe mood swings and unpredictable
behavior. They tend to swing "between sadism and masochism, destruction and
creativity, cruelty and kindness” (Waite, 1977, p. 168). But again what good
does it do to pathologize Hitler? What do we learn about him by doing this?
What does this category keep us from thinking about?
In a book called The Soul’s Code: In Search of Character and Calling.
post-Jungian psychologist James Hillman (1996) argues that Hitler was
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“possessed" by the demonic (p. 216). The demonic, Hillman suggests, is a
“timeless” (p. 216) “transcendence" (p. 235). This “particular demon selected
Hitler for its host” (p. 215). And this demonic spirit was both “genius" and “evil"
(p. 215). Hillman goes on to argue that Germans suffered from a “collective
demonization" (p. 216). Hillman explains
The idea of a demon or evil genius helps
account for his appeal to the substrate
of shadow in the German Volk, and to the
formation of that group ethos which,
blinded by his demonic visions, complied
with and executed them ... the fascinating
power in Hitler changed millions into
a collective demonization. (p. 216)
Hillman's thesis echoes that of Thomas Mann’s (1948/1992) in Doctor Faustus.
A transcendent mystical demonic force possesed Adrian Leverkuhn and he
made a pact with the devil because the devil sought him out. Adrian’s pact with
the devil marked the end of Germany, for Germany had gone astray.
James Hillman is certainly out of step with current trends in psychohistory
and Holocaust scholarship generally. In contrast to Hillman, Ernst Rappaport
argues that,
Hitler was neither a genius nor a demonic
personality.. . . His intellect was below average
and his “soaring” imagination was that of an
ambulatory schizophrenic who was obsessed
with his paranoid delusions. (1975, p. 210)
To contend that Hitler was possessed by some kind of transcendent spirit and
that Germans were blinded by this spirit functions as an apologetic. Germans'
egos were quite intact, as Roth (1995a) points out. Germany knew what it was
doing (Hilberg, 1961/1985). Christopher Browning (1998) suggests that
legimate Holocaust scholarship must avoid demonizing. Hillman’s argument
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that Germans suffered from "collective demonization” (p. 216) implies the notion
of collective guilt. But the notion of collective guilt has been dismissed by
historians at least since the Eichmann trial in 1961. Disturbingly, Hillman
criticizes the prosecutors of the Nuremberg trial and actually compares them to
Inquisitors!
The labored, obsessive methods used from the
Inquisition through the trial of Adolf Eichmann
in Israel, Klaus Barbie in France, and in the Nuremberg
trials themselves. This controling carefulness of
step-by-step rationalism defends against the demonic
force, (p. 230)
But these so-called step-by-step rational judicial methods were necessary to
demonstrate that individuals, not transcendent demons or forces, were guilty.
Individuals who made choices, who committed crimes, who carried out mass
murder were guilty. And what was at stake in these trials was individual guilt
and responsibility. Jeffrey Herf (1997) drives this point home.
The message of the Nuremberg trials was
that human beings and their political decisions
had made Auschwitz possible-not being, fate
destiny [or demons], instrumental reason, the
Enlightenment, modernity or the West. (p. 208)
Hillman offers up an argument shrouded in mystical language that I think is
dangerous. The demon in Hitler was nothing transcendent; it was Hitler’s own
badness that he projected onto Jews. He needed scapegoats and, at the end of
the day, we do not really know why. Some psychobiographers blame Hitler's
tyrannical behavior on his alcoholic father (Waite, 1977); some blame his
overbearing mother (Rappaport, 1975; Binion, 1976). Binion declares that after
Hitler’s mother died from cancer, he "saw Germany’s fateful enfeeblement as
due to the Jewish cancer” (1976, p. 21). A Jewish doctor tended to Hitler’s
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mother and Hitler possibly blamed him for her death. Hence, his scapegoat was
bom. But of course there was more to it than that.
Whoever Hitler was, he was a man of his culture and his time. I do not
believe that he was possessed by demons, by some evil spirit hovering around
the universe waiting to take somebody over, waiting to steal someone's soul. I
believe that he was little more than an ordinary German. Robert Waite
comments that
A thoughtful writer in the Frankfurt Allgemeine
Zeitung (11 Oct. 1972) who warned his countrymen
against “demonizing Hitler”. .. for to do so would
be to diminsh their own responsibility. The German
journalist concluded that the terrifying thing about
Hitler was not his uniqueness but his banality. (1977, xvii)
Hitler, Eichmann, Roehm, Mengele, Heydrich, architects of the Holocaust, were
all ordinary men, mortal men who made choices, who killed willingly, who were
responsible for the “great crime" (Grass, 1985, p. 86). A Germany fated to
become possessed by demonic forces does not explain, but explains away. A
demonic Germany conceals more than it reveals.
I offer a dystopic curriculum as a warning against hope. It is a curriculum
that demands that happy texts be dismantled. I offer a dystopic curriculum as a
warning so that one may understand in a more adequate way how texts
handed down through culture may fool us into believing that utopias are good
things. 2,000 years of utopian thinking led, in part, to the murder of six million
Jews. But it was not just utopian thinking that led to Hitler's killing dream: the
causes of this terrible event are highly complex. Dahlia Beck suggests that
“curriculum is the battered sub-/emerging carriage of memory, it is what makes
verses of the vanished possible” (1997, p. 17). What has been forgotten is that
in happy places (utopias), people tend to vanish. If curriculum is to “tap the
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current within” (Doll, in press), memories might be stirred up a bit in order that
curriculum workers get some understanding of why it is they want happy
endings. Must we despair of hope? Since Auschwitz, yes.
Under the sign of a dystopic curriculum, I struggle to make sense of this
research against the background of my Jewishness. I struggle to make sense of
my life in the midst of the memory of this horrific event. I struggle because the
sense that I have made is continually interrupted and ruptured by the enormous
wound left in my psyche. Everyday seems split by the present post-Holocaust
era and the black sun of Auschwitz. The paradox is that the Holocaust is not
“post” at all; it is here every day. Not only is it in my psyche, it is in the public eye
as well. Every day in the newspaper yet another article related to the Holocaust
appears. There have been more books published on the Holocaust than any
other event in history, and books keep proliferating. The memory is so
haunting that it demands continual re-thinking. Doing research on this Jewish
tragedy has unnerved me. The past bursts into the present at every turn. Anti
semitism is alive and well, not just in Germany but in the United States, where
synagogues were recently burned in California. August 10, 1999 Buford O.
Furrow walked into a Jewish Community Center in Granada Hills, Los Angeles
and fired off seventy rounds of bullets at children! Five were wounded. Luckily
most of the children were outside playing. Rabbi Marvin Hier, who is dean of the
Simon Wisenthal Center, reports that about twenty children from the Jewish
Community Center were taking a tour of the Wiesenthal center's Museum of
Tolerance at the time of the shootings. Rabbi Hier remarks that “it's ironic that
the 20 children were here learning about man’s inhumanity to man, when their
own day camp became a target of such hatred” (1999, A-4). In New Orleans,
since August 10, there has been a police presence at the Jewish Community
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Center and at the local synagogues. It is so disturbing to me that children are
targets of hate. And it is so disturbing to me that when I attend the synagogue I
see police outside of the building. This is no time for complacency.
The Jewish News reports that about 30,000 Jews have fled Russia
because of the rise of anti-Semitism and 30,000 more are expected to emigrate
by the end of the year. Leopold Kaimovsky, the manager of Moscow’s Jewish
Arts center was stabbed by a neo-Nazi who when caught by the police said,
“There are 50,000 of us. We will kill all of you anyway” (1999, p. 24). Lev
Krichevsky claims that in Russia there are, in fact, about 50,000 neo-Nazis who
belong to a group called Russian National Unity. This is alarming because of a
tremendous sense of lawlessness in Russia today. The Russian Mafia does as it
pleases. While the hard-liners, according to Krichevesky, make “inflammatory
statements” (p. 24) against Jews. And to top it off the economy in Russia is at
rock bottom. Scapegoating worsens in such climates. This is no time for
complacency.
Remembering the Holocaust is an international issue. Intercultural
dialogue and the internationalization of curriculum studies might open avenues
for further discussion and debate cross-culturally. I urge open and democratic
discussions between Germans and Jews, especially. I urge open and
democratic disscusions cross-culturally. More academic projects which foster
this kind of exchange might help second, third and fourth generation Jews and
Germans to cope. Work around race, class, gender and sexuality in Holocaust
studies needs to be deepened. Queer memories demand more visibilty, too.
More work needs to be done on transgenerational trauma. Some of our
students and colleagues in the academy may suffer from a transgenerational
haunting. As teachers and researchers, educators need to become more aware
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of this. Broader and more interdisiplinary approaches to Holocaust research is
needed. Popular culture is also crucial for understanding this event. Young
people probably get introduced to the Holocaust through film. Film, art, dance,
theater, poetry and museums, all have something to offer to the future
generations.
The important issue for educators is to keep this memory alive. Never
again. This is the chant Jews utter. But can we be so sure? Who is to say what
the new miiienium will bring? The Holocaust lives in a present absence, it is
simultaneously here and not here. But educators might take up the
responsibility to make this “great crime" (Grass, 1985, p. 86) known and reknown again. For, too soon the next generation will forget. How many have
forgotten already? I remember when I was in the sixth grade and Mrs. G. came
to our class to show us the numbers on her arm. She came to our sixth grade
class to tell us that every time she hears a train she mourns. But I did not
understand what she was talking about. What does a twelve year old know?
However, the memory of Mrs. G. has stuck with me all these years; in fact, it has
haunted me. And so whenever I hear a train I think of Auschwitz. Another
haunting is this one: At the beginning of my graduate program at LSU I wrote a
letter to Elie Wiesel asking him if I could study with him, fly to Boston a few times
a semester to work on his novels. (I forgot I had done this, and I do not
understand why I forgot: Repression works in uncanny ways.) Wiesel wrote
back a lovely letter to me, saying that he just did not have extra time to take on
another student. But Wiesel has taken on another student. I am a student to this
memory. My work has just begun.
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